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# The American Historical Review

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



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**Cover Illustration:** In the early 1960s, a period of intense Cold War competition between communism and capitalism, Soviet citizens were introduced to Cuba—through film, print, images, and music—as a source of socialist inspiration. Just as their own Russian Revolution of 1917 had freed them from the yoke of tsarism, they viewed the Cuban Revolution as a “humanitarian” struggle that had liberated an oppressed people from the absolute rule of a dictator. They were especially enamored of Fidel Castro, whose magnetic appeal was such a contrast to their own leaders. Castro, in turn, was drawn to the Soviet model of modernization, and soon the two countries were engaged in an exchange of trained specialists, teachers, and students. Soviet citizens’ initial excitement about Cuba had faded by the end of the decade, however. What they had originally viewed through a romantic lens as a tropical island of liberty came to be seen as merely another country that their government supported at the expense of its own population. In “‘Cuba, My Love’: The Romance of Revolutionary Cuba in the Soviet Sixties,” Anne E. Gorsuch explores the 1960s Soviet-Cuban relationship, showing how the transition from passion to disillusionment helped bring the Soviet sixties to an end.

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The April issue contains four articles on subjects ranging from medieval law and the Atlantic slave trade to revolutionary Cuba and the long history of self-determination and human rights, along with an *AHR* Exchange on a recent publication that has attracted a lot of attention, *The History Manifesto*. Four featured reviews precede our usual extensive book review section. “In Back Issues” offers readers a glance at issues from one hundred, seventy-five, and fifty years ago.

## Articles

In the first article, “Medieval Law and Materiality: Shipwrecks, Finders, and Property on the Suffolk Coast, ca. 1380–1410,” **Tom Johnson** builds on recent work in the humanities that has looked critically and with a historical eye at conceptions of material and materiality. One function of law is to order the material world, and the approach Johnson takes in showing how medieval legal processes categorized objects and established rules for their use will help historians to understand the pervasiveness of law in premodern society. Johnson analyzes a set of court rolls from late-fourteenth-century England that record the shipwrecks found by sailors off the coast of Suffolk. His analysis brings out the ontological categories employed in these rolls to organize the wrecks—the finder of each object, its name, and its value—which were not merely neutral descriptors, he argues, but politicized constructions. The constraints of the court’s conception of materiality circumscribed what these washed-up objects could be: it transformed them from random, ownerless things into legitimate pieces of property, owned by the office-holding elite of the local community. Legal processes thus organized materiality in convenient ways, just as physical objects gave substance to law.

The *AHR* has for many years featured cutting-edge work on Atlantic history in general and the slave trade in particular. “Atlantic History and the Slave Trade to Spanish America,” by **Alex Borucki**, **David Eltis**, and **David Wheat**, adds to this work. The authors present new data on transatlantic slave arrivals and a comprehensive examination of the intra-American trans-imperial traffic, thereby offering a fresh assessment of the slave trade to the Spanish Americas. Their analysis of this material leads to a new appreciation of not only the African presence in the Spanish colonies, but also—given the links between slavery and economic power before abolition—the



status of the whole Spanish imperial project. Overall, they find, more enslaved Africans permanently entered the Spanish colonies than the whole British Caribbean, making the Spanish Americas the most important political entity in the Americas after Brazil to receive slaves. Two-thirds of the more than two million enslaved Africans arriving in the Spanish Americas disembarked before 1810—that is, prior to the era of large-scale sugar cultivation in Cuba and Puerto Rico—which leads Borucki, Eltis, and Wheat to reconsider the real significance of slavery in the Spanish colonies. The history of the slave trade to Spanish America had implications for the whole Atlantic, they conclude, in the sense that it drew on all European branches of this traffic, and captives from all African regions engaged in this traffic landed in at least one of the many Spanish colonies in the New World.

No phrase has had greater political resonance in the last one hundred years than “self-determination.” As **Eric D. Weitz** notes in “Self-Determination: How a German Enlightenment Idea Became the Slogan of National Liberation and a Human Right,” since the 1940s it has become the favored slogan of nationalist and anticolonial movements around the globe, written into virtually every major human rights declaration. In its origins, however, self-determination was an Enlightenment concept relating to individuals. From the late eighteenth century to World War I, it evolved from a primarily individualist into a collectivist doctrine. Weitz tracks this dramatic, often unnoticed transformation, untangling the diverse meanings of self-determination to examine the dilemmas intrinsic to the history of human rights, notably the tension between individual and collective rights. He provides an account of the different meanings of self-determination to the socialist movement of the nineteenth century, beginning with its major Enlightenment proponent, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, as well as to its many advocates in the twentieth. As self-determination became a doctrine related to national or racial belonging, it lost much of its Enlightenment meaning as a concept fundamental to individual self-constitution and emancipation. Self-determination’s twentieth-century proponents argued that individual rights flowed naturally and smoothly from national liberation, but the same doctrine that underpinned the emancipation of the national or racial elect could justify the brutal exclusion of others.

In “‘Cuba, My Love’: The Romance of Revolutionary Cuba in the Soviet Sixties,” **Anne E. Gorsuch** explores the underlying longings, desires, and anxieties in the relationship between the USSR and Cuba in the 1960s. Her article explores what it meant to “fall in love” with Cuba, both literally—through an exploration of the cross-cultural experience of Soviet and Cuban citizens traveling for love, work, or education—and figuratively, through an exploration of the place of Cuba in the Soviet cultural imagination. For some members of the Soviet intelligentsia, revolutionary Cuba served as a mirror that reflected the Soviet Union as they wished it could be. If the dominant metaphor of the relationship was passion, however, there was also tension: between husband and wife, parent and child, white and black, Second World and Third. It is in the realm of sexuality, as well as in expectations and experiences concerning race, that Cuba’s emotional norms differed most visibly from Soviet values and modes of expression, and where Cuba as Third World object of Soviet verbal

and visual power was particularly evident. By the late 1960s, disillusionment with Cuba was one of a number of disappointments—culminating in the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968—that marked the end of the Soviet sixties.

## **AHR Exchange**

The *AHR* Exchange, “On *The History Manifesto*,” features essays by two sets of historians: the first a critique by **Deborah Cohen** and **Peter Mandler**, who offer a very sharp assessment of this recently published book; and the second a response to Cohen and Mandler by the book’s authors, **David Armitage** and **Jo Guldi**. *The History Manifesto*, made available by Cambridge University Press as an open-access publication, poses a spirited and sustained challenge to current historical practice, especially, the authors claim, the recent retreat from long-term considerations of historical development. The book has generated significant discussion, in journals, in the press, and on the web. Here we offer a forum in which both its critics and its authors are given a voice. In the spirit of the discussion, we are posting this Exchange on our website.

June’s issue will include articles on ancient history and slave rebellions along with an *AHR* Roundtable, “The Archives of Decolonization.” The *AHR* Conversation, originally scheduled for April, has been postponed for a later issue.

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# In Back Issues

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In the hope of encouraging readers to dip into the long history of scholarship contained in the pages of the *American Historical Review* (now in the 120th year of its publishing history), and to take advantage of the digital availability of this archive to most readers, the *AHR* editors offer a look back at issues from one hundred, seventy-five, and fifty years ago. What follows is not a comprehensive survey of the contents of those issues, but rather a glance at some of the articles and other features that might be of interest, or even of use, today.

## Volume 20, Number 3 (April 1915)

A hundred years ago, all of the articles in the April issue of the *AHR* were confined to European and North American history, which was typical for that time when areas outside the West and the Northern Hemisphere were considered by many to be lands without history. It might be noted as well that the book review section contained twenty-one reviews—as compared to the approximately two hundred in most current issues. The first article, “Boyen’s Military Law,” was by Guy Stanton Ford, a long-time member of the faculty of the University of Minnesota as well as its president from 1938 to 1941, who also served as the editor of this journal from 1941 to 1953. His expertise in Prussian military history is reflected in this article, which presents a solid account of the development of military conscription in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, leading up to the law of 1814 referred to in the title. While he clearly began drafting his piece well before the outbreak of the European war in August 1914, the “terrific events that have intervened” obviously colored his final presentation, “placing us not in memory alone, but in actuality also, back in the world-war conditions of 1814.” (It might be noted as something of an unintended insight that Ford draws an analogy between the Napoleonic Wars and the current conflict as “world-wars,” long before this label was conferred on World War I.) Despite the somber relevance of his piece, it is not free of the colorful prose that has often characterized military history: “The subject of military service takes us at once into the heart of the history of Brandenburg-Prussia,” Ford writes. “As one reads it, the rustle of its pages sounds like the rattle of swords in their scabbards. Its seemingly tortuous course has one straight red line that leads from battle-field to battle-field.” Still, there is much that can be learned from this competent account of a



historical development that is now appreciated as fundamental to early state formation in Europe.

Another article of interest in this issue, "The Cotton Factorage System of the Southern States," by Alfred Holt Stone, takes us into cotton economics in the nineteenth century, before railroads transformed the trade and marketing of this agricultural commodity. Stone was a planter himself, and he draws upon his own memories and the experiences of his family as cotton growers. Indeed, he was a founder of the Staple Cotton Cooperative Association, where his activism undoubtedly informed the material in this article. Although he was not a trained historian, but rather a politician who held several state offices, Stone served as president of the Mississippi Historical Society. He was also well-known for his racist views, which he publicly trumpeted in speeches and lectures. His *AHR* piece does provide some insight into the role of "factorage houses" in promoting the cotton trade as a truly capitalistic and international endeavor. The factors were mostly British businessmen who advanced credit to planters and served as agents for marketing their agricultural products. They were indispensable: "If cotton was king, the cotton factor was the power behind the throne," writes Stone. He is, in fact, quite astute in noting the power of the capitalist ethos as a driving force in the planters' mentality. His piece, in other words, is no paean to a pastoral idyll of plantation life. "There was a sort of atmospheric psychology in the situation which seemed to make a man forever dissatisfied with a stagnated sufficiency." And here the factorage houses, as a source of credit and the linchpin in the system of marketing, also themselves contributed to the concentration of wealth in a few southern cities, where their ever-expanding enterprises were located. All this came to end, however, with the penetration of the railroads and the development of a land mortgage system.

### **Volume 45, Number 3 (April 1940)**

The first article in the April 1940 issue, "Educating Clio," is a report by the editors of the *AHR* on the 54th Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, held in Washington, D.C., in December 1939. It is largely a summary of the range of papers and discussions during the three-day meeting, which attracted a little over a thousand participants, the second-largest gathering at that time in the association's history. "What history can learn from other fields of knowledge, rather than what it can teach, was perhaps the dominant note of the meeting," comment the editors, identifying the disciplines of psychology, cultural anthropology, and sociology as particularly prominent in the proceedings, having been "called upon to contribute to the broadening and vitalizing of Clio's education and thus to prepare her for the better performance of her role in the complex and confused world of today." The papers were a typical mix of old and new approaches to history. The editors note at one point: "the devotees of the New History propounded by James Harvey Robinson, must have raised a disapproving eyebrow at the unmistakable popularity of the sessions on military and diplomatic history." There were sessions on the rise of the Nazi regime in Germany, with one paper on "The Corporation and the Rise of National

Socialism.” Its author, Gerhard Colm, did not argue that business or businessmen were responsible for the Nazis’ strength, but rather suggested that they contributed to its success by keeping the Weimar Republic weak, undermining its capacity “as an instrument of social adjustment and control.” A luncheon session was addressed by the Chinese ambassador to the United States, Dr. Hu Shih, whose topic was “The Modernization of China and Japan—A Comparative Study in Cultural Conflict.” His analysis was novel, and might strike present-day readers as odd. He argued that while in the past the subject might have been posed in terms of Japan’s superiority and greater advancement over China, the relationship had now been reversed. “China, after long hesitation and resistance, has emerged as a nation fully modern in her outlook on life and feeling completely at home in the modern world, while it is suddenly discovered that Japan, after seventy years of apparently rapid modernization, has never been transformed in all the fundamental aspects of her national life.” The explanation, he suggests, is that Japan, despite several decades of “modernization,” never managed to dispel its “solid core of ancient habit.” And the reason for this is that Japan’s development was carried out “under the powerful leadership and control of a ruling class,” with its rigid militaristic and dynastic taboos; whereas the “Chinese Renaissance” was the result of a “long process of free contact, gradual diffusion, and voluntary following . . . The net outcome is that modern China has undoubtedly achieved more far-reaching and more profound transformations in the social, political, intellectual, and religious life than the so-called modern Japan has ever done in similar fields.”

This issue also contains a somewhat short piece in the “Notes and Suggestions” section by Frederic C. Lane, “The Mediterranean Spice Trade: Further Evidence of Its Revival in the Sixteenth Century.” Lane, a long-time member of the Johns Hopkins University history faculty, was an important historian of Venice, the Mediterranean, and maritime trade more generally. As is evident in this piece, his scholarship helped demonstrate the economic vitality of the Mediterranean well into the sixteenth century, a period when it was supposed to have been in decline owing to the sea routes around Africa established by the Portuguese. Here, his primary sources are many, ranging from the diary of a young Venetian nobleman to the observations noted by officials at the Portuguese embassy in Rome, who were keen to monitor the activities of their competitors in the spice trade. Lane explains the “revival” of the Levant spice trade by noting the high prices in these commodities created by the Portuguese with their monopoly and their attempts to place obstacles in the way of trade via the land routes of the Levant. But this policy backfired, he argues. For high prices in Amsterdam and Lisbon only provided an incentive for Italian merchants to attempt to circumvent the Portuguese blockades, which they frequently did. Lane’s work has contributed to several generations of pathbreaking historians: both those in the tradition of Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein, who gave rise to world-system studies, and the more recent transnational history, which sees the traversing of oceans as a fundamentally meaningful historical experience.



**Volume 70, Number 3 (April 1965)**


The four articles in the April 1965 issue are all solid pieces of scholarship, worthy of the good reputation of this journal over the years. The first is a fascinating study, "The Role of the Horse in Chinese History," by H. G. Creel, a professor of Chinese at the University of Chicago for many years, and considered the "doyen of American sinologists." He begins by noting that throughout its early history—the article deals primarily with the first three centuries B.C.E.—horses were crucial to China's very existence "as an independent state," but that it had to depend upon foreign peoples, primarily Central Asian nomads, for their supply. Indeed, he argues that the Chinese were relatively late in incorporating the horse into their military culture, putting them at a distinct disadvantage to their enemies. Some of their resistance was cultural: "Even though the danger from the mounted warrior was pressing, the Chinese resisted riding because, among other things, it required the wearing of a short jacket rather than the long gown which, in Chinese eyes, was obligatory for a man of status," he writes. And the need to procure large numbers of horses from others meant the enormous outlay of silks and later tea as payment to the nomad suppliers, causing deleterious effects on the Chinese economy. The need to foster a trade in horses for the cavalry also led to greater attention to China's northern and western borders, which "produced phenomena having some intriguing parallels with those associated with 'the frontier' in American history." He concludes, "It seems entirely probable that the course of history would have run differently, in some significant respects, if the Chinese had never had to deal with the cavalry horse, or if they had been able to deal with it more effectively. "

The next article, "Almain and Major: Conciliar Theory on the Eve of the Reformation," is by Francis Oakley, a long-time member of the faculty of Williams College and its president from 1985 to 1993. He has been a prolific scholar, focusing mostly on late medieval and early modern intellectual and religious history. Here he deals with a subject that has been central to his career: the conciliar tradition of church governance, which is to say the view that a council of churchmen, representing the body of the church as a whole, was superior to the pope. Oakley traces the development of this theory from its prominence in the context of the great Councils of Constance and Basel in the early part of the fifteenth century, carefully anatomizing the novel logic of its major fashioners in the early years of the sixteenth, most notably Jacques Almain and John Major. From their efforts, conciliarism persisted as a robust vision of church governance and reform, even well beyond the religious struggles of the sixteenth century. Oakley quotes Harold Laski on this score: "the road from Constance to 1688 is a direct one." Still, by the era of the Reformation, conciliarism had become less relevant to Protestants and Catholics alike. In the Catholic camp, it was incorporated into French Gallicanism, which, paradoxically, generated a sentiment "adamantly opposed" to the calling of a general council, "and the Catholic kingdom . . . , when such a council had finally met, altogether refused to accept its vital decrees on disciplinary reform."



This piece is followed by “The General Motors Sit-Down Strike: A Re-examination,” by Sidney Fine, who taught American history at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, for fifty-five years. Fine’s article focuses on the great industrial action in the Flint, Michigan, GM plant in 1936–1937, a key moment in U.S. labor history. His interest in this event, it seems, was as much in the role in the dispute of Michigan’s newly elected governor, Frank Murphy, as in the dispute itself. Fine would go on to write a three-volume biography of Murphy, who held a number of prominent positions during his public life: he served as mayor of Detroit, governor of Michigan, high commissioner to the Philippines, attorney general of the U.S., and associate justice of the Supreme Court. But while revealing, Fine’s interest in Murphy’s role renders his account top-heavy, with a focus on various officials and leaders rather than the rank and file. His piece is certainly not without interest, but his treatment contrasts dramatically with a then-emerging new approach to labor history, which attempted to recover the experiences and attitudes of ordinary workers, as exemplified in Peter N. Stearn’s January 1965 *AHR* article, “Patterns of Industrial Strike Activity in France during the July Monarchy,” discussed in last issue’s “In Back Issues.”

The final article takes up a subject that cannot fail to interest many readers today: the political education of Germans in the years immediately following the end of the Second World War in Europe. “The Origins of the *Institut für Zeitgeschichte*: Scholarship, Politics, and the American Occupation, 1945–1949,” by John Gimbel, is a careful reconstruction of what obviously was a vexed, even tortured, history of attempts to bring Germans to a proper awareness of their recent past. The brief for the new institute was categorical in this respect. Proclaimed one of its founders: “The political re-education of the people must rest on thorough knowledge of recent German history, and the description of the Hitler period is particularly significant in this respect.” But problems immediately emerged, most intractably the different attitudes of Germans about what starting out from *Nullpunkt* (“point zero”) meant. “Should the occupation be viewed as an interregnum? A mere turning point? Or a new departure?” Some believed in a *Gnade der Nullpunkts*, “a period of grace,” after which German society could start anew. Others thought that after an interregnum, the social and political order of the pre-Nazi period could be restored. And there were those, of course, most notably the Allies, who insisted that Germans needed to come to terms with their collective guilt for the Nazis’ crimes. In any case, Gimbel shows that by 1949, attitudes and aspirations had changed considerably. “Gone . . . was the wish to use a portrayal and analysis of National Socialism to justify de-Nazification, demilitarization, industrial dismantlement, and other harsh measures with which the ruling elite were identified by necessity of the occupation,” he writes. Another concern was to counter efforts in the Soviet Zone to publicize Nazi atrocities as a feature of “the new, reformed, ‘other Germany.’” Gimbel concludes, “The story of the *Institut*’s origin is, thus, a significant case study reflecting the German political response to the occupation between 1945 and 1949. The response tended toward traditionalism rather than reform, toward restoration rather than reconstruction.”



Detail from a fourteenth-century “wreck roll” held at Sizewell, Suffolk, dated Sunday, December 5, 1388. The entries record the names of the fishermen who found shipwrecked goods at sea and on land, the things that they found, and the value of the items. According to custom, finders of wrecks were allowed to keep the things that they discovered, but they were required to pay a fine of half of the wreck’s assessed value to the local lord and landowner. The things found in this section were an oar worth 14d., a barrel worth 3d., trestles and some poor-quality wood worth 6d., and sixty pieces of firewood worth 4d. In the years 1377–1409, fishermen from Sizewell and the neighboring village of Thorp made at least 322 reports of wreck (some of which mentioned multiple items). The average value of these shipwrecks was 21d., but less than a quarter of the items were worth more than 12d. The average was buoyed by the occasional incidence of high-value wrecks, like large pieces of timber, barrels of pitch, and sometimes even whole boats. Suffolk Record Office, Ipswich, HD371/1, m. 10v.



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# Medieval Law and Materiality: Shipwrecks, Finders, and Property on the Suffolk Coast, ca. 1380–1410

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TOM JOHNSON

IT IS NOW WIDELY RECOGNIZED that medieval law was more than a system of words and ideas, confined to lawyerly debate and scholarly treatises. Recent scholarship has shown how legal categories and discourses were interwoven with social relations and praxes, mentalities and ideologies, and the operation of the economy.<sup>1</sup> But there is a different dynamic of medieval law that has yet to be explored, namely, the way in which it was implicated in the construction of materiality. Legal discourse in the Middle Ages provided a means of differentiating “what” was matter, what was not, and what attributes it might possess.<sup>2</sup> Thus, medieval legal processes were onto-

A version of this article was presented as a paper at a conference held at the Institute of Historical Research in London. I am grateful to the organizers and audience there for providing feedback at that early stage, and to the editor and staff at the *AHR* for helping to bring it to fruition as an article. I would like to specially thank John Arnold, Frank Trentmann, and Chris Briggs, along with seven anonymous reviewers, for their constructive comments on previous drafts.

<sup>1</sup> Central in this trend is the work of Anthony Musson, *Medieval Law in Context: The Growth of Legal Consciousness from Magna Carta to the Peasants' Revolt* (Manchester, 2001). On law and social relations, see Wendy Davies and Paul Fouracre, eds., *The Settlement of Disputes in Early Medieval Europe* (Cambridge, 1986). Predating this collection was the more general collection John Bossy, ed., *Disputes and Settlements: Law and Human Relations in the West* (Cambridge, 1983). Both rely heavily upon the “processualist” legal anthropology of John L. Comaroff and Simon Roberts, *Rules and Processes: The Cultural Logic of Dispute in an African Context* (Chicago, 1986). More recently, see Peter Coss, ed., *The Moral World of the Law* (Cambridge, 2000); Chris Wickham, *Courts and Conflict in Twelfth-Century Tuscany* (Oxford, 2003); Daniel Lord Smail, *The Consumption of Justice: Emotions, Publicity, and Legal Culture in Marseille, 1264–1423* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2003); Paul R. Hyams, *Rancor and Reconciliation in Medieval England* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2003). On law and mentalities, see Hyams, “What Did Edwardian Villagers Understand by ‘Law’?,” in Zvi Razi and Richard Smith, eds., *Medieval Society and the Manor Court* (Oxford, 1996), 69–100; Barbara A. Hanawalt, *“Of Good and Ill Repute”: Gender and Social Control in Medieval England* (Oxford, 1998); Marjorie Keniston McIntosh, *Controlling Misbehavior in England, 1370–1600* (Cambridge, 1998); Shannon McSheffrey, *Marriage, Sex, and Civic Culture in Late Medieval London* (Philadelphia, 2005); Ruth Mazo Karras, Joel Kaye, and E. Ann Matter, eds., *Law and the Illicit in Medieval Europe* (Philadelphia, 2008). On law and the economy, see R. Poos, Zvi Razi, and Richard M. Smith, “The Population History of Medieval English Villages: A Debate on the Use of Manor Court Records,” in Razi and Smith, *Medieval Society and the Manor Court*, 298–368; Chris Briggs, “Manor Court Procedures, Debt Litigation Levels, and Rural Credit Provision in England, c. 1290–c.1380,” *Law & History Review* 24, no. 3 (2006): 519–558; James Davis, *Medieval Market Morality: Life, Law and Ethics in the English Marketplace, 1200–1500* (Cambridge, 2012).

<sup>2</sup> Of course, law was just one of these means. For materiality in medieval religion, see Caroline Walker Bynum, *Christian Materiality: An Essay on Religion in Late Medieval Europe* (New York, 2011). For an overview of Renaissance material culture, see Ulinka Rublack, “Matter in the Material Renaissance,” *Past & Present* 219 (2013): 41–85. It is also important to acknowledge a group of medieval and early modern literary scholars who have led the charge in theorizing interdisciplinary approaches to medieval matter. For a sample, see the essays in Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, ed., *Animal, Vegetable, Mineral: Ethics and Objects* (Washington, D.C., 2012).



logical processes. Law singled out material objects from indistinctness, giving them categories (“chattel,” “real property”), assigning them names (“cup,” “field”), according them properties (“silver,” “pasture”), and, consequently, establishing their owners and the rules that governed their use and conveyance. The first point of taking such an approach is that it helps us to understand how law, to use E. P. Thompson’s phrase, appears to have been at “every bloody level” of past societies.<sup>3</sup> The legal decision that a particular material thing was indeed a thing, and actually was this particular kind of thing, flowed through social relations (who owns such a thing?), mentalities (why should they own it?), and the economy (what was the thing’s relative worth?). By performing the “radically creative operation” of dividing up inchoate substance into discernible chunks of stuff, law was stitched into the fabric of the medieval world, and all of the ways that humans sought to utilize and distribute its resources.<sup>4</sup> In turn, we can expand our conception of “what” medieval law was, and what it could do. Law was an intellectual discourse, and a means of ordering society, yes—but it was also a quality of physical stuff: it resided in trees and boundary stones that divided land, in deer that belonged to the king, and even in shipwrecked detritus that washed up onshore.<sup>5</sup> Understanding the implications of medieval law’s materiality—its construction of and constitution in matter—thus enables us to get a handle on law’s heterogeneousness, while remaining anchored to an interest in its social, cultural, and political effects.

In recent years, as part of a wider trend in the humanities, many scholars have leveled critical attention at materiality and ontology, at least partly in response to the problems arising from the postmodern emphasis on discourse.<sup>6</sup> Many different names have been associated with this mode of thought: Actor-Network Theory, Object-Oriented Ontologies, Speculative Realism, Non-Representational Theories, and Political Ecology, to name just a few.<sup>7</sup> Two important points arise from this loose assemblage of critical theory.<sup>8</sup> First, the dichotomy between subject (human, social, representational) and object (thing, material, real) is illusory, the product of hierarchic orderings rooted in historical processes, rather than an analytical necessity.<sup>9</sup> The field is thus open to new ways of understanding “what” a human is and “what”

<sup>3</sup> E. P. Thompson, “The Poverty of Theory; or, An Orrery of Errors,” in *The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays* (New York, 1978), 193–397, here 288.

<sup>4</sup> Quote from Alain Pottage, “Introduction: The Fabrication of Persons and Things,” in Alain Pottage and Martha Mundy, eds., *Law, Anthropology, and the Constitution of the Social: Making Persons and Things* (Cambridge, 2004), 1–39, here 10.

<sup>5</sup> On law and the landscape, see Nicola Whyte, *Inhabiting the Landscape: Place, Custom and Memory, 1500–1800* (Oxford, 2009), especially chap. 4, “Geographies of Custom and Right,” 91–124. On law and hunting, see William Perry Marvin, *Hunting Law and Ritual in Medieval English Literature* (Cambridge, 2006).

<sup>6</sup> Caroline W. Bynum, “Perspectives, Connections & Objects: What’s Happening in History Now?,” *Daedalus* 138, no. 1 (2009): 71–86.

<sup>7</sup> This far from complete sample of different names reflects, to some extent, different disciplinary preoccupations between the social sciences, literary and art-historical theory, philosophy, geography, and political theory, respectively. See the alternative list of theory-nyms offered in Benjamin Alberti, Severin Fowles, Martin Holbraad, Yvonne Marshall, and Christopher Witmore, “‘Worlds Otherwise’: Archaeology, Anthropology, and Ontological Difference,” *Current Anthropology* 52, no. 6 (2011): 896–912, here 896.

<sup>8</sup> What follows represents nothing like the volume of work or the number of insights available in this scholarship; the purpose of this article is not to provide a theoretical survey, but to attempt to show the utility of this approach for understanding the past.

<sup>9</sup> A famous account is Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, trans. Catherine Porter (Cam-

an object is, and how they interact with one another, if not in a straightforward subject/object relation. One approach has been to situate this insight within the notion of performativity, whereby meaning does not float around in a symbolic universe, but has to be enacted or performed physically.<sup>10</sup> Another, not mutually exclusive, approach has been to conceive of highly complex networks of people, things, meanings, and actions that come together and appear as unities.<sup>11</sup> Others have dispensed with discrete entities entirely, understanding society, culture, and reality as flows of energy, matter, and affect, temporary assemblages that are constantly reforming.<sup>12</sup> The strong implication of all this is that we—historians, anthropologists, social scientists—can no longer take such foundational categories as “human” and “object” for granted, but must begin to investigate the ways in which they were established and perpetuated.<sup>13</sup> The second point to be taken from this theoretical scholarship is the idea that characteristics we traditionally associate with people, such as agency and activity, are not the sole preserve of humankind.<sup>14</sup> This has been formulated in various ways.<sup>15</sup> For historians, it may be interesting to think about the ways in which physical objects “do” things: from paper letters that transpose information across empires, to the infrastructures of electricity and water upon which the modern city is utterly dependent, human existence is—and, crucially, *was*—wrapped in dense agglomerations of *stuff*, shaping where we can go, what we can do, and how we think.<sup>16</sup>

These conjoined insights—that nonhuman stuff can have some sort of determinative influence on (or agency in relation to) humans, and that “the material” is a cultural construct—have particular implications for how we understand law in both past and present societies.<sup>17</sup> First, law is commonly seen as a discourse, something

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bridge, Mass., 1993). A useful summary is Patrick Joyce, “What Is the Social in Social History?,” *Past & Present* 206 (2010): 213–248, here 221–227.

<sup>10</sup> Ben Anderson and Paul Harrison, “The Promise of Non-Representational Theories,” in Anderson and Harrison, eds., *Taking Place: Non-Representational Theories and Geography* (Farnham, 2010), 1–34, here 9–10, 17.

<sup>11</sup> Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory* (Oxford, 2005). An excellent survey of work on this is Graham Harman, “The Assemblage Theory of Society,” in Harman, *Towards Speculative Realism: Essays and Lectures* (Winchester, 2009), 170–198.

<sup>12</sup> This is a key notion in the thought of Gilles Deleuze (and his collaborator Félix Guattari), who is frequently cited as an inspiration. For an introduction, see Deleuze, *Negotiations, 1972–1990*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York, 1995).

<sup>13</sup> This is a central concern within an often-neglected genealogy of this wider trend, that of the post-Foucauldian tradition of Marxism, adherents of which are particularly interested in “biopolitics.” For an introduction, see John Frow, “Matter and Materialism: A Brief Pre-History of the Present,” in Tony Bennett and Patrick Joyce, eds., *Material Powers: Cultural Studies, History and the Material Turn* (London, 2010), 25–37. For a critique, see Frank Trentmann, “Materiality in the Future of History: Things, Practices, and Politics,” *Journal of British Studies* 48, no. 2 (2009): 283–307.

<sup>14</sup> Jane Bennett, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things* (Durham, N.C., 2010).

<sup>15</sup> For some philosophers, it is intriguing that objects “withdraw” from humans’ ability to know them; see Levi R. Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2011), 70–71. For archaeologists, it is important that certain materials were interdependent with important primal relationships (flint, wood, fire; sheltering, cooking, gathering); see Ian Hodder, *Entangled: An Archaeology of the Relationships between Humans and Things* (Oxford, 2012), 44.

<sup>16</sup> Miles Ogborn, *Indian Ink: Script and Print in the Making of the English East India Company* (Chicago, 2007); Joyce, “What Is the Social in Social History?,” 242–247; Trentmann, “Materiality in the Future of History,” 303–305.

<sup>17</sup> For an actor-network theory perspective on modern law, see Bruno Latour, *The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d’État*, trans. Marina Brilman and Alain Pottage (Cambridge, 2010).



that is distinct from, yet gives meaning to, things in the “real world.” This severance is in fact highly suspect: law does not stop at the end of legislation or the pronouncement of a verdict, but goes on to have important effects in the world. Thus, the very idea of “the law” as a discourse separate from “real life” is itself “a crucial boundary-making event.”<sup>18</sup> This is not simply to claim, as many historians now recognize, that law cannot be studied apart from its social and political context.<sup>19</sup> It is, rather, to conceive “law” as a quality that can inhabit physical stuff, as well as legal treatises and social practices. For example, Nicholas Blomley has recently highlighted the work done by hedges in the enclosure of common fields in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. By physically demarcating *and* representing private fields, “the hedge both helped to concretise a new set of controversial discourses around land and property rights, and aimed to prevent the forms of physical movement associated with the commoning economy.”<sup>20</sup> The second implication of the “material turn” for socio-legal history is the way that past legal systems attributed certain characteristics to humans and non-humans, and why they did so. In the antebellum American South, for example, the slave owner John Lewis Poindexter left a provision in his will that upon his death his slaves could be emancipated if they so wished. In a battle over his estate, the Virginia Supreme Court finally ruled the testament to be illegitimate because slaves were chattels and not humans, and thus could not be considered to have agency at law.<sup>21</sup> By contrast, material chattels in medieval and early modern English law *were* understood to have some kind of agency, through the concept of the “deodand.” When someone was killed accidentally, a jury was required to decide which physical object had “moved towards” that person’s death—such as a ladder that broke and caused a builder to fall off the roof of a house, or the cart wheel that crushed a man’s leg.<sup>22</sup> In different times and places, then, legal processes formed one of the means by which “objects” were created and policed. The particular material forms that law inhabited (hedge, slave, deodand) were culturally variable. Law projected a certain kind of materiality, and these projections manifested in material things.

It is possible to explore these premises through a close reading of an unusual body of evidence. A critical approach to the physical objects dealt with by medieval law helps us to better understand both law and the particular society in which it operated.

<sup>18</sup> David Delaney, “Beyond the Word: Law as a Thing of This World,” in Jane Holder and Carolyn Harrison, eds., *Law and Geography* (Oxford, 2002), 67–83, here 79.

<sup>19</sup> For example, this is a central tenet of Robert C. Palmer, *English Law in the Age of the Black Death, 1348–1381: A Transformation of Governance and Law* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1993); and more recently Anthony Musson and W. M. Ormrod, *The Evolution of English Justice: Law, Politics and Society in the Fourteenth Century* (Basingstoke, 1999).

<sup>20</sup> Nicholas Blomley, “Making Private Property: Enclosure, Common Right and the Work of Hedges,” *Rural History* 18, no. 1 (2007): 1–21, here 5. See also Blomley, *Law, Space, and the Geographies of Power* (New York, 1994), especially chap. 3, “Legal Territories and the ‘Golden Meteward’ of the Law,” 67–105.

<sup>21</sup> Colin Dayan, *The Law Is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons* (Princeton, N.J., 2011), chap. 5, “A Legal Ethnography,” 138–176; for an account of the case, see 140–144.

<sup>22</sup> The full Latin tag is “omnia quae movent ad mortem deodanda sunt” (“everything that moves toward death is [to be] deodand”). See the concise explanation in R. F. Hunnisett, *The Medieval Coroner* (Cambridge, 1961), 32–34. For a legal history of the concept, see Anna Pervukin, “Deodands: A Study in the Creation of Common Law Rules,” *American Journal of Legal History* 47, no. 3 (2005): 237–256. The examples quoted here are from The National Archives, Kew [hereafter TNA], JUST 2/178, m. 5r., JUST 2/178A, m. 7r.



The evidence in this case is a set of court rolls from coastal Suffolk in eastern England, which survive in an almost unbroken series for more than thirty years, 1377–1409.<sup>23</sup> These documents record the things that local mariners found at sea or on the shore in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. Each item was noted by the court and given a monetary value by a jury of local shipmasters, and the finder of the wreck then paid half of this value to the landowner, Leiston Abbey, and kept the thing he had found. *Prima facie*, the rolls provide straightforward insight into the socioeconomic dynamics of a small maritime community in medieval England.<sup>24</sup> However, this evidence can also be used to demonstrate the ways in which legal processes constructed material objects, and how those objects were implicated in the enactment of legal obligations, the constitution of property, and the stratification of maritime society. In the majority of cases from the Leiston rolls, the only information given is the name of the finder, the name of the item, and its price. This means that it is possible to interrogate these apparently straightforward facts as contingent categories—“finder,” “name,” “value”—that imbued the wrecks with legal qualities at the same time that they delineated their material characteristics. Each of these categories served a function: the “finding” of wrecks was a legal construct, “naming” was a way of giving an object local associations, and “valuing” enabled it to enter the economic life of the community.<sup>25</sup> Overall, these procedures involved in legally registering shipwrecks helped to transform a washed-up thing without an owner into a legitimate piece of property belonging to someone; in short, they demonstrate how material was made legal.

THE LITTLE-STUDIED RIGHT OF WRECK entitled a landowner to take a share in the value of objects that were found on the shores of his land or brought back to ports on his land from sea. Such rights were common across medieval and early modern Europe, although the treatment of wreck varied significantly from place to place, and from court to court.<sup>26</sup> In medieval England, “right of wreck” was actually a bracket term

<sup>23</sup> A fuller series of rolls survives for the century 1380–1480. I have not used the later rolls in this article, in order to keep the focus of the case study tight. The full series of rolls is Suffolk Record Office, Ipswich [hereafter SROI], HD 371/1 (1377–1397), HD 371/2 (1398–1409), HD 1032/86 (1422–1430), HD 1032/87 (1432–1435), HD 1032/88 (1436–1481). A single membrane of a court for the twentieth year of the reign of Henry VII (1504) survives in Cambridge University Library, Vanneck Box 17. A final medieval series, still being repaired, is SROI, HD 371/3 (1504–1517). Finally, a couple of “Hetheward-mote” court rolls also survive from the mid-sixteenth century, bound among Leiston’s manorial rolls for those years: HD 1032/8 (part 1), mm. 18r–v (29 Henry VIII); m. 39r (36 Henry VIII). A printed sample of the first roll is available in Mark Bailey, ed., *The English Manor, c. 1200–1500* (Manchester, 2002), 236–237.

<sup>24</sup> I have used the full body of evidence to conduct a quantitative socioeconomic study; see Tom Johnson, “The Economics of Shipwreck in Late-Medieval Suffolk,” in Alex Brown and James Bowen, eds., *Custom and Commercialisation in English Rural Society, c.1350–c.1750: Revisiting Postan and Tawney* (Hertford, forthcoming 2016).

<sup>25</sup> On this approach to valuation, see the essays in Arjun Appadurai, ed., *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective* (Cambridge, 1986).

<sup>26</sup> For examples, see Rose Melikan, “Shippers, Salvors, and Sovereigns: Competing Interests in the Medieval Law of Shipwreck,” *Journal of Legal History* 11, no. 2 (1990): 163–182, here 166–171. For an important article on local variation in the application of maritime law (contra widespread assumptions about the existence of a universal medieval “sea law”), see Edda Frankot, “Medieval Maritime Law from Oléron to Wisby: Jurisdictions in the Law of the Sea,” in Juan Pan-Montojo and Frederik Pedersen, eds., *Communities in European History: Representations, Jurisdictions, Conflicts* (Pisa, 2007), 151–172.

for several technically distinct rights, known as “lagan” (sunken goods marked by buoys), “flotsam” (objects floating on the surface at sea), and “jetsam” (objects that have been deliberately jettisoned); in practice, it also included objects that had washed up on the seashore, and in many cases “royal fish”—whales, porpoises, sturgeons, conger eels, and a few others—which technically belonged to the crown.<sup>27</sup> These claims, bracketed under the technical term *wreccum maris* (wreck of the sea), were part of the royal prerogative; that is, they belonged to the king *qua* sovereign.<sup>28</sup> As Rose Melikan has shown, however, successive monarchs often renounced this right, presenting it to secular and ecclesiastical landowners: “by the end of the reign of Henry II [1189], the franchise was largely granted out in all coastal manors in the kingdom.”<sup>29</sup> Much of the legal activity associated with shipwreck thus took place at the local level, in the seigneurial courts of manors and liberties.

Nonetheless, kings continued to legislate on the proper way to assess shipwrecked goods between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries. The principal concern was that mariners might escape a shipwreck and return to land, only to find that their property had been claimed by others. In 1190, Richard I proclaimed that a washed-up object was only “wreck” (and thus forfeit) if its original owner, along with his heirs or siblings, had died.<sup>30</sup> Henry III confirmed these rules in 1236, and also established workable procedures for implementing them. He granted that if any animal (*bestia*) escaped alive from the wrecked ship, then the goods ought to be safeguarded for three months, in case the owner had also survived. If no one claimed the goods in this time, then the crown “or person possessing the liberty of wreck” should have them.<sup>31</sup> The first Statute of Westminster (1275), a codification of much existing law, extended this period of safeguard to one year; and then in 1353, the Ordinance of the Staple confirmed that wrecks ought to be kept by sheriffs and bailiffs until their owners claimed them, adding that a “convenient” fee should be paid to those who had salvaged the goods.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Lionel H. Laing, “Historic Origins of Admiralty Jurisdiction in England,” *Michigan Law Review* 45, no. 2 (1946): 163–182, here 177. It is a common misconception that the coroner dealt with wreck *ex officio*. In fact, the right was usually handled by the sheriff or royal bailiff for manors where the crown retained its wreck rights; Hunnisett, *The Medieval Coroner*, 6–7.

<sup>28</sup> In this way, the right of wreck was much like admiralty jurisdiction, with which it was frequently entangled in medieval England. See Percy Thomas Fenn, Jr., “Origins of the Theory of Territorial Waters,” *American Journal of International Law* 20, no. 3 (1926): 465–482.

<sup>29</sup> Melikan, “Shippers, Salvors, and Sovereigns,” 172. The first mention of the right is in a charter of Canute, who granted rights over port, ferry, and wreck to Canterbury in 1023. It is clear that the crown did continue to retain wreck rights in some places after Henry II’s reign; an entry in the pipe roll for 1190 notes that men of Paston and Bacton (both in Norfolk) paid several shillings to the king *pro wrecco*: Pipe Roll Society, *Pipe Roll 2 Richard I*, 39, n.s. 1 (Lincoln, 1925), 95. In the later Middle Ages, the Hundred of Lothingland (Suffolk) still collected wrecks; see fn. 42 below.

<sup>30</sup> Roger de Hoveden, *The Annals of Roger de Hoveden: Comprising the History of England and of Other Countries of Europe from A.D. 732 to A.D. 1201*, ed. Henry T. Riley, 2 vols. (1853; repr., Felinfach, 1997), 2: 170–171.

<sup>31</sup> *Calendar of the Charter Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office*, 6 vols. (London, 1903–1927), 1: 220.

<sup>32</sup> *The Statutes of the Realm*, 11 vols. (London, 1810–1828), 1: 28 (3 Edw. I, c. 4). In fact, this rule seems to have been in force before 1275, judging by an inquisition held the previous year in Kent; *Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous*, 8 vols. (London, 1916–2003), 1: 296 (no. 968). This statutory framework was also included in a late-thirteenth-century treatise on mercantile law. See Mary Elizabeth Basile, Jane Fair Bestor, Daniel R. Coquillette, and Charles Donahue, Jr., eds. and trans., *Lex Mercatoria and Legal Pluralism: A Late Thirteenth-Century Treatise and Its Afterlife* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), 17. For the Ordinance of the Staple, see *The Statutes of the Realm*, 1: 338 (28 Edw. III, st. 2, c. 13).



By the fourteenth century, then, there was a well-established statutory framework for the administration of wrecked goods. Merchants who lost goods to shipwreck but survived retained their legal title, provided that they claimed them within a year and paid the people who had recovered their goods for them. Indeed, there is evidence that these rules were applied in practice. In the decade 1390–1400, ten commissions were issued by the crown to make restitution to merchants whose goods had been claimed as wreck but who had in fact survived.<sup>33</sup> In May 1390, for example, Peter Wermystre of Bristol petitioned Chancery for help because his ship, the *Christopher* of Gdansk, was “tempest tossed” off Norfolk while journeying to England, and most of its cargo was cast ashore. The master and crew, however, escaped alive. Wermystre declared himself “ready to pay the salvors for their labour,” and local officers, acting on behalf of the crown, were ordered to make sure that he received his goods.<sup>34</sup> The medieval common law, then, did protect the interests of an owner of shipwreck against the finder.<sup>35</sup>

Notably absent from the legislation on wreck is any positive explication of how to deal with shipwrecked goods whose owners were dead. This deficiency is probably explained by the assumption that the crown—or the landowner who had been granted the right of wreck—simply took such goods by prerogative (although it was common practice to split the profits of a wreck between the finder and the right-holder). It may also be related to the haziness in English common law over how ownerless natural objects could be appropriated into human possession—how something became “property.”<sup>36</sup> The influential thirteenth-century legal treatise known as *Bracton* characteristically asserted that a piece of shipwreck rightfully belonged to the king if it came to land, although the writer also noted that wreck was *res nullius* (literally, “no one’s thing”), a concept borrowed from Roman law.<sup>37</sup> However, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when the evidence base shifts from treatises such as *Bracton* to law reports known as Year Books, there was very little discussion among legal writers about how *res nullius* could become property—indeed, the very word “property” (and its cognates) was used only rarely.<sup>38</sup> As David Seipp’s illuminating work has shown, it was not until the later fifteenth century that common

<sup>33</sup> *Calendar of Patent Rolls*, 74 vols. (London, 1891–1986) [hereafter *CPR*], 1389–1392: 267, 271; 1392–1396: 87, 233, 442, 521, 726; 1399–1401: 164, 215. These cases, instigated by petition to the crown, were obviously exceptional; they were almost all launched by foreign merchants, who may have found it difficult to sue for their goods. See also the cases mentioned in the introduction to Reginald G. Marsden, ed., *Select Pleas in the Court of Admiralty*, 2 vols. (London, 1892), 1: 44–45.

<sup>34</sup> *CPR*, 1389–1392: 271. The translation is taken from the printed edition.

<sup>35</sup> But compare an extraordinary case of the early sixteenth century, in which the owner of a sunken ship sold his interest in it to another man. Before the latter could salvage it, however, another two men managed to recover the ship’s gable anchor and buoy rope. The purchaser of the wrecked ship sued them for detainee in the High Court of Admiralty, exhibiting his title, but the judge awarded the goods to the men who had actually salvaged them. He therefore requested a writ of *certiorari* from Chancery. TNA, C 1/614/55.

<sup>36</sup> For a discussion of the ways in which property in chattels could arise after this period, see John Baker, *The Oxford History of the Laws of England*, vol. 6: 1483–1558 (Oxford, 2003), 729–748. There was some uncertainty about whether property could be divested by abandonment; Baker, *An Introduction to English Legal History*, 4th ed. (Oxford, 2007), 388.

<sup>37</sup> *Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England*, ed. George E. Woodbine, trans., with revisions and notes, by Samuel E. Thorne, 4 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1968–1977), 2: 339.

<sup>38</sup> David J. Seipp, “The Concept of Property in the Early Common Law,” *Law & History Review* 12, no. 1 (1994): 29–91, here 33. On the shift from (and lack of interaction between) treatises and Year Books, see 38–40.



lawyers began to explore the concept of *res nullius* in more detail, through problems such as the ownership of captured wild animals.<sup>39</sup> Between around 1290 and 1450, then, there is little explication in intellectual legal discourse about how people acquired property rights in material objects.

Yet to see this problem only within the context of texts written, accessed, and circulated among a small elite is to miss its repercussions on the lives of ordinary people in medieval England. The absence of a positive legislative or intellectual framework had little impact at the local level, as innumerable ownerless shipwrecked goods were translated into valued, verified possessions belonging to specific people within maritime communities. Acquiring “property” in a material object did not simply happen theoretically, in the folios of textbooks and the imaginations of lawyers, but in the manifold legal processes performed by local courts, in which legal ideas were pressed into physical things. Shipwrecks arriving on the shore in medieval Suffolk were not made into property by distant musings on Roman law, but through the participation of the local community in the workings of legal process.

In medieval England, the majority of shipwrecks were handled by local courts. In East Anglia, at least twelve different courts reported wrecks, although undoubtedly there were more.<sup>40</sup> Boroughs such as Yarmouth, Dunwich, Orford, and Colchester recorded wrecks in town court rolls or books; half of the value of the wreck went to the finder, and half to the municipal government.<sup>41</sup> On rural stretches of coast, the arrangement was similar, but with the local lord taking half the value of wrecks through his manorial court.<sup>42</sup> The disintegration of landed estates could lead to the fragmentation of seigniorial profits from the right of wreck. For example, at Runton (Norfolk), the court held in 1382 reported that a “board called ‘a plank’ and a piece of an anchor” had come to land, worth in total 10d. Half of this went to the lord of Beeston Hall, and the other half was divided into five parts. Three-fifths of this went to the prior of Beeston, one part to “a certain John Plumsted” (the finder?), and, finally, one part to the lord of Runton, all of one penny.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 64–65.

<sup>40</sup> Some coastal manors do not seem to have exercised wreck rights; for example, the courts for the coastal villages of North Hales and Covehithe (Suffolk) reveal no maritime activity at all, even though it is known from other sources that their landowner held wreck rights elsewhere, and that the inhabitants were involved in the fishing industry. For the rolls, see SROI, V5/19/2.6–2.10; for the landowner, see Colin Richmond, *John Hopton: A Fifteenth Century Suffolk Gentleman* (Cambridge, 1981), 41 fn. 39, 89 fn. 154, 137.

<sup>41</sup> Respectively, Great Yarmouth: Norfolk Record Office [hereafter NRO], Y/C 4/176, mm. 4r–v; Y/C 4/205, m. 13v; Dunwich: British Library, Additional Charter 40733; Orford: SROI, HD64/1/12–21, 23, 25, 26, 28; Colchester: Essex Record Office [hereafter ERO], D/B 5/R2, fols. 213r–217v.

<sup>42</sup> Most, but not all, such payments were taken at leets or tourns (presumably as survivors of the royal hundredal jurisdiction that would have taken them earlier). See Foulness (Essex): ERO, D/DK M136; Harwich (Essex): ERO, D/B 4/38/7–8; Lothingland Hundred (Suffolk): Suffolk Record Office, Lowestoft, 194/B1/6–9; Southwold (Suffolk): TNA, SC 2/203/107–108; Blythburgh and Walberswick (Suffolk): SROI, HA30/314/19c, HA30/314/19d/1–21, HA 30/369/390; Felixstowe, Trimley, and Walton (Suffolk): SROI, HA119/30/3/17, mm. 3r, 12r; Runton and Beeston (Norfolk): NRO, WKC 2/166 398x7; Scratby and Hemsby (Norfolk): NRO, DCN 63/2. For some further examples from Suffolk, see Mark Bailey, “Coastal Fishing off South East Suffolk in the Century after the Black Death,” *Proceedings of the Suffolk Institute of Archaeology and History* 37, no. 2 (1992): 102–114, here 108–109. Although cf. W. O. Massingberd, ed., *Court Rolls of the Manor of Ingoldmells in the County of Lincoln* (London, 1902), where finders of wreck apparently received nothing until 1436, when reference is first made to the expenses of salvagers (272).

<sup>43</sup> NRO, WKC 2/166 398x7, m. 1r.

In some places wrecks were dealt with by a special maritime court held separately from that for the manor or borough. At the coastal villages of Sizewell and Thorp in Suffolk, wrecks were reported to a court called the “Hethewardmote.”<sup>44</sup> This name suggests an institution of some antiquity: a “hithe” was a small port or landing stage, and “mote” or “moot” was an Anglo-Saxon word for a legal gathering.<sup>45</sup> The Hethewardmote primarily dealt with shipwrecks, but occasionally heard civil pleas between mariners and merchants relating to debts, apprenticeships, and broken contracts, and in at least one case fined two people for fighting.<sup>46</sup> It is unclear why this specialist court should have existed for two relatively small fishing villages, Sizewell and Thorp; special maritime courts for merchants and admiralty courts for the regulation of naval and other nautical matters were fairly common in late medieval England, but they were almost exclusively confined to towns.<sup>47</sup> Still, if the Hethewardmote was rather unusual in this regard, then it nonetheless fitted into the wider pattern of administration regarding the right of wreck, as its procedures conveyed some of the profits from wrecked goods to the local landowner, Leiston Abbey.<sup>48</sup>

This abbey was a small Premonstratensian (or Norbertine) house of canons, founded in 1182 by Ranulf de Glanville, sometime chief justiciar of Henry II.<sup>49</sup> The first record of the abbey claiming its right over wreck dates from the early thirteenth century, when it was stated that it had exercised the right “for a great time.”<sup>50</sup> Later in the same century, during the *quo warranto* proceedings of Edward I (whereby landowners were required to report “by what warrant” they held certain legal rights),

<sup>44</sup> A few manorial court rolls for Leiston survive for the late fourteenth century; Cambridge University Library, Vanneck Box 9. A lardiner’s account (1418) and a rental (temp. Edward III) also survive from around this time; *ibid.*, Vanneck Box 17.

<sup>45</sup> See Baker, *An Introduction to English Legal History*, 7–8. It may be that the name refers to an officer called the “hitheward” (i.e., “the hithe keeper”), as suggested in B. Schofield, “Wreck Rolls of Leiston Abbey,” in J. Conway Davies, ed., *Studies Presented to Sir Hilary Jenkinson* (London, 1957), 361–371, here 363.

<sup>46</sup> For example, debts: SROI, HD 371/2, m. 1r; contracts: HD 371/1, m. 1r; apprenticeship: HD 371/1, m. 9r; fighting—“hamsoken”: HD 371/2, m. 5v.

<sup>47</sup> These two villis were within the manor of Leiston. On the history of the house and its few (almost exclusively local) possessions, see Richard Mortimer, ed., *Leiston Abbey Cartulary and Butley Priory Charters* (Ipswich, 1979), 1–8, 19–29. R. G. Marsden, “The Vice-Admirals of the Coast,” *English Historical Review* 22, no. 87 (1907): 468–477, here 472.

<sup>48</sup> As a legal institution, the Hethewardmote appears to be unique. However, there is an analogue in the muniments of Denge Marsh in Kent, owned by Battle Abbey. Here a few inquisitions, jury presentments, and other administrative scraps about shipwrecks from the early fourteenth century were bound together into a roll. Though they probably do not constitute a “court,” this evidence does suggest that here the proceedings associated with shipwreck were institutionally separate from the manor court. See TNA, SC 2/180/57.

<sup>49</sup> William Page, ed., *The Victoria History of the County of Suffolk*, 2 vols. (London, 1907–1911), 2: 117–119.

<sup>50</sup> As they put it, “a multo tempore”: *Rotuli Hundredorum temp. Hen. II et Edw. I in Turr. Lond. et in Curia receptae scaccarii Westm.*, 2 vols. (London, 1812–1818), 2: 148. The right is not mentioned in the foundation charter, which mentions almost every right *except* “wreck.” Mortimer, *Leiston Abbey Cartulary and Butley Priory Charters*, 71–73 (no. 23). It mentions “socha et sacha, thol et theam, et infangenetheof, et . . . omnibus aliis libertatibus et liberis consuetudinibus et quietantiis suis . . . et pecunia danda pro forisfacturo de murthero, et de wapentachio et scutagio, et geld et denegeld, et hidagiis, et assisis, et de operationibus castellorum et parcorum et pontium et calcearum, et de ferdwita et de hengwita, et de femmenesfrenthe, et de hamsocha, et de warpeni et de averpeni, et de blodwita, et de fictwita, et de leirwita et de hundredpeni, et de thenthingpeni . . . et de passagiis, et de pontagiis, et de stallagio et de lestagio . . . et omnibus aliis occasionibus et consuetudinibus secularibus, excepta sola iustitia mortis et membrorum.” It is possible that “all other secular occasions and customs” encompassed the right.



the abbey successfully established its right to take wrecks on that stretch of coast, on the basis that de Glanville had done so when he held the manor.<sup>51</sup> The right of wreck represented a slight financial asset for this relatively small religious house. Over the thirty years from 1380 to 1410, the total value of wrecks was £24 16s., giving an average annual revenue of just under 9s. for the canons.<sup>52</sup> In the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, the abbey's need for revenue was dire. In 1362, it was reported that recent floods had so weakened its foundations that it had to be rebuilt; three years later, the canons obtained a papal license to move from "the swampy site near the sea" to the village of Leiston itself, some three miles inland from Sizewell (and further still from Thorp).<sup>53</sup> In 1380, this newly relocated abbey burned down.<sup>54</sup>

Clearly, the abbey did not begin to hold the Hethewardmote in order to extort the fishermen living on its estates; the relatively small sums garnered from wrecks notwithstanding, the court was probably very old by the late fourteenth century. There is, however, some interesting circumstantial evidence associated with the abbey's wreck rights at this time. In 1373 the abbot of Leiston, among others, was alleged to have taken goods from a wrecked ship carrying Gascony wine; the surviving mariners had petitioned the crown for restitution.<sup>55</sup> It seems possible that this investigation prompted the abbey into creating more comprehensive written records of the proceedings of the Hethewardmote on parchment (or perhaps thereafter it took steps to better preserve its records).<sup>56</sup> This is merely a suggestion: the rolls themselves, parchment membranes written upon in unremarkable Latin handwriting of the late fourteenth century, give nothing away in this regard.<sup>57</sup> What can be said with certainty, however, is that by the time of the first surviving roll, from 1377, it is clear that the Hethewardmote and its procedures were well established, forming an important part of the everyday life of the communities it governed.

Of Sizewell and Thorp, we know relatively little. A total of 142 local men found wrecks there between 1380 and 1410.<sup>58</sup> Although this figure is of course imperfect as a demographic measure, it would seem to represent a relatively large rural population who worked near the coast.<sup>59</sup> Certainly Sizewell and Thorp were not mere

<sup>51</sup> *Placita de quo warranto temp. Edw. I., II., et III. in curia Scaccarii asservata. by Command of the King* (London, 1818), 734–735.

<sup>52</sup> SROI, HD 371/1, HD 371/2.

<sup>53</sup> *CPR, 1361–1364*: 264–265; Mortimer, *Leiston Abbey Cartulary and Butley Priory Charters*, 8–9. The link between flooding and socioeconomic change in East Anglia is explored in Mark Bailey, "Per impetum maris: Natural Disaster and Economic Decline in Eastern England, 1275–1350," in Bruce M. S. Campbell, ed., *Before the Black Death: Studies in the "Crisis" of the Early Fourteenth Century* (Manchester, 1991), 184–208.

<sup>54</sup> *Calendar of Close Rolls*, 47 vols. (London, 1900–1963), 1377–1381: 486. Only the church of the new monastery survived the fire (and survives to this day). In the petition to the crown, they claimed to be "so burdened with debt that they may not content their creditors . . ." It appears that the old abbey site was maintained as a cell for anchorites; see Page, *The Victoria History of the County of Suffolk*, 2: 117–119.

<sup>55</sup> *CPR, 1370–1374*: 307.

<sup>56</sup> The abbey also faced jurisdictional challenges around this time. It was being extorted by the head constable of Blithing Hundred in 1388; in 1399 it was accused of usurping the crown's jurisdiction within its soke. See Mortimer, *Leiston Abbey Cartulary and Butley Priory Charters*, 25.

<sup>57</sup> For more information on the rolls and their composition, see Schofield, "Wreck Rolls of Leiston Abbey."

<sup>58</sup> SROI, HD 371/1–2. One woman, and seven men who are identified as non-natives are also mentioned as finders of wreck.

<sup>59</sup> The relevant portion of the Poll Tax of 1381 is badly damaged, including only a partial list of



“cellar settlements,” occupational dwellings used by fisher-farmers, but neither was their population characterized solely by landless fishermen.<sup>60</sup> It is clear that while some men were engaged full-time in maritime activity, others “kept arable holdings, raised some stock, dug turves and so on.”<sup>61</sup> As the wreck rolls make clear, with their mention of different “fares” or seasons, fishing provided neither year-round nor especially stable employment.<sup>62</sup> The industry may well have been characterized by a specific phase in an occupational life cycle for communities that maintained a stake in local agriculture. As Maryanne Kowaleski has suggested, fishing may have been a profession for young men before they inherited land.<sup>63</sup> As well as fishing and farming, the mariners of Sizewell on occasion turned to piracy: in 1404, seven of them were included in a list of more than a hundred people into whose hands the goods of some Hanse merchants had fallen “by force of arms.”<sup>64</sup> These mariners may also have found employment in East Anglia’s licit coastal trade networks, or in ferrying pilgrims to Santiago de Compostela, as others from nearby settlements did.<sup>65</sup> Certainly it seems that the men of Sizewell and Thorp partook in a broader maritime culture. They would have possessed specialist knowledge of the sea, its tides, and winds; they may have conversed in a distinctly nautical language that extended beyond technological terminology and into an occupational patois.<sup>66</sup> They perhaps felt a special religious allegiance to St. Nicholas, the patron saint of fishermen and sailors, for whom the chapel-of-ease at Sizewell was named and on whose feast day they

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people from Sizewell. It lists thirty-four people, half of whom were women. See Carolyn C. Fenwick, ed., *The Poll Taxes of 1377, 1379 and 1381*, pt. 2: *Lincolnshire-Westmorland* (Oxford, 2001), 511–512.

<sup>60</sup> These categories are presented in Harold Fox, *The Evolution of the Fishing Village: Landscape and Society along the South Devon Coast, 1086–1550* (Oxford, 2001), 12–13.

<sup>61</sup> Bailey, “Coastal Fishing off South East Suffolk in the Century after the Black Death,” 112. Some shipmen from the Hethewardmote can be found as jurors and prominent landholders in Leiston manorial courts; see fn. 44 above.

<sup>62</sup> For instance, SROI, HD 371/1, m. 4r. Different shipmasters (*magistri navium*) are listed for “flue-fare” and “sperlingfare,” a “fare” being a season, for which see Peter Heath, “North Sea Fishing in the Fifteenth Century: The Scarborough Fleet,” *Northern History* 3, no. 1 (1968): 53–69, here 56–57. On the seasonality of fishing, see Bailey, “Coastal Fishing off South East Suffolk in the Century after the Black Death,” 112.

<sup>63</sup> Maryanne Kowaleski, “The Demography of Maritime Communities in Late Medieval England,” in Mark Bailey and Stephen Rigby, eds., *Town and Countryside in the Age of the Black Death: Essays in Honour of John Hatcher* (Turnhout, 2012), 87–120, 94.

<sup>64</sup> *Calendar of Clôse Rolls, 1402–1405*: 428–430. The men had between 6 and 7½ shillings as their share of the spoils. On the difficulty of classifying “piracy” from a legal perspective, see Bryan D. Dick, “‘Framing Piracy’: Restitution at Sea in the Later Middle Ages” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Glasgow, 2010).

<sup>65</sup> For East Anglia’s coastal trade, see Dorothy Burwash, *English Merchant Shipping, 1460–1540* ([Devon], 1969), especially chap. 5, “A Statistical Survey of English Shipping,” 145–164. For the ferrying of pilgrims by Suffolk men, see Judith Middleton-Stewart, “‘Down to the Sea in Ships’: Decline and Fall on the Suffolk Coast,” in Carole Rawcliffe, Roger Virgoe, and Richard Wilson, eds., *Counties and Communities: Essays on East Anglian History Presented to Hassell Smith* (Norwich, 1996), 69–83, here 72 fn. 9.

<sup>66</sup> See David Kirby and Merja-Liisa Hinkkanen, *The Baltic and the North Seas* (London, 2000), 15–18; Maryanne Kowaleski, “The French of England: A Maritime *lingua franca*?” in Jocelyn Wogan-Browne, ed., *Language and Culture in Medieval Britain: The French of England, c.1100–c.1500* (York, 2009), 103–117. For some examples of the absorption of foreign words by English sailors, see *The Accounts of John Balsall, Purser of the Trinity of Bristol, 1480–1*, ed. T. F. Reddaway and Alwyn A. Ruddock (London, 1969), 21–22.

held their courts.<sup>67</sup> The sparse supplementary evidence ought to hold back speculation much further than this.

A critical analysis of the objects in the wreck rolls provides a vital window onto the lives of these communities. Through a focus on the complex ways in which physical objects were shaped and conditioned by legal processes, we can learn a great deal about the power relations, social conditions, and material culture of medieval maritime communities. These legal processes can be divided into three categories. “Finding” an object was a legal construct, dependent partly on considerations of status and office-holding, and partly on the perceived agency of the wrecked object; naming the object was a way of making it legally real, and enrolling it within local knowledge; and the process of valuation helped to legitimate shipwrecked items as pieces of exchangeable property. As shipwrecks were fitted into these legal categories, they worked to reflect and reinforce extant social hierarchies, local knowledge, and the authority of the Hethewardmote as an arbiter of economic relations. As the court’s procedures constructed “what” a wreck was—to whom it belonged, what it was called, how much it was worth—so particular legal associations were embedded in the property that the wreck became. Overall, these judicial processes were geared toward the creation of legitimate pieces of property within the local community. By examining the “finding,” “naming,” and “valuing” of the objects brought into the Hethewardmote, we can gain insight into the way that law was assimilated into the fabric of the world in which these fishermen and their families lived, constituting an environment in which obligations and property were inextricably linked to the objects that they found, used, exchanged, and sold. It is thus possible to show the close entanglement of law and materiality, and what this meant for ordinary people in medieval England.

THE LEGAL PROCESS OF WRECK began with “finding” an object. Of course, the exercise of the right of wreck was founded upon the practice of mariners noticing things and picking them up. This was described in the wreck rolls using the verb *invenio*, to “find” or “come across.” In most entries, indeed, this was the only verb used at all. The court rolls place a great deal of emphasis on this initial interaction between person and thing, as “finding” provides the central conceptual apparatus of the administration of wreck rights. It is useful, therefore, to unpack some of the connotations of this idea. Perhaps most obviously, finding or coming across something is, in a legal context, rather crucially different from soliciting, seeking, or stealing it.<sup>68</sup> Moreover, objects cast overboard or broken off of ships were legally available to be “found” as wreck only if the original owners were dead.<sup>69</sup> In the majority of cases,

<sup>67</sup> Middleton-Stewart, ““Down to the Sea in Ships,”” 71. Fishermen at Dungeness (Kent) also had their own chapel (dedicated to Our Lady); see Sheila Sweetinburgh, “Strategies of Inheritance among Kentish Fishing Communities in the Later Middle Ages,” *History of the Family* 11, no. 2 (2006): 93–105, here 95.

<sup>68</sup> In the common law, the count of *detinue sur trover* (“detainment on account of finding”) was a fiction developed in the late fourteenth century that allowed plaintiffs to reclaim property that the defendant possessed and withheld: they alleged that they had lost the thing in question, and the defendant had found it. See Baker, *An Introduction to English Legal History*, 392–394.

<sup>69</sup> See above, fnn. 30–33.



it must have been difficult for the fishermen of Sizewell and Thorp to know definitively whether this was the case or not.

Thus, the concept of “finding” appears to be a rather careful way of describing how these objects came into the hands of the local community. Wrecks turned up “uninvited,” occurring as unpredictably as the storms and gales that caused them. Finders could not help but come across the objects. Occasionally, this was hinted at in the rolls through a change in the normal grammatical structure, for instance, in this presentment from 1387: “The jurors of Sizewell present that 1 boat, price 6s. 8d., and one barrel, price 3d., came from wreck and the finder is John Cowen to whom pertains half of the said wreck.”<sup>70</sup> Here it was not John Cowen who “found” the wreck; rather, the boat and barrel themselves “came” (*venerunt*). This is significant. It shows that the objects themselves, rather than the humans who picked them up, could be conceived as active in the initial encounter between the mariner and the wreck. “Finding” was thus never a solely human action, for which full legal responsibility could be attributed to a particular person. Putting some of the animus on the object allowed for a little more room to maneuver should a shipwrecked merchant return to claim his goods. Wrecks were not calculatingly taken, but innocently found. The verb *invenio*, then, emerges as an artful sleight of legal discourse, carefully associating, but never totally entangling, a wreck with its finder.

How was this association between finder and thing elaborated? In one unique case from 1383, a finder seems to have taken his name from the thing he found (or vice versa): it was presented that “John Gebelots found as wreck of the sea one ‘gebelot.’”<sup>71</sup> In most cases, though, the associations between finders and wrecks were grounded in more nebulous social and legal structures. A quantitative analysis of finders shows that wreck was not found by just anyone. In the first place, finders were almost always male.<sup>72</sup> If women did engage in maritime occupations such as the salting of fish, they seem to have been excluded, on the whole, from the operation of the right of wreck: they did not find things.<sup>73</sup> In the second place, the finder was almost always connected closely with the Hethewardmote. While 142 different people found wrecks in the thirty years studied (giving an average of two objects per finder), more than half of these people found just one object.<sup>74</sup> The people who found more than this were normally involved in the running of the court, either as

<sup>70</sup> SROI, HD 371/1, m. 10v: “Jur[at]i de Syswalle p[re]sent[ant] q[uo]d I batell[am] prec[ia] vj s viij d et unus barell[us] prec[ia] iij d vener[unt] de Wrek et inventor est Joh[ann]es Cowen cui p[er]tinet medietas dicti Wrek[is].”

<sup>71</sup> SROI, HD 371/1, m. 6r. The name seems to have stuck, at least temporarily: the next year, he found an oar worth 2d. Ibid., m. 6v. After that, he disappears from the records. The word “gebelot” is an old form of “gimlet,” for which the *Oxford English Dictionary* has two unrelated meanings: a hand-operated tool for boring holes, or a shallow tub used for salting.

<sup>72</sup> The single exception is Mary, daughter of Thomas Cote; SROI, HD 371/1, m. 8v. This pattern is repeated across the East Anglian courts. In the rolls of Ingoldmells, two women were held in mercy for taking wool “found of wreck of the sea” in 1346; Massingberd, *Court Rolls of the Manor of Ingoldmells in the County of Lincoln*, 124.

<sup>73</sup> On a potential piece of evidence for female maritime employment in this area, see Bailey, “Coastal Fishing off South East Suffolk in the Century after the Black Death,” 107. On their place in maritime communities more generally, see Kowaleski, “The Demography of Maritime Communities in Late Medieval England,” 88–89, 103–104.

<sup>74</sup> This figure is imprecise because of flaws in the data; in eleven further presentments, it was not possible to determine a finder, either because the membrane was faded or because the name was omitted. In several cases, an undefined group (e.g., “vill de Thorp”) was recorded as finder. The usual problems



jurors, who had to be shipmasters, or as officers of the court—the bailiffs or *vagantores*, “roamers.”<sup>75</sup> The statistics are striking: 80 percent of the sixty-eight people who found two objects or more, and 97.5 percent of the forty people who found three objects or more, were from this group. Even in these small coastal fishing ventures, vessels would have required crews of up to twelve men or possibly more; it is thus difficult to believe that officials were simply luckier, or more watchful, than ordinary fishermen.<sup>76</sup>

The disproportionate number of shipmasters and officials who “found” wreck strongly suggests that there was an important distinction between the act of spotting and recovering a piece of shipwreck and the act of being the “finder” who presented it to the Hethewardmote. In the case of shipmasters in particular (although a tight distinction is not necessary, since many shipmasters were also officials at some point), the right to “find” wrecks found on voyages may have formed part of the broader matrix of legal privileges and duties accorded to their occupational position.<sup>77</sup> For *vagantores* and bailiffs, it was perhaps a perk of the job (or a facet of corruption) to frequently “find” wrecks in the course of working in behalf of the court. There may also have been a pragmatic financial reason for acting as “finder”: no one ever found something for which he could not afford the fine.<sup>78</sup> The concept of finding, then, allowed the communities at Sizewell and Thorp to fashion the initial encounter between person and thing. The “finder” was almost always from a local elite of office-holding men, who took on both the legal responsibilities and the profits associated with wrecked objects.

The scribe sometimes associated the act of finding with the geographical jurisdiction of the Hethewardmote. A few presentments mentioned the place at which an object was found.<sup>79</sup> Of these few, almost all refer to places on land; Mark Bailey has thus argued that most objects were found at sea, with an unusual find on the beach occasioning an extra note in court rolls.<sup>80</sup> In five cases it was noted that some-

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in identifying individuals in medieval court rolls (fathers and sons with the same names, inconsistent names) of course apply.

<sup>75</sup> Bailey, “Coastal Fishing off South East Suffolk in the Century after the Black Death,” 107, suggests that the *vagantores* (elsewhere “*vagantes*”) were appointed to oversee the reporting of wrecks; this is not immediately apparent from the court rolls, but it seems likely. In the Norfolk manors of Scratby and Hemsby, this official was called the *scrutator de le Wrek*; NRO, DCN 63/2, m. 21r. In Yarmouth, the town bailiffs were penalized for “not making scrutiny of the rivers running to the town” (*fecerunt scrut[agium] super ripas ad villam*), after four “bombas voc[at]ur Gunnys” were found in the harbor; NRO, Y/C 4/223, m. 14v.

<sup>76</sup> One reviewer suggested that the likely size of crews for these villages was between six and twelve. Other historians have suggested figures as high as thirty for east coast fishing vessels. Heath, “North Sea Fishing in the Fifteenth Century,” 60. In a significant minority of presentments (forty-four, or 14.5 percent), the court mentioned additional finders; but in most of these cases the actual individuals were not specified, but recorded as *socij sui*, “his crew,” or *et alii*, “and others.”

<sup>77</sup> See Robin Ward, *The World of the Medieval Shipmaster: Law, Business and the Sea, c.1350–c.1450* (Woodbridge, 2009), chaps. 1, 3, 4, 5.

<sup>78</sup> An extremely similar phenomenon is found in coroners’ postmortem inquests: as the “first finder” of a dead body was obligated to attend the eyre, he was sometimes made the “first finder” of subsequent corpses. See Hunnisett, *The Medieval Coroner*, 10–11. My thanks to the several anonymous reviewers of this article who pointed out this connection.

<sup>79</sup> Fifteen entries, or just under 5 percent, recorded the place at which a wrecked object was found.

<sup>80</sup> Bailey, “Coastal Fishing off South East Suffolk in the Century after the Black Death,” 107. Just three entries refer to an object being found “super mare”; SROI, HD 371/1, mm. 1r, 2r, 10v.

thing was found “on the ground of the lord.”<sup>81</sup> On a couple of other occasions, an object was found “at Thorp.”<sup>82</sup> In moving to immediately associate these objects with its own jurisdiction, the court was marking the wrecks as its own concern, against the potential rival claims of nearby settlements.<sup>83</sup> Why this was necessary can be seen in an unusual memorandum entered in the rolls, which records how John Ode and Thomas of Carleton, both regular jurors in the Hethewardmote, “found and captured” an enemy ship at sea, and “with the help of others led it to the ground of Sizewell.” Afterwards, however, a man from Happisburgh (in Norfolk) claimed the ship “as his own chattel,” and with the abetment of some locals, “took and removed the said ship from the said ground of Sizewell to the port of Minsmere, and there it remains.”<sup>84</sup> Even though the ship was quite clearly taken either because it was thought to be or could conceivably have been construed as an “enemy ship,” the scribe still saw fit to use the verb *invenio* alongside the more incriminating *capio* (to capture). The idea of “finding,” then, emerges once more as an elastic legal concept that could work to emphasize the associations between a wreck and the places under the jurisdiction of the Hethewardmote, while implying a sense of innocent discovery that might assuage future conflicts over the ownership of property.

The notion of “finding” a wreck thus performed several valuable functions in the wreck rolls. It provided a framework for constructing the shipwrecks as happenstance occurrences, at the same time that it subtly imbued the encounter with legal valences particular to its own authority.<sup>85</sup> In the first place, the concept of *invenio* established an encounter in which some agency was accorded to the object. This prefigured a legitimate act of “finding” rather than an underhand or speculative appropriation. In the second place, the concept helped to construct the kind of person who could find these objects: these were the *fidedigni* of the maritime community, the “trust-worthy men” who could be relied upon to report their finds, pay their fines in full, and account for the legitimacy of the found objects.<sup>86</sup>

Finally, finding shipwrecks was an act assumed to take place at sea, a place in

<sup>81</sup> SROI, HD 371/1, mm. 2r, 7r; HD 371/2, m. 5r. The phrase used was “super solum domini” or “super terram domini.” This terminology was frequently employed by other courts. For example, Orford (Suffolk): SROI, HD64/1/12, HD64/1/17, HD64/1/28, mm. 1v, 3v; Runton and Beeston (Norfolk): NRO, WKC 2/166 398x7, m. 9r.

<sup>82</sup> In the text, “apud Thorp”; SROI, HD 371/1, mm. 3v, 4r.

<sup>83</sup> To the north, the manors of Walberswick and Blythburgh, owned by Sir John Swillington, claimed wreck; see SROI, HA30/369/327, an indenture of 1405 recording an agreement relating to wreck jurisdiction, among other matters, between Swillington and the borough of Dunwich. Swillington’s copy survives in the British Library, Additional Charter 40673. To the south, the borough of Orford was certainly exercising its wreck jurisdiction during the mid-fifteenth century; see SROI, HD64/1/12–29.

<sup>84</sup> SROI, HD 371/1, m. 2r: “Item quod Joh[annem] Ode et Thom[am] de Carleton invener[unt] et ceper[unt] I nave[m] sup[er] mare vagante[m] ut weynat[am] sua[m] p[er] ext[ra]neos inimicos et dictam navem p[er] auxilium aliorum duxer[un]t usque t[er]ram de Syswalle et apr[eciandam] ad xij s iij d Et postea p[er] abetta[m] et p[ro]cura-mentu[m] Joh[annis] Tasel de Syswalle unu[s] Roger[us] del Hel de Apesbourgh clamand[o] dictam nave[m] esse su[os] p[ro]p[ri]u[m] catall[um] et Johannes Norman vic[i]nus dicti Rog[er]i et alij s[er]vientij p[re]dictorum Rog[er]i et Joh[annis] et p[er] auxiliu[m] p[re]dicti Joh[annis] Masel sim[u]l cum Rob[er]to Masel Joh[anne] Cowen et Henr[ico] de Weston et cu[m] Thom[a] Smotheng, Joh[anni] Mottele ceper[unt] et abduxer[unt] p[re]dictam nave[m] de p[re]dicta t[er]ra de Syswalle usque ad portu[m] de Mensemere et de p[re]dicto portu dictam nave[m] prolongaver[unt] etc. ideo etc.”

<sup>85</sup> A similar point is made in Alain Pottage, “Law after Anthropology: Object and Technique in Roman Law,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 31, no. 2–3 (2014): 147–166, here 160.

<sup>86</sup> On *fidedigni*, see Ian Forrest, *The Detection of Heresy in Late Medieval England* (Oxford, 2005), chap. 8, “The Social Contours of Heresy Detection,” 207–230, here 213, 219; Forrest, “The Transfor-



which jurisdictional claims were murky at best; when objects were conceded to have washed up on land, that land was said to be under the jurisdiction of the Hethewardmote. This ontological categorization admitted a person, a thing, and sometimes a place. The person became a finder (preferably a trustworthy, well-off male), the object became a function of its being found, and the act of finding itself became a happy coincidence rather than a calculated act of seizure. Framing the encounter between person and wreck as “finding,” then, circumscribed the range of meanings that could be attributed to a shipwrecked object. If the original owner came to land, then no accusations of thievery could be made. The trustworthiness and maritime expertise of the finder, by contrast, were rewarded. If the owner was dead, then the act of finding had initiated a process through which the legally ambiguous object could begin to become a piece of property. The price for this legitimation was bound up in the object itself, as half of its monetary value. The concept of finding—*invenio*—was the Hethewardmote’s first discursive move toward the declaration of its authority over this process.

THE NAME OF THE OBJECT is the second variable in the information given by the majority of presentments. It was of course crucial to be able to enunciate “what” a thing was after one had found it: as a legal process, naming followed naturally from finding, just as the names of objects followed grammatically after *invenit* (he found . . . ) in the presentments themselves. It is not the particular substantive noun given to a particular material thing that is important here, but rather the *process* of naming.<sup>87</sup> If naming a thing in a particular way seems to have been a matter of “common sense,” then the processes and assumptions underlying that “common sense” are worthy of investigation.<sup>88</sup> The act of giving a wreck a name constituted it as a particular kind of thing: the Hethewardmote bounded it from the other physical elements in which it was found, shaping it into an “it,” a unitary entity. In giving a wreck a name, the Hethewardmote was thus performing a substantiating function, delineating material stuff that was relevant to the court.<sup>89</sup> For example, it was presented that Robert Couper “found as wreck one drowned man with goods and chattels around the corpse, worth 6d.”<sup>90</sup> Clearly the body was not the subject of this monetary evaluation; naming the things found was what separated the corpse from the “goods and chattels” that were of relevance to the Hethewardmote’s purpose.<sup>91</sup> For the jurors of the

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mation of Visitation in Thirteenth-Century England,” *Past & Present* 221, no. 1 (2013): 3–38, here 13, 37.

<sup>87</sup> As has been pointed out, however, the words might be interesting to students of Middle English or nautical terminology; Schofield, “Wreck Rolls of Leiston Abbey,” 366.

<sup>88</sup> See Clifford Geertz, *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology* (New York, 1983), chap. 4, “Common Sense as a Cultural System,” 73–93.

<sup>89</sup> For a modern analogue, and a much deeper discussion of referents in relation to law and materials, see Javier Lezaun, “The Pragmatic Sanction of Materials: Notes for an Ethnography of Legal Substances,” *Journal of Law and Society* 39, no. 1 (2012): 20–38.

<sup>90</sup> SROI, HD 371/1, m. 11vr.

<sup>91</sup> Another drowned man was found lying on the gravel; SROI, HD 371/1, m. 10v. The money found in his pockets (*loculatio*) was used toward his funeral expenses.



court, an object was an object only insofar as it was an object of wreck; in naming something, they constituted it as something that belonged to their jurisdiction.

The characteristics that objects might possess were generally encapsulated in the Leiston wreck rolls as nouns. That is, objects were only rarely described as having particular features; normally they were simply delineated as a particular kind of thing. For example, the great many “barrels” presented were not generally given any other distinctive features in the court rolls. In a few odd cases it was recorded that a “barrel of beer” was found; on another occasion, someone found a barrel “of tallow.”<sup>92</sup> In designating these barrels in relation to some specific substance, the court arranged a particular set of associations for the objects, thereby helping to constitute them as something known and recognized by the community. This is perhaps clearest in relation to specialist knowledge about nautical equipment or merchandise that washed up. For example, Robert Potter found a “regalbourd” (“Riga board,” that is, timber from Riga), Henry Hudde found a “herryngflow” (a kind of fish trap), and Simon Hane found *unum tremiseum de i mast* (“the weigh-beam of a mast”).<sup>93</sup> Clearly the jury of the Hethewardmote could recognize these things for what they were. An untrained eye—someone unfamiliar with nautical hardware—might have seen only pieces of wood of varying shapes, sizes, and colors. The name eventually given to an object was a product of the highly specialized professional knowledge of the communities of fishermen at Sizewell and Thorp. When the men of Sizewell found *unam virgam vocatam Seykerd*, “a stick called a ‘sea-cord,’” it is entirely proper to ask: “called” by whom? The answer is the jurors of the Hethewardmote, or from their own perspective, “us.” In being named, the object became materially and legally associated with them, as something they recognized, something they were qualified to name, something they could value.

On occasion, the name given by the jurors to a shipwreck hinted at an awareness of the object’s longer lifespan: Simon Rust found “an old oar,” and John Tasel, along with his crew, found “an old boat.”<sup>94</sup> The idea that these things were “old” is more obviously a subjective interpretation than an inherent characteristic; but it was clearly deemed an important enough quality to record, and speaks to the way the rolls hint at the histories of these objects. This can be seen in two consecutive entries from the Hethewardmote held in 1395: Robert Legat found “a piece of a certain oar,” and John Newman found “a plank of a certain ship.”<sup>95</sup> Of course, the use of “certain” (*cuiusdam*) can be taken with a grain of salt; it is a common scribal tic in local court documents from this period. It seems unlikely that the finders, or the court, in fact knew the specific ship or the oar whence these fragments came. Yet the association of these objects with larger wholes is important, because it creates a discontinuity in their narrative: the pieces *had been* part of some other things, but now they were simply fragments. Thus, although the scribe obliquely drew attention to the idea that these things used to be owned by someone else, he also marked the radical break in each object’s history, its material—and thus legal—separation from

<sup>92</sup> SROI, HD 371/1, m. 6r; HD 371/2, mm. 2r, 5r; HD 371/1, m. 9v. In Ingoldmells, a cask of honey and a barrel of fish were found; Massingberd, *Court Rolls of the Manor of Ingoldmells in the County of Lincoln*, 75, 99.

<sup>93</sup> SROI, HD 371/1, m. 11r; HD 371/2, m. 5v; HD 371/1, m. 1r.

<sup>94</sup> SROI, HD 371/2, m. 1v; HD 371/1, m. 3r. In both examples the adjective “*vetus*” is used.

<sup>95</sup> SROI, HD 371/1, m. 11v.

the former, whole, piece of property. It is in such instances that naming a wreck appears more clearly as an ontological act. A new name constituted a shipwreck as a distinct material entity, fitting it into categories of physical stuff that were formed from the expertise of the local maritime community. In each case, the object was thus inscribed with a set of associations that belonged firmly to the court and the community in which it operated.<sup>96</sup>

While finding was constructed as an encounter between wreck and finder, naming was the moment at which this encounter was rhetorically presented to the Hethewardmote. For the most part, the actual mechanics of the court's procedures remain a mystery, but one memorandum provides some hints about why naming was so essential. In 1386, twelve men were presented "because they concealed an article, viz. a gunstock, coming from wreck, therefore [they are] in mercy. The said gunstock is not hitherto appraised. This was presented by the whole jury of Sizewell."<sup>97</sup> The twelve men were the shipmasters of Thorp, and each was fined 6d.<sup>98</sup> This case is interesting for two reasons. First, it shows that the juries were kept institutionally separate, and might act as a check on the veracity of one another's presentments.<sup>99</sup> Second, the fact that the gunstock had not "hitherto" been appraised strongly implies that the Hethewardmote was the setting in which information about wrecks was shared among the court officials and the shipmaster-jurors.

In this example, it becomes clear how the act of naming an object as wreck was at once a material and a legal pronouncement. The jury of Thorp, in having omitted to name the gunstock as wreck, had in effect dematerialized it; the jury of Sizewell, in knowing, recognizing, and naming the object as such, had somewhat rematerialized it. After all, the ideal final state of the gunstock, as property belonging to a local finder, was still rather provisional, since it had not yet been appraised. The fact that the Sizewell jury knew of the deception at all hints at the exchange of local, legal information between the individuals who made up the two juries. More generally, we can infer from this exception to the rule that the wreck rolls show us the moment at which it was agreed "what" an object was. This decision was both legal and ontological. As the incident of the gunstock demonstrates, it had important economic, social, and legal consequences: its unknown worth, the split of loyalties between the two communities, and the punishment of the Thorp jury. The name given to a wreck shaped the possibilities of its use, worth, distribution, and meaning: as an object was

<sup>96</sup> For an elegant exploration of this point more generally, see Geertz, *Local Knowledge*, chap. 8, "Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective," 167–236, here 215–217.

<sup>97</sup> SROI, HD 371/1, m. 9v: "quia concellaver[unt] unum articulum viz de uno gunnestock venienti de wreck ideo in mi[sericordi]a etc. Et dictum gunnestok ad huc non ap[re]s[iatur] Et hoc p[re]sent[at]us est per om[ne]s jur[at]os de Syswall." "Gunstock" can refer to just the trestle for a cannon, or to the whole armament. In either case, it was probably an expensive item. A set of guns were also found at Yarmouth; see fn. 75 above. Ingoldmells men found "a certain iron war engine or a chamber of a gonne, weighing six stone of iron," but not until the latter half of the sixteenth century; Massingberd, *Court Rolls of the Manor of Ingoldmells in the County of Lincoln*, 295.

<sup>98</sup> SROI, HD 371/1, m. 9r. This Hethewardmote distinguished the shipmasters of both villis for both "fluefare" and "sperlingfare" (two of the fishing seasons).

<sup>99</sup> It was common in medieval English local courts for a jury of free peasants to check on and verify the presentments of unfree jurors; see John S. Beckerman, "Procedural Innovation and Institutional Change in Medieval English Manorial Courts," *Law & History Review* 10, no. 2 (1992): 197–252, here 229.



named, it was ingrained with the local knowledge of the maritime communities of Sizewell and Thorp, and the legal authority of the Hethewardmote.

IF THE PROCESSES OF FINDING and naming an object came first, they ultimately served the last and perhaps most important function in the Hethewardmote, that of valuing the wreck. Value, of course, is relative. One man's mast weigh-beam is another man's firewood. What, then, were the jury's considerations in assigning value to the wrecks brought in to the court? As Bailey has suggested, "If fishermen were consistently prepared to buy up all kinds of wrecked goods, then the clear assumption is that there was a ready 'second-hand' market for their disposal."<sup>100</sup> This statement is borne out through a quantitative analysis of the Leiston wreck rolls. The average value of a wreck presentment in the years 1377–1409 (which might include more than one object, albeit not always with separate values given) was just over 21d.<sup>101</sup> This figure is slightly misleading, however; just less than a quarter of the objects were worth more than a shilling (12d.).<sup>102</sup> Most wrecks, then, were small things that fishermen could afford to pay a couple of pennies to keep. Furthermore, the majority of objects found obviously had some direct use for the fishermen: seven masts were presented, twenty-six planks, twenty-eight oars, fifty-four barrels, and so forth. Bulk goods, such as iron, timber, and tallow, presumably spilled or wrecked from merchant ships, were found much less frequently, and valuable items, such as intact boats, accounted for only a fraction of wrecks.<sup>103</sup>

Taken together, these points in the data suggest that wrecks were in general cheap objects that would stay within the local community of fishermen. In turn, it seems that Bailey is right to propose that there was a local market in shipwreck; we might presume that this market helped to determine an object's value.<sup>104</sup> There were certain limitations upon this, however. Perhaps the most obvious is that the Hethewardmote jury valued expensive objects in a different way than it did cheaper ones. Items worth less than two shillings (24d.) were precisely appraised, and given values from 1 to 24d.<sup>105</sup> This niggardly attitude toward low-value objects may have led to their being underreported. A 1385 presentment is suggestive: John Purchas found a barrel worth just 3d., and received his half-share "because of the lord's gratitude for his confession."<sup>106</sup> For items worth more than two shillings, however, the jury's valuations cling to round numbers of shillings, marks, and pounds sterling. So while a low-value object might be said to be worth 7d., a high-value one would never be

<sup>100</sup> Bailey, "Coastal Fishing off South East Suffolk in the Century after the Black Death," 108.

<sup>101</sup> The mean is 21.08d.; this figure only includes objects for which any value greater than 0d. was given. Eighteen presentments out of 322 did not give a value, either because of difficulties reading the manuscripts (which are in places water-damaged) or simply because of absences in the record.

<sup>102</sup> This figure is calculated from the 304 objects for which a value was given.

<sup>103</sup> Iron: (*xxiiij osm'ndia* = *osmondum*, "Swedish iron"), SROI, HD 371/1, m. 1v; timber: [*e.g.*] (*ij mens[uras] de striche bourd* = 2 measures of Ostrich Board), *ibid.*, m. 3r.

<sup>104</sup> I explore these points in more detail in Johnson, "The Economics of Shipwreck in Late-Medieval Suffolk." Although I agree with Bailey's broad point, there was no correlation between supply and prices of a sample commodity (barrels) in my quantitative analysis of the rolls for the century ca. 1380–1480.

<sup>105</sup> The jury's values clustered toward even numbers; for example, forty-one objects were valued at 4d., eight at 5d., and thirty at 6d.

<sup>106</sup> SROI, HD 371/1, m. 7r: "j d. et ob. invenitori ex gra[ti]a d[o]m[in]i pro confesc[i]o[n]e sua."



57d.—it leaps to 60d. (six shillings). The rough worth of an object (cheap or expensive), then, seems to have affected how it was valued, with the borderline for rough worth lying at two shillings.

The type of shipwrecked object also determined how it was priced. This is clearest in relation to the “royal fish” that were registered in the Hethewardmote. Although these particular marine creatures technically belonged to the crown, it seems that in practice in medieval England, lords possessing rights of wreck frequently also possessed the right to take royal fish.<sup>107</sup> At Sizewell and Thorp, several kinds of fish were claimed—each time noted “as wreck.” Three people found conger eels (priced between one and two shillings), two found “codlings” (juvenile cod, worth a couple of pence), three found what were simply called “fish” (all worth less than sixpence), and John del Brooks found a *magnum pissem* worth no less than eight shillings.<sup>108</sup>

However, the most common marine creature found was the porpoise, with no fewer than seven reported between 1380 and 1410. Porpoises, indeed, were valued differently than were any of the other fish, or indeed, any other of the wrecks found; they were handed over to the court officials, whereupon “the lord gave the finder 4 bushels of grain as is the custom from ancient usage.”<sup>109</sup> This is the most fulsome explication of the custom, which was invoked with regard to five of the seven porpoises that were reported over those thirty years.<sup>110</sup> In the exceptional cases when this custom was not mentioned, a monetary payment was made in the manner of ordinary wreck objects. In both presentments where this happened, the value was reported as half a mark (80d.).<sup>111</sup> This suggests that the bushels of grain may have had a fixed equivalent monetary value.<sup>112</sup> However, the distinction between payment in cash and in kind was clearly important: John Purchas was presented for having found “a little fish (*pessulem*) called a ‘tolfyn’ in the sea,” and it was valued at the princely sum of 26s. 8d. (320d.).<sup>113</sup> To distinguish between a dolphin and a porpoise was also to distinguish the ways in which that animal was valued by the court. Whereas a porpoise was entangled in the legal associations of “ancient usage,” a dolphin was an exchangeable piece of property. Once again we see ontological and legal boundaries drawn at the same time in the Hethewardmote, and in this instance, the way in which those boundaries shaped what happened to the object after its valuation.

<sup>107</sup> See *Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England*, 2: 58, 339. For lords’ rights in this regard, see Laing, “Historic Origins of Admiralty Jurisdiction in England,” 177–178. A royal grant to Henry VI’s consort specifically included this right to royal fish along with flotsam, jetsam, and lagan (i.e., “the right of wreck”); *CPR, 1452–1461*: 115–116. The crown’s right to “royal fish” is still in effect. In 2004, a Welsh fisherman found a sturgeon in Swansea Bay, which he had to register with an official called the receiver of the wrecks. The queen waived her right in this instance; see “Fisherman Lands £8,000 Catch,” June 2, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/3771441.stm>.

<sup>108</sup> SROI, HD 371/1, mm. 9v, 12r; HD 371/2, m. 5r; HD 371/1, m. 12r; *ibid.*, mm. 11r, 12v; *ibid.*, m. 11r. This was perhaps a sturgeon.

<sup>109</sup> This quote is from a presentment of Simon Rede; SROI, HD 371/1, m. 6r.

<sup>110</sup> For the others, see SROI, HD 371/1, mm. 5r, 9r; HD 371/2, m. 1v (two cases).

<sup>111</sup> SROI, HD 371/2, mm. 3r, 5r.

<sup>112</sup> The lord of the manor of Ingoldmells possessed the right to take royal fish, but the several “mere-swine” (an old term for porpoise) found were given a cash value. Notably, in a court of 1414, a washed-up porpoise was given a value of 6s. 8d. (80d.). The fact that it is the same value that the Hethewardmote gave is suggestive. See Massingberd, *Court Rolls of the Manor of Ingoldmells in the County of Lincoln*, 230.

<sup>113</sup> SROI, HD 371/1, m. 3r.

The valuation of an object was thus informed by its exchange value, its status as a cheap or an expensive thing, and the kind of thing it was. The outcome of this process, in turn, molded the possibilities of that object's afterlife, the "spheres of exchange" in which it could operate.<sup>114</sup> The wreck rolls are generally silent on that afterlife, but an exception exists from the court of 1390. Two consecutive entries in the roll for that year record first how John Plowman found an anchor "and carried it away for his own use without the licence of the lord or bailiff," and then how "he killed a fish, namely a porpoise, taken in his nets in the sea, and carried it away and sold it without licence [etc.]."<sup>115</sup> Neither object was given a value by the court, because Plowman had in both cases subverted the very process of valuing. By selling the porpoise, he had cut across "ancient custom" and created a monetary value for something that should have been valued in kind; by taking the anchor for his own use, he had denied the court the opportunity to give it an exchange value. If most objects were traded locally, then the value given to an object by the Hethewardmote in a very real way *was* what that item was worth. The court provided a legally ratified value, allowing the finder to recoup twice the fine he had paid to the lord. Valuation thus cut both ways: the finder had to pay a fine, but in return he gained a legitimate price for the object should he want to sell it. Interfering with this process by selling the object before it was valued not only deprived the lord of revenue, but undermined the ability of the Hethewardmote to set prices. Such actions were punished accordingly. In 1384, for example, John Gebelots found an oar worth 2d., but "sold the said oar before the cellarer or his lieutenant had view of it, against the form and ordinance of the court." He was fined 12d.<sup>116</sup> Valuation, then, was about more than value: it was about the jurisdiction of the Hethewardmote. The process of valuation consolidated the processes of finding and naming a piece of shipwreck; it finally became a piece of property, and made its way into the material culture of the local community.

COURTS LIKE THE HETHEWARDMOTE, routinely registering, sorting, and ordering shipwrecks in medieval England, acted as "machines for manufacturing property, producing the fundament of power in rural society."<sup>117</sup> In came some *thing*, its name, owner, and worth unknown; out went a finder (and an owner), an "oar," and a price tag—a fully fledged piece of property. The court "machinery" is most obvious when

<sup>114</sup> See Igor Kopytoff, "The Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization as Process," in Appadurai, *The Social Life of Things*, 64–91, here 71–77.

<sup>115</sup> SROI, HD 371/1, m. 11v: "Jur[ati] p[re]sent[an]t q[uo]d Joh[an]nes Plouman invenit de Wrek maris I Ankir p[re]c[ia] et[c.] et ill[ud] elong[it] ad usu[m] suu[m] p[ro]p[ri]um sine lic[encia] d[omi]ni vel ball[iv]i ideo [in misericordia] etc. It[e]m q[uo]d id[e]m Joh[an]nes int[er]fecit unu[m] pissem viz a porpays in rethis suis capt[is] in mari et ill[ud] elong[it] et vendidit sine lic[encia] domini vel ballivi ideo etc."

<sup>116</sup> SROI, HD 371/1, m. 6r.

<sup>117</sup> Richard Lyman Bushman, "Farmers in Court: Orange County, North Carolina, 1750–1776," in Christopher L. Tomlins and Bruce H. Mann, eds., *The Many Legalities of Early America* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2001), 388–413, here 412. Professor Bushman was commenting not on movable property, but on the arbitrariness of the land boundaries between farms, as they were established by courts in pre-revolutionary America.



its gears jam and the production of property fails.<sup>118</sup> For example, it was reported in 1388 that seven men of Theberton, a village about four miles northwest of Sizewell, had “made a rescue upon John Purchas, Robert Legats, and Thomas Cote . . . of a boat with goods and chattels to the value of [     ], found as wreck of the sea, in prejudice of the said [lord], and to the grave damage of the said tenants. And therefore in mercy.”<sup>119</sup> The fact that this boat was not previously presented in the rolls suggests that this “rescue” took place while the boat was being collected as wreck, or perhaps from wherever it had been put for safekeeping—in any case, certainly before the court or any of its personnel were able to view it.<sup>120</sup>

Immediately above this entry, the scribe had begun to write out an ordinary wreck presentment—“Item that John Purchas, Robert Legats, and Thomas Cote . . .”—but had stopped and then redacted it. This implies that he initially thought that a wreck was being reported, but he then had to revise the entry to reflect the unusual circumstances. Moreover, the use of “rescue” is suggestive of a careful appreciation of potential proprietorial rights to the boat. In a legal context, the word means “to remove from (lawful) custody”—it is different from “to steal” or “to take”—and generally refers to a proprietorial claim on an object not in one’s possession.<sup>121</sup> In this situation at Sizewell, “rescue” strongly implies that the boat was at an intermediate stage between being a shipwreck and being a piece of property. The machinery, the process of transformation that the Hethewardmote normally effected, had been interrupted, and so the boat could be neither wreck nor property. The blankness of the space in the record where there should be a value is thus a wonderful metonym for the problem of this boat as a material object: it was not a full piece of property before it had been valued. The boat itself was thus emphatically unclear to the court and the jurors, its value literally a gap, an absence. It is in these absences—these patent malfunctions of the Hethewardmote “machine”—that the legal ontologies of wreck rights are perhaps most palpable for the historian.

Overall, though, the Hethewardmote tended to smoothly categorize the material world in certain convenient ways, serving a particular set of interests. Clearly it served the lord’s—Leiston Abbey’s—interests, providing a source of reliable revenue. It also served the interests of shipmasters and office-holders, the upper and

<sup>118</sup> The “hammer breaking” example is of course famous in Heidegger’s explication of *vorhandenheit*—a thing’s “presence-at-hand.” See Harman, *Towards Speculative Realism*, 26–27.

<sup>119</sup> SROI, HD 371/1, m. 10v. “It[e]m q[uo]d Petrus Alred de Theberton Joh[ann]es Peverel Joh[ann]es Everard Joh[ann]es Petman Rob[er]tus Pykebon Will[el]m[u]s Pykebon et Joh[ann]es le Clerk s[er]viens p[ar]son[e] eccl[es]ie de Theberton fecer[unt] rescussu[m] Joh[ann]i Purchas Rob[er]to Legats et Thom[e] Cote tenentibus d[omi]ni in Syswalle de uno batell cum bon[a] et catell[a] ad val[endum] [blank] invent[a] de Wrek’ maris in p[re]iudi[ci]u[m] d[omi]ni et ad g[ra]ve damp[um] p[re]d[ic]tor[um] tenenc[ium] et i[de]o ip[s]i in m[isericord]ia.” (The text quoted here can be seen in the bottom third of the image that appears at the beginning of this article.) Interestingly, the church of Theberton had only recently been appropriated to Leiston Abbey, in 1380, and was then given to Margaret, countess of Norfolk, in exchange for the patronage of Kirkley, in 1382. Perhaps the events recorded here thus relate to some kind of jurisdictional dispute: see Page, *The Victoria History of the County of Suffolk*, 2: 118.

<sup>120</sup> Perhaps significantly, one of the *vagantores* that year was John Clays, who was identified in the court rolls as being from Theberton; SROI, HD 371/1, m. 10r. Clays was not implicated in the theft, however, and served as *vagantor* subsequently.

<sup>121</sup> The word used is *rescussu[s]*. This meaning is attested in R. E. Latham, *Revised Medieval Latin Word-List from British and Irish Sources* (1980; repr., Oxford, 2008), 404, in reference to the illegal recovery of distrained cattle. The common-law remedy for such distrains (which were frequently heard in manorial courts) was *detinue*; see Baker, *An Introduction to English Legal History*, 390–391.



middling sorts within these small fishing communities who made up its juries. For those poorer men, occasional crewmates, or women who found wreck, the 50 percent levy on a chance find may have felt more like an imposition than a boon. Certainly, some people tried to conceal things they found, although obviously it is impossible to know how often they got away with it.<sup>122</sup> Should we, then, place wreck rights into some wider scheme of social control, whereby the richer peasantry colluded with seigniorial authority in imposing legal categories that disadvantaged their poorer neighbors? It would not be surprising if that had been the case: as Ian Forrest has shown, local elites used legal mechanisms both to compete with one another and to socially regulate their inferiors.<sup>123</sup> Yet it is important not to see the connections between legal categories and material objects as deterministic. The ontological distinctions made in the processes of finding, naming, and valuing wrecks did not definitively structure the nature and distribution of resources. What they did do was circumscribe the kinds of choices available to the maritime communities of Sizewell and Thorp.

For the fisherman out at sea, the “right of wreck” created a very limited series of options: leave the wreck, take it and conceal it, or take it and report it. To choose the first was to abandon something already abandoned, to leave the object formless in the waves, a legal non-event. To choose the second was to rely on the silence of crewmates and the Hethewardmote jurors, and to accept that the object would have no legally validated value. To choose the last option, the most secure, was the only way that object became *real*, that is, socially real, as something manifest, open, known, valued, exchangeable, and so forth. The processes of the Hethewardmote were thus what constituted wrecks as objects, and eventually as property—a found object could be neither legitimate nor valuable unless it went through the court’s legal processes. As David Delaney has remarked, “through the imposition of ‘form’ on what may appear as formlessness, and of meaning on potential meaninglessness, law recreates the conditions of its own possibility.”<sup>124</sup> The court’s concerns framed “what” the material was, and the material itself shaped the possibilities of the court’s referents; this dialectic molded the object’s social and economic significance within the local community.

Of course, the legal-material transition from washed-up stuff to proprietary goods displays a rather particular set of concerns. Different medieval legal institutions made use of different visions of materiality depending on their purpose and functions. At the same time, it is noteworthy that some of the concepts employed in the Hethewardmote were of wider currency in late medieval English law. Most obviously, there was the concept of “treasure trove”—another royal prerogative right like wreck—that came into play when people dug up hoards of money or other valuables.<sup>125</sup> Treasure trove, as we might expect, seems to have been relatively rare. A

<sup>122</sup> For instances of concealing, see SROI, HD 371/1, mm. 6v, 9v (three instances), 10v, 11r, 11v; HD 371/2, mm. 1r, 1v. The cluster of incidents around the last membranes of HD 371/1 is illusory in terms of chronology; the membranes are not always bound sequentially. The verso of the ninth membrane thus refers to a court held in 1397, whereas those courts recorded on the tenth and eleventh are from a decade earlier. Incidentally, there is nothing in the court proceedings of (November) 1381 to suggest that the fishermen were influenced by the general revolt of that year (HD 371/1, m. 4r).

<sup>123</sup> Forrest, “The Transformation of Visitation in Thirteenth-Century England,” 34–37.

<sup>124</sup> David Delaney, *Law and Nature* (Cambridge, 2003), 22.

<sup>125</sup> On the concept, see Baker, *An Introduction to English Legal History*, 388. For a late-fifteenth-

more quotidian analogue with shipwreck was the legal registration of “strays,” animals that had wandered into the community whose owners were unknown. Normally such an animal was impounded and proclamation was made throughout the vill for the owner to come forward; if no one claimed the animal within a year and a day, then it became the property of the lord.<sup>126</sup> There was apparently not any reward for the finder of a stray, although custody and perhaps use of the animal was given to a court official in the interim.

The comparison between shipwrecks and strays is illuminating. In both cases, the owner of a piece of property had become separated from it by misfortune; in both cases, he retained ownership for a length of time; in both cases, his continued absence transformed the thing from a piece of “lost property” into a safeguarded object, and eventually into someone else’s property; and in both cases, finally, the crown theoretically profited from the accident (although as with wreck rights, it was common for a local lord to actually receive the lost things by virtue of royal grant). It was situations such as these—strays, accidental losses, and loans—that prompted medieval common lawyers to break with their general reluctance to use the word “property” in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.<sup>127</sup> And indeed, they raise an important theoretical issue: the very etymology of “property,” as Nicholas Blomley has pointed out, implies the closeness of an object to oneself (in Latin, *prope*—in front of, before).<sup>128</sup> Once people are separated from their material things, their property, a whole host of legal, social, and economic conventions have to do the work that is normally done by physical proximity.

THE PROCESSES THAT A GIVEN LEGAL CULTURE uses to deal with “lost property” tell us a great deal about the way it conceives, creates, enforces, and re-creates property in things. In medieval England, lost property—even goods whose very presence was made possible by vast trade routes—was handled mainly by local courts. By the middle of the sixteenth century, a combination of legal centralization and institutional change meant that the officers of the High Court of Admiralty were carrying out the work once done by the bailiffs of courts such as the Hethewardmote.<sup>129</sup> Shipwrecks were no longer listed and quickly shuffled off to the nearest “finder” available: early modern scribes began to transcribe the merchant marks of foreign traders who had lost their goods, so that they could be matched with those inscribed on the objects

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century example, see TNA, C1/66/305. The best (but rather outdated) work on the history of treasure trove is George Francis Hill, *Treasure-Trove: The Law and Practice of Antiquity* (Oxford, 1933).

<sup>126</sup> For a printed example of this common occurrence in leet courts, see Bailey, *The English Manor*, 226–227 (court at Fitfield, Berkshire, 1441). Although conceptually and colloquially grouped together, strays were distinct from “waifs,” which were the goods abandoned by thieves in flight; these were forfeit to the king, or to lords who were granted that right. See Baker, *An Introduction to English Legal History*, 389.

<sup>127</sup> Seipp, “The Concept of Property in the Early Common Law,” 44, 52, 86–87.

<sup>128</sup> Nicholas Blomley, “Cuts, Flows, and the Geographies of Property,” *Law, Culture and the Humanities* 7, no. 2 (2011): 203–216, here 205.

<sup>129</sup> There is no modern account of the medieval development of the Admiralty and its courts. See the brief account in the introduction to Marsden, *Select Pleas in the Court of Admiralty*, xi–lxxxviii.



that washed up.<sup>130</sup> It was not simply that the horizons of trade had expanded (although they had), nor that people's attitudes to materiality and material culture had fundamentally changed.<sup>131</sup> Rather, the legal processes that dealt with shipwreck had gradually transformed from a loose aggregation of local courts employing broadly similar customs, into a more coordinated "network of agencies" that experimented with ways of better enforcing property rights.<sup>132</sup> As legal institutions and procedures changed, so the relationship between property and materiality changed. Physical things—now more routinely branded and marked, precisely weighed and measured, warranted and stamped—became, perhaps, more tightly bound to owners ever more distant in an age of global empire.<sup>133</sup>

Legal processes did not just facilitate the circulation of objects, however, but also helped to define what those objects were and what they could do. For example, the assessed value of the "deodand," the object that had caused an individual's death, had to be paid to the crown. The jurors on coroners' inquests, who made these assessments, were drawn from the locale in which the death had taken place, and therefore "often did their utmost to shield their unfortunate fellows who owned deodands."<sup>134</sup> Hunnisett notes an inquest from 1383 in which William Bat died after he was run down by a horse-drawn cart. The jurors obstinately asserted that as "neither the cart nor the horses were the cause of death of the said William, they were not obliged to value them for the use of the lord king."<sup>135</sup> Rather, they asserted, it was the much cheaper cart wheel that had caused the man's death. Problems of causation were framed as legal questions, and answered by immediate socioeconomic concerns. Or to look at it the other way around, physical things were distributed unevenly in the environment, and were occasionally involved in certain remarkable occurrences (like death, shipwreck, treasure trove, or strays); legal processes were required to redistribute and rearrange them, in order that they could become unremarkable again, part of the quotidian material culture of medieval life.

In exploring the materiality of medieval law, there is always this complex interplay between legal concepts and discourse, the immediate concerns of human actors and the objects themselves. None was fully determinative of the others: legal categories were bent and molded, people compromised, and objects were rearranged, both physically and conceptually, in convenient ways. Equally, each exercised some force on the others: law provided institutions and ideas that shaped people's lives, individuals made spontaneous decisions, and objects occasionally "pushed back" against

<sup>130</sup> See the notebook of the vice-admiral of Norfolk and Suffolk (for the years 1536–1537), TNA, HCA 13/1. For the marks, see fols. 16r–v, 19r–v.

<sup>131</sup> This is suggested by Rublack, "Matter in the Material Renaissance," 85: "Subjectivity was *increasingly* experienced in relation to this transient or durable object world, and not just in relation to other people"; emphasis added.

<sup>132</sup> This term is developed and elaborated in Michael J. Braddick, *State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550–1700* (Cambridge, 2000).

<sup>133</sup> See the remarks on "the ship as accounting space" in Miles Ogborn, "Writing Travels: Power, Knowledge and Ritual on the English East India Company's Early Voyages," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, n.s., 27, no. 2 (2002): 155–171, here 163–164.

<sup>134</sup> Hunnisett, *The Medieval Coroner*, 33.

<sup>135</sup> TNA, JUST 2/9, m. 5r: "p[re]d[ic]ta carecta nec equos causa mortis p[re]d[ic]ti Will[el]mi ad opus d[omi]ni Regis app[re]ciari non debent." The unusual amount of detail about the verdict in this case suggests that the coroner who recorded it was rather skeptical, and wished to distance himself from the decision: this is noted in Hunnisett, *Medieval Coroner*, 33–34.



the roles assigned to them. The Hethewardmote recorded that Richard Goodwyn captured a porpoise “which he was not able to guard safely and liberate to the lord according to the custom of the manor, on account of which it is feeble and rotten.”<sup>136</sup>

Matter degenerated and re-formed, complicating the operation of the legal institutions and people that made it their concern. Rotten porpoises were worthy of comment in relation to custom; the destructive power of carts relative to cart wheels caused disputes between legal officers and the local community; mariners were prepared to swear under oath that their shipmaster had “found” a shipwreck. The relationship between medieval law and materiality was enacted in this infinitesimal accretion of categories, conventions, and procedures that helped to shape material stuff into discrete objects of legal concern, with social, economic, and political consequences that could reverberate around the local community. As legal processes gave forms, names, owners, qualities, and values to objects, these physical things gave substance to law.

<sup>136</sup> SROI, HD 1032/88, m. 7r.

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**Tom Johnson** recently completed his doctoral thesis, “Law, Space, and Local Knowledge in Late-Medieval England,” at Birkbeck, University of London; he is currently developing this work into a monograph. His postdoctoral research will explore the relationship between law and materiality in England ca. 1270–1420. In October 2015, he will take up a Junior Research Fellowship at Emmanuel College, Cambridge.

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# Atlantic History and the Slave Trade to Spanish America

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ALEX BORUCKI, DAVID ELTIS, AND DAVID WHEAT

WITHIN HALF A CENTURY OF COLUMBIAN CONTACT, the most powerful state in Europe had taken over the two most powerful polities in the Americas: the Aztec and Inca empires. From that point until at least 1810, Spanish America was the largest and most populated European imperial domain in the New World, stretching eventually from California to Buenos Aires. Both the first and the last slave voyages to cross the Atlantic disembarked not very far from each other, in the Spanish colonies of Hispaniola (1505) and Cuba (1867).<sup>1</sup> This continent-sized group of colonies developed the first and, until the late eighteenth century, the largest free black population in the Americas.<sup>2</sup> Spanish America was therefore the part of the Americas with the most enduring links to Africa. Yet while the French, the British, and even the Portuguese empires have reasonably precise data on the origins, composition, and de-

<sup>1</sup> The first African slaves probably arrived in 1501 from Seville, Spain, but not on a slave voyage in the usual sense. Antônio de Almeida Mendes, "The Foundations of the System: A Reassessment of the Slave Trade to the Spanish Americas in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in David Eltis and David Richardson, eds., *Extending the Frontiers: Essays on the New Transatlantic Slave Trade Database* (New Haven, Conn., 2008), 63–94.

<sup>2</sup> Spain's American possessions, the size and complexity of which should not be underestimated, were the linchpin of an empire that was genuinely global in scope during the eras of Hapsburg and Bourbon rule. In Europe, it stretched from the Spanish Netherlands to Sicily, and from Oran in North Africa to the Canary Islands. It included the Philippines in Asia, and the Mariana Islands and Guam in Oceania. During the Iberian Union, which lasted from 1580 to 1640, the Spanish crown also ruled over Portugal and the entire Portuguese empire, including Brazil and Angola, and territories in North Africa, India, and the Moluccas, among many other sites. Until the Constitution of 1812, Spanish territories in the Americas were considered kingdoms or provinces under the rule of the Spanish crown (much like the kingdoms of Aragon and Naples), and were typically grouped into larger administrative units known as audiencias. The audiencias, in turn, nominally fell under the jurisdiction of viceroalties, though some retained a considerable degree of autonomy. The main center of Spanish power in North America was the Viceroyalty of New Spain, which encompassed all of modern Mexico plus the provinces of Upper California, New Mexico, and Texas. Stretching across the circum-Caribbean, the Audiencia of Santo Domingo included the islands of Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, and Cuba, as well as Florida. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it also included most of present-day Venezuela and its neighboring islands, and it would add the Floridas (again) and Louisiana during the eighteenth century. The neighboring Audiencia of Guatemala encompassed most of Central America, including territories that correspond to the modern nations of Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica. Immediately to the south, the Audiencias of Panamá, Santa Fe, and Quito—more or less corresponding to the modern nations of Panamá, Colombia, and Ecuador—fell within the jurisdiction of the expansive Viceroyalty of Peru, as did the audiencias of Charcas, Chile, and Lima (where the viceroyalty was headquartered), including territories in what are today Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. In short, Spain laid claim to all of South America, with the exceptions of Brazil and the "Wild Coast" of Suriname and the Guyanas; the Viceroyalty of Lima ostensibly held sway over this vast region until the establishment of additional viceroalties and audiencias as in Buenos Aires during the eighteenth century.

mographic evolution of their black populations, most of the information we have for the Spanish colonies is on nineteenth-century Cuba. How puzzling that we know less about the size, nature, and significance of the African connection with Spanish America, especially the Spanish role in the slave trade, than we do about any other branch of the transatlantic traffic.<sup>3</sup> While there is an ancient and well-developed historiography on Latin America, Africans in the Spanish-speaking Americas, and indeed the Spanish themselves, have yet to receive their due in Atlantic history—at least for the years after 1640.

Using the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, at [www.slavevoyages.org](http://www.slavevoyages.org), as well as new archival sources, we have conducted a new evaluation of the slave trade to the Spanish colonies. Our reassessment has given us a new appreciation of not only the African presence in the Spanish Americas, but also—given the links between slavery and economic power before abolition—the status of the whole Spanish imperial project. Overall, more enslaved Africans permanently entered the Spanish Americas than the whole British Caribbean, making Spanish America the most important political entity in the Americas after Brazil to receive slaves. We now believe that as many as 1,506,000 enslaved Africans arrived in the Spanish Americas directly from Africa between 1520 and 1810. We further estimate that an additional 566,000 enslaved Africans were disembarked in Spanish America from other European colonies in the New World, such as Jamaica and Brazil. Our new, upwardly revised figures will appear on the updated estimates page of the Voyages section of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database (hereafter Voyages); however, it is important to note that the database does not address the trans-imperial intra-American slave trade, a lacuna that obscures the picture of how the slave traffic functioned in Spanish America.

Two-thirds of the more than two million enslaved Africans arriving in the Spanish Americas disembarked before 1810—prior to the era of large-scale sugar cultivation in Cuba and Puerto Rico—which necessitates a reconsideration of the real significance of slavery in Spain's American colonies. This large inflow is indeed remarkable when we remember that the labor force sustaining the most valuable export of these colonies—silver—was largely Amerindian. In every other European empire in the Americas, by contrast, it was slaves of African descent who produced all significant exports until well into the nineteenth century. British military and industrial ascendancy in the eighteenth century and the meteoric rise and fall of St. Domingue have blinded scholars to the continued expansion of the Spanish colonies and their populations of African descent through to their independence. Nevertheless, black populations had a key role in the growth of the Spanish Americas before 1800.

In addition to the importance of the slave trade for the colonization and development of the Spanish Americas, the Spanish colonies have significance for the broader history of the transatlantic slave trade, and consequently for Atlantic history. The history of the slave trade to Spanish America had implications for the whole

<sup>3</sup> Nationally bounded works on slavery do exist, but they tend to say little about the African origins of captives. For broad overviews, see Rolando Mellafe, *La esclavitud en Hispanoamérica* (Buenos Aires, 1964); Leslie B. Rout Jr., *The African Experience in Spanish America, 1502 to the Present Day* (Cambridge, 1976); Jean-Pierre Tardieu, *Le destin des noirs aux Indes de Castille, XVI<sup>e</sup>–XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècles* (Paris, 1984). Even the rollovers on the map displayed on the home page of [www.slavevoyages.org](http://www.slavevoyages.org) ignore Spanish America.



Atlantic in the sense that it drew on *all* European branches of this traffic, and captives from *all* African regions engaged in this traffic landed in at least one of the many Spanish colonies. It was not only the metropolitan authorities of the different European powers who fought over and negotiated slave-trade contracts, but also, at the local level, officials, merchants, and Africans—often the very subjects being trafficked—who shaped the trans-imperial trade flows of the New World.

For the first decades of the slave traffic, as for the last, the slave trade provides a previously overlooked means of gauging the economic strength of the Spanish Americas relative to other European empires. Riverine gold and copper mined by slaves guaranteed the preeminence of Hispaniola prior to the invasion of the mainland, and Cuba's sugar sector ensured that this island probably had a higher per capita output than the United States in the mid-nineteenth century, as well as the first railroad network in Latin America.<sup>4</sup> But even in the eighteenth century, exports to Europe from the Spanish Americas had a far greater value than those from their British, French, Dutch, and Portuguese counterparts. In 1700, the total output of the non-Hispanic Caribbean, more than 90 percent of which consisted of sugar and sugar by-products, amounted to 1.7 million pounds sterling or 7.6 million pesos.<sup>5</sup> In the Spanish possessions, by contrast, bullion production alone averaged 8 million pesos annually from 1696 to 1700, an amount that made them also more valuable to Spain than Brazil was to Portugal, and than both mainland and Caribbean colonies were to the British. Seventy years later, the supremacy of the Spanish was only slightly eroded. The total annual value in pesos of French Caribbean output was 23.1 million, and of British, 16.2 million, whereas the Spanish Empire generated exports worth close to 31 million pesos—29.2 of which was bullion. Even if we include the thirteen mainland colonies in the British total, the Spanish Americas still come out well ahead—it is just that they no longer out-produced all their competitors combined.<sup>6</sup> The cession of Jamaica to Britain and St. Domingue to France apparently did not enable the British and French to catch up prior to the era of independence; Spanish America grew vigorously until at least 1800.<sup>7</sup> Alongside specie exports and population estimates, the slave trade can be used as an indicator of the continued dynamism of Spanish America in the Atlantic prior to 1800, and in Cuba specifically

<sup>4</sup> Laird W. Bergad, *The Comparative Histories of Slavery in Brazil, Cuba, and the United States* (Cambridge, 2007), 18; "Introduction," in David Eltis, Frank D. Lewis, and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, eds., *Slavery in the Development of the Americas* (Cambridge, 2004), 1–6; David Eltis, *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade* (New York, 1987), 235–236; Stanley L. Engerman, Stephen Haber, and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, "Inequality, Institutions and Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies," in Claude Menard, ed., *Institutions, Contracts and Organizations: Perspectives from New Institutional Economics* (Cheltenham, 2000), 108–134.

<sup>5</sup> Calculated from David Eltis, "The Slave Economies of the Caribbean: Structure, Performance, Evolution and Significance," in Franklin W. Knight, ed., *General History of the Caribbean*, vol. 3: *The Slave Societies of the Caribbean* (New York, 1997), 105–137, here 110, 118. The Caribbean total does include the Spanish Antilles, though removing them would not change our assessment.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. For bullion production and shipments, see John J. TePaske, *A New World of Gold and Silver*, ed. Kendall W. Brown (Leiden, 2010), data from 315. For exchange rates, see John J. McCusker, *Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600–1775: A Handbook* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1978), 104, 106. For a similar argument on the importance of Spanish colonies, see Javier Cuenca-Esteban, "Statistics of Spain's Colonial Trade, 1747–1820: New Estimates and Comparisons with Great Britain," *Revista de Historia Económica* 26, no. 3 (2008): 323–354.

<sup>7</sup> Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, *Economic Development in the Americas since 1500: Endowments and Institutions* (Cambridge, 2012), chaps. 1 and 2. See p. 10 on comparative GDP and p. 45 on population.

to 1867. Economic divergence between the Spanish Americas, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other, began only in the nineteenth century.<sup>8</sup>

Indigenous peoples mined most of the silver that underpinned colonial exports, but the role of Africans has been poorly understood in an Atlantic world historiography that has emphasized export-oriented plantations. With the possible exception of nineteenth-century Cuba, the Black Atlantic is still defined in terms of links between Africa, on the one hand, and the English, French, and Lusophone worlds, on the other. From 1640 to the end of the eighteenth century, the Spanish Empire's links with Africa are seen as moribund, compared to the millions of Africans pouring into the non-Spanish Americas.<sup>9</sup> References to a "second Atlantic" have recently appeared, denoting the period dominated by Northwestern Europe (England, France, and to a lesser extent the Netherlands), in contrast to the Iberian-led "first Atlantic."<sup>10</sup> Our calculations counter this view. The slave trade remained of central importance during all four centuries of Spanish colonialism in the New World. The slave trade was pivotal not just for the early colonization of the Spanish Americas, when varied regional economies emerged in both highlands and lowlands. It was also of key importance throughout the eighteenth century, when the Spanish transformed their empire.<sup>11</sup> Thereafter it sustained the rise of export-oriented sugar and coffee plantations in Cuba and Puerto Rico.

Figure 1 provides an overview of our new assessment. While the major British (and indeed Portuguese) transatlantic slave trade rose and fell in a regular parabola from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, Figure 1 shows the bi-modal pattern of the traffic to Spanish America, with a first peak around 1620 and a second, higher peak in the nineteenth century. The U shape in between was emphatic. But the figure also adds information on intra-American voyages, that is, slave expeditions departing from the non-Hispanic Caribbean and Brazil for the Spanish colonies.

<sup>8</sup> For explanations stressing factor endowments, sustained growth, and relative equality in the U.S. and Canada vis-à-vis Latin America, see Stephen Haber, ed., *How Latin America Fell Behind: Essays on the Economic Histories of Brazil and Mexico, 1800–1914* (Stanford, Calif., 1997).

<sup>9</sup> For Spanish echoes of this view, see Josep M. Fradera and Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, "Introduction: Colonial Pioneer and Plantation Latecomer," in Fradera and Schmidt-Nowara, eds., *Slavery and Antislavery in Spain's Atlantic Empire* (New York, 2013), 1–12. "Spain was the first Atlantic empire to establish sugar plantations in its American colonies, but it was also the last to engage directly in the transatlantic slave trade" (1).

<sup>10</sup> The terms "first" and "second" Atlantic appear in P. C. Emmer, "The Dutch and the Making of the Second Atlantic System," in Barbara L. Solow, ed., *Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System* (Cambridge, 1991), 75–96, here 78. Elinor G. K. Melville argues that "the Spaniards remained primarily agro-pastoralists of the temperate highlands and latitudes; they avoided the humid tropical lowlands where possible," unlike the Portuguese in Brazil. Melville, "Land Use and the Transformation of the Environment," in Victor Bulmer-Thomas, John H. Coatsworth, and Roberto Cortés Conde, eds., *The Cambridge Economic History of Latin America*, vol. 1: *The Colonial Era and the Short Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, 2006), 109–142, here 125. More bluntly, Robin Blackburn in his widely read *Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848* (London, 1988), 16–17, contrasts the "vigour" of the English and French colonies with that of the Spanish, where the creole elite outside the plantation sectors were "sunk in provincial torpor." For a more realistic view of how the Spanish Empire shaped the Atlantic world, see Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, *How to Write the History of the New World: Histories, Epistemologies, and Identities in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World* (Stanford, Calif., 2001).

<sup>11</sup> Aaron Alejandro Olivas, "The Global Politics of the Transatlantic Slave Trade during the War of the Spanish Succession, 1700–1715," in Francisco Eissa-Barroso and Ainara Vázquez Varela, eds., *Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era, 1700–1739* (Leiden, 2013), 85–109. On the late colonial period, see Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic* (Princeton, N.J., 2006), chap. 2.






FIGURE 1: The Slave Trade to Spanish America

More than a quarter of the slaves arriving in Spanish America had departed from colonies of other European powers in the New World rather than directly from Africa. Figure 1 shows that the lowest point of the transatlantic Spanish trade's U trend was offset to some extent by the trans-imperial intra-American traffic from 1640 until its ending by 1820, during the era of independence for the Spanish American mainland, but not completely so.

Cartagena, Veracruz, Buenos Aires, and Hispaniola received the majority of slave arrivals shown by the first peak in Figure 1, with many captives then re-exported to additional destinations, including Lima and Mexico City. By contrast, Cuba and Puerto Rico account for almost all of the second peak. Nevertheless, some regions, such as the Río de la Plata—today's Argentina and Uruguay—and to a lesser extent Venezuela, did experience this U-shaped trend. The Río de la Plata both absorbed slaves and was a major entrepôt, supplying Chile and Peru, whereas slaves arriving in Venezuela tended to remain there. In Mexico the slave trade declined from the 1650s to the last recorded transatlantic slave arrival in 1735. There was nevertheless a vibrant and naturally growing population of African ancestry, probably made possible by the less brutal working conditions (notably the absence of a dominant sugar sector) and Spain's reliance on a large Amerindian labor force, both coerced and free, for the harsh work in the mines.

The dual-peak structure of the slave trade to Spanish America also points to two major cycles of demographic change related to African arrivals (Africanization) and the intermixing of indigenous peoples, Africans, and Europeans in the Americas (*mestizaje*). These cycles provide a chronological framework that helps to explain why identities evolved differently in the Spanish colonies than they did in what be-

came the United States. While some Spanish American colonies experienced a cycle of Africanization followed by *mestizaje* during the first slave-trade peak, and others experienced the same during the second peak, some regions can be said to have experienced both. The relative weight of these two processes varied across the Spanish colonies. With the possible exception of New Orleans (itself a Spanish colony from 1769 until 1803), it is difficult to imagine any city in the early-nineteenth-century United States in which people of mixed origins outnumbered those of either full European or African ancestry, as was the case in Venezuela in 1810. For the antebellum U.S., it is equally difficult to visualize the almost complete disappearance of “black” as a category of identity in official records, subsumed by multiple *mestizo* labels, as in early independent Mexico. Further, there was no equivalent in the United States of the diversity of African-based associations and religions that existed in Cuba and the Río de la Plata as late as the 1830s.

HOW CAN WE BE SURE THAT the broad trends shown in Figure 1 are correct? To explain the Spanish slave trade, we first have to define it. Two rather different concepts are possible—on the one hand, the traffic into the Spanish colonies; and on the other, the smaller and less significant slave trade carried out on Spanish vessels. For anyone working with official documents of the early modern era, it must often appear that incompetence, smuggling, venal officials, and the hazards of everyday life undermine the reliability of any state-generated data. For the slave trade, skepticism takes the form of doubt regarding whether every actual voyage could have left behind evidence, and whether the numbers of people on board such vessels are likely underreported. These problems loom large for the Spanish Atlantic, notwithstanding the fact that the Spanish bureaucracy probably generated more documentation per imperial subject than any other empire before the nineteenth century. Thus, for Colin Palmer, tracking the British *asiento* in the first half of the eighteenth century, “Contraband traders . . . may have sold the Spaniards as many or even more slaves than their legal counterparts but this dimension of the trade . . . will forever be confined to the realm of scholarly speculation.” Juan Amores’s study of the traffic into Cuba (1760–1790) describes an uncontrollable slave trade and a huge contraband, with officials pointing to a coastline, “almost all of it open and unguarded.” For Leslie Rout, “all efforts aimed at making an acceptable estimate of the Spanish American slave traffic [are] innately flawed.”<sup>12</sup> Contraband, slaves landed in Spanish colonies outside the official record, seemed impossible to stop.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> In the context of the transatlantic slave trade, *asientos* were monopoly contracts in which the Spanish crown granted permission to individual merchants or merchant houses to orchestrate the transportation of a fixed number of enslaved Africans to specific Spanish American ports over a set period of time. On contraband, see Colin A. Palmer, “The Company Trade and the Numerical Distribution of Slaves to Spanish America, 1703–1739,” in Paul E. Lovejoy, ed., *Africans in Bondage: Studies in Slavery and the Slave Trade* (Madison, Wis., 1986), 27–42, here 40; Juan B. Amores, *Cuba en la época de Ezpeleta, 1785–1790* (Pamplona, 2000), 133; Rout, *The African Experience in Spanish America*, 66. We thank Henry Lovejoy for drawing our attention to Amores’s book.

<sup>13</sup> Due to limitations of space here, we cannot adequately address the extensive body of scholarship devoted to examining the nature and significance of contraband in colonial Spanish America. Suffice it to say that Spanish sources prior to 1800 rarely used the word *contrabando* to describe contraband trade, which is illustrative of the very thin line (if such a line even existed) between legal trade and



But is the situation quite so hopeless? For the British, French, Dutch, and Luso-Brazilian slave trades, internal and external (to the state, that is) checks are possible for some periods, so that one might be able to assess the probability that ships were omitted from the Voyages database.<sup>14</sup> Such checks are not yet possible for most of the Spanish transatlantic slave trade, but readers should keep in mind a broader perspective on the size and direction of the traffic into Spanish colonies. During the second half of the seventeenth century, the era in which Britain entered the transatlantic slave trade and solidified its presence in the Americas, observers in Jamaica indicated that slave prices were higher in the Spanish markets than in the British Caribbean.<sup>15</sup> And Joseph Massie, an acute observer of the English sugar business, pointed out in a book published in 1759 that in the previous thirty years, low slave prices had underpinned the success of the English plantations.<sup>16</sup> Contraband was significant, but it was not large enough to integrate the Spanish and British markets in the Caribbean to the extent that price differences reflected no more than the cost of sailing from one market to another. After 1790, by contrast, captains typically checked out slave prices in at least two of the major markets of Kingston, Havana, and Charleston (where prices by then were similar) before deciding where to sell. The same voyage from Africa frequently shows up in more than one of these ports within the space of a month.

New archival data have enabled us to reassess the key routes by which Africans entered the Spanish Americas, as well as to carry out a more refined inquiry into contraband. As a result, we are able to shed new light on two large branches of the slave trade to Spanish America: the transatlantic traffic for the period before the breakup of the Iberian Union (when Portugal and its colonies were under the Spanish crown) in 1641, and the intra-American traffic that from 1661 to about 1800 became the Spanish Americas' major source of African slaves. We offer little new information on nineteenth-century Cuba and Puerto Rico, a branch of the trade that has been subject to greater scholarly scrutiny than inflows into other Spanish American colonies.

Table 1 provides a breakdown of slave arrivals across broad regions of the Americas, together with a separate column to the right that presents our estimates of

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contraband. Seemingly an oxymoron, the category of "legalized contraband" best describes the interplay of strategies between metropolitan and colonial authorities on this issue.

<sup>14</sup> David Eltis and Paul F. Lachance, "Estimates of the Size and Direction of Transatlantic Slave Trade," 2–3, <http://www.slavevoyages.org/downloads/estimates-method.pdf>.

<sup>15</sup> Walter Riding to the Royal African Company [hereafter RAC], July 27, 1691, British National Archives [hereafter BNA], T70/17, fol. 26; William Noël, Sainsbury, J. W. Fortescue, Cecil Headlam, and Arthur Percival Newton, eds., *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series*, 44 vols. (London, 1860–1969), 5: 36, "Narrative of the buying and forfeiture of a shipload of negroes . . .," June 4, 1661; Chaplin and Parke, January 29, 1707, T70/8, fols. 20, 23, 24; Beckford and Galdy, January 16, 1708, T70/8, fol. 30.

<sup>16</sup> "British Sugar planters have all along had a considerable advantage over the French Sugar Planters; . . . the British traders . . . have not only supplied our . . . colonies with Sufficient Numbers of Negroes, at moderate prices, but have likewise been able to furnish several Thousands yearly, for the Spanish Colonies . . . [N]o People who trade in or to the West Indies, navigate so cheap, or carry any commodities in, to, or from the West Indies, for so little money as the English do." J. Massie, *A State of the British Sugar Colony Trade* (London, 1759), 22, 26. Modern research supports this viewpoint; David Eltis and David Richardson, "Productivity in the Slave Trade," *Explorations in Economic History* 32 (1995): 465–484.

TABLE 1: Slaves Arriving in the Americas by Broad Region and Slaves Arriving under the Spanish Flag Direct from Africa, 1525–1867

	Mainland								Slaves arriving under
	North America	British Caribbean	French Caribbean	Dutch Americas	Danish West Indies	Spanish Americas	Brazil	Totals	Spanish flag
pre-1581	0	0	0	0	0	84,900	4,100	89,000	84,900
1581–1640	100	100	0	0	0	444,900	261,400	706,500	222,450
1641–1700	15,000	308,000	38,700	124,200	18,100	61,700	523,000	1,088,700	21,700
1701–1760	188,900	807,000	393,700	162,700	20,500	56,800	1,084,600	2,714,200	300
1761–1820	184,200	1,173,200	640,500	154,300	62,300	298,900	1,696,600	4,210,000	133,600
1821–1867	500	11,000	47,300	3,500	8,100	558,800	1,269,400	1,898,600	563,100
Total	388,700	2,299,300	1,120,200	444,700	109,000	1,506,000	4,839,100	10,707,000	1,026,100
Adjustment for intra-American trade		–247,500	–19,000	–115,900	–47,800	566,300	–136,100		
Total after adjustment	388,700	2,051,800	1,101,200	328,800	61,200	2,072,300	4,703,000	10,707,000	

Source: <http://Slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces?yearFrom=1501&yearTo=1866>, with modifications. For column 6 see text, and for row 8 see Alex Borucki, David Eltis, and David Wheat, “Notes on the Estimates of the Intra-American Slave Trade to the Spanish Americas” and “IntraAmer-toSpanAmer.xlsx,” both downloadable at <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/download.faces>.

Note: The Spanish and British totals have been adjusted to reflect the changing status of Trinidad. On the 2010 estimates page of the Voyages database, Trinidad is classed as part of the British Americas even though British occupation began only in 1797. Here, the 16,500 captives taken there before 1797 are reassigned to the Spanish Americas.

captives carried on Spanish vessels alone. The non-Spanish data in columns 1 through 5 and column 7 are all from the 2010 version of the Voyages database, but the two Spanish columns—one for the Spanish Americas (column 6) and one for the slaves transported under the Spanish flag (column 9)—are new. The Spanish figures previous to 1641 draw on new archival data and in addition incorporate a fresh approach to estimating the large illegal influx of slaves into Spain’s colonies that occurred throughout the slave-trade era. Table 1 shows that in the pre-1641 period, 529,800 captives arrived in the Spanish Americas from Africa. Thus, according to our calculations, almost 60 percent more Africans arrived in the New World than the 2010 Voyages estimate page displays. For the later period, too, new transatlantic voyages to Venezuela and the Río de la Plata have come to light.<sup>17</sup> For the whole period, we found that 14 percent more slaves entered the Spanish Americas directly from Africa than are shown on the Voyages estimate page.

Whereas the 2010 Voyages dataset contains 998 voyages prior to 1641, we now have information on 1,843 transatlantic slave voyages to the Spanish Americas. The new material permits us to construct robust lower-bound estimates of the size and direction of the first half-century of the traffic. Iberian registration and port-de-

<sup>17</sup> For arrivals direct from Africa into the Río de la Plata, 1641–1760, we use the list of voyages in the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, [www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces?yearFrom=1641&yearTo=1760&mjslptimp=42000](http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces?yearFrom=1641&yearTo=1760&mjslptimp=42000), with 10 percent added for unreported captives. For the later period, see Alex Borucki, “The Slave Trade to the Río de la Plata, 1777–1812: Trans-Imperial Networks and Atlantic Warfare,” *Colonial Latin American Review* 20, no. 1 (2011): 81–107; Borucki, “Trans-Imperial History in the Making of the Slave Trade to Venezuela, 1526–1811,” *Itinerario* 36, no. 2 (2012): 29–54.



parture records constitute our only source of information for many slaving voyages up to 1580. Thus most volume estimates for the years prior to 1581—including Antonio Mendes's estimates for those years, and the estimates page of Voyages based on his work—are heavily influenced by research on slave-trade *licencias*, permits that were awarded by the Spanish crown but did not necessarily result in slaving voyages.<sup>18</sup> Our data for this period, by contrast, consist primarily of intended slaving voyages and vessels that actually arrived in Spanish American ports. Despite the different methodologies, the two approaches generate similar outcomes: 84,900 vs. 82,000 slaves for 1526–1580. For the period 1581–1640, we now have 583 more voyages than are shown in the 2010 Voyages database. While the work of Enriqueta Vila Vilar previously grounded our knowledge of the traffic during the Iberian Union, it now appears that her data account for less than half of all known arrivals for the years 1595–1640 alone.<sup>19</sup> More important than the additional voyages is the much clearer idea of how many captives slave vessels carried when they arrived in the Americas.<sup>20</sup> The improved data indicate that the slave trade to the early Spanish Americas has been greatly underestimated.

The additional archival data permit us to take a new approach to the question of contraband, slaves landed in Spanish colonies outside the official record. Of the 1,843 voyages recorded in our dataset, 748, or about 40 percent, have no information on the number of slaves carried, leaving 1,095 for which we know at least one of three indicators of how many were on board. The first is the number that captains declared they had on board at the port of entry (800), the second is the number that the vessel was licensed to carry before the voyage began (721), and the third is the number that were actually carried (65). Voyages fell into this last group because they had become the subject of intense investigation by colonial authorities. Such inquiries generated sufficient data that we feel reasonably certain of knowing the actual number of slaves

<sup>18</sup> Mendes, "The Foundations of the System." The foundational study of sixteenth-century licenses is Lutgardo García Fuentes, "Licencias para la introducción de esclavos en Indias y envíos desde Sevilla en el siglo XVI," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas* 19 (1982): 1–46.

<sup>19</sup> Enriqueta Vila Vilar, *Hispanoamérica y el comercio de esclavos: Los asientos portugueses* (Seville, 1977).

<sup>20</sup> The additional information comes from sources in the Archivo General de Indias [hereafter AGI] not previously consulted, as well as published sources. For the former, see Alex Borucki, David Eltis, and David Wheat, "Notes on the Estimates of the Intra-American Slave Trade to the Spanish Americas," downloadable at <http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/download.faces>. For the latter, see Raúl A. Molina, *Las primeras experiencias comerciales del Plata: El comercio marítimo, 1580–1700* (Buenos Aires, 1966); Eduardo Arcila Farías, ed., *Hacienda y comercio de Venezuela en el siglo XVII, 1601–1650* (Caracas, 1986); Esteban Mira Caballos, "Las licencias de esclavos negros a Hispanoamérica, 1544–1550," *Revista de Indias* 54, no. 201 (1994): 273–297; Elsa Gelpí Baíz, *Siglo en blanco: Estudio de la economía azucarera en Puerto Rico, siglo XVI, 1540–1612* (San Juan, 2000); Nikolaus Böttcher, "Negreros portugueses y la Inquisición: Cartagena de Indias, siglo XVII," *Memoria* 9 (2003): 38–55; Rafael M. Pérez García and Manuel F. Fernández Chaves, "Sevilla y la trata negrera atlántica: Envíos de esclavos desde Cabo Verde a la América española, 1569–1579," in León Álvarez Santaló, ed., *Estudios de historia moderna en homenaje al profesor Antonio García-Baquero* (Seville, 2009), 597–622. Huguette and Pierre Chaunu's multi-volume work also provides Iberian port-departure data for more than 400 voyages, nearly half of which can presently be matched with Spanish American port entry records. Chaunu and Chaunu, *Séville et l'Atlantique, 1504–1650*, 8 vols. (Paris, 1955–1959), vols. 2–5. Our examination of AGI, Contratación 2898–2899, suggests that the Chaunus identified all vessels sailing to the Cape Verde Islands, the "Rivers of Guinea," or some other African port en route to Spanish America as slavers. They consulted several *legajos* in AGI-Contaduría, providing additional data for twenty-one voyages arriving in Nombre de Dios (Panama), and one voyage arriving in Veracruz in the years 1549–1569.

on board. For some cases, we know two or all three of the indicators. On average, we found that vessels were licensed to carry 156 slaves, and that, unsurprisingly, captains declared they had 153 on board when they arrived in the Americas. By contrast, the mean of the 64 Iberian slave ships (the 65th was a Dutch intruder) for which we have data on actual slaves disembarked was 287, suggesting that vessels delivered 80 percent more slaves than their captains were permitted to or admitted to.<sup>21</sup>

A subset of these 64 voyages comprising 61 cases also contained information on either licensed or declared numbers of captives, and thus we were able to estimate a simple regression equation that allowed us to predict actual numbers on board for the 1,030 individual voyages (1,095 less 65) for which the documents yield only licensed or declared numbers.<sup>22</sup> For the 748 voyages that lacked information of any kind on slaves, we simply assigned that same derived mean of 287. For the pre-1581 period, these procedures point to 84,900 captives disembarking (from 299 voyages) in the Spanish Americas, with 444,900 (on 1,544 voyages) estimated to have arrived between 1581 and 1640. This total is only for slaves coming directly from Africa, but even so, it does not include several thousand Africans carried across the Atlantic from Spain in small groups on the Indies fleets before 1641. Neither does it include any of the 666 vessels that Huguette and Pierre Chaunu identified as registered to depart from the Canary Islands for Spanish America before 1580, some of which likely carried slaves off from Africa on the way.<sup>23</sup> Finally, it includes only a few documented incursions of French, English, Dutch, and Portuguese slave ships during an era in which Spanish American colonists regularly engaged in *rescate* with such intruders despite the risk of penalties.<sup>24</sup> Thus, while our total for pre-1641 is substantially greater than previous estimates, it is readily apparent why we describe it as “lower-bound.”

After 1640, slave arrivals to the Spanish Americas declined precipitously. Be-

<sup>21</sup> These findings are consistent with Marc Eagle, “Chasing the *Avença*: An Investigation of Illicit Slave Trading in Santo Domingo at the End of the Portuguese *Asiento* Period,” *Slavery & Abolition* 35, no. 1 (2014): 99–120.

<sup>22</sup> Inspection of the resulting estimated values indicated some forty-seven anomalies for which further adjustment was required. For forty-eight cases, declared slaves in the historical record were equal to or less than forty. Almost all of these were identified as non-specialist slave ships. For these we set actual numbers equal to declared numbers. A further four cases turned out to have predicted values (calculated from the regression equations) lower than declared slaves. For these, too, we substituted declared values. The breakdown of the estimated 1,843 cases in the slave arrival column is as follows—65 with actual slaves reported, 52 with declared values, 979 with values predicted from registered slaves (via a simple regression), and 747 assigned a simple average of 287.

<sup>23</sup> Chaunu and Chaunu, *Séville et l'Atlantique*, 2: 416–419, 448–451, 466–471, 486–489, 498–503, 508–513, 522–527, 552–554, 564–570, 586–589; 3: 38–43, 54–59, 72–74, 82–85, 102–107, 116–121, 132–135, 142–149, 154–161, 170–177, 184–187, 196–201, 252–257, 264–265.

<sup>24</sup> *Rescate* (in this context meaning ransom or barter) referred to Spanish American colonists' acquisition of untaxed merchandise and slaves from merchants who were not authorized by the House of Trade in Seville. Merchants who eschewed Spain's mercantilist Atlantic fleet system by engaging in this type of direct commerce were often French, English, or Dutch traders arriving from non-Iberian colonies, or indeed from Western Europe. In many cases, these non-Iberian interlopers captured Spanish or Portuguese vessels at sea, then sailed to Spanish American ports, where they would attempt to sell any confiscated goods or captives. I. A. Wright, “Rescates: With Special Reference to Cuba, 1599–1610,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 3, no. 3 (1920): 333–361; Kenneth R. Andrews, *The Spanish Caribbean: Trade and Plunder, 1530–1630* (New Haven, Conn., 1978); Alejandro de la Fuente, “Introducción al estudio de la trata en Cuba: Siglos XVI y XVII,” *Santiago* 61 (1986): 155–208; Carlos Esteban Deive, *Tangomangos: Contrabando y piratería en Santo Domingo, 1522–1606* (Santo Domingo, 1996).



tween 1641 and 1789, Spanish vessels brought in only 23,500 captives directly from Africa, compared to a non-Spanish transatlantic component accounting for 128,100 people, with the British alone carrying more than half.<sup>25</sup> But in this same period, over four times more captives entered the Spanish Americas from other parts of the Americas, an activity summarized in row 8 of Table 1. Thus, soon after the collapse of the Iberian Union, Spanish merchants began to purchase captives from ports under the control of *all* European powers with a presence in the Americas, but especially the Dutch, Portuguese, and British. Sometimes this was under an *asiento* or contract, and sometimes not. The surviving record means that estimating these various streams of coerced migrants requires us to focus either on departures from major entrepôts such as Curaçao and Jamaica, or on arrivals at major Spanish American ports such as Cartagena. For the Río de la Plata during the whole period, the documentation is such that we can reconstruct an annual series of slave arrivals. For all other regions under Spanish control, however, we use both approaches. Before 1789, we focus on what the foreign entrepôts sent to the Spanish colonies; after 1789, data on inflows of captives into Spanish ports form the basis of our estimates.<sup>26</sup>

For the Spanish Americas, the intra-American slave trade had three major branches. The best-known of these centered on Curaçao, the Caribbean island close to Venezuela that, from 1662 to 1728 and intermittently thereafter, functioned as an entrepôt through which captives on Dutch transatlantic ships reached Spanish colonies. A second branch of the intra-American slave traffic originated in Barbados and Jamaica, while a third, based in Brazil, delivered slaves to the Río de la Plata for more than two centuries until the 1830s alongside its better-known transatlantic counterpart. In addition to these three distinct streams of traffic, there was a fourth, multi-branched inflow of shorter duration that drew from a wide range of Caribbean islands, intensifying between 1790 and 1808, and focused mostly on Cuba, as the sugar boom got underway, and to a much lesser extent on Venezuela.

The outlines of the Dutch entrepôt trade in Curaçao have become much clearer recently.<sup>27</sup> Between 1658 and 1777 (but mostly between 1662 and 1728), Curaçao was a major source for slaves entering the Spanish Caribbean islands and mainland, including the Gulf of Mexico. This internal traffic was almost identical to that part of the Dutch transatlantic slave trade that disembarked slaves in the Dutch Caribbean, given that most *asentistas* (holders of an *asiento*) in this period, whatever their nationality, resorted to Curaçao as they tried to meet their commitments to the Span-

<sup>25</sup> <http://slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces?yearFrom=1642&yearTo=1789&flag=2.3.4.5.6.7&disembarkation=702.703.701.705.704>.

<sup>26</sup> A key resource for both approaches is a database of 7,000 intra-American slave-trade voyages first assembled by Greg O'Malley and subsequently augmented. Although incomplete, the database allows us to understand the broad direction and fluctuations of the flows into the Spanish Caribbean from foreign islands. See Gregory E. O'Malley, "Beyond the Middle Passage: Slave Migration from the Caribbean to North America, 1619–1807," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd series, 66, no. 1 (2009): 125–172.

<sup>27</sup> Wim Klooster, "Curaçao and the Caribbean Transit Trade," in Johannes Postma and Victor Enthoven, eds., *Riches from Atlantic Commerce: Dutch Transatlantic Trade and Shipping, 1585–1817* (Leiden, 2003), 203–218; Klooster, "Slavenvaart op Spaanse kusten: De Nederlandse slavenhandel met Spaans Amerika, 1648–1701," *Tijdschrift voor Zeegegeschiedenis* 16, no. 2 (1997): 121–140; Han Jordaan, "The Curaçao Slave Market: From Asiento Trade to Free Trade, 1700–1730," in Postma and Enthoven, *Riches from Atlantic Commerce*, 219–258; Borucki, "Trans-Imperial History in the Making of the Slave Trade to Venezuela."

ish.<sup>28</sup> Between 1658 and 1714, 63 percent of the Dutch slave traffic was directed to the Dutch Caribbean (largely to disembark slaves destined for Spanish colonies) or to Spanish America directly. Close to 116,000 slaves passed into Spanish America through Dutch hands.<sup>29</sup> If the Dutch were the first major suppliers of captives, the British were not far behind. Spanish merchants began buying slaves from the Company of Royal Adventurers to Africa (the precursor of the Royal African Company) in Jamaica and Barbados in the early 1660s and continued until at least 1801. As late as the 1820s, several thousand English-speaking slaves are reported to have been moved from British islands to Cuba, in this case by their owners. Overall we estimate a total flow of 247,500 from British to Spanish jurisdictions.<sup>30</sup> The third major intra-American source for slaves, Brazil, focused almost entirely on the Río de la Plata and was anchored mainly in Rio de Janeiro. A handful of pre-1641 transatlantic slave voyages stopped first in Brazil (usually Pernambuco or Maranhão) before disembarking captives in Venezuela, Jamaica, Honduras, and Veracruz. New data suggest that Hispaniola was a significant locus for unauthorized Brazilian-Caribbean shipping in the sixteenth century. After the mid-1600s, however, slave ships from Brazil would not reach the Caribbean again until 1811. Slave traffic from Brazil to mainly the Río de la Plata (but including minor shipments to the Spanish Caribbean) brought 136,100 captives, as Table 1 shows, which makes it larger than the Curaçao traffic.<sup>31</sup> In the pre-1790 era, slaves also arrived in Spanish colonies via the French

<sup>28</sup> After a few years of sailing to Africa for slaves, even the British South Sea Company, the largest slave trader after 1700, began buying its slaves in the Caribbean.

<sup>29</sup> <http://slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces?yearFrom=1501&yearTo=1730&disembarkation=501>. Curaçao was the dominant Dutch distribution center before 1750, and St. Eustatius thereafter. Ninety percent of the transatlantic arrivals at both islands were re-exported, with almost all of the Curaçao departures taken to the Spanish Caribbean mainland. St. Eustatius supplied mainly the French and British possessions, but the O'Malley database suggest that 10 percent went to Spanish colonies in the seventeenth century, rising to 40 percent in the late eighteenth century. Of the 148,700 captives disembarked in the Dutch Caribbean before 1790 (see <http://slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces?yearFrom=1501&yearTo=1789&disembarkation=501>), 115,900 are estimated to have reached Spanish colonies. For arrivals in the Dutch Caribbean, see <http://slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces?yearFrom=1660&yearTo=1789&disembarkation=501>. The total was then distributed across the Dutch colonies using ratios calculated from <http://slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces?yearFrom=1660&yearTo=1789&mjslptimp=32100>. Many of the Curaçao departures went to Venezuela. See Borucki, "Trans-Imperial History in the Making of the Slave Trade to Venezuela."

<sup>30</sup> The Spanish bought one-third of the captives brought to Jamaica and 15 percent of those going into Barbados between 1661 and 1667; calculated from BNA, T70/869. For 1668 to 1700, we estimate an annual average of 1,000 based on departures from Jamaica and Barbados in the first eleven years of the eighteenth century—prior to the British *asiento*. The years 1668–1700 thus are not based on hard data but are broadly consistent with comments on the Spanish traffic made by RAC agents in Jamaica and Barbados referenced in Borucki, Eltis, and Wheat, "Notes on the Estimates of the Intra-American Slave Trade to the Spanish Americas." For annual re-exports of slaves from Jamaica, 1701–1789, see Richard B. Sheridan, "Slave Demography in the British West Indies and the Abolition of the Slave Trade," in David Eltis and James Walvin, eds., *The Abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade: Origins and Effects in Europe, Africa, and the Americas* (Madison, Wis., 1981), 259–285, here 274. We use Sheridan's preferred series, augmented with a series from Sheila Lambert, ed., *House of Commons Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century*, 147 vols. (Wilmington, Del., 1975), 67: 239, for two quinquennia. We add 10 percent to these figures to accommodate undocumented transactions. We do not know where all these captives were taken, but O'Malley's database shows destinations for a large sample of 722 voyages leaving Jamaica before 1790 that allows us to distribute the Jamaican outbound series across the slave markets of the Caribbean. For the much smaller flows from other British islands—which together supplied less than 10 percent of the Jamaican total—we draw directly on O'Malley's database. See *IntraAmertoSpanAmer.xlsx* at [www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/download.faces](http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/download.faces).

<sup>31</sup> Zacarías Moutoukias, *Contrabando y control colonial en el siglo XVII: Buenos Aires, el Atlántico y el espacio peruano* (Buenos Aires, 1988), 62–65; Molina, *Las primeras experiencias comerciales del Plata*; AGI-Charcas 123, sin número, "Certificazion de los esclavos que entraron en Bs Ayres desde el año de



and Danish islands.<sup>32</sup> After 1789, captives could be entered at most Spanish American ports without restriction, with the result that records of arrivals from both foreign New World colonies and Africa become more abundant and more reliable.<sup>33</sup>

The transatlantic slave trade introduced 1.51 million slaves into the Spanish Americas, and the intra-American traffic a further 0.57 million, for a total of 2.07 million Africans (after rounding). If the intra-American traffic is taken into account, the Spanish areas received 80 percent more slaves than did the French Americas,

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97 asta el de 607," Buenos Aires, June 12, 1682, and "Relazion de los negros de Guinea y otras partes que an entrado en Bs Ayres desde su fundazion asta el año de 1682," Buenos Aires, June 12, 1682. Moutoukias and Molina did not consult these two AGI sources. These sources list slaves arriving from both Africa and Brazil; by attempting to isolate the latter and by applying the ratio of estimated to declared slaves from the transatlantic traffic, we can obtain an estimate series. Between 1683 and 1777, the Portuguese ferried thousands of slaves from Brazil to their outpost of Colônia do Sacramento—across the Río de la Plata from Buenos Aires—whence they were smuggled into Spanish territory. See Enrique M. Barba, "Sobre el contrabando de la Colonia del Sacramento, siglo XVIII," *Academia Nacional de la Historia, Separata Investigaciones y ensayos* 28 (1980): 57–76. For a transcribed copy of one of Barba's sources, see Anónimo, "Discursos sobre el comercio legitimo de Buenos Aires con la España y el clandestino de la Colonia del Sacramento: Medios de embarazarle en la mayor parte y poner a cubierto de enemigos a aquella provincia" (1766), Biblioteca de la Academia Nacional de la Historia, Buenos Aires. We thank Fabrício Prado for drawing our attention to this document. For 1777–1812, see Borucki, "The Slave Trade to the Río de la Plata." A few hundred more arrived thereafter, as late as the 1830s. See IntraAmertoSpanAmer.xlsx for a detailed derivation of our estimates.

<sup>32</sup> The French were more likely to buy slaves from the Dutch and English than to sell them to the Spanish given the dominance of St. Domingue. But during the U.S. War of Independence, particularly toward the end, French planters could not get their sugar to Europe, and slave prices in St. Domingue declined temporarily as a result. Unspecified numbers moved to Cuba from 1777 to 1779, then 7,000 from 1781 to 1783, and nearly 5,000 went to Venezuela. Borucki, "Trans-Imperial History in the Making of the Slave Trade to Venezuela," 49; Amores, *Cuba en la época de Ezpeleta*, 129, 134; and <http://slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces?yearFrom=1777&yearTo=1790&natinimp=10> for slave prices. A doubling of the documented number allows for unrecorded inflows. From 1680 to 1789, the Danish Islands (St. Croix and St. Thomas) received only 64,300 captives from Africa, and the great majority were put to work on sugar plantations, the value of whose output was only slightly behind that of Cuba and Puerto Rico in 1770; Eltis, "The Slave Economies of the Caribbean," 113. Thus the Danish Islands could not have supplied large numbers before that year. The O'Malley database has 1,500 captives leaving Danish islands for Spanish colonies before 1790, with destinations centered on Cartagena before 1710 and Puerto Rico in the 1780s. We estimate 6,000 taken to the Spanish colonies before 1790. For post-1790, see Svend E. Green-Pedersen, "Colonial Trade under the Danish Flag: A Case Study of the Danish Slave Trade in Cuba, 1790–1807," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 5, no. 1–4 (1980): 93–120.

<sup>33</sup> Only three colonies north of the Río de la Plata received slaves from ports in the Americas between 1790 and 1818—Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela. We estimate that the first received 60,300, the second 3,900, and the third 10,000. See Borucki, Eltis, and Wheat, "Notes on the Estimates of the Intra-American Slave Trade to the Spanish Americas"; IntraAmertoSpanAmer.xlsx; Borucki, "Trans-Imperial History in the Making of the Slave Trade to Venezuela." The combined total of 74,300 is distributed across American regions of departure using ratios calculated from the O'Malley database. This procedure allows us to estimate that 25,300 came from the British Caribbean, 1,900 from St. Eustatius, 41,900 from the Danish Islands, 2,500 from St. Domingue, and 2,700 from Brazil. After 1820, some English owners moved their slaves illegally to Spanish islands, for which we allow 5,000. Such activity reportedly created an English-speaking enclave between Holguín and Gibara in Cuba in the 1820s. See Great Britain, Parliament, House of Lords, *Second Report from the Select Committee of the House of Lords, Appointed to Consider the Best Means Which Great Britain Can Adopt for the Final Extinction of the African Slave Trade, Parliamentary Papers, 1850*, vol. 9, 75–79; also Richard Madden to James Stephen, Colonial Office, January 1, 1841, BNA, FO313/33, and Attorney General to Foreign Office, December 2, 1841, *ibid.* A much smaller movement went from Anguilla and Tortola to Puerto Rico; see George Grey to Palmerston, November 29, 1835, BNA, FO84/186, and George Canning to Sir William A'Court, October 24, 1823, FO84/24. To the south, 1,536 captives were removed from Brazilian vessels by Argentine privateers during the Argentine-Brazilian War (1825–1828), some of whom left from Brazil.

and, most strikingly, more than the whole of the British Caribbean. Of even greater significance, however, is that in the colonial era in both the Spanish and the British imperial domains, many times more people came in from Africa than from Europe, a central demographic point that receives scant recognition in the literature on transatlantic migrations to Latin America.

But can we say more than just “Africans”? What was the ultimate provenance of these two million captives? The broad pattern is one of heavy reliance on Upper Guinea and Angola through to the mid-seventeenth century, when the direct link with Africa prevailed, followed by a remarkable inflow of African peoples and cultures as the intra-American trading routes emerged. The founder generations in the Caribbean, Mexico, and Peru left overwhelmingly from northern Upper Guinea—“the Rivers of Guinea” feature strongly in the records, suggesting the coast of modern Guinea-Bissau.<sup>34</sup> The first vessel bringing captives directly from elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa—actually the first known transatlantic slave ship—sailed from São Tomé in 1525, and other sixteenth-century voyages from this island would follow, carrying captives from both Lower Guinea (probably eastern Nigeria) and West-Central Africa. However, Upper Guinea remained the dominant source until the early seventeenth century. In the mid-1590s, vessels from what is now Angola supplied the majority of slaves in Veracruz, but in the larger slaving port of Cartagena, Angola and Upper Guinea accounted for roughly equal shares from about 1590 until 1620. After 1620, close to seven out of ten slave ships arriving in both Cartagena and Veracruz came from Angola.<sup>35</sup> This pattern ended abruptly after 1640, when Dutch and English slave traders began supplying the Spanish colonies. Both of these slaving powers had a strong presence on the Gold Coast and the Bight of Benin through to the early eighteenth century. Thereafter, from 1720 to 1790, almost all *bozales*—a term that referred to newly arrived Africans who did not yet speak Spanish or Portuguese or practice Catholicism in ways that Spanish colonists could easily recognize—arrived via Jamaica, the African provenance of whose captives in this era is well established. It is likely that for 150 years after 1640, three out of four Africans arriving in the Spanish Americas left from the coast between Elmina in Ghana and the Cross River in Nigeria.<sup>36</sup> Today, no fewer than 716 languages are spoken in the hinterlands of this most densely populated part of sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>37</sup>

On the other side of the Atlantic, the African inflow into Mesoamerica diminished after 1640, though occasional arrivals in Mexico are recorded until 1735. Other Spanish-speaking regions relied on non-Hispanic slave traders sailing from West Africa. When the Spanish direct trade reemerged—starting slowly in 1792 but growing rapidly after 1808—they not only were able to restore their old links with Upper Guinea, but drew on the whole range of slave markets from Senegambia in the north

<sup>34</sup> David Wheat, *Atlantic Africa and the Spanish Caribbean, 1570–1640* (to be published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, forthcoming in 2015), chap. 1.

<sup>35</sup> David Wheat, “The First Great Waves: African Provenance Zones for the Transatlantic Slave Trade to Cartagena de Indias, 1570–1640,” *Journal of African History* 52, no. 1 (2011): 1–22.

<sup>36</sup> See the decadal breakdowns of captives arriving in Jamaica between 1721 and 1790 at <http://slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces?yearFrom=1721&yearTo=1790&disembarkation=301>.

<sup>37</sup> See <http://www.ethnologue.com> for Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria. Most Africans were multilingual, and some languages were mutually intelligible, but cultural divisions within language groups could also be profound.



to Mozambique in the southeast (not least because most of their European rivals had pulled out). Cuba became the main Caribbean buyer of African slaves, and thus continued the pattern of extreme African diversity established earlier in the rest of the Spanish possessions. The Spanish had the most mixed African-descended population of any region in the Americas. Rio de Janeiro received 85 percent of its two million slaves from Luanda and Benguela; half of the large inflow into São Salvador de Bahia came from the Mina coast (the Gold Coast and the Bight of Benin); a similar proportion of slaves from St. Domingue left from a region stretching just 250 miles north of the Congo River estuary. Of the major Spanish ports, only the Río de la Plata's dependence on Angola is comparable, and perhaps Mexico's reliance on the widely separated Guinea and Angola regions given the early end of the slave trade there. Much of the circum-Caribbean drew from all African provenance zones except Mozambique.<sup>38</sup> Yoruba influence was certainly strong in nineteenth-century Cuba, but languages based on African elements in Spanish America survived in only the most remote locations, and can be observed in fragmentary form in the rituals of modern African-based religions.<sup>39</sup> Confraternities and African "nations" in the Iberian Americas were in the long run inevitably highly syncretic across African cultures.

The overall diversity of the Spanish Empire's black population was further increased by *mestizaje*, which sometimes developed in regions very close to places receiving new slave arrivals. By 1800, 30 percent of the inhabitants of Buenos Aires were of African ancestry, the large majority of whom had been born in Africa and were identified as "black" in official documents. However, 800 kilometers northwestward, in the city of Córdoba at the core of modern Argentina, colonial census-takers recorded the majority of the non-white population as *pardos*, an ambiguous term referring to people of mixed African, Amerindian, and European ancestry.<sup>40</sup> Late-colonial Venezuela had a similar repertoire of colonial *casta* categories, from the recently arrived Africans on the coast to the long-established *pardos* inland.<sup>41</sup> Our findings suggest that those toiling in the export sector after 1790 were predominantly African-born, whereas the mainly free populations of mixed ancestry remained on the fringes of the Atlantic economy—which sometimes led them to migrate to port cities in search of better prospects.

THE SLAVE-TRADING ACTIVITY ON THE part of the Spanish—as opposed to the introduction of slaves into the Spanish Americas—is harder to track than the involvement in the trade of any other national group. Spain's participation in the slave trade began

<sup>38</sup> This assessment incorporates the ultimate sources of the intra-American traffic. One small example of this diversity is that more people with Arabic/Islamic names arrived in Cuba than in Bahia. Daniel B. Domingues da Silva, David Eltis, Olatunji Ojo, and Phil Misevich, "The Nineteenth Century Transatlantic Islamic Diaspora in Atlantic History" (unpublished paper, 2015).

<sup>39</sup> Armin Schwegler, "*Chi ma nkongo*": *Lengua y rito ancestrales en El Palenque de San Basilio (Colombia)*, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1996); John M. Lipski, review of "*Chi ma nkongo*" by Armin Schwegler, *New West Indian Guide* 72, no. 3–4 (1998): 356–360.

<sup>40</sup> Erika Edwards, "Mestizaje, Córdoba's Patria Chica: Beyond the Myth of Black Disappearance in Argentina," *African and Black Diaspora* 7, no. 2 (2014): 89–104.

<sup>41</sup> John V. Lombardi, *The Decline and Abolition of Negro Slavery in Venezuela, 1820–1854* (Westport, Conn., 1971), 132.

nearly half a century before Columbus's landing in 1492. While the Portuguese pioneered early modern European expansion along the coasts of Africa, it is often forgotten that Spanish mariners and merchants were close behind. During the mid- and late 1400s, Castilian ships sailed from Andalusia to Upper Guinea, and even as far as the Mina coast.<sup>42</sup> Spanish voyages transported enslaved Africans to the Canary Islands from the late fifteenth century; not only did these voyages increase in the 1530s, but a small number of them continued to the Americas with their captives, three decades before the Portuguese began a regular slave trade to Brazil.<sup>43</sup>

Only Spanish vessels were allowed to enter ports in the Spanish Americas until 1580, at least in theory. Thereafter the union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns provided much greater access to Portuguese vessels. In this era (1580–1640), slaving expeditions were generally organized by merchants in the Iberian Peninsula and in practice were sometimes Spanish, sometimes Portuguese, and sometimes both.<sup>44</sup> Portuguese ships frequently left from a Spanish port, or visited such a port prior to sailing to Africa, and often our only knowledge of a particular voyage emerges from Spanish sources, which in this era habitually Hispanicized the names of vessels, their captains, and sometimes their owners. Thus it is difficult and somewhat anachronistic to attempt to separate Spanish from Portuguese voyages for the years prior to 1641, particularly during the era of the Iberian Union. Additionally, there is the question of the true nationality of the owner of a vessel or venture. How do we label the 1594 venture owned by the Florentine investor Francesco Carletti and his father, Antonio, who first journeyed to Seville from Florence to obtain a license from the Spanish authorities and then fitted out their expedition before proceeding first to Upper Guinea, then to Cartagena, and ultimately to Peru with eighty-nine slaves? Their vessel certainly sailed under the sanction of the Spanish authorities, as did many others that were not owned by Spanish subjects, and is counted as such here.<sup>45</sup>

A parallel situation with different roots existed at the end of the slave trade, when the Spanish again emerged as major carriers of slaves to their colonies. The Bourbon reforms that liberalized trade meant that by the early 1790s, Spanish ports in the New World were effectively open to slave vessels of all nations. At the same time, the revolution in St. Domingue and the rising demand for plantation produce stemming from industrialization boosted Spanish American slavery and the slave trade itself.

<sup>42</sup> Florentino Pérez Embid, *Los descubrimientos en el Atlántico y la rivalidad castellano-portuguesa hasta el Tratado de Tordesillas* (Seville, 1948); Antonio Rumeu de Armas, *España en el África Atlántica*, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1956–1957), 1: 71–75, 101–104, 185–214; John Vogt, *Portuguese Rule on the Gold Coast, 1469–1682* (Athens, Ga., 1979), 10–18; George E. Brooks, *Landlords and Strangers: Ecology, Society, and Trade in Western Africa, 1000–1630* (Boulder, Colo., 1993), 136.

<sup>43</sup> Manuel Lobo Cabrera, *La esclavitud en las Canarias orientales en el siglo XVI (negros, moros y moriscos)* (Las Palmas, 1982), 103–104; Cabrera, “Viajes canarios a Guinea,” in *Vice-Almirante A. Teixeira da Mota: In Memoriam*, 2 vols. (Lisbon, 1989), 2: 129–153; P. E. H. Hair, “A Note on French and Spanish Voyages to Sierra Leone, 1550–1585,” *History in Africa* 18 (1991): 137–141; Brooks, *Landlords and Strangers*, 168, 294.

<sup>44</sup> The Voyages database assigns national character to a voyage first on the basis of the country in which the ship was registered, and second—given that only one in five voyages have that information—on the basis of the attribution of a national character by a contemporary observer.

<sup>45</sup> Francesco Carletti, *My Voyage around the World*, trans. Herbert Weinstock (New York, 1964), 3–33. For earlier *asientos* backed by Genoese investors, see Georges Scelle, *La traite négrière aux Indes de Castille: Contrats et traités d'assiento* (Paris, 1906), 150–177. It is likely that if we were able to identify all the Italian-owned vessels in the early trade, Italy would displace Denmark as the sixth-largest European slave-trading nation.



The initial beneficiaries were British and U.S. slave traders, who from 1790 to 1807 together brought in seven out of every ten transatlantic captives landing in Hispanic colonies. Merchants of Buenos Aires and Montevideo with trans-imperial networks stemming from their eighteenth-century links with the Portuguese Colônia do Sacramento became the first to revive Spanish transatlantic slaving. In the fifteen years after 1790, they introduced two times more slaves directly from Africa into the Americas than did their Cuban-based counterparts.<sup>46</sup>

Not until the U.S. and the British largely withdrew from the traffic in 1808 did the Spanish come to dominate the slave trade to their remaining insular colonies. In the quarter-century after 1810, after all the mainland Spanish American republics had abolished this traffic, Spanish traders brought 306,000 African captives into Cuba and Puerto Rico, well over three-quarters of an estimated overall total of 347,000 arrivals in the Spanish Americas from Africa in these years.<sup>47</sup> In 1835, facing extended diplomatic and naval pressure from the British, Spain agreed to a treaty that allowed British cruisers to detain Spanish vessels suspected of slave-trading activity even if they had no slaves on board. In response, most Spanish slave merchants registered their vessels under other flags, especially those of Portugal and to a lesser extent the United States, neither of which had a major naval presence off West Africa. And when the British imposed similar terms on the Portuguese a few years later, some Cuban-bound Spanish slave ships began to sail without any registration papers. Overall, however, the pattern of the nationalities of those organizing the massive influx of Africans into the Spanish Americas is clear. After a transitional period lasting about a decade after 1807 that saw some Spanish merchants acting as fronts for U.S. or British citizens, 90 percent of traders bringing slaves into Cuba were a mixture of Cuban and Spanish (especially Catalan). They were born or lived overwhelmingly in Cuba and Puerto Rico, some of them trading even to Brazil.<sup>48</sup>

What was the nature of Spanish involvement in the transatlantic trade between 1640 and 1790? For the first twenty-two years of this period—until the establishment of the Grillo and Lomelín *asiento* in 1662—close to *de facto* free trade existed in the Spanish Americas, largely as a consequence of the crisis in Spanish Atlantic commerce.<sup>49</sup> The old licensing system collapsed, and while the Spanish managed at least

<sup>46</sup> Fabrício Prado, “In the Shadows of Empires: Trans-Imperial Networks and Colonial Identity in Bourbon Río de la Plata” (Ph.D. thesis, Emory University, 2009); Borucki, “The Slave Trade to the Río de la Plata.”

<sup>47</sup> <http://slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces?yearFrom=1791&yearTo=1807&disembarkation=701.703.705.702.704>; <http://slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces?yearFrom=1811&yearTo=1835&disembarkation=701.703.705.702.704>.

<sup>48</sup> Leonardo Marques, *The United States and the Transatlantic Slave Trade to the Americas* (Yale University Press, forthcoming in 2015); Eltis, *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade*, 125–163. For Catalan traders, see Josep M. Fradera, “La participació catalana en el tràfic d’esclaus, 1789–1845,” *Recerques: Història, economia, cultura* 16 (1984): 120–139.

<sup>49</sup> The slave-trade *asiento* awarded to the Genovese merchants Domingo Grillo and Ambrosio Lomelín was the first such contract organized after Portugal’s renewed independence from Spain in 1640, and was responsible for the disembarkation of more than 18,000 enslaved Africans in Spanish American ports between 1663 and 1674. Though it lasted only eleven years, the Grillo and Lomelín *asiento* exemplifies Spain’s shift away from a reliance on Portuguese slaving networks based in Africa and the Atlantic Islands, toward Dutch and English networks that could provide captives from their own American slaving outposts such as Curaçao and Jamaica. See Marisa Vega Franco, *El tráfico de esclavos con América: Asientos de Grillo y Lomelín, 1663–1674* (Seville, 1984).

eleven transatlantic slaving expeditions, sixty-four non-Spanish slave ships (mainly Portuguese and Dutch) entered Spanish American ports in the same period.<sup>50</sup> For the next twenty-eight years, to 1690, only twenty slaving vessels set out under the Spanish flag, mostly between 1677 and 1681, an average of less than one a year.<sup>51</sup> By contrast, for the seventy-five years from 1691 to 1765, the Voyages database contains only a single transatlantic Spanish voyage. But then, in response to the short British occupation of Havana (1762–1763), when the British disembarked 3,500 slaves in ten months, the Spanish crown made determined efforts to revive their own transatlantic slave-trading role. They established the *Compañía Gadjitana* and attempted to funnel all slaves destined for the islands and Caribbean mainland ports through Puerto Rico.<sup>52</sup> The company brought an estimated 3,000 slaves into San Juan between 1766 and 1769, but it was a financial disaster and ceased operations.

Next, the Spanish crown obtained the islands of Fernando Po (now Bioko), Anobón, and Corisco and commercial rights to the mainland between the Niger and Ogoue Rivers in the Bight of Biafra from Portugal in the 1778 Treaty of El Pardo. Their attempt to establish slave-trading bases there also resulted in financial disaster and severe loss of life, with only a few slaves arriving in the Río de la Plata (mainly from Corisco Island, now part of Equatorial Guinea).<sup>53</sup> In 1784, the Spanish crown contracted with the large Liverpool firm of Baker and Dawson to bring slaves to Venezuela and Cuba. In the late 1780s, the crown also arranged for Spanish personnel to sail on Baker and Dawson vessels, subcontracted by the Company of the Philippines to carry slaves to the Río de la Plata. These personnel were expected to learn the trade and form a pool of skilled labor on which Spanish merchants would be able to draw to reestablish a strong presence in the transatlantic traffic. This, too, was unsuccessful. In the twenty years after the *Compañía Gadjitana* shut down, only four Spanish slaving voyages show up in the most recent Voyages database, as opposed to 2,000 British, 1,100 French, and 1,000 Portuguese.<sup>54</sup>

In two of the major branches of the intra-American slave trade, the Spanish were hardly any more successful. Dutch merchants dominated the slave traffic through Curaçao (though Hispanic slave traders were certainly involved), and the Portuguese played a similar role in the traffic from Brazilian ports to the Río de la Plata from 1585 (just five years after the founding of Buenos Aires) through to 1777 (when the Spanish conquered *Colônia do Sacramento*). Thereafter, Spanish American merchants came close to sharing the traffic equally with Luso-Brazilian slave traders.<sup>55</sup> Rio de Janeiro resumed its earlier position as the largest point of transshipment to

<sup>50</sup> <http://slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces?yearFrom=1641&yearTo=1662&mjslptimp=31100.31200.31300.4000>.

<sup>51</sup> British sources suggest that the Spanish transatlantic trade from Portuguese Guinea in the 1670s and early 1680s is underreported. Thomas Thurloes, Gambia, to Royal African Company, March 15, 1678, BNA, T70/10, fol. 1; Edwin Steede and Stephen Gascoigne, Barbados, to Royal African Company, April 11, 1683, T 70/16, 50.

<sup>52</sup> Bibiano Torres Ramírez, *La isla de Puerto Rico, 1765–1800* (San Juan, 1968), 195–211; Torres Ramírez, *La Compañía Gadjitana de Negros* (Seville, 1973).

<sup>53</sup> See the internal memo dated February 26, 1841, in BNA, FO84/383, fol. 262; and the Spanish documents in FO84/299, fols. 19–25.

<sup>54</sup> <http://slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces?yearFrom=1770&yearTo=1789&natinimp=3.6.7.8.9.10.13.15.30>. We know for certain that only one of the four actually embarked any slaves.

<sup>55</sup> Barba, “Sobre el contrabando de la Colonia del Sacramento”; Borucki, “The Slave Trade to the Río de la Plata.”



Buenos Aires and Montevideo, and the Río de la Plata briefly became the most important destination for slaves leaving Rio de Janeiro for all secondary markets (Rio de Janeiro also being a major slave entrepôt).<sup>56</sup> Of course, the Spanish were largely responsible for the now-centuries-long land slave-trading routes connecting Veracruz, Mexico City, and Acapulco and linking Cartagena with Lima, especially after the rupture of the Iberian Union and the concomitant withdrawal of Portuguese merchants.

In the British Caribbean—the largest intra-American market for Hispanic America—Spanish merchants had a larger role. Both the Company of Royal Adventurers and its successor, the Royal African Company (RAC), usually refused to deliver slaves to Spanish colonies, though they did sell them to all comers from their factories in Kingston and Bridgetown. Beginning at least as early as 1661, Spanish merchants carried off purchases from Kingston and Bridgetown in their own vessels both before and after Grillo and Lomelín, the first *asentistas* of the post-1640 system, began their activities.<sup>57</sup> Some English merchants operating outside the RAC's monopoly did, however, carry slaves into Spanish ports.<sup>58</sup> Whole shiploads of enslaved people newly arrived from Africa were handed over to the Spanish in Kingston and Bridgetown—so many, in fact, that in 1680 the Jamaican legislature imposed a tax on slaves traded to foreign colonies.<sup>59</sup> The major Spanish figure here was Santiago Diego del Castillo, a native of Barcelona who eventually became an English subject. His official title from 1688 was Commissioner-General for the Introduction of Negroes.<sup>60</sup> In 1690, when war brought shortages of slaves and high prices in Jamaica, it was Castillo who organized expeditions from Kingston to Curaçao to relieve the situation—a Spanish slave trader serving the needs of English planters.<sup>61</sup>

After the mid-1690s, as English Caribbean slave entrepôts gradually became the

<sup>56</sup> On the first slaving expedition from Buenos Aires, see Molina, *Las primeras experiencias comerciales del Plata*, 25. On the significance of the late-eighteenth-century traffic to the Río de la Plata for Brazilian internal markets, see Borucki, "The Slave Trade to the Río de la Plata," 91–94.

<sup>57</sup> The first recorded instance was when the soon-to-be-dismissed Cromwellian governor of Jamaica bought 180 slaves from a Dutch ship, then sold 40 to a Quaker plantation owner and the rest to a Spanish merchant. See George Frederick Zook, *The Company of Royal African Adventurers Trading into Africa* (New York, 1919), especially 79–80, 87–96; for journal entries about Spanish involvement, see BNA, T70/869, fols. 14, 38, 39, 50; <http://slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces?yearFrom=1514&yearTo=1866&voyageid=21196>.

<sup>58</sup> See the Minutes of Court of Assistants (of the RAC), June 16, 1675, BNA, T70/76, fol. 46: "That as to the proposition of transporting the Negroes in English ships & to deliver them . . . it is too great an hazard & trouble to the Company." For the links between English "interlopers" and the slave trade to Spanish ports, see Hender Molesworth and Charles Penhallow to RAC, September 20, 1682, BNA, T70/10, fol. 29, and Molesworth and Penhallow to RAC, February 20, 1683, fol. 30. For non-RAC ships after 1698, see Dalby Thomas, October 22, 1709, T70/5, fol. 63.

<sup>59</sup> Thus, the Spanish bought all the captives on the *Merchant Bonadventure* (<http://slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces?yearFrom=1514&yearTo=1866&voyageid=9870>) for silver in 1683 in Kingston; Hender Molesworth and Charles Penhallow to RAC, October 20, 1683, BNA, T70/16, fol. 69. For legislation, see Curtis Nettels, "England and the Spanish-American Trade, 1680–1715," *Journal of Modern History* 3, no. 1 (1931): 1–32. The imperial government disallowed the tax, but the colonial legislature periodically reinstated it over the course of the next century. It thus was not always collected.

<sup>60</sup> He circulated between Cádiz, Jamaica, Barbados, Curaçao, Cartagena, and Veracruz in the 1680s and 1690s but was based in Jamaica for two decades from 1684, first as agent for Nicolas Porcio, and for most of the 1690s as Porcio's *asentista* partner. He also had an extensive private business in slaves. F. J. Osborne, "James Castillo—Asiento Agent," *Jamaican Historical Review* 7 (1971): 9–18.

<sup>61</sup> "A Memoriall of what is desired by Don St. Iago del Castillo, Comisioner Generall for Introduction of Negroes into the Spanish . . .," n.d., but ca. 1687, BNA, T70/169; Charles Penhallow and Walter Ruding to RAC, July 1, 1690, T70/12, fol. 84; Walter Ruding to RAC, February 2, 1692, T70/17, fol. 51.

dominant source for the nearby Spanish colonies, Spanish participation fell away. When first the Portuguese and then the French assumed the *asiento* between 1694 and 1713, they drew on English ports and Curaçao without using Spanish intermediaries. More importantly, a huge expansion of the English transatlantic trade began with the effective curtailment of the RAC monopoly in 1698.<sup>62</sup> The London, Bristol, and Liverpool slave dealers who now entered the trade were much less inhibited than the RAC about smuggling slaves into Spanish colonies. And for most of the 1713–1739 period, the South Sea Company could legally bring slaves into Spanish ports. References to Spanish colonies are abundant in English sources after 1700, but most slave shippers were not Spanish. The Spanish seaborne slave trade, except for activity between Spanish ports in the Caribbean and the Pacific, became largely moribund for nearly a century. Even the twenty-four vessels recorded as bringing slaves from Africa into Cádiz after 1662 were Dutch or English.<sup>63</sup> While the Bourbon reforms signaled the gradual return of the Spanish to transatlantic slave-trading, their immediate impact was to increase the Spanish presence in the intra-American trade rather than on the African coast. The years 1790–1810 saw the last great surge of slave arrivals into Spanish territory from other parts of the Americas (chiefly Rio de Janeiro, Jamaica, and the Danish West Indies), and one-fifth of Cuban arrivals were on Spanish vessels.<sup>64</sup>

We can develop a rough estimate of the Spanish slave trade direct from Africa following the same intervals that we used to reassess the inflow into the Spanish Americas. For the earliest era, we have records of 299 transatlantic vessels carrying an estimated 84,900 slaves. Despite considerable Portuguese participation, we assume that these vessels were all “Spanish” because ships sailing to the Spanish colonies had to first register with Spanish authorities, departing from Seville or other authorized ports.<sup>65</sup> For the Iberian Union—given the impossibility of separating out Spanish from Portuguese vessels—we follow Mendes in dividing the number of slaves carried evenly between the two flags. The Spanish portion of this total is 222,500. For the third period, 1641–1789, the most recent Voyages database shows 56 Spanish slave voyages from Africa—48 of them either in the forty years after the collapse of the Iberian Union or under the *Compañía Gaditana* in the late 1760s. Together they disembarked an estimated 15,700 slaves, or fewer than 150 per year. Even if the actual figure was double this number, the Spanish transatlantic traffic was

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The governor of Jamaica made Castillo a naturalized English subject, and the English crown gave him a knighthood.

<sup>62</sup> For a new political interpretation of this expansion and the Royal African Company’s withdrawal from the traffic, see William A. Pettigrew, *Freedom’s Debt: The Royal African Company and the Politics of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1672–1752* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2013), 115–150, 159–172.

<sup>63</sup> <http://slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces?yearFrom=1661&yearTo=1866&mjslptimp=10100>. The hyperlink shows fifteen such vessels. Ruud Paesie references the other nine in “Overzicht van getraceerde lorrendraaiers, 1674–1730” (unpublished ms., updated December 2009), kindly supplied by the author. Victoria Gardner Sorsby, “British Trade with Spanish America under the Asiento, 1713–1740” (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1975), 282–420, lists the vessels carrying slaves to Spanish ports in the English *asiento* period, and these are almost all British.

<sup>64</sup> Calculated from the augmented version of Greg O’Malley’s intra-American slave-trade database.

<sup>65</sup> This is in contrast to the practice on [slavevoyages.org](http://slavevoyages.org), where, following Mendes, the assumption is that half of the ships were Portuguese and half were Spanish.



operating at trivial levels. In many years, not a single Spanish slave voyage set sail from Africa.

This pattern changed drastically after 1789. Before 1867, there were only two years (occurring in wartime in 1805 and 1806) for which there is no record of the Spanish flag, or at least Spanish owners, in the transatlantic slave trade. Spanish ships disembarked nearly 10,000 slaves from Africa between 1790 and 1808, several times greater than the annual pre-1790 flow, but still only one-seventh of total transatlantic inflows into Spanish colonies. Despite the fact that the revolution in the Río de la Plata interrupted the regular inflow of slaves in 1812, Spanish deliveries of captives to America increased nine-fold from 1809 to 1820, to 120,200 captives, almost all of them taken to Cuba. Initially—say, prior to 1814—many of them arrived on ships that had Spanish papers but were actually owned or part-owned by citizens of the United States. But even before the 1820 Piracy Law that made slave-trading a capital offense, direct U.S. ownership had become unusual, and the Spanish flag accounted for more than 80 percent of the trade into the Spanish Americas in the second decade of the century.<sup>66</sup> It is hard to imagine anything approaching this expansion without U.S. and British abolition of the slave trade.<sup>67</sup> From 1816 to 1819, the Spanish traffic appears to have surpassed the previous peak of Spanish slaving, achieved as long ago as the 1610s and 1620s.

But there was further growth ahead. The Spanish crown declared its Caribbean colonies closed to the slave trade in the aftermath of the Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1817, with the ban to take effect in 1820. The volume of arrivals declined sharply in the early 1820s. But the trade recovered to its former peak briefly in 1827, surpassed previous levels again in the late 1830s, and reached its all-time annual high in 1859, when Spanish vessels left Africa with an estimated 28,400 captives. Spanish ships (some of them steam-powered) brought in a total 563,100 Africans in the last forty-six years of the traffic.

The final column of Table 1 distributes these estimates across the same sixty-year intervals used for slave arrivals in the Spanish Americas. The U-shaped time profile of Spanish involvement is not drastically affected by the addition of the intra-Caribbean and Brazil–Río de la Plata trades shown in row 8. The effect is to flatten the U and make it somewhat more lopsided. Arrivals from foreign colonies in the Spanish Americas did not make up for the decline in traffic direct from Africa between 1640 and 1790. And while flag and ownership data for the intra-American traffic are scarce, it is unlikely that the Spanish vessels carried as many as half the slaves brought in from those foreign ports. The time profile of Spanish involvement in the slave trade (transatlantic and intra-American combined) thus formed a deeper U than the one that tracks total slave arrivals (again from all sources) into the Spanish Americas. These patterns help account for the lack of awareness in the Spanish American literature of Spain's role in the transatlantic slave trade. The sixteenth- and early-

<sup>66</sup> The 1820 Act was improbably titled “An Act to continue in force ‘An act to protect the commerce of the United States, and to punish the crime of piracy,’ and also to make further provisions for punishing the crime of piracy.” <http://slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces?yearFrom=1809&yearTo=1820&disembarkation=701.703.705.702.704>. For U.S. ownership in the Cuban traffic, see Marques, *The United States and the Transatlantic Slave Trade to the Americas*, chap. 2.

<sup>67</sup> This was especially true for the U.S. decision. U.S. vessels were responsible for half of transatlantic arrivals in Spanish territories in foreign bottoms between 1804 and 1807.

seventeenth-century slave trade to the Spanish colonies is often viewed as something carried on exclusively by the Portuguese.<sup>68</sup> When the transatlantic slave trade was at its peak in the eighteenth century, Spanish involvement was negligible, and when this changed in the nineteenth century, the slave trade could be seen as something that Cubans did, even though the leading slave traders based in Havana after 1820—Pedro Martínez, Pedro Blanco, and Julián Zulueta—were Spanish by birth and conducted business in both Cuba and Spain.<sup>69</sup>

Spanish transatlantic slavers disembarked over one million captives in the Americas. Two-thirds of those captives embarked in the nineteenth century, more than half of them after 1820, or in other words in contravention of Spanish efforts to stop the slave trade. The Spanish ships carried four times more Africans than did their U.S. counterparts. When the aggregate total is compared with the transatlantic slave trades of other empires, we can see that Spain ranks as the fourth-largest slave-trading power overall, not far, in fact, from the third-place French. We do not have precise figures for the Spanish share of the intra-American trade, but if we did, they would likely show the Spanish exceeding the contribution of the French—given the relatively minor role of the latter in carrying captives between ports in the Americas. For the first few decades and the last sixteen years of the transatlantic slave trade, Spain was, indeed, the only transatlantic slave-trading empire. Unlike all of their imperial competitors, the Spanish almost never delivered slaves to foreign territories. By contrast, the British, and the Dutch before them, sold slaves everywhere in the Americas (with the exception of Brazil in the English case); the French had only a small slave trade to Cuba in the nineteenth century; Portuguese slave traders were everywhere outside the British and French Americas. An even more striking feature of the Spanish trade is that while the Spanish were the most compulsive producers of official documentation, they were also the most dependent on contraband; thus, theirs was the only trade that delivered the majority of its captives outside the limits of the law and official policy as these then stood. Not only was the size of the net inflow of Africans into Spanish colonies larger than the influx into the British Caribbean, but two-thirds of transatlantic arrivals in the Spanish Empire arrived under the control of Spanish merchants. Scholars have yet to recognize the scale of Spanish involvement.

SO WHAT WERE ALL THESE CAPTIVES of African descent doing in the Spanish colonies if they were not generating export revenues? Some, of course, *did* work producing agricultural, mining, and fishery exports. Production of cacao and pearls in Venezuela as well as hides in Cuba and the Río de la Plata depended heavily on slave labor. Half of all the gold exported from colonial Spanish America to the metropolis came from New Granada (Colombia), given that early deposits in Hispaniola, Honduras, and Venezuela were soon exhausted—Africans and their descendants mined all

<sup>68</sup> On the early Spanish slave trade as “only Portuguese,” see Fradera and Schmidt-Nowara, “Introduction,” 2. See also Vila Vilar, *Hispanoamérica y el comercio de esclavos*; Maria da Graça Ventura, *Negreiros portugueses na rota das Índias de Castela, 1541–1556* (Lisbon, 1999).

<sup>69</sup> Eltis, *Economic Growth*, 148–150.



these sites.<sup>70</sup> While most of the silver was mined by Amerindians, slaves performed multiple tasks in mining camps from Zacatecas to Potosí.<sup>71</sup> But the majority of blacks in Spanish colonies worked in many occupations outside the export sector. Spanish America had by far the largest urban centers in the Americas. Mexico City, Guanajuato, Querétaro, Lima, Buenos Aires, and Havana were larger than New York, Boston, and Philadelphia by the turn of the eighteenth century, with the first two dwarfing all other urban centers throughout the colonial period and beyond.<sup>72</sup> Enslaved and free black communities typically performed tasks that provided food, clothing, shelter, and other services to urban environments.<sup>73</sup>

More importantly, slaves produced goods that were traded between Spanish colonies. They made textiles in the *obrajes* of New Spain and Ecuador (some of which were sold in Manila), and they produced sugar near Veracruz and cacao, flour, tobacco, and hides in Venezuela, all for colonial markets.<sup>74</sup> Slaves in coastal Peru produced wine, wheat, and sugar—essential to Spanish consumers and Spanish culture in the Andes. In Cartagena Province, slaves produced maize, pork, and manatee lard that were exported to the rest of the Caribbean.<sup>75</sup> The Jesuits, perhaps the largest corporate owner of slaves in the Americas (after the Catholic Church itself), used almost exclusively African slaves to work farms, cane lands, mines, vineyards, and textile mills, as well as ranches for cattle, sheep, and mules. The largest Jesuit estates were in coastal Ecuador, Peru, and Córdoba in modern Argentina, most of which supplied urban centers from Guayaquil to Potosí.<sup>76</sup> Slaves were concentrated near the coast, partly because that was where the decline of the indigenous population had been most severe, and partly because of the greater availability of arable land.<sup>77</sup> How did the large cities—located in the highlands and to a lesser extent in the lowlands—pay for this produce? Silver was a large part of the answer, and here, too, Africans were involved, given that slaves minted the coins of Potosí that facilitated intercolonial trade across South America.

Paradoxically, one analogy that helps us see the regional interdependence and

<sup>70</sup> TePaske, *A New World of Gold and Silver*, 30; William Frederick Sharp, *Slavery on the Spanish Frontier: The Colombian Chocó, 1680–1810* (Norman, Okla., 1976).

<sup>71</sup> Kris Lane, “Africans and Natives in the Mines of Spanish America,” in Matthew Restall, *Beyond Black and Red: African-Native Relations in Colonial Latin America* (Albuquerque, 2005), 159–184; Lane, *Colour of Paradise: The Emerald in the Age of Gunpowder Empires* (New Haven, Conn., 2010), 67–69. For African and Andean interactions in coastal Peru, see Rachel Sarah O’Toole, *Bound Lives: Africans, Indians, and the Making of Race in Colonial Peru* (Pittsburgh, 2012).

<sup>72</sup> Alan Knight, *Mexico*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 2002), 2: 209.

<sup>73</sup> James Lockhart, *Spanish Peru, 1532–1560: A Colonial Society* (Madison, Wis., 1968), chap. 10; Herman L. Bennett, *Africans in Colonial Mexico: Absolutism, Christianity, and Afro-Creole Consciousness, 1570–1640* (Bloomington, Ind., 2003), chap. 1.

<sup>74</sup> Frank T. Proctor III, “Afro-Mexican Slave Labor in the *Obrajes* de Paños of New Spain, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” *The Americas* 60, no. 1 (2003): 33–58.

<sup>75</sup> María del Carmen Borrego Plá, *Cartagena de Indias en el siglo XVI* (Seville, 1983), 42–43, 63–66; Antonino Vidal Ortega, *Cartagena de Indias y la región histórica del Caribe, 1580–1640* (Seville, 2002), 171, 179–180.

<sup>76</sup> Nicholas P. Cushner, *Farm and Factory: The Jesuits and the Development of Agrarian Capitalism in Colonial Quito, 1600–1767* (Albany, N.Y., 1982), 135–138; Cushner, *Lords of the Land: Sugar, Wine, and Jesuit Estates of Coastal Peru, 1600–1767* (Albany, N.Y., 1980); Cushner, *Jesuit Ranches and the Agrarian Development of Colonial Argentina, 1650–1767* (Albany, N.Y., 1983). For patterns of consumption and slaves in Potosí, see Jane Mangan, *Trading Roles: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Urban Economy in Colonial Potosí* (Durham, N.C., 2005).

<sup>77</sup> Not all concentrations of modern black populations are easily explained. The Pacific Costa Chica has the most visible part of today’s Afro-Mexican population, for reasons that remain unclear.

application of slave labor in the Spanish Empire is provided by the British Americas—the Caribbean plus the thirteen mainland colonies.<sup>78</sup> Caribbean sugar was the heart of the British system. Before 1800, the mainland produced only tobacco, rice, some indigo, and furs that could be sold in Europe, items that never approached one-quarter of the value of sugar. Yet the British mainland colonies purchased large quantities of goods from Europe as their populations expanded, and were able to do so because they sold produce and shipping services to the Caribbean. In the Spanish case, bullion was sugar; the highlands (as the source of a valuable transatlantic commodity) constituted the counterpart of the Caribbean; an indigenous labor force filled the role of imported slaves; and the lowlands (Cartagena, Veracruz, coastal Peru and Ecuador, Venezuela, and the Río de la Plata, among other regions) were the equivalent of the British American mainland, in that they traded heavily with the export heartland. Both the British mainland and the Spanish lowland could export to Britain (tobacco, rice, and indigo) and to Spain (hides, gold, cacao, and pearls), respectively. But all these items combined could not come close to matching the value of sugar from the British Caribbean and silver from the Spanish highlands. This did not matter. Lowland territories in Spanish America were as important to the highlands as the British American mainland was to the British Caribbean. Indeed, some Spanish lowland jurisdictions exerted direct administrative authority over highland regions (Lima and later Buenos Aires). Perhaps much of both the Spanish lowlands and the British mainland north of Virginia would have had little beyond subsistence agriculture without their connections to the silver and sugar sectors. The ability of both the Spanish lowlands and the British North American mainland to import transatlantic commodities (including slaves) hinged on the ability of these two areas to sell their produce to the rest of their respective imperial systems. Yet Spanish intercolonial exchange and relations have attracted much less scholarly attention than has trade between British colonies, and the central role of the Spanish colonies in Atlantic history after 1640 is still largely ignored.<sup>79</sup>

All parts of the Americas (except, briefly, for Georgia) were prepared to buy African slaves prior to the early nineteenth century—if they could afford them.<sup>80</sup> Slaves were cheapest in Brazil and in the Caribbean (both islands and littoral), more expensive on the North American mainland, and more expensive again in Potosí—the source of silver that tied together markets in Buenos Aires, Lima, and Cartagena, and formed the key axis (in terms of value) of the early modern Atlantic economy. Transfers of funds from the Royal Treasury of Mexico to the colonial administration

<sup>78</sup> We extend John Elliott's comparison here of relations between both Spanish and British colonies and their respective imperial governments. J. H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1830* (New Haven, Conn., 2006).

<sup>79</sup> Historians in Latin America have demonstrated greater awareness of the importance of internal markets than have their U.S. counterparts. See, for example, Eduardo Arcila Farías, *Comercio entre Venezuela y México en los siglos XVI y XVII* (México, D.F., 1950); Enrique Tandeter, *Coercion and Markets: Silver Mining in Colonial Potosí, 1692–1826* (Albuquerque, 1993); Moutoukias, *Contrabando y control colonial en el siglo XVII*; Jorge Gelman, *De mercachifle a gran comerciante: Los caminos del ascenso en el Río de la Plata colonial* (La Rábida, 1996); João Luís Ribeiro Fragoso, *Homens de grossa aventura: Acumulação e hierarquia na praça mercantil do Rio de Janeiro, 1790–1830* (Rio de Janeiro, 1992).

<sup>80</sup> Thus the Quebec intendant negotiated for a cargo direct from Africa in 1716, but upon finding out the price, he decided to continue to make do with the thousands of *panis* (the Quebecois term for aboriginal slaves) in the colony instead. Robin Winks, *Blacks in Canada: A History*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, Conn., 1997), 7–9.



in Cuba and Venezuela, as well as from Peru to Buenos Aires, made it easier to purchase slaves in the recipient areas during the eighteenth century.<sup>81</sup> On the British mainland, the natural growth of black populations had begun by 1730, and by the early nineteenth century, Africa seemed less important as a source of labor than it had once been. For the Spanish American highlands, the equivalent was the reappearance of a positive rate of growth among indigenous peoples and *mestizaje* in the late seventeenth century after nearly two centuries of sharp decline. As a consequence, by the mid-eighteenth century, coerced Indian labor had declined even in Potosí, and mining operations were conducted mostly on the basis of waged labor. Black slaves could be found in most Spanish American colonies. Where they were fewer in number, for example in Central America, mid-eighteenth-century Appalachia, and rural New England (outside Rhode Island), it was usually an indication of relative poverty and lower levels of intercolonial commerce.<sup>82</sup>

Africans were among the very first arrivals to disembark from the Old World, but at the point of contact no one could have anticipated a transatlantic slave trade from Africa. In the early years of Spanish colonization, the Spanish may have carried more Amerindian slaves east than African slaves west, and the latter left not from Africa itself but rather from Spain (the first known slave voyage direct from Africa did not disembark until 1525). Furthermore, within the colonial Spanish Americas, each of the three major founder populations—Amerindians, sub-Saharan Africans, and Iberians—came to be associated with different terms of labor. Beyond the circum-Caribbean and the Río de la Plata, forced indigenous labor extracted via the *encomienda* and *repartimiento* (or *mita*) systems sustained both private *obrajes* and public works into the eighteenth century. Indigenous population densities combined with Spanish takeover of preexisting Amerindian imperial structures facilitated this process. Intermittent forced labor was not, however, enslavement. Slavery, a second labor regime, was, after the early decades, mostly reserved for Africans—the largest transoceanic immigrant group. Not much is known about the terms of either migration or labor of the third group—Europeans. They were to be found among galley slaves in sixteenth-century Havana, Santo Domingo, and Cartagena, but the Spanish shared the general European aversion to enslaving other Europeans (unless they were Moriscos or Muslims).<sup>83</sup> No evidence of indentured servants among the half-million arrivals from Spain before 1660 has surfaced, but to describe Spanish immigrants as “free labor” is hardly correct. Most were dependents or retainers, rather than soldiers, bureaucrats, or merchants with obligations extending beyond the provision of labor. If less challenging than enslaved Africans’ struggles to gain their freedom, the ultimate goals of Spanish migrants were similar in that they, too, hoped

<sup>81</sup> On this topic, see the exchange in the *Hispanic American Historical Review* sparked by Alejandra Irigoin and Regina Grafe, “Bargaining for Absolutism: A Spanish Path to Nation-State and Empire Building,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 88, no. 2 (2008): 173–209.

<sup>82</sup> For references to slave-trading in colonial Central America, see Lowell Gudmundson and Justin Wolfe, eds., *Blacks and Blackness in Central America: Between Race and Place* (Durham, N.C., 2010), 29, 35, 70, 132–133.

<sup>83</sup> David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Emancipation* (New York, 2014), 28, 349–350 n. 36; David Wheat, “Mediterranean Slavery, New World Transformations: Galley Slaves in the Spanish Caribbean, 1578–1635,” *Slavery & Abolition* 31, no. 3 (2010): 327–344.

to establish their independence in the Americas and re-create as much of what was familiar from the Old World as possible.<sup>84</sup>

From an African perspective, for a century from around 1550, several of Spain's circum-Caribbean colonies would have been predominantly black long before the development of the export sugar complex. More Africans than Europeans arrived in this broad region, as well as along the Pacific coast from Panama to Lima, before 1600. The influence of various Upper Guinea and West-Central African cultures on the circum-Caribbean between the sixteenth century and the early seventeenth century can now only be imagined. After the mid-seventeenth century, however, Africans arriving in any Spanish colony were likely to find themselves in a minority, with the larger society usually comprising Amerindians, Peninsular and *criollo* Spaniards, their *mestizo* progeny, and a growing native (creole) population of full and mixed African ancestry. There were significant black populations in Mexico City and on the Mexican coasts, on the Pacific and Caribbean shores of Colombia, in coastal Ecuador and Peru, and in Caribbean Venezuela—regions where the Amerindian population had largely been decimated after contact. Nevertheless, the dispersal of captives over an immense geographic area, and the fact that their arrival occurred over a much longer time span than in any other major polity in the Americas, may have inhibited the emergence of both large and permanent regions of black demographic and cultural dominance during the three centuries of Spanish colonialism.

Our research also suggests certain implications for the histories of those born to African parents in the Spanish Americas. A positive rate of intrinsic natural growth for people of full and mixed African ancestry probably emerged in Mexico before the United States—perhaps as early as 1650. Intrinsic natural growth rates were also positive for blacks even at the height of the later Cuban sugar boom.<sup>85</sup> Diminishing slave arrivals were one of the factors behind Mexican *mestizaje*. People of mixed origins became more common than those of full African ancestry after 1700, just as free people of color outnumbered slaves as early as 1680 in some regions. When the mainland colonies began to loosen ties with Spain, two opposite but related processes had already been unfolding: first, the formation of African-descended populations in Mexico and elsewhere that hardly fit modern U.S. understandings of “blackness” and “whiteness,” and second, the rise of slave arrivals in Cuba, Venezuela, and the Río de la Plata, renewing direct links with Africa. Coastal Peru, particularly Lima, saw a combination of the two patterns as Peru underwent centuries of *mestizaje* yet received new slave arrivals through the Río de la Plata in the late colonial era. As with Mexico, the large majority of Peru's population was of full and mixed Amerindian ancestry. Venezuela received a very significant flow of slave arrivals during

<sup>84</sup> Peter Boyd-Bowman, “Patterns of Spanish Emigration to the Indies until 1600,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 56, no. 4 (1976): 580–604; Magnus Mörner, with the collaboration of Harold Sims, *Adventurers and Proletarians: The Story of Migrants in Latin America* (Pittsburgh, 1985); James Lockhart and Enrique Otte, eds., *Letters and People of the Spanish Indies: Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1980).

<sup>85</sup> Frank T. Proctor III, “*Damned Notions of Liberty*”: *Slavery, Culture, and Power in Colonial Mexico, 1640–1769* (Albuquerque, 2010), 22–25. This Afro-Mexican population was increasingly free, rather than enslaved, by the eighteenth century. See Bennett, *Africans in Colonial Mexico*, 22–27. Jack Eblen defines intrinsic natural rates of change as “reflecting the characteristics of a closed population with a stable age structure”; Eblen, “On the Natural Increase of Slave Populations: The Example of the Cuban Slave Population, 1775–1900,” in Stanley L. Engerman and Eugene D. Genovese, eds., *Race and Slavery in the Western Hemisphere: Quantitative Studies* (Princeton, N.J., 1975), 211–247, 214, 245.



its last thirty years as a colony. Yet, free *pardos*—people of mixed African, European, and Amerindian origin—formed the majority of the Venezuelan population by 1810. Growing majorities of people of mixed ancestry emerged before the Africanization process triggered by these revived African inflows. The long view suggests that population growth due to *mestizaje* plus recovery from the virgin soil epidemics of the early period enabled Spanish America to remain the most populous imperial domain until late in the colonial era.

Demographics provide no more than an outline of the African presence, however. In late-eighteenth-century Cuba and the Río de la Plata, a surge of African arrivals interacted with a growing free African and African-descended population living in Havana, Buenos Aires, and Montevideo. This encounter led to the expansion (and reshaping) of African-based associations and black urban culture.<sup>86</sup> Africans and their descendants formed black confraternities in cities from Mexico to Lima, under the umbrella of the Catholic Church, from the earliest times through to the eighteenth century. Better documentation from the late eighteenth century enables us to see the emergence of *cabildos de nación* and “African nations” in Cuba and the Río de la Plata, respectively, that were not as directly controlled by the Church. Their functions were very similar to those of the old black confraternities and included the rituals of life (particularly funerals), socialization, and mutual support. In Cuba, adherents of Oyo-centric socio-religious groupings such as Sango emerged, and the tensions between the founding members of the organization and the large numbers of new arrivals from Africa after 1817 can now be laid out in some detail. The influences of African origins and the Catholic Church on these new associations are obvious, but so are many syncretic practices, the meaning of which is a matter of scholarly debate. Black socialization and distinctive African-based cultural practices are at least very clear. Free and enslaved populations of African ancestry mingled in these associations, though the leaders were usually free blacks. Free people of color were essential, since they could own real estate (for example, the house of the association), they had more time to devote to group activities, and in Spanish America they could represent black associations and defend them against colonial authorities. There is much less evidence of black organizations, and indeed public celebrations such as the Day of Kings, in the British, Dutch, and French Americas, probably because urban environments were of less relative importance there. The activities of such groups in other traditionally black cities of the Spanish Atlantic, such as Cartagena and Caracas, await historians’ attention.

The breadth, diversity, and chronological expanse of the Spanish colonies make the slave trade to Spanish America very difficult to address. The subdivision of this field into national Spanish American historiographies makes the subject even more complex. Additionally, an immersion in the literature of the British, Luso-Brazilian, Dutch, and French slave trades is essential if we are to understand the Spanish traffic. In recent years, the historiographies of the transatlantic slave trade, on the one hand, and colonial Spanish America, on the other, have not seriously engaged with each

<sup>86</sup> This paragraph is based on Henry B. Lovejoy, “Old Oyo Influences on the Transformation of Lucumí Identity in Colonial Cuba” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2012), and Alex Borucki, *From Shipmates to Soldiers: Emerging Black Identities in the Río de la Plata* (University of New Mexico Press, forthcoming in 2015).

other. Scholarship on the slave trade is mostly Anglophone and Francophone and tends to foreground Northwestern Europe, the North Atlantic, and the United States, including the non-Hispanic Caribbean. More recently, scholars have moved the Lusophone world to center stage.<sup>87</sup> While many new studies of slavery and the peoples of African ancestry in Spanish America have appeared, this new scholarship does not yet embrace the methods and perspectives now used by scholars of the transatlantic slave trade. Contributions to the history of people of African ancestry in colonial Spanish America still do not explain how the founder populations got there.<sup>88</sup> Not a single monograph or even article on the slave trade to Mexico has appeared since the partial treatment in Colin Palmer's work.<sup>89</sup> For countries such as Peru, Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador, scholars have yet to fully exploit the abundant documentary sources on the connections with Africa. And very little is known of the Africans shipped to Iberia, the Canary Islands, and the Philippines during and after the Iberian Union.<sup>90</sup> We hope that our research will be the beginning of a coordinated effort to recover the stories of what is the least-known large branch of the African diaspora.<sup>91</sup>

<sup>87</sup> Out of a total of thirty-seven essays, Gad Heuman and James Walvin, eds., *The Slavery Reader* (London, 2003), contains only two on Brazil and none on Spanish colonies. A second recent compendium ignores black experiences in mainland Spanish America, but includes two essays on Cuba and one on Brazil; Laurent Dubois and Julius S. Scott, eds., *Origins of the Black Atlantic* (New York, 2010).

<sup>88</sup> The second edition of Herbert S. Klein and Ben Vinson III, *African Slavery in Latin America and the Caribbean* (New York, 2007), has raised the profile of slavery in Latin America, but ignores the slave trade to Spanish colonies. Jane G. Landers and Barry M. Robinson, eds., *Slaves, Subjects, and Subversives: Blacks in Colonial Latin America* (Albuquerque, 2006), includes chapters on factors influencing slave production in Africa, but also passes over the topic. In "Shape of a Diaspora: The Movement of Afro-Iberians to Colonial Spanish America," in Sherwin K. Bryant, Rachel Sarah O'Toole, and Ben Vinson III, eds., *Africans to Spanish America: Expanding the Diaspora* (Urbana, Ill., 2012), 27–49, Leo Garofalo examines the arrival of people of African descent from the Iberian Peninsula, but the volume ignores the slave trade from Africa.

<sup>89</sup> See Colin A. Palmer, *Slaves of the White God: Blacks in Mexico, 1570–1650* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), chap. 1; Palmer, *Human Cargoes: The British Slave Trade to Spanish America, 1700–1739* (Urbana, Ill., 1981), 108. Thus far the lone attempt to reconstruct slave-trade networks linking early-seventeenth-century Veracruz with both Angola and the Caribbean is David Wheat, "García Mendes Castelo Branco, *fidalg*o de Angola y mercader de esclavos en Veracruz y el Caribe a principios del siglo XVII," in María Elisa Velázquez, coord., *Debates históricos contemporáneos: Africanos y afrodescendientes en México y Centroamérica* (México, D.F., 2011), 85–107. See also Nicolás Ngou-Mve, *El África bantú en la colonización de México, 1595–1640* (Madrid, 1994).

<sup>90</sup> Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán, "The Slave Trade in Mexico," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 24, no. 3 (1944): 419–421. On the slave trade to the Philippines, see Tatiana Seijas, "The Portuguese Slave Trade to Spanish Manila, 1580–1640," *Itinerario* 32, no. 1 (2008): 19–38; Pascale Girard, "Les Africains aux Philippines aux XVI<sup>e</sup> et XVII<sup>e</sup> siècles," in Berta Ares Queija and Alessandro Stella, eds., *Negros, mulatos, zambaigos: Derroteros africanos en los mundos ibéricos* (Seville, 2000), 67–74.

<sup>91</sup> In this essay we have of necessity focused on ports and broad regions from which slaves were embarked and disembarked. Sources from the Catholic Church, notarial records, censuses, court cases, and other colonial documents offer keys to understand the many meanings of African "nations" for Africans as well as for the bureaucrats and priests who created the files. Future scholarship will integrate the numerous local studies based on these sources with our new data to refine the debate on African origins and black identities. The locally based but Atlantic-focused scholarship on Africans and their descendants in colonial Spanish America is expanding rapidly. For a survey, see Rachel Sarah O'Toole, "As Historical Subjects: The African Diaspora in Colonial Latin American History," *History Compass* 11, no. 12 (2013): 1094–1110.



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**Alex Borucki** is Assistant Professor of History at the University of California, Irvine. He is the author of *From Shipmates to Soldiers: Emerging Black Identities in the Río de la Plata* (University of New Mexico Press, forthcoming in 2015) and *Abolicionismo y tráfico de esclavos en Montevideo tras la fundación republicana* (Biblioteca Nacional, 2009), and co-author, with Karla Chagas and Natalia Stalla, of *Esclavitud y trabajo: Un estudio sobre los afrodescendientes en la frontera uruguaya* (Pulmón Ediciones, 2004). He has published articles in the *Hispanic American Historical Review*, the *Colonial Latin American Review*, *Itinerario*, and *Slavery and Abolition*.

**David Eltis** is Emeritus faculty at Emory University and Research Associate at the University of British Columbia. Among many publications, he is the author of *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade* (Oxford University Press, 1987) and *The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), and co-author, with David Richardson, of the *Atlas of the Transatlantic Slave Trade* (Yale University Press, 2010). Along with Paul Lachance and Martin Halbert, he is the co-creator of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, an open-access website containing an interactive database of more than 35,000 slave voyages that has led to major advancements in the understanding of this traffic.

**David Wheat** is Assistant Professor of History at Michigan State University. He is the author of *Atlantic Africa and the Spanish Caribbean, 1570–1640* (to be published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, forthcoming in 2015). His articles have appeared in the *Journal of African History*, *Slavery and Abolition*, and the *Journal of Early Modern History*, and in various edited volumes published in both English and Spanish.

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# Self-Determination: How a German Enlightenment Idea Became the Slogan of National Liberation and a Human Right

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ERIC D. WEITZ

NO PHRASE HAS HAD GREATER political resonance in the last one hundred years than “self-determination.” No concept is as murky as self-determination. Even legal scholars, from whom one hopes to find some precision, throw up their hands in confusion and dismay. “No one is very clear as to what it [the right of self-determination] means,” writes James Crawford.<sup>1</sup> Others are even more scathing: “Juridically, the notion of a legal ‘right’ of self-determination is nonsense—for can ex hypothesi [an] as yet juridically nonexistent entity be the possessor of a legal right?”<sup>2</sup>

Yet self-determination became and is still the favored slogan of all sorts of movements around the globe and has been written into virtually every major human rights declaration and convention since the 1940s—including the United Nations Charter, the final statement of the famed Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian Countries in 1955, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and article 1 of the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of which were adopted in 1966. All the conventions and declarations assert “the right of self-determination” for “all peoples” so they can “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their eco-

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<sup>1</sup> James Crawford, “The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and Future,” in Philip Alston, ed., *Peoples’ Rights* (Oxford, 2001), 7–67, quotation from 10, where he also says that the law is “obscure.” See also Richard A. Falk, “The Right of Self-Determination under International Law: The Coherence of Doctrine versus the Incoherence of Experience,” in Wolfgang Dan-speckgruber with Arthur Watts, eds., *Self-Determination and Self-Administration: A Sourcebook* (Boulder, Colo., 1997), 47–63, along with the commentary by Ruth Lapidoth, 63–68. Falk shows anything but the coherence of doctrine.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Richard Fitzmaurice, quoted in Bernd Roland Elsner, *Die Bedeutung des Volkes im Völkerrecht: Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der historischen Entwicklung und der Praxis des Selbstbestimmungsrechts der Völker* (Berlin, 2000), 19.



conomic, social and cultural development,” to quote the 1966 covenants.<sup>3</sup> Many documents and conventions go even further, giving primacy to the rights of “the people,” from which individual rights are seen to flow, easily and naturally. In the words of the final communiqué of the Bandung Conference, “self-determination . . . is a prerequisite of the full enjoyment of all fundamental Human Rights.”<sup>4</sup> By its very title, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights makes it clear that rights inhere in peoples, not just individuals.<sup>5</sup>

In its origins, however, self-determination was an Enlightenment concept relating to individuals, not to nations.<sup>6</sup> Over roughly 150 years, from the mid- and late eighteenth century to World War I, it evolved from a primarily individualist into a collectivist doctrine. Tracking this dramatic, often unnoticed transformation is more than an exercise in intellectual genealogy. Untangling the diverse meanings of self-determination goes to the heart of the complexities and dilemmas intrinsic to the history and politics of human rights.

The transformation of self-determination’s meaning occurred in deep consonance with political developments, even for the most lofty of philosophers. At every stage, from the French Revolution to Third World (as it was once known) liberation, a dialectic between ideas and politics marked the historical evolution of the meaning of self-determination. For its early progenitors amid the German Enlightenment and Romantic Age—Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and others—the defining events were the French Revolution and the Napoleonic conquests. For their successors, Karl Marx and his followers, especially Austro-Marxists such as Otto Bauer and Karl Renner and then V. I. Lenin and Joseph Stalin, the rise of nationalist movements and the creation of multiple European nation-states between 1870 and 1919 forced socialists to think beyond class as the sole motor of history and contend with the reality of the nation. In the twentieth century, anticolonial thinkers and activists drew on self-determination as a powerful mobilizing tool against their im-

<sup>3</sup> See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966, <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm>, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, December 16, 1966, <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b2esc.htm>. See also the Resolution on the Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination, December 16, 1952, <http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNGARsn/1952/148.pdf>, and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, December 14, 1960, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Independence.aspx>.

<sup>4</sup> Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung, April 24, 1955, [http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/final\\_communique\\_of\\_the\\_asian\\_african\\_conference\\_of\\_bandung\\_24\\_april\\_1955-en-676237bd-72f7-471f-949a-88b6ae513585.html](http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/final_communique_of_the_asian_african_conference_of_bandung_24_april_1955-en-676237bd-72f7-471f-949a-88b6ae513585.html).

<sup>5</sup> African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z1afchar.htm>.

<sup>6</sup> The intellectual history of self-determination is barely known. Jörg Fisch, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker: Die Domestizierung einer Illusion* (Munich, 2010), analyzes the term but does not trace its intellectual development. Prior to this recent publication, one has to go back forty years to Alfred Cobban, *The Nation State and National Self-Determination* (London, 1969), which is a revised version of a study that first appeared in 1945. In the 1920s and 1930s, many studies that refer to self-determination were written under the shadow of the League of Nations minority protection system, including C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (London, 1934). In the 1940s and 1950s, a number of scholars wrote about self-determination amid discussions on the post-World War II political order. Typically, the works from the 1920s to the 1960s viewed self-determination as an age-old concept, extending as far back as Thucydides and then to the Middle Ages, when nations struggled against the supremacy of the church. See, for example, Oskar Halecki, “The Problem of Self-Determination,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 87, no. 2 (1943): 194–198; and Günter Decker, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen* (Göttingen, 1955).

perial overseers. After 1945, they and their Soviet bloc allies played the driving role in making self-determination a key element of the postwar human rights regime.

In its first century and a quarter, from the French Revolution to World War I, the history of self-determination was very much a German story. Marx was of course deeply schooled in the German philosophical tradition, and he developed his ideas in dialogue not only with Hegel but more generally with the German Enlightenment, including Kant and Fichte. Drawing on his corpus, German-language thinkers dominated the intellectual milieu of Second International socialism, and from that well the Austro-Marxists and the Bolsheviks drew deeply, with long-lasting effects, extending into the post-1945 decolonization movements. In this way, the German intellectual tradition went global, even as the original meaning of self-determination as individual emancipation became transformed into a collectivist doctrine regarding the national liberation of suppressed peoples.

Another stream of thinking emerged in the World War I era. Self-determination had been used somewhat episodically by liberal nationalists in Germany and Italy in the 1860s.<sup>7</sup> But when U.S. president Woodrow Wilson took up the slogan of self-determination in a determined effort to shape the postwar world along American lines and to forestall Bolshevik influence, the term ricocheted around the world. Wilson gave a different turn to the meaning of self-determination by drawing on the Anglo-American political tradition epitomized by John Locke and John Stuart Mill. In Wilson's understanding, self-determination meant civilized men coming together to form a democratic polity. Never did he imagine that his deployment of the term would resonate far beyond his own highly limited conception of the civilized world and white men as the only ones entitled to be full rights-bearing citizens.

The confluence of socialist and liberal ideas of self-determination gave the term its great power in the twentieth century. For both streams of political thought, self-determination was a doctrine that applied first and foremost to nations, and only subsequently to individuals. In that regard, *national* self-determination became a *doxa*, an unreflected, hegemonic idea, in the words of Pierre Bourdieu.<sup>8</sup> None of the key eighteenth- and nineteenth-century intellectual and political protagonists discussed here—Kant, Friedrich Schiller, Fichte, Marx, and Bauer, let alone their political successors such as Wilson, Lenin, and Kwame Nkrumah—ever seems to have considered the transformation in the meaning of self-determination. Many of them, in a seemingly unreflective manner, moved from using “self-determination” in an individualist sense to employing it as a collectivist term.

Yet as Hannah Arendt argued more than sixty years ago in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, the great irony of the French Revolution is that despite its universalist claims, one has rights only as a citizen of a particular nation, and the worst condition of all, short of physical annihilation, is statelessness.<sup>9</sup> Despite the individualist tenor of all the great rights proclamations, from the American Bill of Rights and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen to the Universal Dec-

<sup>7</sup> For example, Eduard Zeller, “Das Recht der Nationalität und das freie Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker,” *Preußische Jahrbücher* 26, no. 6 (1870): 627–650. See the discussion in Decker, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen*, 84–90, and Paul Kluge, *Selbstbestimmung: Der Weg einer Idee durch die Geschichte* (Göttingen, 1963), 10–12.

<sup>8</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford, Calif., 1990).

<sup>9</sup> Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951; repr., Cleveland, 1958).



laration of Human Rights in 1948, only as nation- or empire-beings do we enter the hallowed world of rights-bearing citizens. Hence, the question of who may or may not belong to the nation or empire is the primary determinant of whether or not one has access to rights.

This insight, that “the right to have rights,” as Arendt phrased it, is fundamentally dependent on national (or, one might add, racial) belonging, suggests yet another, even more disturbing conclusion.<sup>10</sup> As the scholarship of the last generation has so forcefully demonstrated, the construction of citizenship necessarily involves boundary-drawing, of territorial borders but also of peoples. The creation of rights for some is, then, inextricably wound up with denying others the access to rights. In so many cases around the globe, the establishment of rights regimes has been tied together with what we would now label as crimes against humanity. The elect group, defined by nation or race, may be granted the right to have rights. Those denied citizenship may be consigned somewhere else, removed to another state or a reservation or a refugee camp of some sort, or in the most extreme cases to literal oblivion.

Historically, then, rights and crimes emerged together. Moreover, even among the elect, rights are often hierarchically structured along national, racial, and gender lines. After the 1860s, for example, American Indians on reservations had certain rights unavailable to whites, and a host of debilities. White women, it barely needs repeating, were American citizens, yet had few of the rights accorded to men. Human rights, then, are not composed of a uniform set of laws and norms applicable to everyone. Instead, they are a somewhat unwieldy set of guarantees, privileges, limitations, and exclusions that cannot be fully captured in the singular.

Perhaps better than any other intellectual construct, the history of self-determination illuminates the complex character of rights regimes as they emerged in the modern world. From its definition in the late eighteenth century as denoting a supposedly universal, free individual—never mind that that notion masked specific national, racial, and gendered meanings—self-determination became in the twentieth century the untrammelled favored slogan of nationalist movements and states around the globe. How this happened—how self-determination, first understood as a concept of individual self-constitution and emancipation, became a doctrine of collectivities, a concept of rights rooted in discrete national or racial communities—constitutes an entwined process of intellectual *and* political history.

ONLY IN THE PAST FEW YEARS has the new history of human rights begun to explore these dilemmas. In contrast, legal scholars and political theorists have long plumbed the meaning of self-determination. The legal literature in particular is massive.<sup>11</sup> Many jurists and political theorists have questioned whether self-determination can be considered a human right at all, since rights, by some definitions, apply only to individuals, not to collectives. For many years, legal scholars also debated whether

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 296. But for a bracing critique regarding the limits of Arendt’s thought, see A. Dirk Moses, “Das römische Gespräch in a New Key: Hannah Arendt, Genocide, and the Defense of Republican Civilization,” *Journal of Modern History* 85, no. 4 (2013): 867–913.

<sup>11</sup> An excellent analysis that also provides a thorough review of the legal scholarship on self-determination is Karen Knop, *Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law* (Cambridge, 2002).

self-determination was an established legal right or an underlying legal principle; that argument had little currency beyond the discipline. More significantly, legal scholars and political scientists have also analyzed the intrinsic conflict between claims for self-determination, including secession and minority rights, and the principle of state sovereignty, a conflict built into the founding documents of the United Nations.<sup>12</sup>

The most extensive treatment of the term, by the renowned jurist Antonio Cassese, takes an unrequitedly positive view of self-determination.<sup>13</sup> For Cassese, as for many other legal scholars, self-determination is virtually a synonym for democracy. He argues that “a permanent link [exists] between self-determination and civil and political rights . . . There is no self-determination without democratic decision-making.”<sup>14</sup> In a rousing conclusion, he states:

Plainly self-determination is the *summa* or synthesis of individual human rights because a people really enjoys self-determination only when the rights and freedoms of all individuals making up that people are fully respected.<sup>15</sup>

But there is, in fact, no necessary connection, historically or theoretically, between what Cassese and others call “internal” self-determination, that is, democratic strictures, and “external” self-determination, which signifies the freedom of a people or a country from rule by an outside power. Cassese pays scant attention to the problem of who, precisely, constitutes the people, and the dilemmas that invariably arise when the nation is defined in exclusively national or racial terms. In those circumstances, self-determination may signify a hierarchical sets of rights, forced deportations, or,

<sup>12</sup> For a concise discussion of this topic, see Patrick Thornberry, “Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments,” in Charlotte Ku and Paul F. Diehl, eds., *International Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo., 2003), 135–153. The emergence of the Quebec secessionist movement in the 1960s stimulated many analyses and also became a focal point for thinking about subsequent cases, including the breakup of the former Yugoslavia; see Edward McWhinney, *Self-Determination of Peoples and Plural-Ethnic States in Contemporary International Law: Failed States, Nation-Building and the Alternative, Federal Option* (Leiden, 2007). See also the classic work by James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 2006), especially 107–131. In the 1970s, self-determination became the underlying component of a larger category known as “peoples’ rights,” including environmental, indigenous, developmental, women’s, and minority rights, sometimes referred to as “third-generation rights.” For excellent overviews and analyses, see Alston, *Peoples’ Rights*, and James Crawford, ed., *The Rights of Peoples* (Oxford, 1988).

On secession, good pathways into the extensive literature and debates are Marcelo G. Kohen, ed., *Secession: International Law Perspectives* (Cambridge, 2006), especially Christian Tomuschat, “Secession and Self-Determination,” 23–45; Stephen Macedo and Allen Buchanan, eds., *Secession and Self-Determination* (New York, 2003); and Margaret Moore, ed., *National Self-Determination and Secession* (Oxford, 1998).

Earlier works in political science were very much written within the modernization paradigm; e.g., David C. Gordon, *Self-Determination and History in the Third World* (Princeton, N.J., 1971), who argues that once decolonized nations mature, they will move from history as myth, as a legitimizing ideology, to scientific history. See also Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), who had a rather laconic approach to the topic. He recognized the difficulty of deciding who constitutes the people, contended that some people were not yet mature enough for self-determination (the classic civilizational and great power argument), and worried about the multiplication of states should self-determination be widely implemented. Yet he was resigned to the immense appeal of self-determination and granted a kind of inevitability to nationalism that signified at least some benefits for developing countries; see 307–308, 327–328, and 379–380 for summary statements.

<sup>13</sup> Antonio Cassese, *Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal* (Cambridge, 1995).

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 54.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 337.



ultimately, genocide. James Crawford, a “rare critic” of self-determination (in contrast to Cassese and most other legal scholars), more effectively captures the harsh world of politics. Under classic international law, he writes pithily, “self-determine *qui peut*.”<sup>16</sup>

The legal and political science scholarship is indispensable to the study of self-determination. But it is also quite limited in scope. Few of the major works deal with the longer intellectual and political history of self-determination; most address it primarily as an issue of decolonization after 1945 or of the post-Cold War decomposition of states. To the historian, it is strange to read that for international lawyers, the term “peoples” refers essentially to post-1945 colonized individuals, and especially to the UN categories of those living under trusteeships or other non-self-governing territories.<sup>17</sup> The long-running debates about the meaning of “the people” and various associated terms like “nation” and “citizen” do not play much of a role here, despite the fact that these debates stretch back to antiquity and took on still greater resonance in the modern era of rights beginning with the American, French, and Latin American revolutions.<sup>18</sup>

Historians, as is their bent, take the longer view. Yet for the most part, they too have adopted a limited chronological framework when it comes to self-determination. Moreover, until just the last few years, they have not been as attentive as legal scholars and political scientists to self-determination’s problematic characteristics. The standard historical accounts of human rights have simply assimilated self-determination into the ever-ascending cascade of rights that now encircle the globe.<sup>19</sup> The newer, far more sophisticated and critical historiography on human rights has challenged this easy, triumphalist narrative, but has simply been dismissive of self-determination. In the important pacesetter of the most recent historiography, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History*, Samuel Moyn establishes a binary opposition between human rights and self-determination, rather than exploring the tensions inherent in the concept as it emerged as the powerful mobilizing slogan of anticolonial movements and then became legally encoded as a human right.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Crawford, “The Right of Self-Determination,” 12. The “rare critic” quote is from Knop, *Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law*, 2. More generally on these problems, see the effective summary and analysis *ibid.*, 50–90.

<sup>17</sup> Knop, *Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law*, 18, 51, 66.

<sup>18</sup> See Reinhart Koselleck, “Volk, Nation, Nationalismus, Masse,” in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, eds., *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, 8 vols. (Stuttgart, 1972–1997), 7: 141–430.

<sup>19</sup> See Paul Gordon Lauren, *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen* (Philadelphia, 1998); Mary Ann Glendon, *A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (New York, 2001); Micheline R. Ishay, *The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era* (Berkeley, Calif., 2004); Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005); Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights: A History* (New York, 2007); and Jean H. Quataert, *Advocating Dignity: Human Rights Mobilizations in Global Politics* (Philadelphia, 2009). For an early and important critical assessment of the literature on human rights, but one that still does not get beyond many of the problems of its topic, see Kenneth Cmiel, “The Recent History of Human Rights,” *American Historical Review* 109, no. 1 (February 2004): 117–135.

<sup>20</sup> Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010). For other important recent works on human rights, see Jan Eckel, *Die Ambivalenz des Guten: Menschenrechte in der internationalen Politik seit den 1940ern* (Göttingen, 2014); Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn, eds., *Moral für die Welt? Menschenrechtspolitik in den 1970er Jahren* (Göttingen, 2012); Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William I. Hitchcock, eds., *The Human Rights Revolution: An International History* (New York, 2011); and Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, ed., *Human Rights in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, 2011; original

But since the publication of Moyn's book in 2010, a number of scholars have presented more nuanced interpretations. Fabian Klose, Roland Burke, Bradley R. Simpson, and Talbot Imlay, for example, have argued that anticolonial nationalists played a fundamental role in the forging of the postwar human rights regime. On the basis of different research topics, each of these scholars has explored the tensions between individual human rights and the claims for national self-determination as the anticolonial movements emerged after 1945. While Moyn echoes the great human rights practitioners and early scholars such as John Humphrey and Lewis Hanke who, by the late 1950s, despaired that self-determination had supplanted human rights, Burke's heroes are the formidable non-Western human rights advocates—the Lebanese Charles Malik, the Filipino Carlos Romulo—who championed the individualism of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights while also fighting for national independence.<sup>21</sup>

In a recent essay, Frederick Cooper writes that the argument “about the relationship of national sovereignty and human rights” has been ongoing for sixty years.<sup>22</sup> Actually, this argument has been ongoing since the late eighteenth century. Taking a much longer historical perspective adds further nuance and insight to the tension-laden relationship of human rights and self-determination, of rights as defined by individual self-constitution and expression or by the individual's membership in the national collective.<sup>23</sup>

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German ed. 2010). For a spirited defense of a strictly political definition of human rights, see Aryeh Neier, *The International Human Rights Movement: A History* (Princeton, N.J., 2012). Somewhere between the newer and older historiography is Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi, *Human Rights at the UN: The Political History of Universal Justice* (Bloomington, Ind., 2008). For one recent work that does treat self-determination critically, see Fisch, *Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker*.

<sup>21</sup> Fabian Klose, *Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence: The Wars of Independence in Kenya and Algeria*, trans. Dona Geyer (Philadelphia, 2013; original German ed. 2010); Roland Burke, *Decolonization and the Evolution of Human Rights* (Philadelphia, 2010); Bradley R. Simpson, “Self-Determination, Human Rights, and the End of Empire in the 1970s,” *Humanity* 4, no. 2 (2013): 239–260; Talbot C. Imlay, “International Socialism and Decolonization during the 1950s: Competing Rights and the Postcolonial Order,” *American Historical Review* 118, no. 4 (October 2013): 1105–1132. See the appreciative but critical review of the Klose and Burke books by Jan Eckel, “Human Rights and Decolonization: New Perspectives and Open Questions,” *Humanity* 1, no. 1 (2010): 111–135. Eckel largely follows Moyn's arguments, and a similar view is also present in A. W. Brian Simpson's monumental study *Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention* (Oxford, 2001), 300–305. But see the rebuttals to Eckel in *Humanity* by Klose, <http://www.humanityjournal.net/blog/response-to-jan-eckel/>, and Burke, <http://www.humanityjournal.net/blog/another-response-to-jan-eckel/>.

Mark Mazower, “The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950,” *Historical Journal* 47, no. 2 (2004): 379–398, is the touchstone for much of the newer writing on human rights history. But Mazower exaggerates the decline of collective rights, as the UN debates and much else indicate. As Klose, Burke, Simpson, and Imlay argue (correctly, in my view), group rights in the form of self-determination constituted a vital element of the post–World War II human rights system. Moreover, see *Dossier on Social Rights and Human Rights in the Twentieth Century*, Special Issue, *Humanity* 3, no. 3 (2012), devoted to social rights; Sandrine Kott and Joëlle Droux, eds., *Globalizing Social Rights: The International Labour Organization and Beyond* (London, 2013); and Daniel Maul, *Menschenrechte, Sozialpolitik und Dekolonisation: Die Internationale Arbeitsorganisation (IAO), 1940–1970* (Essen, 2007), all of which complicate Mazower's view that post–World War II history marked simply the triumph of an individualist conception of human rights.

<sup>22</sup> Frederick Cooper, “Afterword: Social Rights and Human Rights in the Time of Decolonization,” *Humanity* 3, no. 3 (2012): 473–492, quotation from 476.

<sup>23</sup> This article builds on the recent critical historiography of human rights, and on newer works in intellectual history that emphasize both the changing meaning of concepts over time and the transnational historical context in which concepts are used by actors—to state it somewhat quickly but accurately, a combination of the Cambridge School and *Begriffsgeschichte*. See Darrin M. McMahon and



THE LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL SOURCES of self-determination are varied. The *Oxford English Dictionary* notes a number of seventeenth-century usages. But the phrase achieved special resonance in German in the late eighteenth century. Kant probably originated the German usage, *Selbstbestimmung*, and it was then taken up by the great figures of the German classical age, Goethe and Schiller, as well as the philosophers who succeeded Kant. These figures of the German Enlightenment and the German Romantic Era wrote about freedom as a process of individual *Selbstbestimmung*.<sup>24</sup> Schiller, a devoted Kantian, echoed the Kantian link between reason, individuation, and emancipation when he wrote: "Pure self-determination is actually a form of practical reason . . . If one wants to demonstrate pure self-determination, one must act out of pure reason."<sup>25</sup>

Kant himself used "self-determination" more often in his notes than in his published work. Whether or not he deployed the term, virtually his entire oeuvre is concerned with its meaning. In his coinage, *Selbstbestimmung* is a multi-layered, mutually constitutive process involving the conjoined subject and object and the very conditions that make knowledge possible. Self-determination means that the individual constitutes himself through the attainment of knowledge, and thereby becomes self-knowing and capable of emancipation. In one of his quick summaries, Kant characterized it as "Knowledge of himself through self-determination in space and time."<sup>26</sup> Or, as he put it in somewhat more developed form and in contrast to Humean empiricism: "the consciousness of myself . . . does not lead to the object but is the very determining of the subject."<sup>27</sup>

So how do we get from *that* understanding, of self-determination as the individual exercising reason, constituting himself, and coming into freedom, with no mention of the people, the nation, or the state, to self-determination as a collectivist notion, as the ideology of national unification, decolonization, and human rights as national liberation?

Almost from its beginnings, self-determination coupled individualist and collec-

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Samuel Moyn, eds., *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History* (New York, 2014); Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, eds., *Global Intellectual History* (New York, 2012); David Armitage, "What's the Big Idea? Intellectual History and the Longue Durée," *History of European Ideas* 38, no. 4 (2012): 493–507; and Peter E. Gordon, "What Is Intellectual History? A Frankly Partisan Introduction to a Frequently Misunderstood Field" (2012), scholar.harvard.edu/files/pgordon/files/what\_is\_intell\_history\_pgordon\_mar2012.pdf, cited by permission.

<sup>24</sup> See various references in Brunner, Conze, and Koselleck, *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*: Peter Christian Ludz, "Anarchie, Anarchismus, Anarchist," 1: 49–109, here 98–99; Werner Conze, "Arbeit," 1: 154–215, here 206; Werner Conze, "Freiheit," 2: 425–542, here 501; Ulrich Dierse, "Ideologie," 3: 131–169, here 150; Rudolf Walther, "Imperialismus," 3: 171–236, here 224; Hans Erich Bödeker, "Menschheit, Humanität, Humanismus," 3: 1063–1128, here 1081–1082; Irmeline Veit-Brause, "Partikularismus," 4: 735–766, here 751.

<sup>25</sup> Schiller to Gottfried Körner, February 8, 1793, in Friedrich Schiller, *Schillers Briefe*, ed. Fritz Jonas, 7 vols. (Stuttgart, 1892–1896), 3: 239–246, quotation from 245.

<sup>26</sup> Immanuel Kant, "Aus dem Nachlaß, April 1800–Februar 1803," VII. Konvolut, VI. Bogen, 4. Seite, in Karsten Worm and Susanne Boeck, eds., *Kant im Kontext II: Werke, Briefwechsel und Nachlaß. Komplettausgabe* (CD-ROM, Berlin, 2003). The first quote at length: "Erstlich das Bewustseyn seiner selbst als *facultas repraesentativa* zweytens die Bestimmung seiner selbst als *function* seiner selbst als *vis repraesentativa*. Drittens die Erscheinung seiner selbst als Phänomens als Mannigfaltigen der Vorstellung: der durchgängigen Bestimmung als Existenz seiner selbst aber bloß als Erscheinung *a priori* nicht als Ding an sich objectiv = X sondern wie das Subject afficirt wird durch den Verstand: Erkenntnis seiner selbst durch Selbstbestimmung im Raum und der Zeit."

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, VII. Konvolut, VII. Bogen, 2. Seite.

tivist meanings, although the individualist strain clearly predominated. Even Schiller, for example, did not imagine an emancipation that could be totally free of the state and nation. Schiller's thought evolved under the impact of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic conquests. Without at all abandoning his Enlightenment individualism, he began to think more of nations and engaged deeply with the German theorist of human diversity Johann Gottfried von Herder.<sup>28</sup> Schiller's great (and last) play *Wilhelm Tell* captured the evolution of his thinking. The famous story of the father shooting the apple placed on his son's head is about resistance against tyranny and the longing for liberty. Completed in 1805, the play can be read as a defense of the French Revolution and a critique of Napoleonic rule over Europe. At its outset, Tell is the great, lone hero, but ultimately, he can fulfill his destiny only by joining his individual person with the national cause (even when couched as the "ancient liberties" of three Swiss cantons). In one of the many rousing stanzas in the play, Werner Stauffacher, one of the leaders of the rebellion against the tyrannical governor who forced Tell to shoot the arrow at his son, cries out:

Whether the lakes or the mountains divide us,  
Every free people rules itself alone,  
We are of one tribe and one blood,  
And from one homeland are we descended.<sup>29</sup>

In the great Age of Revolution, the rights of man were indeed the rights of *man* and of the *citizen*. "The People," however they were constituted, whether by blood descent and homeland as in *Wilhelm Tell*, or by more open, democratic forms of citizenship, were the source of sovereignty; their representatives would delineate their rights, which were, in any case, *natural* (and perhaps even self-evident), and *their state* would be the guardian of those rights. That is, of course, the original regime of rights established in the French, American, and Latin American revolutions, and which reached something of a culmination with the founding in 1830 of an independent Greece out of the Ottoman Empire, the first post-French Revolution and Napoleonic nation-state established in Europe.

In this era, Kant's younger contemporary Johann Gottlieb Fichte played the decisive intellectual role in transforming the meaning of self-determination into a collectivist concept. In the older intellectual history going back to the 1930s and 1940s, Fichte, along with Nietzsche, was seen as a proto-Nazi, largely because of his 1807 *Addresses to the German Nation*.<sup>30</sup> But it is far more important to see in Fichte's writings not Nazism, but an Enlightenment commitment to liberty, rights, and rationality. His later advocacy of the German nation was completely in keeping with other early-nineteenth-century nationalist activists and thinkers, such as the Italian Giuseppe Mazzini. In their view, the nation-state would mark the completion of the

<sup>28</sup> See Norbert Oellers, *Schiller: Elend der Geschichte, Glanz der Kunst* (Stuttgart, 2005). More generally, see the unjustly neglected study by Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 4th ed. (Oxford, 1993). Alone among modern theorists of the nation, Kedourie recognizes its Kantian roots.

<sup>29</sup> This is a somewhat altered version of Francis Lamport's translation in *William Tell: A Play* (London, 2005), 50, based on *Wilhelm Tell*, in Friedrich Schiller, *Werke und Briefe*, 12 vols., vol. 5: *Dramen IV*, ed. Matthias Luserke (Frankfurt am Main, 1996), 428.

<sup>30</sup> See, for example, Peter Viereck, *Metapolitics: From the Romantics to Hitler* (New York, 1940); and Hans Kohn, *The Mind of Germany: The Education of a Nation* (New York, 1960).





FIGURE 1: *Der Weimarer Musenhof: Schiller in Tiefurt dem Hof vorlesend* [*The Learned Circle at Weimar: Schiller Reading to the Court in Tiefurt*]. Self-determination was, in its origins, a German Enlightenment concept relating to individual self-constitution and emancipation. Here the great dramatist, essayist, and philosopher Friedrich Schiller reads to the luminaries of the German Enlightenment, who are gathered together in Weimar. Standing to the right is Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and next to him, in the hat, is Johann Gottfried Herder. Fichte probed and refined the concept of self-determination and transformed it into a doctrine of national liberation. Painting by Theobald Reinhold von Oer, 1860. Nationalgalerie, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin. Granger, NYC—All rights reserved. Reproduced by permission.

collective destiny of the nation, and every national would find fulfillment—that is, be a self-determining individual—only in and through the nation. In all their writings, they sailed over the intrinsic tensions between individual and group rights and the difficult problem of what to do with non-nationals who lived within the borders of the new national state.

Fichte led a disorderly, chaotic life, and his philosophy ran through different phases, each of which stamped self-determination with a somewhat different meaning. As was true of everyone of his generation, the towering event in his life was the French Revolution. Early in his career, deeply affected by the Revolution, he wrote blistering appeals for freedom of speech and charged the German kings, princes, and dukes with the responsibility to protect the rights of their subjects. He often faced the charge of atheism, which he denied, but the attacks forced him, in one of the great



FIGURE 2: Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) was the most important proponent of the concept of self-determination in its early phase. He developed his philosophy in dialogue with Kant and in response to the French Revolution. Fichte claimed to have surpassed the master's achievement. His philosophy moved from egocentricity, to the universal man, to the national man. Down to World War I, leading socialists such as Jean Jaurès and Clara Zetkin placed him in the pantheon of socialism's forerunners. Drawing by Karl Bauer in the *Münchener Illustrierte Zeitung*, 1912. Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz/Art Resource, N.Y. Reproduced by permission.



*causes célèbres* of 1790s German-speaking Europe, to decamp from his position at the university in Jena.

If the Revolution was the great historical event that so shaped him, it was his encounter with Kant that proved decisive in the development of his thinking. “I live in a new world,” he wrote after reading Kant’s *Critique of Practical Reason*. “It is beyond comprehension what regard for mankind, what power, this system [of thought] gives us.”<sup>31</sup> Both—the revolution in politics fostered by the French, the revolution in thought fostered by Kant—shaped Fichte’s actions and philosophy throughout his life, with deep impressions left on the meaning of self-determination. In all his writings, he engaged the deepest philosophical questions as well as the great intellectual and political debates—republicanism, liberty, revolution, constitutions, the social contract, markets—spurred on by the French Revolution and the emerging commercial economy, a debate that transpired all across Europe and the Americas in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.<sup>32</sup>

All through the 1790s, Fichte protested that he was a loyal Kantian even as he hammered away at the philosophical difficulties that Kant had failed to resolve. In the process, he reshaped and radicalized Kant’s philosophy, moving his mentor’s system from the realm of pure thought to the realm of action. Fichte’s magnum opus, the *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* (*Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge*) of 1794–1795, was designed to provide a total system of knowledge, which, he believed, surpassed even Kant’s achievements—a position Fichte’s contemporaries either glowingly affirmed or laughingly dismissed. Modesty was never one of Fichte’s hallmarks.<sup>33</sup> He also refined and elaborated Kant’s political thought, particularly in regard to the social contract, perpetual peace, and the nation.<sup>34</sup>

Two elements of Fichte’s thought in the early and mid-1790s are decisive here: its absolute egocentricity and its emphasis on action in the constitution of the self. As he developed his thinking in the *Wissenschaftslehre*, *Foundations of Natural Right*, and other writings of the decade, Fichte continually deployed the term *Selbstbestimmung* and its various analogues, on some occasions in dizzying fashion, three or four times in one sentence.<sup>35</sup> As he expressively articulated it, “the ultimate goal of all

<sup>31</sup> Quoted in Manfred Kühn, *Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Ein deutscher Philosoph, 1762–1814* (Munich, 2012), 116. In addition to Kühn’s biography, I have found particularly useful Isaac Nakhimovsky, *The Closed Commercial State: Perpetual Peace and Commercial Society from Rousseau to Fichte* (Princeton, N.J., 2011); Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore, eds., *After Jena: New Essays on Fichte’s Later Philosophy* (Evanston, Ill., 2008), especially Violetta L. Waibel, “Structures of Imagination in Fichte’s *Wissenschaftslehre*, 1794–1795 and 1804,” 41–50, and Günter Zöller, “Thinking and Willing in the Later Fichte,” 51–66; and Anthony J. La Vopa, *Fichte: The Self and the Calling of Philosophy, 1762–1799* (Cambridge, 2001).

<sup>32</sup> See Nakhimovsky, *The Closed Commercial State*, who shows how Fichte was deeply influenced, for example, by Rousseau and the Abbé Sieyès, and read and debated the works of the Scottish and French political economists.

<sup>33</sup> Kühn’s biography provides acute analyses of Fichte’s thought and life, as well as an enjoyable romp through his many foibles and the often scathing reactions of his contemporaries.

<sup>34</sup> Nakhimovsky, *The Closed Commercial State*.

<sup>35</sup> For example, in “Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre” (1794), in Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *J. G. Fichte Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 4 parts, 42 vols. to date (Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt, 1962–) [hereafter *GA*], I:2: 91–172. “But the I should be absolute and be determined completely by itself as self-determination. If the Not-I determines it [the I], then it is not self-determined, and the highest and absolutely first principle is contradicted” (150). Another example is “Die Thätigkeit einer Selbstbestimmung zum Bestimmen eines bestimmten Objekts muß weiter bestimmt werden”; *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* (1794/1795), *ibid.*, 173–451, quotation from 380.

rational being is absolute unity, continuous identity, total agreement with the self . . . For man is his own purpose. He should determine himself and should never let himself be determined by anything foreign to himself."<sup>36</sup>

In all of his writings, Fichte obsessively focused on the "I." As he wrote in *Foundations of Natural Right*, the free, rational being posits itself by acting in the world, and in so doing also constitutes the world. The self-determining individual "exercise[s] free efficacy" and "posits and determines a sensible world outside of itself."<sup>37</sup> Through action, one is both determined by the world of objects and, at the same time, determining; in the "free self-determination to exercise efficacy," activity "reverts into itself."<sup>38</sup> The I creates itself through this encounter with the world, which is marked by a certain friction (*Anstoß*), the I and the world rubbing against one another.<sup>39</sup>

Fichte's I is anything but a passive receptor. It does not exist merely as a thing or a substance; it *becomes* through action out of which the world emerges. In so doing, the individual strives to bring the external world into conformity with himself, even if the identity between the individual and the world, between the empirical and the absolute I, is unrealizable in its fullest form.<sup>40</sup>

Action in the world, then, is both the way we come to knowledge and the decisive expression of the freely constituted self. Fichte's neologism for this process is *Tathandlung*—"fact-act" or "deed-act," but also, more colloquially, perhaps, "self-conscious activity," which suggests as well a creative process of the imagination.<sup>41</sup>

In Fichte's thought, this mutual process of self-constitution and world-creation is dynamic and never-ending; it is the essence of self-determination.<sup>42</sup> "The I is infinitely determinable . . . [It] exists in a state of endless becoming."<sup>43</sup> Indeed, Fichte went so far as to write that "the human being is originally nothing at all. He must become what he is to be . . . Formability . . . is the character of humanity."<sup>44</sup> Even objects are "infinitely alterable, . . . one must be able to make of the object whatever one can will to make it."<sup>45</sup>

Fichte would not always articulate his ideas in such a radically constructivist fashion, but the underlying emphasis on action in the world and on the malleability of the world was a *leitmotif* of his thinking, from the *Wissenschaftslehre* through *Foundations of Natural Right* and on to *Addresses to the German Nation*. To educated Germans in the 1790s—few in number, hemmed in by the old regimes that domi-

<sup>36</sup> Fichte, "Ueber die Bestimmung des Menschen an sich" (1794), in *GA*, I:3: 30; see also 35. I have reversed the order of the sentences here. The second in German is "Denn der Mensch ist selbst Zweck; er soll sich selbst bestimmen und nie durch etwas fremdes sich bestimmen lassen."

<sup>37</sup> J. G. Fichte, *Foundations of Natural Right: According to the Principles of the "Wissenschaftslehre"* (1796), ed. Frederick Neuhouser, trans. Michael Baur (Cambridge, 2000), 24. See also *ibid.*, 28, and "Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre" (1797–1798), in *GA*, I:4: 167–281, where he writes that the ability to receive and judge external objects "depends on my self-determination" (189–190).

<sup>38</sup> Fichte, *Foundations of Natural Right*, 20, 28.

<sup>39</sup> "Friction" is the term used by a number of Fichte's translators.

<sup>40</sup> Kühn, *Johann Gottlieb Fichte*, 228, 229.

<sup>41</sup> On the translation of *Tathandlung*, see the editor's note in Fichte, *Foundations of Natural Right*, 25 n. 1.

<sup>42</sup> See Fichte, *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre*, 356, 378–384, 434–435.

<sup>43</sup> Fichte, *Foundations of Natural Right*, 27.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 74.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.



nated Central Europe, but soon to become that decisive social class in German history, the *Bildungsbürgertum* (educated middle class)—Fichte's emphasis on the self and on action was utterly inspiring. The world was malleable; it could be remade by rational, free men. One contemporary noted his impact:

Fichte is really driven to have an impact on the world through his philosophy. The inclination for restless activity, which lives in the breast of every fine young man, is carefully nourished and cultivated by him so that it bears fruit in our time. He proclaims at every opportunity: "The act! The act! That is the purpose of man."<sup>46</sup>

The dialectic of ideas and politics, thought and action, is quite evident here, in the echoes of the French Revolution, of people acting in the world to create something utterly new.

Yet for all of Fichte's egocentricity, his determination to elucidate the foundations and formations of individual self-determination, his thought did not languish on the plane of the individual—a fact that is critical to the transformation in the meaning of self-determination. In *Foundations of Natural Right*, published in 1796, Fichte argued that the notion of a single individual, existing solely unto himself, is nonsensical. The I is irreducible, but the I always exists in conjunction with others. "The human being . . . becomes a human being only among human beings," he wrote.<sup>47</sup> The social and the individual are inextricably bound; intersubjectivity is a necessary condition of the world.<sup>48</sup>

Precisely from this egocentric vantage point, Fichte makes a profound contribution to the development of rights thinking: the I has to recognize that others deserve the same set of rights.<sup>49</sup> Fichte situated the origins of rights not in some universal landscape, whether it be moral, theological, or political, not in some original state of nature, but in the self-acting, self-conscious I that has to grant others the same rights. Fundamental here is the notion of mutual recognition (*Anerkennung*), which would play such an important role in Hegel and then in late-twentieth-century philosophy, notably in the work of Emmanuel Lévinas.<sup>50</sup> As Fichte wrote, "The finite rational being cannot ascribe to itself a free efficacy in the sensible world without also ascribing such efficacy to others."<sup>51</sup> The acting subject has to grant others the same freedom through which it is constituted.

I posit myself as rational, i.e., as free. In doing so, the representation of freedom is in me. In the same undivided action, I simultaneously posit other free beings. Thus, through my imagination I describe a sphere for freedom that several other beings share . . . In appro-

<sup>46</sup> Friedrich Karl Forberg, quoted in Kühn, *Johann Gottlieb Fichte*, 256. Forberg went on to express his fear that "the majority of youth who take this to heart will see the call to act as nothing more than a call for destruction."

<sup>47</sup> Fichte, *Foundations of Natural Right*, 37.

<sup>48</sup> Or as Nakhimovsky writes, "it is a key feature of Fichte's transcendental deduction of consciousness that intersubjectivity is coeval with subjectivity itself"; *The Closed Commercial State*, 49.

<sup>49</sup> See Kühn's discussion in *Johann Gottlieb Fichte*, 300–301, as well as La Vopa, *Fichte*, 305–317. As Fichte wrote, "The source of this [mutual] obligation is certainly not the moral law; rather, it is the law of thought"; *Foundations of Natural Right*, 47. Fichte makes an analogical argument in regard to universal morality, but it is the issue of rights that concerns us here.

<sup>50</sup> See Samuel Moyn, *Origins of the Other: Emmanuel Lévinas between Revelation and Ethics* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2005).

<sup>51</sup> Fichte, *Foundations of Natural Right*, 29.

prating freedom for myself, I limit myself by leaving some freedom for others as well. Thus the concept of right is the concept of the necessary relation of free beings to one another.<sup>52</sup>

A reasoned world can be constructed only by free men acting together. Individual and collective freedom, individual and collective self-determination, are inextricably bound together.

For all its intersubjectivity, for all its refreshing universalist tone, Fichte's thought immediately poses the problem that always stalks the collectivist meaning of self-determination: Who is eligible to enter into the charmed circle of those endowed with the capacity to posit themselves and to exercise freedom? Fichte wrote: "The concept of individuality determines a *community*, and whatever follows further from this depends not on me alone, but also on the one who has—by virtue of this concept—entered into community with me . . . We are *bound* and *obligated* to each other by our very existence."<sup>53</sup> But who, precisely, constitutes the community?

In two critical arenas, Fichte's universal subject is immediately undone: when he writes about women and the family, an entire section of *Foundations*, and when he turns his attention to the German nation, as he did amid the Napoleonic occupation of Germany in the first years of the nineteenth century.

Always attuned to the philosophical and political events around him, Fichte responded to the calls for equal rights for women that had been articulated in England and France in the wake of the French Revolution, if not yet in Germany. Moreover, he was self-critical enough to recognize the obvious question that arose from his egocentric philosophy: Do women have the capacity to develop the free, rational I, to become self-determining individuals?

Not quite. Fichte's writings on women and the family are his least convincing, a mix of philosophical pretension with the rank prejudices of the day.<sup>54</sup> "The one sex," he wrote, "is entirely active, the other entirely passive . . . [I]t is absolutely contrary to reason for the second sex to have the satisfaction of its sexual drive as an end."<sup>55</sup> Instead—no surprise here—the sexual drive in women exists only for them to bear children. The woman achieves dignity by surrendering herself to her husband, by becoming the means of his sexual satisfaction, out of which she derives meaning in life.<sup>56</sup> In the process, she cedes to him all her property and rights.<sup>57</sup> "The husband represents her entirely, from the state's point of view, she is completely annihilated by her marriage . . . In the eyes of the state, her husband becomes her guarantee and her legal guardian; in all things, he lives out her public life, and she retains only a domestic life."<sup>58</sup> A woman, he went on, "cannot even think about exercising her rights directly on her own."<sup>59</sup> She was self-determining only by freely entering into a marriage of her choice. Thereafter, her husband self-determined for her, rendering the concept truly meaningless.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 9. See also 39–45.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 45.

<sup>54</sup> La Vopa, *Fichte*, chap. 11, is perhaps too generous to his subject on this matter. More critical is Isabel V. Hull, *Sexuality, State, and Civil Society in Germany, 1700–1815* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1996), 314–323.

<sup>55</sup> Fichte, *Foundations of Natural Right*, 266.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 269.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 271.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 282.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 299.



Fichte's universalism would be undone even more dramatically in his writings on Germany. After the turn into the nineteenth century, amid the Napoleonic occupation of the German lands, he took the social dimension of his thought to a new level. The universal I became, in essence, the German nation. In that way, Fichte moved the concept of self-determination, the focus of all his intellectual striving, from a purely individualist concept to a collectivist one. Like Wilhelm Tell and the Swiss nation as depicted by Schiller, so with Fichte the individual could be self-determining only as a German. Somewhat roughly but accurately, one can argue that Fichte's thought developed from the more individualist strain in the *Wissenschaftslehre*, to a more social dimension in *Foundations of Natural Right*, to an identification of the social with the German nation in the famed *Addresses to the German Nation*. In other words, his thought moved from egocentricity, to the universal man, to the national man. Ultimately, in Fichte, "the right to have rights" became restricted to those who belonged to the German nation—at least for those living in the German lands.<sup>60</sup>

The *Addresses to the German Nation* were delivered over the winter of 1807–1808.<sup>61</sup> At this point, the political events that shaped Fichte's thought were less the emancipatory promise of the French Revolution, more the Napoleonic invasions and occupation of the German lands. By the time he was delivering the *Addresses*, Prussia had been decisively defeated by Napoleon's forces at Jena and Auerstedt. Fichte himself, in an exaggerated sense of his own importance and fear of French persecution, had stayed on the run, going from one German town to another, and finally to Copenhagen. But then he came back, and was even granted permission by the Prussian king to lecture. Soon he would be appointed rector of the new Berlin University, yet another position he would lose due to his many intemperate outbursts.

The *Addresses* express the standard fare of nineteenth-century nationalism. There is nothing particularly virulent about them, nothing in their content that seriously marks off German from other European nationalisms that emerged in the French revolutionary age and afterward.<sup>62</sup> Nor were they much heard at the time. Despite Fichte's apparent rhetorical powers, his complex thought and phraseology and his scathing comments about his listeners' stupidity had already driven away

<sup>60</sup> For a recent reading of Fichte that is more sophisticated but ultimately emphasizes his nationalism to the exclusion of much else, see Helmut Walser Smith, *The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race across the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, 2008), 58–73. But see Nakhimovsky, *The Closed Commercial State*, which provides an insightful reading of Fichte's republicanism and views of the state that in some ways runs parallel to my argument here. Nakhimovsky shows how Fichte argued that a true republicanism, which would also be the foundation of international peace, could be founded only when the state limited the functioning of the market, established autarky, and guaranteed work for everyone.

<sup>61</sup> See Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation*, trans. George Armstrong Kelly (New York, 1968).

<sup>62</sup> For the contrary view, see Kühn, *Johann Gottlieb Fichte*, 509, who quotes Fichte's justification for a war of conquest and writes: "One cannot resist the impression that ideas like this served as the godfather to the later National Socialist conception of *Lebensraum*. Even more: it sounds actually like a precursor to the [Nazis'] 'General Plan East.'" Kühn quotes other sentences in which Fichte seems to open the way for wars of conquest, all of which the biographer sees as presaging National Socialist policies. But these passages in the *Addresses* are by no means so clear, and Kühn's position is in any case too much of a reading back into the past. See *Addresses to the German Nation*, 191, 193, 196; for the German, see *GA*, I:10: 268, 269, 272.

audiences. In Erlangen, where he had lectured in 1806 and 1807, in a matter of weeks he had managed to reduce an initial crowd of listeners to less than a handful.

Maybe he had learned from that experience. The *Addresses* were written and delivered in straightforward prose, and they dealt with pressing questions of the day. Fichte found a welcome reception among the educated, including those in state service—a most significant social class in the German states. But he did not have a wide audience, and only in succeeding decades would the *Addresses* come to be understood as an early rallying cry of German nationalism.

Undergirding the structure of a political tract lay Fichte's philosophy as he had developed it since the 1790s, with his emphasis on the self and on praxis. But in the *Addresses* that philosophy is combined with a ringing pathos concerning the German people, who are trampled under by foreign occupation, have failed to recognize their own greatness, and have been deceived by leaders who, out of greed for power and pleasure, neglect their own subjects.

Such tales of woe were the standard stuff of nineteenth-century nationalist rhetoric, as was Fichte's appeal to the national glory and greatness that had once existed, and were still possible if Germans grasped their historical destiny. Germans were an "original" people who had once lived in freedom and could do so again. Following Herder's emphasis on language, Fichte argued that the distinctiveness—and for him, the superiority—of Germans lay in their long-lasting and uncorrupted language. German is *the* language of philosophy. German articulates the historical conjoining of the tribal characteristics originating in Asia with the traits of European civilization rooted in the ancient Mediterranean.<sup>63</sup> It is through German that the unity of subject and object is revealed, that the spirit of Being becomes approachable and Freedom obtainable.<sup>64</sup>

Although Fichte did not use the term "self-determination" in the *Addresses*, the meaning is there and is consonant with his entire philosophical teaching: an individual is never alone; he becomes self-determining only in conjunction with others; the others are his people; as the mass of individuals act as one, they become self-knowing, and the self-determining individuals and the nation of which they are a part become inextricably bound together. Fichte's social world has become a German world.

But there is a democratic and egalitarian potential in Fichte's thought alongside its exclusionary current, all of which is fully in keeping with the inherent dilemmas in the collectivist understanding of self-determination. Fichte gave universal meaning to the particular nation. Like Mazzini and many other nationalists, he allowed for other nations to develop their own characteristics and their own historical destinies. Much as he argued from the singular I to the other I's, Fichte argued from one nation to the collective of nations. Other peoples, he wrote, also have the drive to give expression to their particular greatness, also seek independence and cohesiveness, also are capable of reason and freedom. Again drawing on Herder, he wrote that "only when each people, left to itself, develops and forms itself in accordance with its own peculiar quality, and only when in each people each individual develops

<sup>63</sup> Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation*, 45, 53.

<sup>64</sup> See Andrew Fiala, "Fichte and the *Ursprache*," in Breazeale and Rockmore, *After Jena*, 183–197, here 187–191, who somewhat exaggerates the universal potential of Fichte's *Addresses*.



himself in accordance with that quality, as well as in accordance with his own peculiar quality, then, and only then, does the manifestation of divinity appear.”<sup>65</sup> Once that state has been reached, once each nation has shed foreign overseers and charted its own path, peace and harmony will reign.<sup>66</sup>

Fichte’s grand accomplishment was to shift the weight of self-determination from its primary individualist orientation to a collectivist meaning. Recognition (*Anerkennung*), so fundamental to his development of the concept of rights, was in the *Addresses* reduced from the universality of educated men into Germans. The “one true right that belongs to the human being as such: the right to be able to acquire rights,” Fichte moved from the I to the process of mutual recognition to the national community, though an explicit continuity prevails based on his lifelong concern with liberty, rights, and *Selbstbestimmung*.<sup>67</sup>

All of the luminaries of the German Classical and Romantic Age moved in and out of Fichte’s circle—among them Schiller, Goethe, Schelling, Novalis, and Schlegel. Virtually all of them also had a brutal falling-out with Fichte, whose disorderly life somehow made it impossible for him to sustain personal relationships, even with admirers, and led him to see slights and attacks everywhere. Nonetheless, the Fichtean emphasis on self-constitution, action, and national sentiment influenced all these key intellectual figures.

In general terms, the tension between rights inhering in individuals as universalist beings without attachments (the strict Kantian view) and rights based first in collectivities—the people or the nation—emerged concurrently with the birth of the modern concept of the self and of a recognizably modern regime of rights grounded in national citizenship. The philosophy of the German Enlightenment, with its emphasis on individual self-constitution, and the politics of the revolutionary era from around 1770 to 1830 moved in tight dialectical relationship with one another. More than any other thinker, Fichte embodied this relationship, his thought evolving under the impact of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic occupation of Germany from a purely individualist into a collectivist conception of self-determination.

FICHTE DIED YOUNG, AT THE AGE of 51, in 1814. In subsequent decades, among his and Kant’s successors, including idealist philosophers, utopian socialists, and social theorists, the individualist strain of self-determination predominated.<sup>68</sup> While the collectivist understanding of self-determination was always present, it would not become hegemonic until the turn from the nineteenth century into the twentieth.

<sup>65</sup> Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation*, 197–198.

<sup>66</sup> See Nakhimovsky, *The Closed Commercial State*.

<sup>67</sup> Fichte, *Foundations of Natural Right*, 333. Arendt’s phrase is uncannily close—“the right to have rights.” See n. 10. Whether she derived the phrase from Fichte is unknown. On the continuities in Fichte’s thought, see Nakhimovsky, *The Closed Commercial State*, 168–169.

<sup>68</sup> See Werner Conze, “Freiheit,” in Brunner, Conze, and Koselleck, *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, 2: 425–542, here 501, on Moses Hess; and Hans Erich Bödeker, “Menschheit, Humanität, Humanismus,” *ibid.*, 3: 1063–1128, here 1082, on Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. Note also Karl Grün, *Die soziale Bewegung in Frankreich und Belgien: Briefe und Studien* (Darmstadt, 1845), 448, who writes about Proudhon’s understanding of anarchism as “the absence of authority, the elimination of every self-relinquishing [*Selbstentäußerung*] and of every self-alienation, [and instead] as pure self-determination of the social person.”

In this transformation in the meaning of self-determination, nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century socialists played the decisive role as they confronted the surge of nationalism and nation-building in Europe. Many of them were strongly influenced by Fichte, including the Saint-Simonians, Marx, Ferdinand Lassalle, and Jean Jaurès.<sup>69</sup> They viewed Fichte as one of socialism's originators, or at least a kindred spirit, precisely because of his enthusiasm for the French Revolution, commitment to liberty, and advocacy of an instrumental role for the state in the creation of the socialist society. If Fichte's key place in the pantheon of socialism is so often overlooked today, it is probably because he was tainted as a proto-Nazi by the generation of scholars, many of them émigrés from Germany, who were active from the 1930s to the 1970s.

Yet no less a figure than Jaurès, the leader of French socialism in the years before 1914, wrote that what one could call the "germ of socialism" was to be found in Kant and Fichte. Fichte's socialism was "moral, not historical," an achievement, according to Jaurès, that surpassed German socialism's excessive reliance on Marx's "severe historical dialectics." Jaurès sympathized with Fichte's view that history was something of a dead past; the future had to be made by free moral agents not bound by the laws of history.<sup>70</sup>

Other socialists also sympathized with Fichte. At a public rally in Germany in 1904, Clara Zetkin offered ringing quotes from both Schiller and Fichte in support of freedom and socialism. The police broke up the event and indicted Zetkin for "provoking class hatred." As Rosa Luxemburg wrote to her friend Luise Kautsky, Zetkin greatly enjoyed being "prosecuted along with comrades Schiller and Fichte."<sup>71</sup> Zetkin, for decades in the front ranks of the German Social Democratic and then the Communist Party, reflected a common current of thought around the turn into the twentieth century when she summoned Fichte from the grave in support of socialism. As did John Dewey when he wrote about Fichte's "ethical socialism," which he contrasted with Kant's "moral individualism."<sup>72</sup> The German scholar Carl Trautwein, also writing in the early twentieth century, devoted pages to Fichte's influence on Lassalle, and lauded both for their combination of individualism and nationhood.<sup>73</sup> Gustav Schmoller, one of the founders of the German school of political economy and social reform, had written earlier that Fichte's *Foundations of*

<sup>69</sup> Generally, see Nakhimovsky, *The Closed Commercial State*, 5–6, 133, 152–157, both on later socialists and on Fichte's future orientation; as well as Andreas Verzar, *Das autonome Subjekt und der Vernunftstaat: Eine systematisch-historische Untersuchung zu Fichtes "Geschlossenem Handelsstaat" von 1800* (Bonn, 1979), 157–165.

<sup>70</sup> Jean Jaurès, "Les origines du socialisme allemand" (1892), in *Oeuvres de Jean Jaurès*, ed. Max Bonnafous, 9 vols. (Paris, 1931–1939), 1: 49–111, with its sections "L'état chez Kant et Fichte," 74–85, and "Le collectivisme chez Fichte," 86–94. Quotations from 83, 94.

<sup>71</sup> Rosa Luxemburg to Franz Mehring, July 7, 1904, and Luxemburg to Luise Kautsky, end of July 1904, in Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Briefe*, ed. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, 5 vols. (Berlin, 1982–1984), 2: 57–61; Fichte references from 57 n. 27 and 61.

<sup>72</sup> John Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics* (New York, 1915), 75.

<sup>73</sup> Carl Trautwein, *Über Ferdinand Lassalle und sein Verhältnis zur Fichteschen Sozialphilosophie* (Jena, 1913). As Trautwein put it, they had a common commitment to "Persönlichkeit und Nation" (162). Jaurès, "Les origines du socialisme allemand," 94, 105–111, also recognized Fichte's influence on Lassalle. For the latter's breathless enthusiasm for Fichte, see Ferdinand Lassalle, *Die Philosophie Fichtes und die Bedeutung des deutschen Volksgeistes: Festrede gehalten bei der am 19. Mai 1862 von der Philosophischen Gesellschaft und dem Wissenschaftlichen Kunstverein im Arnim'schen Saale veranstalteten Fichtefeier*, 4th ed. (Leipzig, 1879).



*Natural Right* and *The Closed Commercial State* constituted “nothing more and nothing less than a socialist system.”<sup>74</sup>

The key person who drew Fichte’s thought, and especially the term “self-determination,” into the socialist movement was none other than Karl Marx. Marx made few direct references to Fichte, in contrast to his immersion in Hegelian thought. The major Marx commentators, acutely aware of the towering presence of Hegel, discern little direct influence of Fichte on Marx.<sup>75</sup> Yet Hegel developed his philosophy in critical dialogue with Kant and Fichte, and thereby constitutes an important link between Fichte and Marx. More important, as Leszek Kolakowski emphasizes in his monumental *Main Currents of Marxism*, is Fichte’s understanding that man cannot be limited by the world of things, by the dogmatism of objects.<sup>76</sup> If that were the case, it would mean that individuals are imprisoned by sense perceptions, rather than active, creative beings engaged with their malleable surroundings—a perspective that underpins Marx’s thought as well.

In that sense, Marx was most certainly Fichte’s heir, even more so than he was Hegel’s beneficiary. Five overarching Fichtean themes echo as fundamental leit-motifs in Marxian thought: first, the belief in a social world rather than an autonomous individual; second, the emphasis on *praxis*, on action in the world; third, the conviction that the philosopher’s role is not merely to understand, but to chart the course for changing the world; fourth, the support for a tutelary state that would engineer the transition to socialism; and fifth, the notion that in accomplishing this task, the philosopher places himself on the side of history, of movement toward the state of freedom rather than a reconstruction of some past idyll.

Marx’s first use of self-determination appears in his early *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* (1843), in which he blisteringly criticized Hegel’s veneration of the monarch as the self-determining ruler. Instead, Marx made self-determination a synonym for democracy and an as yet undefined “people”—in other words, not a nationality or the proletariat—as its source.<sup>77</sup>

Self-determination does not appear in Marx’s famed 1844 *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*. But as with Kant’s oeuvre, one could argue that the meaning in its Kantian sense is present, since the entire thrust of the manuscripts is about how to move from the present condition of alienation to the world of free, self-determining individuals. Marx’s great innovation, of course, would be to locate the process

<sup>74</sup> Gustav Schmoller, “Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Eine Studie aus dem Gebiete der Ethik und Nationalökonomie” (1864–1865), in Schmoller, *Zur Litteraturgeschichte der Staats- und Sozialwissenschaften* (Leipzig, 1888), 28–101, quotation from 50.

<sup>75</sup> To cite just two examples, there is no mention of Fichte in the most recent biography, Jonathan Sperber’s *Karl Marx: A Nineteenth-Century Life* (New York, 2013); and George Lichtheim, *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study* (New York, 1961), barely mentions him. For a different view, see Warren Breckman, *Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical Social Theory: Dethroning the Self* (New York, 1999). On Marx’s rejection of Kantian and Fichtean idealism, see Marx to his father, November 10, 1837, in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert Tucker, 2nd ed. (New York, 1972), 7–8.

<sup>76</sup> Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, vol. 1: *The Founders*, trans. P. S. Falla (New York, 1978), 51.

<sup>77</sup> Karl Marx, *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law* (1843), in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Collected Works* [hereafter *MECW*], 50 vols. (London, 1975–2004), vol. 3: *Marx and Engels, 1843–44* (1975), 31. German original in Marx, *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie* (1843), in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe* [hereafter *MEGA*], 4 series and multiple volumes (Berlin, 1982–2012), Series I, vol. 1, pt. 2: *Karl Marx: Werke, Artikel, Entwürfe März 1843 bis August 1844* (1982), 32.

of alienation and its supersession (*Aufhebung*) in social conditions, or, to use the later Marxian terminology, in the mode of production.

Two years later, his thinking already developing rapidly, Marx, joined by Friedrich Engels, in *The German Ideology* blasted Max Stirner for his individualist conception of self-determination, which, they argued, obfuscated the social determinants of emancipation.<sup>78</sup> This was a position they would continue to enunciate over the years in various writings, sometimes even more fiercely, as in Engels's *Anti-Dühring* (1878).<sup>79</sup>

As with Fichte, the evolution of Marx and Engels's idea occurred through their reflection on the political developments around them. That meant not only the ever-expanding reach of capitalism, but also the surge of nationalist movements despite their defeat in the Revolutions of 1848. As Marx and Engels moved toward more economic concerns—Marx toward the writing of *Capital*—the language of self-determination faded in regard to individuals, but emerged forcefully in relation to nations, especially in their journalistic and programmatic writings.<sup>80</sup> Always scouring the landscape for any glimmer of revolution, Marx and Engels leapt with enthusiasm at the signs of burgeoning national movements—the Irish against the English, the Poles against the Russians, the Italians against the Habsburg Empire. In a seemingly unconscious manner, they, like Fichte, moved beyond Kant's individualist notion and deployed the term “self-determination” for those nations-in-the-making that had demonstrated the capacity for self-defense and economic progress. About others, including Slavs with the exception of Poles, they were scathing.<sup>81</sup> None of them constituted a “viable people”; they were at best semi-civilized and therefore incapable of self-determination.<sup>82</sup>

From Marx and Engels's usage, self-determination entered easily into the language and politics of the socialist movement. In 1896, the Socialist International included in its program an article on “self-determination for all peoples”—a decisive way-station on self-determination's path to becoming a human right.

<sup>78</sup> Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (1845/1846), in *MECW*, vol. 5: *Marx and Engels, 1845–47* (1976), 291, 311; Marx and Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie* (1845/1846), in Marx and Engels, *Werke* [hereafter *MEW*], 39 vols. plus supplements (Berlin, 1958–1971), vol. 3: *1845 bis 1846* (1958), 292.

<sup>79</sup> Friedrich Engels, *Anti-Dühring* (1878), in *MECW*, vol. 25: *Friedrich Engels: Anti-Dühring, Dialectics of Nature* (1987), 92, and in *MEW*, vol. 20: *Anti-Dühring, Dialektik der Natur* (1962): 92–93.

<sup>80</sup> Self-determination does not appear at all in *Capital*, and only once in its drafts, whether in the *Grundrisse* or in later economic manuscripts. See Marx, “Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863: Capital,” in *MECW*, vol. 34: *Marx 1861–1864* (1994), 435. Original in Marx, “Ökonomische Manuskripte, 1863–1867: Das Kapital,” in *MEGA*, Series II, vol. 4, pt. 1: *Karl Marx: Ökonomische Manuskripte 1863–1867* (1988), 101–102.

<sup>81</sup> See Roman Rosdolsky, *Engels and the “Nonhistoric” Peoples: The National Question in the Revolution of 1848*, trans. and ed. John-Paul Himka ([Glasgow], 1987).

<sup>82</sup> Friedrich Engels, “For Poland,” *Der Volksstaat*, March 24, 1875, in *MECW*, vol. 24: *Marx and Engels 1874–1883* (1989), 57, and in *MEW*, vol. 18: *März 1872 bis Mai 1875* (1962), 574. See also Marx to Hermann Jung, November 20, 1865, in *MEW*, vol. 31: *Briefe Oktober 1864 bis Dezember 1867* (1965), 486–487, and in *MECW*, vol. 42: *Marx and Engels 1864–1868* (1987), 200, in which he calls for self-determination for Poland to be included in the program of the International; and Jung to the Editor of *L'echo de Verviers*, February 20, 1866, in *MECW*, vol. 20: *Marx and Engels 1864–1868* (1985), 399; and “Briefe an das Echo des Verviers,” February 15, 1866, in *MEW*, vol. 16: *September 1864 bis Juli 1870* (1962), 518. Shortly before his death, Engels had come around to the belief that Czechs were worthy of self-determination: “that is natural, and we must welcome it.” See Engels to Czech Social Democrats, August 1893, in *MECW*, vol. 27: *Engels 1890–1895* (1990), 403.



Indeed, in the period from the 1860s to the 1920s, self-determination fully lost its anchor in the universalist individualism of Kant and the early Fichte. This was, of course, the grand period of nation-state formation in Europe and of the first glimmers of anticolonial independence movements in southern Africa, India, and the Middle East. The great markers of the era were the founding of Italy and Germany in 1871; of an essentially independent Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania at the Congress of Berlin in 1878; and of the successor states to the Russian, Habsburg, and Ottoman empires as a result of the Paris Peace Conference after World War I. Not individual rights but national rights became the primary focus of state founders and of political activists still chafing under imperial control, whether in the land-based empires of Eurasia or the colonial empires ruled by the Atlantic seaboard states.

Socialists could not but respond to these developments, their ideas and programs shaped by the politics around them just as Fichte had responded to the French Revolution and Marx and Engels to various national rebellions. Like Marx and Engels, second-generation Marxists were always on the hunt for signs of progress and revolution. However reactionary in practice were many of the new states, the nation-state was a sign of history making its way, surmounting decrepit autocratic empires and taking a new step on the path to socialism. There were a few exceptions, including Rosa Luxemburg, who adhered to a rigorous internationalist position and condemned any manifestation of nationalism. But most socialists could never free themselves from the clasp of the nation and viewed independent nation-states as a grand sign of progress. The aura of the nation—present in Schiller, in the late Fichte, in Marx and Engels—had become a commonplace, and signified that the individual could be self-determining only as a national citizen, and the nation itself could achieve greatness only when it was composed of such men.

For socialists in the multinational Habsburg Empire, the problem was especially acute. How could democracy and socialism be built amid the great ethnic and national diversity of the empire? But the central problem remained. Who, precisely, constituted the nation? Who had the right to have rights in the new nation-states or in a federal system? The most determined and forthright effort to address this problem came from the Austro-Marxists, and their thinking, with all its weaknesses and strengths, reverberated far beyond their own circle.

The late Habsburg Empire, we know, was the setting for many precocious modernist developments whose impact resonated long into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries—neoclassical economics, Freudian psychology, art nouveau, antisemitism.<sup>83</sup> And so it was with political thinking in regard to self-determination, nationalities, and ethnic diversity. Living in the fabled multinational setting of the Habsburg Empire, the Austro-Marxists knew that national identity was not a mere abstraction. Many workers felt deep cultural and linguistic affinities with the nation. Writing just after the turn into the twentieth century, the Austro-Marxists drew on the by then common socialist understanding of self-determination as a basic right of all peoples.

For Otto Bauer, one of the leading Austro-Marxists, self-determination meant

<sup>83</sup> See the classic study of Carl E. Schorske, *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (New York, 1979).

not “to each nation its state, to each state its nation,” but to each nation its cultural autonomy. In a multinational setting, a powerful central state inevitably becomes a battleground of nations, each one striving to capture the state. Instead, Bauer pleaded for a decentralized state and widespread national autonomy within the empire. In that way, the “self-determination of the nations” would become the program of the working class of all nations in the multinational state.<sup>84</sup>

Bauer’s program was democratic to the core. But it also served to fix national identities on populations whose own loyalties were highly fluid and who often had multiple linguistic capabilities.<sup>85</sup> In other words, Austro-Marxist thought *made* national citizens as much as it reflected nationalist sentiments within the Habsburg Empire. It also blended class and national identities, an intellectually confused but politically powerful stance. Bauer transported the concept of self-determination over to the working class when he defined “the struggle of the working class” as “a struggle for self-determination.”<sup>86</sup>

The Austro-Marxist program never went beyond conjecture, especially amid the shattering of the Habsburg Empire in World War I. But in a different way, it exercised profound influence on a global scale throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. As is well known, just before World War I, Lenin commissioned Stalin to write *Marxism and the National Question*, which would become a mainstay of communist thinking on the nationalities issue.<sup>87</sup> Both future Soviet leaders carefully read Bauer and other Austro-Marxists; they took the Austro-Marxist position and radicalized it, as they did with so much else. When Bauer characterized the nation as “a community of destiny” (*Schicksalgemeinschaft*) and “a community of shared character” (*Charaktergemeinschaft*) and wrote, “each nation wants to maintain its own particular nature and develop its culture,” one can see the basis of Stalin’s definition of a nation as “a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.”<sup>88</sup> That position, a recognition of the reality of national belonging and of nation-state formation as a historical step on the way to communism, would undergird much of Soviet domestic policy as well

<sup>84</sup> Otto Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, 2nd ed. (Vienna, 1924), in Bauer, *Werkausgabe*, 9 vols. (Vienna, 1975–1980), 1: 332, 368.

<sup>85</sup> Gary B. Cohen wrote the first critical history of nationalism in the Habsburg Empire, which demonstrated the tentative and constructed character of national identities. See Cohen, *The Politics of Ethnic Survival: Germans in Prague, 1861–1914* (Princeton, N.J., 1981). See also Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848–1948* (Princeton, N.J., 2002); Pieter M. Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontier of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006); and Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900–1948* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2008).

<sup>86</sup> Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, 368.

<sup>87</sup> J. V. Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question* (1913), in *Works*, vol. 2: 1907–1913 (Moscow, 1953), 300–381.

<sup>88</sup> Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, 332; Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question*, 30. Stalin offered many criticisms of the Austro-Marxists, but their influence is clear nonetheless. Lenin had written about self-determination earlier, as in “Critical Remarks on the National Question” (1913), in V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 45 vols. (Moscow, 1964–1975), vol. 20: *December 1913 to August 1914* (1964), 17–51, especially 22, 45–46. But see especially “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination” (1914), *ibid.*, 393–454; and “The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination,” in *Collected Works*, vol. 22: *December 1915–July 1916* (1964), 143–156.



as the Soviet Union's international engagement after 1945 in support of self-determination as national liberation and a human right.

BY WORLD WAR I, THEN, self-determination understood in its collectivist sense—in regard to nations—had become a fixed feature of socialist political thought. In Russia, the term was specifically incorporated into the programs of both the Provisional and the Bolshevik Governments in 1917. But another stream of thought then played a role equally as powerful as the socialist one in the global diffusion of self-determination. President Wilson, fearful that the Bolshevik promise of self-determination would reverberate throughout Europe, took up the term when he spoke to Congress on February 11, 1918.<sup>89</sup> Wilson went to a different well than did Lenin, the long tradition of Anglo-American political philosophy going back to Locke and Mill. For Wilson, self-determination meant free white men coming together consensually to form a democratic political order.

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the language of self-determination moved to center stage, the prominence of the concept evident in the wide array of statesmen and activists who deployed the term. Antiwar socialists, leaders from various belligerent countries, pacifists, and even, before the end of the war, the German occupiers of Eastern Europe all bandied about “self-determination.”<sup>90</sup>

However, the “Wilsonian Moment” was also—perhaps even more so—the “Bolshevik Moment,” one high point being the Bolsheviks' Congress of the Peoples of the East, held in Baku in September 1920, which called for anticolonial struggles.<sup>91</sup> No doubt the differences between the socialist and the liberal positions were lost on

<sup>89</sup> See Arno J. Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918* (New Haven, Conn., 1959), especially 75–86, 185–186, 298–304; Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York, 2007); and Eric D. Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions,” *American Historical Review* 113, no. 5 (December 2008): 1313–1343.

All of the treaties between the Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic and the other republics of the soon-to-be USSR, such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia, contained self-determination clauses. See Decker, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen*, 125. Even the U.S. Senate, in rejecting the Versailles Treaty, proclaimed that “the United States adheres to the principle of self-determination,” which it tied explicitly to “the aspirations of the Irish people for a government of their own choice.” *Congressional Record* 59, no. 5 (March 18, 1920): 4499–4522, quotation from 4499.

<sup>90</sup> See Decker, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen*, 98, for one quote from Sir Edward Grey, and 106 for the German Reichstag peace resolution, which used *Selbstbestimmung*. In the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918) with Soviet Russia, Germany claimed, completely duplicitously, to be establishing self-determination for previously oppressed peoples. On Brest-Litovsk, see Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1967). For the very active debate about self-determination among German-speaking socialists, see Heinrich Cunow, “Marx und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen,” *Neue Zeit* 36, no. 1 (March 22, 1918): 577–584, who also provides citations to some of the other articles in the Social Democratic Party press on self-determination; Ludwig Quessel, “Marx' deutsche Politik und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen,” *Sozialistische Monatshefte* 20, no. 50 (May 4, 1918): 386–392; Karl Kautsky, *Die Befreiung der Nationen*, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart, 1918); and Karl Renner, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen, in besonderer Anwendung auf Österreich*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1918).

<sup>91</sup> In general, in my view, the historical literature overemphasizes Wilson's impact and underplays the importance of the Bolshevik and Soviet use of self-determination, a problem replicated in the newer historiography on human rights. The very title of Manela's book, *The Wilsonian Moment*, reflects this point. See also Klose, *Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence*; Burke, *Decolonization and the Evolution of Human Rights*; and Simpson, “Self-Determination, Human Rights, and the End of Empire in the 1970s.” I thank Peter Holquist for an e-mail exchange on this point.



FIGURE 3: V. I. Lenin speaking to the Second Congress of Soviets. By the turn into the twentieth century, self-determination as a doctrine of national liberation had become a fixed feature of socialist politics. In the Russian Revolutions of 1917, both the Provisional Government in April 1917 and the Bolshevik Government in October 1917 declared their support for self-determination. The Second Congress of Soviets met and affirmed the government and its policies. Eight days later, on November 12, 1917, the government issued the "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia," which specifically granted the right of self-determination, including secession. © Heritage Images/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

the hundreds of thousands in Europe, Egypt, China, and India, and somewhat later in Africa, who found great hope in the promise of self-determination.

They would be disappointed. The major powers at the Peace Conference drew back from the term, fearful of the popular demands that Wilson and Lenin had unleashed and the political fragmentation that might ensue if every self-proclaimed people, or at least the parties and movements that professed to embody them, actually achieved its own state. In his memoir of the Peace Conference, Wilson's secretary of state, Robert Lansing, vibrantly expressed the common fears of the statesmen at Paris:

The more I think about the President's declaration as to the right of "self-determination," the more convinced I am of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races . . . The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes that can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives . . . What a calamity the phrase was ever uttered! What misery it will cause!<sup>92</sup>

<sup>92</sup> Robert Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative* (Boston, 1921), 97–98.






FIGURE 4: President Woodrow Wilson speaking to the United States Congress, January 8, 1918. Wilson is presenting his 14 Points, in which he outlined his postwar peace plan. The 14 Points included the idea of but not the term “self-determination.” One month later, again speaking before Congress, he adopted the term, in large part to regain the initiative from the Bolsheviks. To Wilson’s later dismay, the phrase resonated far beyond the European and North American world. © Bettmann/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.

In the end, none of the six post–World War I treaties included the term “self-determination.” But the idea was powerfully present in the formation of new states, the drawing of borders, and the establishment of the League of Nations mandate and minority protection systems. The Lausanne Treaty in July 1923, the very same treaty that established Turkey as an independent, sovereign state, legitimized the forced deportations of Christians from Anatolia to Greece and Muslims from Greece to Turkey. The “population exchange,” as it was called, exposed the nether side of self-determination. Both Greece and Turkey as national states were presumed to be ethnically and religiously homogeneous, even though the presumption covered up significant diversity that remained despite the nearly 1.5 million people who had fled or were forced out of their ancestral homes. Both the rights of national citizens and the deportations of those deemed the “other” derived from the same concept that nations should be self-determining and, therefore, have their own states.<sup>93</sup>

In its practical implementation in the post–World War I order, then, self-determination had traveled far from its Kantian origins. It was now enshrined as a

<sup>93</sup> See Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System.”




FIGURE 5: In September 1920, the Soviets convened the Congress of the Peoples of the East, one of the first large-scale international efforts to mobilize anticolonial revolution. Nearly two thousand delegates gathered in Baku, most from Soviet Russia and the Soviet borderlands. Self-determination was the byword, and it figured prominently in the discussions, speeches, and resolutions of the Congress and subsequent Soviet politics. The Bolshevik leader Grigory Zinoviev, with raised arm, is speaking to the delegates. To his left is his comrade Karl Radek. Revolutionary Books UK.

concept that meant that rights inhered first in nations, and only subsequently in individuals. To be sure, legions of its defenders, from Woodrow Wilson to the socialist Karl Kautsky, overlooked any possible tensions or conflicts and viewed self-determination as a synonym for democracy.<sup>94</sup> In fact, self-determination no longer

<sup>94</sup> Karl Kautsky, *Die Befreiung der Nationen*, 5. The belief in a unity between what would later be called internal and external self-determination also can be found in Immanuel Kant, *Toward Perpetual*



had an intrinsic connection to democracy and individual rights, not as long as membership in the nation or race was seen to have primacy over individual rights. In its great popularity, the term had also become infinitely malleable. Nothing underscores the point as much as the fact that the Nazis also found amenable the language of self-determination. All through the 1930s, Hitler kept up the drumbeat of charges that Germany's rights as a nation had been violated by the Versailles Treaty and that German minorities in Central and Eastern Europe were being viciously attacked and persecuted. In regard to Germany, the Nazis claimed, the international community was hypocritical in its advocacy of self-determination and minority protection. National Socialist Germany offered one version of self-determination: the *Volksgemeinschaft*, the Aryan racial community, determining its own future with complete disregard for the concerns, the interests, and the very existence of other national or racial communities.<sup>95</sup>

THE NAZIS, HOWEVER, WERE NOT to write the last chapter in the history of self-determination. Instead, self-determination—of nations, not individuals—would become enshrined as a human right, a central item in the architecture of the postwar world. The term was adopted by countless anticolonial activists and was written into the programs of their movements from Kenya to Algeria to Vietnam.<sup>96</sup> Sometimes the source was Wilson, sometimes the Soviets, but there were also plenty of pronouncements closer at hand, like the Atlantic Charter of 1941, in which the meaning but not the phrase was present, and the UN Charter.<sup>97</sup> The Soviets themselves self-consciously drew on a century of socialist and communist understanding of self-determination. The Western liberal states found themselves in a deep quandary, barely able to reject their own intellectual lineage and the heroic (in many accounts) Woodrow Wilson, yet deeply fearful of the radicalism of anticolonial movements and the instability that might ensue if so many new states came into existence.

The advocates of self-determination prevailed only after intense diplomatic wrangling among foreign ministries and in the relevant UN bodies, wrangling that extended over more than two decades, starting with the initial planning for the UN and the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<sup>98</sup> At the time, the UDHR was broadly understood as only the first step in a new postwar world in which

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*Peace: A Philosophical Essay* (1795), in Pauline Kleingeld, ed., and David L. Colclasure, trans., *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History* (New Haven, Conn., 2006).

<sup>95</sup> See Jörg Fisch, "Adolf Hitler und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker," *Historische Zeitschrift* 290, no. 1 (2010): 93–118.

<sup>96</sup> See especially Klose, *Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence*, and Burke, *Decolonization and the Evolution of Human Rights*.

<sup>97</sup> The Atlantic Charter, signed by Great Britain and the United States on August 14, 1941, had already had an energizing impact upon anticolonial activists, who understood the following clause to mean, in fact, self-determination: The two nations "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." For one example, see Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela* (Boston, 1994), 83–84. For the text of the Atlantic Charter, see <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp>. Self-determination is proclaimed in article 1 of the UN Charter, June 26, 1945, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>.

<sup>98</sup> Once the UN was founded, the key bodies where the debates on human rights unfolded were the Committee on Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs (as it is now known), more commonly called

human rights would be fully guaranteed by both the UN and its constituent members. Quickly, it was thought, the UDHR would be followed by an international criminal court and by an international treaty that would deepen and make legally binding the rights principles enunciated in 1948. Instead, human rights became another field of conflict in the Cold War and anticolonial struggles, forestalling any quick and easy agreements.

The stakes in the dispute over self-determination were therefore quite high.<sup>99</sup> In the negotiations leading to the founding of the United Nations, the Soviet position on self-determination had the support of one member of the U.S. delegation, Ralph Bunche, a State Department representative who would go on to a long and illustrious career at the UN. Bunche, already a pioneering advocate of civil rights in the United States and of decolonization abroad, managed to prevail among his colleagues by getting provisions for decolonization included in the draft documents of the UN. For Bunche, self-determination was a right of all peoples, not just the “civilized.” Ultimately, among the purposes spelled out in article 1 of the UN Charter is the promotion of “equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”<sup>100</sup>

Upon that founding principle, representatives of countries such as India, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Ethiopia, as well as the Soviet Union and its allies, argued that self-determination—understood by all concerned in its collective sense—was a self-evident human right, and any human rights instrument worthy of the name had to include the concept.<sup>101</sup> The Uruguayan representative stated the point most simply and clearly, and in a way that would be repeated through all the debates into the 1960s: “any limitation of . . . the right [of self-determination] would deprive the other rights of reality.”<sup>102</sup> Collective rights came first; individual rights would follow.

All this caused great consternation for Britain, Belgium, Portugal, and other colonial powers who—for good reason—feared the impact of self-determination on their subject populations.<sup>103</sup> The British and their allies defended state sovereignty, another founding principle of the UN. Echoing U.S. Secretary of State Lansing at the Paris Peace Conference after World War I, they raised the fearsome specter of continual instability in the global order if every self-proclaimed people achieved its own state. As the debates continued through the 1940s and 1950s, they also reverted to the old imperial line that only “mature” populations had the capacity to exercise self-determination.<sup>104</sup>

The U.S. representatives, Eleanor Roosevelt foremost among them, expressed

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the Third Committee; its subsidiary bodies, the Human Rights Commission and the various drafting committees; and the General Assembly.

<sup>99</sup> See Normand and Zaidi, *Human Rights at the UN*, especially 212–224.

<sup>100</sup> On Bunche’s role in the formation of the UN, see Brian Urquhart, *Ralph Bunche: An American Life* (New York, 1993), 111–138.

<sup>101</sup> For representative statements at the debates on whether or not to include self-determination in the human rights covenants, see United Nations General Assembly, *Official Records: Third Committee, Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Questions*, Sixth Session (1951–1952): 358th Meeting, November 30, 1951, 69; 359th Meeting, December 4, 1951, 74; 362nd Meeting, December 8, 1951, 93, 95; 365th Meeting, December 11, 1951, 108; 366th Meeting, December 12, 1951, 115, 116, 117.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 365th Meeting, December 11, 1951, 110.

<sup>103</sup> For the British example, see Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire*.

<sup>104</sup> For example, a comment by the Belgian representative set off a firestorm of criticism; see United





FIGURE 6: Chinese prime minister Chou En Lai arrives for the Bandung Conference, April 25, 1955. In April 1955 the Conference of Afro-Asian Nations convened in Bandung, Indonesia, a major expression of postwar decolonization and a significant step toward the non-aligned movement. The participants represented twenty-five countries, many of them newly independent. The final document of the conference committed the states to support self-determination for all peoples. Rue des Archives/Granger, NYC—All rights reserved. Reproduced by permission.

support for self-determination, but tried strenuously to block its inclusion in all human rights pronouncements and covenants. They succeeded only once, when Roosevelt and the French representative, René Cassin, both strong advocates of an individualist conception of rights, managed to ensure that the UDHR made no

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Nations General Assembly, *Official Records: Third Committee, Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Questions*, Sixth Session (1951–1952): 361st Meeting, December 7, 1951, 84.

mention of self-determination. Roosevelt affirmed the Wilsonian understanding of self-determination when she said in 1951 that “the question of the equal rights of peoples to self-determination [is] connected with the free and genuine expression of the will of the people.”<sup>105</sup> By the end of the decade, the U.S. was sounding much like the old colonial powers when its representative warned that self-determination could lead to excessive “political fragmentation,” and that “emerging peoples” first had to have “adequate preparation for self-government.”<sup>106</sup>

Cassin, one of the twentieth century’s great advocates of human rights, and a Nobel Peace Prize recipient for his work on the UDHR, was among the few who seriously addressed the question of the relationship between individual and collective rights in the UN debates.<sup>107</sup> Cassin hewed strictly to the notion that human rights are “purely individual rights.” If they are collective at all, they mean the right to vote and freely associate; they are not about “rights of peoples,” which is a collective right. In other words, Cassin strictly distinguished *human* rights, which are individual in nature, from the rights of peoples, which entail rights of some sort, but not those that the UDHR delineated and that the covenants would establish in international law.<sup>108</sup>

Cassin did not prevail. From the early 1950s onward, every resolution, declaration, and covenant on human rights affirmed “the right of all peoples to self-determination.”<sup>109</sup> One major moment came in 1960 with the passing of the Soviet-sponsored “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.” By this point, many more newly independent countries had become members of the UN. Six years later, “after two decades of laborious, indeed epic endeavor,” as the delegate from the Dominican Republic phrased it, the UN took up *two* human rights covenants—one on political and civil rights, the other on economic, social, and cultural rights—and an additional resolution in support of self-deter-

<sup>105</sup> See Roosevelt’s comments *ibid.*, 364th Meeting, December 10, 1951, 104–105, quotation from 104, and her additional remarks in 374th Meeting, February 4, 1952, 505.

<sup>106</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Official Records: Plenary Meetings, Part I*, Fifteenth Session (1960), vol. 2: 947th Meeting, December 14, 1960, 1283.

<sup>107</sup> But see Klose, *Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence*, and Burke, *Decolonization and the Evolution of Human Rights*. Burke starts with the 1955 Bandung Conference and shows that numerous Third World representatives defended both individual human rights and self-determination as national liberation.

<sup>108</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Official Records: Third Committee, Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Questions*, Sixth Session (1951–1952): 373rd Meeting, February 5, 1952, 515.

<sup>109</sup> For a few highlights of the debate in 1951–1952, see the comments by Fernand Dehousse, the Belgian representative; Eleanor Roosevelt for the U.S.; and Jiří Hájek, the Czech delegate, *ibid.*, 504, 505, 510. For some highlights of the 1960 debates on the two resolutions, “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” and “Strict Observance of the Prohibition of the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, and of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination,” see the British representative, William Ormsby-Gore; the U.S. delegate, James J. Wadsworth; and a host of voices from the Soviet bloc and the Third World, in United Nations General Assembly, *Official Records: Fifteenth Session (1960), Part I. Plenary Meetings*, vol. 2: 925th Meeting, November 28, 1960, 984; 926th Meeting, November 28, 1960, 997–998; 929th Meeting, November 30, 1960, 1034; 933rd Meeting, December 2, 1960, 1102; and 947th Meeting, December 14, 1960, 1283–1284. Ormsby-Gore’s career had traversed all the exit points of the vanishing British Empire. His comments read like an antiquated affirmation of British imperialism. For the text of the resolution, see United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, December 14, 1960, <http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml>.





FIGURE 7: Congolese celebrate independence, July 1, 1960. In 1960, seventeen African countries became independent and joined the United Nations. That same year, on December 14, the UN General Assembly passed the Soviet-sponsored "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," which proclaimed "faith in fundamental human rights . . . and self-determination of all peoples." © Bettmann/CORBIS. Reproduced by permission.

mination.<sup>110</sup> To the Soviet bloc and Third World representatives, political and civil rights were meaningless if people did not have adequate food and clothing, shelter, means of employment, and so on.<sup>111</sup> The United States and its allies ferociously resisted the articulation of these issues as rights. The result, the two covenants, was a half-baked compromise that pleased almost no one but reflected the ideological and political stalemate of the Cold War.

By the time of debate on the covenants in 1966, only the colonial diehards, Portugal and Britain, could publicly oppose the rhetoric of self-determination, which wafted far and wide. Indeed, the 1960s were the halcyon days of self-determination. The Soviets and their allies charged the United States with brutally violating the right of self-determination through its war in Vietnam. The U.S. countered that it was defending the right of self-determination for the people of South Vietnam.<sup>112</sup> From

<sup>110</sup> Horacio Julio Ornes-Coiscou, in United Nations General Assembly, *Official Records, Twenty-First Session (1966), Plenary Meetings*, vol. 2: 1495th Meeting, December 16, 1966, 12.

<sup>111</sup> See, for example, the words of the Chilean representative, Ana Figueroa, in United Nations General Assembly, *Official Records: Sixth Session, Plenary Meetings (1951–52)*: 374th Meeting, February 4, 1952, 502–503.

<sup>112</sup> For some highlights of the debate, see United Nations General Assembly, *Official Records, Twenty-First Session (1966), Plenary Meetings*, vol. 2: 1459th Meeting, November 9, 1960, 1–5; 1461st Meeting, November 11, 1966, 1–7; 1463rd Meeting, November 14, 1966, 1–11; 1465th Meeting, November 15,



FIGURE 8: "Self-Determination for All Germans!" The mayor of West Berlin, Willy Brandt, speaks at a rally in Bonn, May 5, 1960. By the mid-twentieth century, self-determination had become a ubiquitous slogan taken up by all sorts of nationalist movements. In Germany the phrase was kept alive by those opposed to the World War II settlement and Cold War stasis that had resulted in the loss of German lands in the East and the division of Germany. Primarily conservatives, including the powerful Bund der Vertriebenen, the association of Germans who had been expelled from Eastern Europe, mobilized around the slogan of self-determination. Social Democrats also joined in, including the party leader, the mayor, and, later in the 1960s, Chancellor Willy Brandt. ullstein bild—dpa. Reproduced by permission.

the streets of Oakland, California, and many other places in the U.S. came the cry for the right to "determine the destiny of our Black community."<sup>113</sup>

In Okinawa, Namibia, and many other places around the globe, indigenous and nationalist movements wrote programs demanding self-determination. At its 1966 meeting, the UN General Assembly passed the resolution on self-determination and, unanimously, the two human rights covenants, both of which used their first article to inscribe into international law "the right of self-determination" of "all peoples."<sup>114</sup> In the subsequent decades and down to our present day, almost every other human rights instrument and document would repeat, virtually word for word, the same phrase.

1966, 1–11; 1466th Meeting, November 16, 1966, 1–10; 1467th Meeting, November 16, 1966, 1–13; United Nations General Assembly, *Official Records, Twenty-First Session (1966), Plenary Meetings*, vol. 3: 1468th Meeting, November 17, 1966, 12–17; 1469th Meeting, November 17, 1966, 9–21; and 1482nd Meeting, November 30, 1966, 1–20.

<sup>113</sup> Black Panther Party, "The Ten-Point Program," October 15, 1966, <http://www.marxists.org/history/usa/workers/black-panthers/1966/10/15.htm>.

<sup>114</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Official Records, Twenty-First Session (1966), Plenary Meetings*, vol. 3: 1496th Meeting, December 16, 1966, 6. The Czech resolution against the use of force and in favor of self-determination passed 98 to 2 with 8 abstentions. *Ibid.*, 1482nd Meeting, November 30, 1966, 17. The U.S. Senate has still not ratified the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.






FIGURE 9: Robert F. Williams, “Self-Defense, Self-Respect, and Self-Determination.” Not all civil rights advocates in the United States followed the non-violence of Martin Luther King. Robert F. Williams, president of the Monroe, North Carolina, NAACP, organized black self-defense in the face of Ku Klux Klan and police violence. Like Communists and Trotskyists in the 1920s and 1930s, Williams advocated black self-determination, including the formation of a separate black state that would secede from the United States. Facing trumped-up charges of kidnapping, he and his wife fled to Cuba in 1961. From an audio documentary CD by the Freedom Archives in San Francisco, <http://www.freedomarchives.org>. Reproduced by permission.

THE THIRD COMMITTEE’S RAPPORTEUR in 1966, Clara Ponce de Leon of Colombia, introduced the covenants on the floor of the General Assembly. “The right of self-determination,” she said, is “one of the most important human rights, since it is a prerequisite for the full enjoyment of other fundamental freedoms and rights.”<sup>115</sup>

Self-determination had traveled a long way from its Kantian origins. Over the course of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, it had evolved from a doctrine of individual self-constitution and freedom into the favored slogan of nationalist movements all around the globe. Fichte played the key philosophical role in the transformation of the idea. Taken up by Marx and his successors, self-determination as national liberation became a fixed feature of socialist thought. But liberals were no less committed to the notion that nations, at least those that were

<sup>115</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Official Records, Twenty-First Session (1966), Plenary Meetings*, vol. 2: 1495th Meeting, December 16, 1966, 7.

civilized enough, deserved independence and the right to determine their own future.

Self-determination has its intellectual history, but it is hardly separate from politics and the emergence of the nation-state as the dominant political form of the modern era. Even when empires have been slow to depart the global stage and a few still thrive, the nation-state has set the political agenda for international politics. The evolution of self-determination into the doctrine of nationalism was in part a response to the facts on the ground—Fichte's fury at the French occupation of Prussia and other German lands, Marx's and Engels's elation at national uprisings, Wilson's and Lenin's efforts to mold the post-World War I world from the decomposition of empires, the promotion of decolonization by many Third World activists. But self-determination also proved to be a powerful rallying cry that helped shape events. From the advocates of German and Italian unification, to the Poles and Czechs and others at the Paris Peace Conference, to Jawaharlal Nehru, Kwame Nkrumah, Leopold Senghor, and many others, self-determination was a slogan that enabled them to form and mobilize nationalists. Who could oppose such an appealing phrase, one that gave the people the right to shape their own future?

But self-determination made "the right to have rights" dependent on membership in the national or racial community. In facile fashion, Ponce de Leon, like so many others, soared over this problem. It is by no means self-evident or natural that the self-determination of a people leads directly to "the full enjoyment of other fundamental freedoms and rights."<sup>116</sup> The searing problem of "the people" remains. Who they are, how the people is constituted, by what standards and criteria, determines whether or not an individual has access to rights.

The history of human rights, then, is not a story of an ever-accumulating wave of rights, a cascade of progress toward some rosy future. It is a history—like any other—crisscrossed by contradictory currents and unanticipated outcomes. Sometimes a concept such as self-determination that, in its founding, inspires emancipatory hopes results, for some, in its precise opposite.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

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**Eric D. Weitz** is Dean of Humanities and Arts and Distinguished Professor of History at the City College of New York. He has published *Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy* (Princeton University Press, 2007; 2nd expanded edition 2013), *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation* (Princeton University Press, 2003; reprint with new foreword 2015), "From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions," *American Historical Review* 113, no. 5 (December 2008): 1313–1343, and *Creating German Communism, 1890–1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State* (Princeton University Press, 1997). With Omer Bartov he co-edited *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands* (Indiana University Press, 2013). In 2006 Weitz initiated a book series with Princeton University Press, Human Rights and Crimes against Humanity. The current article is derived from his book project *A World Divided: A Global History of Nations and Human Rights from the Age of Revolution to the Present*.



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# “Cuba, My Love”: The Romance of Revolutionary Cuba in the Soviet Sixties

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ANNE E. GORSUCH

IN 1963, ZOIA BARASH MOVED to Cuba from her home in the Soviet Union. “We were young and Cuba was beautiful when we got here,” she remembered in a recent interview. So too for Natalia Balashkova, who moved to Cuba after marrying a Cuban military officer she met in Moscow: “I knew what to expect. Cuba was building socialism. We came willingly, out of love.”<sup>1</sup> The popular Soviet song “Cuba, My Love,” from 1962, is suggestive of the attachment some Soviets citizens felt for revolutionary Cuba in the early 1960s: “Cuba, my love / Island of crimson dawns / Its song flies over the planet and rings out: / Cuba, my love!” The Cuban Revolution was, as described by Petr Vail’ and Aleksandr Genis in their evocative book about the Soviet sixties, “a striking event for the Soviet person of the 1960s, a powerful, creative social revolution combined with an exotic, distant sea.”<sup>2</sup> This romantic passion for Cuba was often accompanied by a concomitant nostalgia for an idealized Soviet past. The complex of longings underpinning the Soviet-Cuban relationship are evident in the Soviet cultural—visual, literary, cinematographic, touristic—imagination, and in the cross-cultural experience of Soviet and Cuban citizens traveling for work, education, or love.

There was enthusiasm and romance between Cuban and Soviet citizens, but there was also mistrust. Both desire and anxiety are particularly evident in Soviet discourses and encounters with the gendered and racialized Cuban body, including the virile Cuban man, the consumptive pleasures of sex associated with Cuban women, and the impoverished black body believed to be in special need of Soviet assistance. Soviet understandings of the body—male and female, white and black—were fundamental to what Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, in *Bodies in Contact*, have

For their insightful comments and conversations about earlier versions of this essay, I am very grateful to Alejandra Bronfman, Bill French, Alexey Golubev, Diane Koenker, Tina Loo, Jean Stubbs, and Esther Whitfield. Versions of the article were presented to helpful colleagues at the following conferences or locations: “Postwar Decolonization and Its Impact in Europe,” University of Exeter; “New Histories of the Cuban Revolution,” Yale University; “Eurasian States and Societies,” Green College, University of British Columbia; Brown University; the annual meeting of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies; and Simon Fraser University. I am also very grateful for the hospitality and recollections of those I interviewed in Cuba. My deep appreciation, finally, for the thought-provoking suggestions and guidance of the reviewers for the *AHR*, and for the expert advice of Robert Schneider and Jane Lyle.

<sup>1</sup> Both as cited in Anthony Boadle, “Russian Women Stranded in Cuba since USSR Fall,” September 5, 2007, Reuters.

<sup>2</sup> Petr Vail’ and Aleksandr Genis, *60-e: Mir Sovetskogo cheloveka* (Moscow, 1989), 44.

called “the articulation of imperial ideologies.”<sup>3</sup> A history of Soviet-Cuban cultural relations in the early 1960s makes visible both the internationalist enthusiasms, often youthful, of the early Soviet sixties and the perceived dangers of those passions when Cuba was understood to challenge the superiority of the Soviet project.

The sixties were a period of intense Cold War competition between capitalism and communism for the allegiance of newly decolonized states and societies. The history of the Cold War has typically, however, prioritized U.S.-European relations with the USSR. When relations with the Third World are invoked, historians have focused on moments of political crisis and emphasized Soviet, or American, manipulation of Third World clients. Instead, as David Engerman argues, Soviet-Third World relations offer an opportunity to “study the USSR in transnational context,” including moments of cooperation but also of tension and disappointment.<sup>4</sup> In contrast to the rich and methodologically diverse historiography about relations between the United States and Cuba, the history of the Soviet-Cuba relationship has received sparse treatment, much of it confined to questions of politics and economics.<sup>5</sup> While recent work on postwar cultural and scientific exchange, on travel and tourism, and on consumption has explored the international circulation of goods, ideas, and people between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world, it too has largely focused on connections with the capitalist First World, and secondly with Eastern Europe.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, eds., *Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters in World History* (Durham, N.C., 2005), 5.

<sup>4</sup> David C. Engerman, “The Second World’s Third World,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12, no. 1 (2011): 183–211, here 185–186. On the cultural history of the Soviet Union and the Third World, see also Elizabeth Bishop, “Talking Shop: Egyptian Engineers and Soviet Specialists at the Aswan High Dam” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1997); Julie Hessler, “Death of an African Student in Moscow: Race, Politics, and the Cold War,” *Cahiers du monde russe* 47, no. 1–2 (2006): 33–63; Sudha Rajagopalan, *Indian Films in Soviet Cinemas: The Culture of Movie-going after Stalin* (Bloomington, Ind., 2009); S. V. Mazov, *Politika SSSR v zapadnoi Afrike, 1956–1964: Neizvestnye stranitsy istorii kholodnoi voyny* (Moscow, 2008); Tobias Rupprecht, “Soviet Internationalism after Stalin: The USSR and Latin America in the Cultural Cold War” (Ph.D. thesis, European University Institute, 2012); Constantin Katsakioris, “The Soviet-South Encounter: Tensions in the Friendship with Afro-Asian Partners, 1945–1965,” in Patryk Babiracki and Kenyon Zimmer, eds., *Cold War Crossings: International Travel and Exchange across the Soviet Bloc, 1940s–1960s* (College Station, Tex., 2014), 134–165.

<sup>5</sup> Jacques Lévesque, *The USSR and the Cuban Revolution: Soviet Ideological and Strategic Perspectives, 1959–1977*, trans. Deanna Drendel Leboeuf (New York, 1978); A. D. Bekarevich, ed., *Sovetsko-kubinskiye otnosheniia, 1917–1977* (Moscow, 1980); W. Raymond Duncan, *The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence* (New York, 1985); Yuri Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuban Alliance, 1959–1991* (Miami, 1994); Mervyn J. Bain, “Havana and Moscow, 1959–2009: The Enduring Relationship?,” *Cuban Studies* 41, no. 1 (2010): 126–142. An exception is João Felipe Gonçalves, “Sputnik Premiers in Havana: A Historical Ethnography of the 1960 Soviet Exposition,” in Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane P. Koenker, eds., *The Socialist Sixties: Crossing Borders in the Second World* (Bloomington, Ind., 2013), 84–117. Literary scholars have also approached the relationship from a cultural perspective: Jacqueline Loss, *Dreaming in Russian: The Cuban Soviet Imaginary* (Austin, Tex., 2013); Jacqueline Loss and José Manuel Prieto, eds., *Caviar with Rum: Cuba-USSR and the Post-Soviet Experience* (New York, 2012).

<sup>6</sup> Some recent examples include Larissa Zakharova and Eleonory Gilburd, eds., “Versions du socialisme, influences internationales et société soviétique,” *Cahiers du monde russe* 47, no. 1–2 (2006): 9–14; Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane P. Koenker, eds., *Turizm: The Russian and East European Tourist under Capitalism and Socialism* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2006); David Crowley and Susan E. Reid, eds., *Pleasures in Socialism: Leisure and Luxury in the Eastern Bloc* (Evanston, Ill., 2010); György Péteri, ed., *Imagining the West in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (Pittsburgh, 2010); Sergei I. Zhuk, *Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dnepropetrovsk, 1960–1985* (Baltimore, 2010); Anne E. Gorsuch, *All This Is Your World: Soviet Tourism at Home and Abroad after Stalin* (Oxford, 2011); Austin Jersild, “The Soviet State as Imperial Scavenger: ‘Catch Up and Surpass’ in the Transnational Socialist Bloc, 1950–1960,” *American Historical Review* 116, no. 1 (February 2011): 109–132; William Jay Risch, *The Ukrainian West: Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv* (Cambridge, Mass., 2011);



There has been little attention to the circulation of images, cultures, and emotions between the Second World and the Third, or within the socialist bloc.

The history of Soviet-Cuban encounters also provides an opportunity to make an intervention into the history of the 1960s. To date, histories of the decade have been dominated by the perspectives and experiences of the United States and, more recently, Western Europe.<sup>7</sup> Examining the sixties from the vantage point of the Soviet Union, the communist Second World, shifts our perspectives and points of comparison, and encourages new questions. Cuba is an especially ripe site for comparison, as Fidel Castro's guerrilla revolution was a defining moment in both East and West. The simultaneity of passion for Cuba across political borders enables us to consider the possibilities, and the limits, of the 1960s as a transnational moment.<sup>8</sup> Of particular importance, as the term "passion" suggests, are the emotional and subjective aspects of the transnational.<sup>9</sup> Van Gosse has explored the "radicalizing force" of *fidelismo* in the United States in the late 1950s, an enthusiasm that spawned the first significant Third World solidarity movement—the Fair Play for Cuba Com-

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Natalya Chernyshova, *Soviet Consumer Culture in the Brezhnev Era* (London, 2013). For a discussion of the transnational turn in Russian and Soviet history, see Michael David-Fox, "The Implications of Transnationalism," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12, no. 4 (2011): 885–904.

<sup>7</sup> An important intervention is the two-part AHR Forum "The International 1968," *American Historical Review* 114, no. 1 (February 2009) and no. 2 (April 2009), but this too has nothing about the sixties under socialism apart from discussions about the Prague Spring. The Prague Spring is the most common socialist reference for those looking to incorporate the socialist East into the international 1960s. See David Caute, *The Year of the Barricades: A Journey through 1968* (New York, 1988); Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker, eds., *1968: The World Transformed* (New York, 1999); Gerd-Rainer Horn and Padraic Kenney, eds., *Transnational Moments of Change: Europe, 1945, 1968, 1989* (Lanham, Md., 2004); Mark Kurlansky, *1968: The Year That Rocked the World* (New York, 2005); and Jeremi Suri, *The Global Revolutions of 1968* (New York, 2007). An exception is Samantha Christiansen and Zachary A. Scarlett, *The Third World in the Global 1960s* (New York, 2012). Two works that consider other East European experiences are Martin Klimke and Joachim Scharloth, eds., *1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism, 1956–1977* (New York, 2008); and Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York, 2005), chaps. 12 and 13. On the broader world of the socialist sixties beyond Prague, see Gorsuch and Koenker, *The Socialist Sixties*. Works on the Soviet Union that specifically address the question of the 1960s include Vail' and Genis, *60-e*; Kristin Roth-Ey, *Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire That Lost the Cultural Cold War* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2011); Zhuk, *Rock and Roll in the Rocket City*; and Boris Kagarlitsky, "1960s East and West: The Nature of the Shestidesiatniki and the New Left," trans. William Nickell, *boundary 2* 36, no. 1 (2009): 95–104.

<sup>8</sup> On the 1960s as a transnational moment, in addition to the works cited elsewhere, see Gerd-Rainer Horn, *The Spirit of '68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956–1976* (Oxford, 2007); and Belinda Davis, Wilfried Mausbach, Martin Klimke, and Carla MacDougall, eds., *Changing the World, Changing Oneself: Political Protest and Collective Identities in West Germany and the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s* (New York, 2010).

<sup>9</sup> Two excellent "conversations" exploring a burgeoning literature on the history of emotions are Jan Plamper, "The History of Emotions: An Interview with William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, and Peter Stearns," *History and Theory* 49, no. 2 (2010): 237–265; and Nicole Eustace, Eugenia Lean, Julie Livingston, Jan Plamper, William M. Reddy, and Barbara H. Rosenwein, "The Historical Study of Emotions," *AHR Conversation, American Historical Review* 117, no. 5 (December 2012): 1487–1531. On the history of Soviet emotions (much of which focuses on the revolution, the 1920s, and Stalinism), see, for example, Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Happiness and *Toska*: An Essay in the History of Emotions in Pre-War Soviet Russia," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 50, no. 3 (2004): 357–371; Marina Balina and Evgeny Dobrenko, *Petrified Utopia: Happiness Soviet Style* (London, 2009); Mark D. Steinberg and Valeria Sobol, eds., *Interpreting Emotions in Russia and Eastern Europe* (DeKalb, Ill., 2011); and Alexey Tikhomirov, "The Regime of Forced Trust: Making and Breaking Emotional Bonds between People and State in Soviet Russia, 1917–1941," *Slavonic and East European Review* 91, no. 1 (2013): 78–118.

mittee—and contributed to the American New Left movements of the 1960s.<sup>10</sup> It was not only American radicals who supported Fidel Castro's bearded rebels: "disparate US citizens—gun-toting teenagers, diehard liberals, excited reporters, stray adventurers, even Errol Flynn"—also took up the revolutionary cause of what CBS News, in 1957, championed as "Cuba's Jungle Fighters."<sup>11</sup> If American enthusiasm waned after 1959, with Cuba's "mass romantic glow" dissipating as it became clear that the revolution was more radical than many had anticipated, activists in Western Europe greeted the revolution and its aftermath with great excitement. "We were mad about Cuba," French activist Jean-Paul Dollé recalled.<sup>12</sup> Jean-Paul Sartre wrote his preface to Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* after visiting a newly liberated Havana in 1960.<sup>13</sup> Cuba was one of the first of a series of hotspots for "revolutionary tourists" (and their armchair equivalents), who traveled to Moscow in 1957 (for the Youth Festival), Havana in the early 1960s, Algiers (the "Mecca of Revolution") in 1962, Beijing in 1966, and Prague in 1968.<sup>14</sup>

What does this transnational context suggest for how we might consider the nature, and the specificities, of Soviet responses to the Cuban Revolution? A difference between pro-Cuba enthusiasts on the two sides of the Iron Curtain is that Soviet enthusiasts were acting in accordance with regime policy. A significant distinction between First and Second World experiences of the 1960s is the official nature of the socialist sixties.<sup>15</sup> Much of the work on the sixties under capitalism emphasizes global flows of unofficial, anti-authoritarian protest. In contrast, while the Soviet regime was unprecedentedly internationalist in the 1960s, most of the cross-cultural contact was officially authorized, even as it was undeniably popular. Soviet regime support for Cuba was not immediate, but after a visit from First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoian in February 1960, Cuba was increasingly deployed as proof of the failure of American imperialism and of the success of the Soviet model. Soviet involvement in Cuba also enabled the USSR to regain some of its legitimacy with the international left, legitimacy that was threatened by the 1956 invasion of Hungary, the Sino-Soviet split, and, in Latin America, the appeal of Trotskyism.<sup>16</sup> Support for Cuba was also, more generally, a reflection of Khrushchev-era backing for the rev-

<sup>10</sup> Van Gosse, *Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America and the Making of a New Left* (London, 1993).

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 110–111; Paul Hollander, *Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, 1928–1978* (New York, 1981); Jennifer Ruth Hosek, "Interpretations of Third World Solidarity and Contemporary German Nationalism," in Karen Dubinsky, Catherine Krull, Susan Lord, Sean Mills, and Scott Rutherford, eds., *New World Coming: The Sixties and the Shaping of Global Consciousness* (Toronto, 2009), 68–76, here 76; Kepa Artaraz, *Cuba and Western Intellectuals since 1959* (New York, 2009); Robert Gildea, James Mark, and Niek Pas, "European Radicals and the 'Third World': Imagined Solidarities and Radical Networks, 1958–73," *Cultural and Social History* 8, no. 4 (2011): 449–472.

<sup>13</sup> Gildea, Mark, and Pas, "European Radicals and the 'Third World,'" 449–450.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 453–454; Jeffrey James Byrne, "Our Own Special Brand of Socialism: Algeria and the Contest of Modernities in the 1960s," *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 3 (2009): 427–447, here 434.

<sup>15</sup> Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane P. Koenker, "The Socialist Sixties in Global Perspective," in Gorsuch and Koenker, *The Socialist Sixties*, 1–21, here 7–10.

<sup>16</sup> Robert J. Alexander, *Trotskyism in Latin America* (Stanford, Calif., 1973); Luis E. Aguilar, *Marxism in Latin America*, revised ed. (Philadelphia, 1978); Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (New York, 2002), chap. 20; Max Elbaum, *Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao and Che* (New York, 2002); Richard Wolin, *The Wind from the East: French Intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution, and the Legacy of the 1960s* (Princeton, N.J., 2010); Alexander C.



olutionary struggles of decolonizing peoples, a change in policy evidenced early on in Khrushchev's many travels abroad, including trips to Beijing in 1954 and to India, Burma, and Afghanistan in 1955.<sup>17</sup> In 1963, in recognition of encouraging developments in Cuba, Algeria, and Egypt, Soviet theorists put forward a new political concept—revolutionary democracy—to describe states in which the "radical petty bourgeoisie" of a "national revolution" could become "active fighters" for the "socialist reconstruction of society."<sup>18</sup> The Soviet Union would, in these circumstances, serve as an international catalyst, evidencing Soviet superiority in an international competition with the United States for influence and control in the Third World.

Of particular interest are official Soviet imaginings of Cuba in the early 1960s as a place worthy of Soviet enthusiasm and the ways that these emotional "styles" were embedded, interpreted, and expressed in daily life.<sup>19</sup> This enthusiasm might be described as one of "romance" because Soviet sources, both official and individual, so often used the language of love to characterize the relationship. Romance was not all there was to the connection between the two countries, however. It was also characterized in both the Soviet and Cuban media as a parent-child relationship, a friendship, a brotherhood, a business partnership, and a military alliance. Looming in the background was yet another kind of "relationship," namely the complex interconnection between Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the United States, with China sometimes a fourth partner.<sup>20</sup> The 1959 Cuban Revolution was not, initially, a socialist revolution. "In the beginning," Khrushchev biographer William Taubman argues, "Cuba couldn't have seemed less important to Moscow . . . Khrushchev welcomed revolutions that could bring the USSR new allies in the developing world, but when Fidel Castro's forces came sweeping out of the Sierra Madre and seized Havana in January 1959, Moscow had no clear idea of who they were and what they stood for."<sup>21</sup> Cuba's new provisional government consisted of liberals and some revolutionaries united by the desire for reform following the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship, but in early 1959 Castro insisted that while his aspirations were revolutionary, they were not communist. Over the course of 1959 and 1960, however, Cuba's estimated 1,500 decrees and laws on everything from redistributing large landholdings, to dramatically reducing the cost of rent and electricity, to putting the

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Cook, "Third World Maoism," in Timothy Cheek, ed., *A Critical Introduction to Mao* (Cambridge, 2010), 288–312.

<sup>17</sup> Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge, 2005), 67.

<sup>18</sup> Lévesque, *The USSR and the Cuban Revolution*, 61–62.

<sup>19</sup> The distinction between emotional "experience" and "expression" (and the question of whether this binary even exists) is central to the ongoing conversation about the history of emotions. See the discussion in Eustace, Lean, Livingston, Plamper, Reddy, and Rosenwein, "The Historical Study of Emotions," 1495–1504; and Barbara H. Rosenwein, "Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions," *Passions in Context: International Journal for the History and Theory of Emotions* 1, no. 1 (2010): 1–32, <http://www.passionsincontext.de/index.php?id=557>. I do not see this article primarily as an intervention in the history of emotions, however, but as an essay that integrates emotions into the cultural history of Soviet-Cuban relations.

<sup>20</sup> Soviet engagement with Cuba also helped address Chinese accusations of Soviet revisionism following the Sino-Soviet split. Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 68–72; Bain, "Havana and Moscow," 128; Lorenz M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton, N.J., 2008).

<sup>21</sup> William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York, 2002), 532.

press under the control of the government led to greater antagonism with the United States, an antipathy that encouraged the Castro regime to radicalize further.<sup>22</sup>

In April 1961, on the eve of what proved to be a decisive victory over the CIA-led forces in the invasion at the Bay of Pigs, Castro for the first time publicly described the Cuban Revolution as socialist; the following December, he characterized himself as a Marxist-Leninist. Cuban leaders were attracted to communist ideology, a degree of commitment that led them to increase connections with communist China in the mid-1960s when China was entering the Cultural Revolution and when the Soviet Union appeared more interested in peaceful coexistence than in world revolution.<sup>23</sup> Like elites in many developing economies, Cuba was also drawn to the Soviet Union for other than ideological reasons. Most important was the Soviet model of modernization, including rapid industrialization, centralized planning, and the extensive and effective training of workers at scientific and technical institutes and universities.<sup>24</sup> For a country so long dominated by the colonializing presence of Spain and the United States, Russia's absence of a colonial past, at least in the traditional sense, was also important.<sup>25</sup> "The 1959 Revolution was predicated on the same ideals as those of the anticolonial struggle in Africa and Asia: national sovereignty, social justice, and development," João Felipe Gonçalves explains. "When the regime declared itself socialist in 1961, it presented socialism as the only way to overcome imperialism and underdevelopment."<sup>26</sup> Famously, Cuba is still "socialist" some twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet project.

IN 1958, WHILE FIDEL CASTRO WAS busy fighting in the Sierra Maestra, but before the Soviet regime had paid him any attention, a popular Soviet animated cartoon, *Secret Small Island* (*Taina dalekogo ostrova*), featured the brave adventures of Petya and his grandfather, and their efforts to save the life and restore the fortunes of a young South Pacific islander whose family had been oppressed by Spanish conquistadors.<sup>27</sup> In the cartoon, Petya comes to the rescue of the less fortunate, notably dark-skinned islander, by virtue of his knowledge of Spanish (learned as a Soviet Pioneer), technology (he and his grandfather are on a scientific expedition), and ideology (socialist humanitarianism versus imperialist greed). The cartoon, which is presented in the adventurous style (if not with the same political message) of Jules Verne, exemplifies the communist romanticism of the Khrushchev era, when Soviet citizens were en-

<sup>22</sup> Gonçalves, "Sputnik Premiers in Havana," 87–90. On early reform measures, and Cuban-U.S.-Soviet relations in 1959–1960, see Louis A. Pérez Jr., *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution* (New York, 1988), 239–248; Jorge I. Domínguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), 137–149.

<sup>23</sup> Westad, *The Global Cold War*, chap. 5.

<sup>24</sup> Bain, "Havana and Moscow," 128. Tobias Rupprecht argues the same about the relationship between Brazil and the Soviet Union in "Socialist High Modernity and Global Stagnation: A Shared History of Brazil and the Soviet Union during the Cold War," *Journal of Global History* 6, no. 3 (2011): 505–528. See also Engerman, "The Second World's Third World," 200–201.

<sup>25</sup> Bain, "Havana and Moscow," 128.

<sup>26</sup> Gonçalves, "Sputnik Premiers in Havana," 86.

<sup>27</sup> *Secret Small Island* [*Taina dalekogo ostrova*] (dir. Valentina Brumberg and Zinaida Brumberg, Soiuzmul'tfil'm, 1958).





FIGURE 1: In the Soviet cartoon *Secret Small Island*, Petya and his grandfather come to the rescue of a local islander. *Taina dalekogo ostrova*, dir. Valentina Brumberg and Zinaida Brumberg (Soiuzmul'tfil'm, 1958).

couraged to enthusiastically participate in the making of a prosperous, internationally respected, non-Stalinist Soviet Union.<sup>28</sup>

In the early 1960s, Soviet citizens were introduced to Cuba—through film, print, images, and music—as a source of socialist inspiration. The 1960 Soviet documentary film *Cuban Envoys—Our Guests* (*Poslantsy Kuby—Nashi gosti*) was one of a series of early efforts to educate Soviet citizens about Castro's efforts on a real-life faraway island. In the opening of the film, viewers were presented with a bird's-eye view of a world map.<sup>29</sup> They were then invited to voyage along a dotted line commencing in Havana and ending in Moscow. They could see how very close Cuba was to the United States, but by following the line, they were encouraged to understand the even closer connection between Cuba and the Soviet Union despite the much greater physical distance. The map had an ideological purpose, but it also would have served

<sup>28</sup> This mood is especially evident at the 1961 Party Congress. N. S. Khrushchev, "Report on the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, October 17, 1961," in *Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU*, vol. 2, <http://www.archive.org/details/DocumentsOfThe22ndCongressOfTheCpsuVolli/20>.

<sup>29</sup> *Cuban Envoys—Our Guests* [*Poslantsy Kuby—Nashi gosti*] (dir. O. Podgoretskaia, 1960), <http://www.net-film.ru/ru/film-5373/>.

a very real purpose: before 1959, most Soviet citizens would have struggled to place Cuba on a map either geographic or symbolic. News coverage grew exponentially after the Cuban Revolution, with the number of articles about Cuba in *Pravda* and *Izvestiia* increasing from 71 in 1959, to 572 in 1960, to a high of almost 1,000 in 1962.<sup>30</sup> Prominent journalists wrote rhapsodic articles about their trips to Cuba in the early 1960s, which were republished in books with impressive print runs.<sup>31</sup>

The imagined world of revolutionary Cuba was not only available in print: Soviet citizens listened to the Red Army Choir sing “The March of 26 July” in Spanish, visited traveling photo exhibitions about the Cuban Revolution, studied Spanish via language programs on the radio (such as *La paz y el progreso*), and participated in “weeks of Cuban culture.”<sup>32</sup> They also learned about Cuba at the movies: in the early 1960s, Cuba figured prominently in the thirty-five-minute newsreels that were commonly shown before feature films. In 1960, newsreel number 38 included images of tractors from the Minsk Tractor Works being sent to Cuba, along with clips of local mushroom pickers in the Moscow region and a story about a mobile dental clinic.<sup>33</sup> One of the ten news stories in episode number 14 from 1962 showed Castro receiving the International Lenin Peace Prize.<sup>34</sup> Filmgoers in 1963 watched the signing of joint agreements between Castro and Khrushchev, clips of Kremlin receptions in honor of Castro, meetings of friendship, and, in a documentary film titled *We Are with You, Cuba* (*My s toboi, Kuba*), a jubilee celebration of the Cuban Revolution based on old newsreel footage joined with images of contemporary Cubans meeting visiting Soviet agricultural and industrial experts.<sup>35</sup> News and film coverage reached a high point in 1963 during Castro’s twelve-city tour of the Soviet Union; his youthful, bearded face was on the front page of Soviet newspapers for the forty days of his visit.<sup>36</sup> Cuba was so prominent in Soviet discourse that the first word spoken by a young child in one family was “Cuba.”<sup>37</sup>

That enthusiasm for Cuba was enabled and encouraged does not mean that it was not genuine, of course.<sup>38</sup> In one romantically heroic, ideologically appropriate, and

<sup>30</sup> Lévesque, *The USSR and the Cuban Revolution*, 203.

<sup>31</sup> Genrich Borovik, *Kak eto bylo na Kube: Glavy iz dokumental'noi povesti* (Moscow, 1961); Dimitri Goriunov, *Zdravstvui, Kuba!* (Moscow, 1961). These books had print runs of 150,000 copies. For more examples, see the seventy-four-page bibliography devoted to listing all of the articles, speeches, document collections, and books published about Cuba between 1959 and 1963: L. A. Shur, comp., *Kuba v sovetskoi pechati: Bibliografiia* (Moscow, 1963).

<sup>32</sup> Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow, f. 9576, op. 10, d. 39, l. 3 (description of Cuban activities in Armenia, 1965); l. 52 (photo of wall newspaper); ll. 56–60 (plans for a week of Cuban culture, 1965); d. 40, l. 102 (letter describing Spanish language studies, 1964); d. 58, l. 93 (ticket to Friendship Society event, 1966); d. 75, l. 1 (plan for activities by Friendship Society, 1967–1968); l. 53 (Cuban friendship activities in Yaroslavl, 1966); l. 47 (Cuban friendship activities in Kiev, 1966).

<sup>33</sup> The first few images, before the map, are of Havana, Cuba’s “revolutionary capital.” “Novosti dnia/Khronika nashikh dnei 1960, No. 38” (dir. B. Nebylitskii), <http://www.net-film.ru/ru/film-10919/>.

<sup>34</sup> Castro received this prize in 1961. “Novosti dnia/Khronika nashikh dnei 1962, No. 14” (dir. L. Makhnach), <http://www.net-film.ru/ru/film-11128/>.

<sup>35</sup> “Novosti dnia/Khronika nashikh dnei 1963, No. 1” (dir. M. Troianovskii), <http://www.net-film.ru/ru/film-11240/>; “Novosti dnia/Khronika nashikh dnei 1963, No. 21” (dir. I. Zhukovskaia), <http://www.net-film.ru/ru/film-11260/>; *We Are with You, Cuba* [*My s toboi, Kuba*] (dir. V. Katanian, 1963), <http://www.net-film.ru/ru/film-5810/>.

<sup>36</sup> Photos from the tour were made into both Russian- and Spanish-language coffee table books. *iViva Cuba!* (Moscow, 1963). When I trolled among the used-book dealers in Havana’s Plaza de Armas in 2012, dog-eared copies of *iViva Cuba!* were still visible at many stalls.

<sup>37</sup> Personal e-mail exchange with Boris Kolonitskii about his wife, Katia, July 29, 2013.

<sup>38</sup> The large literature on the Soviet subject and his/her behavioral, ideological, and emotional re-



mysteriously exotic package, Soviet representations of Cuba evoked the Russian Revolution, the Spanish Civil War, World War II, and, implicitly, Khrushchev's own "revolutionary" Thaw. Magazines such as *Vokrug sveta* (*Around the World*) described the battles of the Cuban Sierra Maestra in language reminiscent of the Russian Revolution and Civil War: "Peasants and workers made up the small vanguard. Revolution was supported by all honest people in Cuba. Following two years of heroic fighting, the people won their victory."<sup>39</sup> The Cuban Revolution, like its Russian counterpart, freed oppressed peoples from the yoke of dictatorship: the transition from colonialism to independence compared with that from tsarism to communism.<sup>40</sup> If the Cuban Revolution was said to resemble the Russian one, Mikoian worked hard to reassure the United States that the Soviet Union was not the mastermind behind it: "There was not here, of course, nor could there have been, any export of revolution."<sup>41</sup> He waxed rhapsodic, however, even when speaking with Americans: "You Americans must realize what Cuba means to us old Bolsheviks," he said to U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk. "We have been waiting all our lives for a country to go communist without the Red Army. It has happened in Cuba, and it makes us feel like boys again."<sup>42</sup> Inspired by the Cuban Revolution, and in imitation of their own Russian revolutionary experience, during which boys had been given names such as Vladlen (Vladimir Lenin), some people in the USSR now changed their names to something more revolutionary: boys named Fyodor, for example, were sometimes called by a new nickname, Fidel.<sup>43</sup>

For interested adults such as Mikoian, the Cuban Revolution evoked the youthful excitement of the Russian Revolution. For some younger people, it offered a heady opportunity to finally participate, if at a distance, in a revolution of their own. The regime was eager to encourage this perspective. Young people were a particular target of the Khrushchev-era project to renew Soviet socialism following the traumas of the Stalinist past, a project for which the Cuban Revolution was useful inspiration. A *Vokrug sveta* review of a 1963 Moscow photo exhibition about revolutionary Cuba emphasized the centrality of Cuban youth: "Young people played a huge role in the realization of the revolution," the article notes. Even more important, the author writes, is that "young men and women are not lacking strength even now, when stone

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lationship to the Soviet project includes, for example, Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization* (Berkeley, Calif., 1995); Anna Krylova, "The Tenacious Liberal Subject in Soviet Studies," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 1, no. 1 (2000): 119–146; Alexander Etkind, "Soviet Subjectivity: Torture for the Sake of Salvation?," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 6, no. 1 (2005): 171–186; Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation* (Princeton, N.J., 2006); Jochen Hellbeck, *Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006); Jan Plamper, "Beyond Binaries: Popular Opinion in Stalinism," in Paul Corner, ed., *Popular Opinion in Totalitarian Regimes: Fascism, Nazism, Communism* (Oxford, 2009), 64–80.

<sup>39</sup> Genrikh Borovik, "Kuba vstrechaet rassvet," *Vokrug sveta*, September 1960, 32.

<sup>40</sup> On this point as it pertains to Africa and the Soviet Union, see Basia Lewandowska Cummings, "Soviet Cinema and African Filmmaking," <http://africasacountry.com/2012/04/20/soviet-cinema-and-african-filmmaking/>; and Josephine Woll, "The Russian Connection: Soviet Cinema and the Cinema of Francophone Africa," in Françoise Pfaff, ed., *Focus on African Films* (Bloomington, 2004), 223–240.

<sup>41</sup> "Mikoian in Cuba: Speech at Opening of Soviet Exhibit," *Pravda*, February 7, 1960, reprinted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP)* 10, no. 6 (1960): 5.

<sup>42</sup> As cited in Samuel Farber, *The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2006), 147.

<sup>43</sup> Evgeniia Bosenko, "Kuba v sud'be pokoleniia," January 1, 2011, *Propaganda: Nauchno-populiarnyi zhurnal*, <http://propaganda-journal.net/3159.html>.

by stone the fundamentals of socialism are being built in Cuba”—the implication being that Soviet youth should be similarly engaged with socialist projects at home.<sup>44</sup> Some young people were inspired by this rhetoric. In her 2011 memoir “Cuba and the Fate of a Generation,” Evgeniia Bosenko recalls how, on her first trip to Moscow from her native Ukraine, she asked her parents to help her find a pin depicting Fidel Castro. When she found only one at a kiosk near the Kremlin, she was dismayed, as she had hoped to return home with twelve of them for her friends.<sup>45</sup> Bosenko’s youthful longing was only partially ideological. Her enthusiasm was for the exhilaration of revolutionary experience. Third World Cuba provided excitement in ways that the rest of the now more stable (or what some would later call “stagnant”) socialist world could not.

If the Cuban Revolution conjured the revolutionary enthusiasms of 1917, the melodic sounds of Spanish also reminded people of “the most romantic period in Soviet history—the Spanish Civil War.” “Just as at that time everyone knew the [Spanish] phrase ‘They shall not pass,’ now those in a Tambov kolkhoz knew the slogan ‘Motherland or death,’” Vail and Genis write.<sup>46</sup> Natasha Sadomskaia, a member of an early 1960s *kompaniia*, studied Cuba at Moscow State University and Spain at the Institute of Ethnography, met with Cubans when they visited the USSR, and kept in contact with Spaniards who had moved as children to the USSR at the end of the Spanish Civil War.<sup>47</sup> Bosenko makes explicit the connection between Cuba and the Spanish Civil War: “On my desk I have a copy of the book *Ernesto Che Guevara: Articles, Speeches, Letters*,” she writes. “His biography includes the following information: ‘1936–1939. The Spanish Civil War. The first political event to seriously impact Guevara’s consciousness.’” “The events in Spain had a strong influence on a generation of Soviet people, equal to victory in the Great Patriotic War,” she continues. “Our fathers saw the Cuban Revolution as revenge for the tragic defeat of the Spaniards. When [the revolution] occurred, my classmates were exactly the same age that Guevara had been in 1936. If one of us had become a revolutionary or a prominent figure with a significant political career, it would have been possible to write in that person’s biography: ‘1958–1961. Cuba. First interest in political events.’”<sup>48</sup> “We were one with Cuba,” Elena Kolosova recalled, “and this made things similar to the situation during the Spanish Civil War . . . Everything sounds romantic with a Spanish accent.”<sup>49</sup>

The Cuban Revolution also evoked the more recent victories of World War II.

<sup>44</sup> “Molodost’ Kuby,” *Vokrug sveta*, April 1963, 17. In the Soviet Union, “youth” (*molodezh*) generally meant adolescents and young adults between fifteen and thirty years of age.

<sup>45</sup> Bosenko, “Kuba v sud’be pokoleniia.”

<sup>46</sup> Vail and Genis, 60–e, 45. On the impact of the Spanish Civil War (and its exiles) in the Soviet Union, see Daniel Kowalsky, *Stalin and the Spanish Civil War* (New York, 2004); Lisa A. Kirschenbaum, “Exile, Gender, and Communist Self-Fashioning: Dolores Ibárruri (La Pasionaria) in the Soviet Union,” *Slavic Review* 71, no. 3 (2012): 566–589; Glennys Young, “To Russia with ‘Spain’: Spanish Exiles in the USSR and the *Longue durée* of Soviet History,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 15, no. 2 (2014): 395–419.

<sup>47</sup> Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, *The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era* (Pittsburgh, 1990), 94.

<sup>48</sup> Bosenko, “Kuba v sud’be pokoleniia.”

<sup>49</sup> Yelena Kolosova, as cited in Donald J. Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers: An Oral History of Russia’s Cold War Generation* (New York, 2012), 152. Raleigh argues that following from enthusiasm about Cuba, “Latin America became more accessible,” too, including, for example, films with Argentine actress Lolita Torres. *Ibid.*, 151.



As one Red Army veteran told a group of visiting Cuban students, "Motherland or death!—Your slogan was also the slogan of our fighters."<sup>50</sup> Published images of Cuban guerrilla fighters and post-revolutionary crowds of people in uniform resembled World War II propaganda images of gun-wielding Soviet soldiers. A 1961 digest of Soviet reporting about Cuba, *Geroicheskii ostrov* (*Heroic Island*), emphasized the battle between American and Cuban forces at the Bay of Pigs. It focused on teenage combatants, a possible allusion to another Soviet wartime reality: *synov'ia polka*, or sons of the regiment.<sup>51</sup> In contrast to World War II, however, this time the enemy was America, which was a threat both to Cuba, "the island of liberty," and to the Soviet Union, "an island encircled by enemies."<sup>52</sup> On October 25, 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, *Pravda* published Evgenii Evtushenko's "Letter to America," phoned in from Havana the previous night:

America, I'm writing to you from Cuba,  
Where the crags and the cheekbones  
Of rigid sentries shine anxiously tonight  
In the gusting storm . . .  
A tobacconist, carrying a revolver, prepares  
to leave for the harbor,  
A shoemaker cleans an old machine gun,  
A showgirl from a cabaret, wearing army boots,  
Goes along with a carpenter to stand guard . . .<sup>53</sup>

Some schoolchildren told each other that the word *Kuba* was short for "Kommunizm U Beregov Ameriki" (Communism on the shores of America).<sup>54</sup> In February 1961, a group of Pioneers sent a letter to Castro: "We students from Leningrad send warm greetings to you, glorious fighter for freedom . . . We are filled with enthusiasm by your firmness and faith toward freedom and join our voices to yours to cry out with the Cubans, 'Cuba, Si! Yanquis, No!'"<sup>55</sup>

Soviet popular responses to the Cuban missile crisis deserve their own history, something Andrei Kozovoi has begun to address in an essay on Soviet youth mobilization, anti-Americanism, and the missile crisis. He explores the way in which the Komsomol used the Cuban crisis to remind their audiences of the danger emanating from the United States.<sup>56</sup> Indeed, Bosenko recalls, the Caribbean crisis and the possibility of a U.S. attack on Cuba led three schoolgirls to consider military training as one way to be of assistance to the Cubans. The young girls, who were in the Russian fifth form, visited a local tank school one day to request quick training so that they could be sent to Cuba. They were allowed on the tanks, shown how to work some

<sup>50</sup> A. Pin, "Pesn' novoi kakhovki," *Vokrug sveta*, February 1962, 21.

<sup>51</sup> V. G. Lenin, ed., *Geroicheskii ostrov: Zametki zhurnal'istov o poezdke na Kubu* (Moscow, 1961), 70–79.

<sup>52</sup> Vail' and Genis, 60–e, 45.

<sup>53</sup> J. Hoberman, review of *I Am Cuba* [*Soy Cuba*, dir. Mikhail Kalatozov, Instituto Cubano del Arte e Industrias Cinematográfica and Mosfil'm, 1964], The Criterion Collection, [http://www.dvduell.de/criterion\\_website/criterion/indepth-116.html](http://www.dvduell.de/criterion_website/criterion/indepth-116.html).

<sup>54</sup> Bosenko, "Kuba v sud'be pokoleniia."

<sup>55</sup> Anita Casavantes Bradford, "La Niña Adorada del Mundo Socialista': The Politics of Childhood and U.S.-Cuba-U.S.S.R. Relations, 1959–1962," forthcoming in *Diplomatic History*.

<sup>56</sup> Andrei Kozovoi, "Dissonant Voices: Soviet Youth Mobilization and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, no. 3 (2014): 29–61.

of the controls, and then politely sent on their way.<sup>57</sup> For most youth, however, Kozovoi concludes that the Caribbean crisis did not result in anti-Americanism, a reminder of the variety of opinions, some dissonant, that Soviet citizens had about Cuba. Many young people remained favorably disposed toward the United States.<sup>58</sup>

The Cuban Revolution was not only about the Cold War, however. It was an evocation of Khrushchev's own promises vis-à-vis Stalin that revolutionary change could happen with the wholehearted support of the population, rather than through oppression and tyranny. The distinctive post-Stalinist culture of the Khrushchev era rejected the oppressive excesses of Stalinism, openly engaged with and even emulated modernizing aspects of the capitalist West, and yet defended the superiority of a modern Soviet state newly willing and able to attend to the needs of its population without exploitation. To this end, the "humanitarian" profile of Cuba's revolution was emphasized in Soviet publications with stories of people energetically at work on farms and in factories, of efforts to improve the lives of destitute Afro-Cubans living in Batista-era shantytowns, and of literacy campaigns.<sup>59</sup> Soviet visitors to Cuba sometimes replicated this rhetoric in their own imaginings. Alexander Calzatti, who worked as a cinematographer on the film *I Am Cuba* (*Soy Cuba/Ia Kuba*), which was shot in Cuba in 1962 and 1963, recalled that before they went to Cuba, they "didn't know much about its history, about the culture, nor about the language spoken" there. "We only knew its location on the map," he remembered. "When we went there, it was a great surprise. We were impressed because the Cuban Revolution seemed more human than we had imagined. We didn't know how it had happened, but we were told it was a revolution with a humanitarian profile that had shed less blood than other revolutions."<sup>60</sup> Rostislav Rokitianski, who kept a diary about his experiences in Cuba during his time there working as a Soviet aviation engineer, argued that the political support of the "oppressed"—blacks and "mulattos"—for the Cuban Revolution was the best evidence of its true revolutionary nature.<sup>61</sup>

For most Soviet citizens, the possibility of travel to Cuba (as was true for foreign travel to anywhere other than Eastern Europe) was very limited. Thus most experienced the country through the written word, moving images, and, for a small number, encounters with visiting Cubans. Although Nikita Khrushchev's de-Stalinizing Soviet Union has long been described as undergoing a period of "Thaw," a term taken from Ilya Ehrenburg's 1954 novella of that name and used as a metaphor to describe Khrushchev-era challenges to Stalinist authority, there were significant limits to the reforms of those years.<sup>62</sup> Some people were disheartened early on by the

<sup>57</sup> Bosenko, "Kuba v sud'be pokoleniia."

<sup>58</sup> Kozovoi, "Dissonant Voices," 56.

<sup>59</sup> Vladimir Volodkin and S. S. Smirnov, *Kuba 1961: Reportazh* (Moscow, 1961), 42, 44, 50.

<sup>60</sup> *Soy Cuba [I Am Cuba]*; interview in *O mamute siberiano [The Siberian Mammoth]* (dir. Vicente Ferraz, Três Mundos Produções, 2005), available in *I Am Cuba: The Ultimate Edition* (Milestone Film and Video, 2007).

<sup>61</sup> Unpublished diary of Rostislav Rokitianski, entry 3220. The diary covers Rokitianski's stay in Cuba beginning in late 1966 through the first few months of 1967. I am grateful to Vladimir Rokitianski for sharing his father's diary.

<sup>62</sup> On the Khrushchev era, including tensions between the liberalizing "Thaw" and continuing repression, see Priscilla Johnson and Leopold Labedz, eds., *Khrushchev and the Arts: The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962–1964* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965); Elena Zubkova, *Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945–1957*, trans. Hugh Ragsdale (Armonk, N.Y., 1998); Julie Hessler, "A Postwar Perestroika? Towards a History of Private Enterprise in the USSR," *Slavic Review* 57, no. 3 (1998):



unstable mixture of optimistic openings, profound anxieties, and authoritarian prescriptions characteristic of Khrushchev, particularly, perhaps, by the cultural reversals of 1963, when Khrushchev declared: "The Thaw is over."<sup>63</sup> Still, that socialist inspiration—and emotional meaning—might be found in another country was a significant, and risky, change from Stalinism and consistent with the internationalism of the early Soviet sixties.<sup>64</sup> Under Khrushchev, Soviet citizens were newly treated, if within definite limits, as individuals confident in their Soviet identity and trustworthy enough to learn about, and even emulate, aspects of the rest of the world.<sup>65</sup> Enthusiastic stories of Cuban successes, together with frequent allusions to the Soviet origins of Cuban actions, were intended to encourage a new kind of Soviet patriotism.

IN FEBRUARY 1960, MIKOIAN VISITED Cuba and crowed: "Yes, [Castro] is a revolutionary. Completely like us. I felt as though I had returned to my childhood."<sup>66</sup> Mikoian's formulation epitomizes the almost envious enthusiasm typical of some Soviet pronouncements about Cuba.<sup>67</sup> Also evident, however, is a sense of pater-

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516–542; Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (New York, 2000); Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2002); Susan E. Reid, "Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev," *Slavic Review* 61, no. 2 (2002): 211–252; Iurii Aksiutin, *Khrushchevskaia "ottepel'" i obshchestvennye nastroyeniia v SSSR v 1953–1964 gg.* (Moscow, 2004); Polly Jones, ed., *The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era* (London, 2006); *Repenser le Dégel: Versions du socialisme, influences internationales et société soviétique*, Special Issue, *Cahiers du monde russe* 47, no. 1–2 (2006); Juliane Fürst, ed., *Late Stalinist Russia: Society between Reconstruction and Reinvention* (London, 2006); Stephen V. Bittner, *The Many Lives of Khrushchev's Thaw: Experience and Memory in Moscow's Arbat* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2008); Melanie Ilić and Jeremy Smith, eds., *Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev* (London, 2009); Vladislav Zubok, *Zhivago's Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009); Miriam Dobson, *Khrushchev's Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of Reform after Stalin* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2009); Juliane Fürst, *Stalin's Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism* (Oxford, 2010); Polly Jones, *Myth, Memory, Trauma: Rethinking the Stalinist Past in the Soviet Union, 1953–70* (New Haven, Conn., 2013).

<sup>63</sup> Zubok, *Zhivago's Children*, chaps. 6 and 9, here 214; Benjamin Tromly, "Soviet Patriotism and Its Discontents among Higher Education Students in Khrushchev-Era Russia and Ukraine," *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 37, no. 3 (2009): 299–326; Jeremi Suri, "The Rise and Fall of an International Counterculture, 1960–1975," *American Historical Review* 114, no. 1 (February 2009): 45–68, here 50–54.

<sup>64</sup> On emotional norms and ideals in revolutionary Russia and during Stalinism and efforts to direct the population inward in order to "establish emotional ties with the regime," see Tikhomirov, "The Regime of Forced Trust."

<sup>65</sup> In 1960, close to 300,000 tourists from capitalist countries visited the Soviet Union; V. E. Bagdasarian et al., *Sovetskoe zazerkal'e: Inostrannyi turizm v SSSR v 1930–1980-e gody* (Moscow, 2007), 94. Soviet citizens also crossed international borders in record numbers; Gorsuch, *All This Is Your World*, 4–5. The 1957 Moscow World Youth Festival was a seminal moment in the opening of the USSR to the world outside. Kristen Roth-Ey, "'Loose Girls' on the Loose? Sex, Propaganda and the 1957 Youth Festival," in Melanie Ilić, Susan E. Reid, and Lynne Attwood, eds., *Women in the Khrushchev Era* (Basingstoke, 2004), 75–95; Pia Koivunen, "The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival: Propagating a New, Peaceful Image of the Soviet Union," in Ilić and Smith, *Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev*, 46–65.

<sup>66</sup> As cited in Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 532–533.

<sup>67</sup> Mikoian's visit led to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, a five-year trade agreement including the purchase of close to one and a half million tons of sugar by the Soviet Union over five years, and a \$100 million credit to buy Soviet industrial equipment. Lévesque, *The USSR and the Cuban Revolution*, 14, 30–31.

nalism: an assertion of Soviet superiority based on experience and age. Cuba was meant to inspire Soviet youth, but Cuba itself was also portrayed as a youth, in a form of infantilization typical of many imperial encounters. "The [Cuban] republic is itself young," *Vokrug sveta* instructed its readers in 1961. "Its leaders are young, as are its national enterprises, cooperatives, and schools."<sup>68</sup> Cuba's revolutionary youth were appropriately eager, according to the Soviet press, to learn from the Soviet Union. An article about a fourteen-year-old Cuban student, Lazaro Garcia, who was studying in Ukraine described him writing letters home detailing the glories of the Soviet Union together with "pictures of his [new] heroes—Matrosov, Gagarin, Titov."<sup>69</sup>

Models of Soviet parent and Cuban child provided a counterbalance to the passionate romance of adulthood, which, if it was to be encouraged, also had its risks. Discourses of youthfulness could also contest Soviet authority, however. The trope of the "wild child," Bill Ashcroft argues, evokes the primitive Other of colonial discourse, but also, in the child's very freedom from "civilization," "the possibility of very different ways of being and knowing."<sup>70</sup> The magnetic appeal of the youthful, bearded male revolutionary as symbolized by Fidel Castro, and as embodied in visiting Cuban students, challenged the narrative of Soviet superiority. For those who still believed in the socialist project but were disappointed by how it had been implemented at home, Cuba was a reminder of possibilities they had believed long gone. Rokitiński's admiration of Cuban support for oppressed minorities triggered him, for example, to criticize the Soviet Union, where "the end of revolution" was evident in "the cult [of personality]."<sup>71</sup> Cuba was a unique source of inspiration. Eastern European countries, especially Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland, were cornucopias of consumptive opportunity compared to the USSR, but their graying political stratum also made Cuba appear to be a site of youthful possibility. Some *shesti-desiatniki* found evidence in Cuba, not at home, that the socialist project was still a vital one, that youthful enthusiasm and ideological rigor might still triumph. "Fidel breathes inspiration again," Iosif Kobzon crooned in "Cuba, My Love."<sup>72</sup>

The envious glances that Cuba inspired are especially evident in the language of love, and in the realm of the body, both male and female. Zoia Barash was a Muscovite who moved to Cuba in 1963 after marrying a visiting Cuban. In an interview, she described her romantic admiration for Cuba, an admiration that implied disappointment in the Soviet Union she had left behind. "Revolutionary enthusiasm was dead" in the USSR, she explained, whereas in Cuba the revolution was alive and youthful. In contrast to the Soviet Union, where those in charge were all "old and fat," in Cuba the minister of culture was just twenty-seven years old. Barash recalled

<sup>68</sup> L. Prokhorova, "Geroicheskii ostrov," *Vokrug sveta*, November 1961, 64.

<sup>69</sup> Pin, "Pesn' novoi kakhovki," 21.

<sup>70</sup> Bill Ashcroft, *On Post-Colonial Futures: Transformations of Colonial Culture* (London, 2001), 54. On the colonialist trope of infantilization in the Caribbean prior to 1959, see Lanny Thompson, *Imperial Archipelago: Representation and Rule in the Insular Territories under U.S. Dominion after 1898* (Honolulu, 2010).

<sup>71</sup> Rokitiński diary, entry 3220.

<sup>72</sup> The lyrics were written by S. Grebennikov and N. Dobronravov and the music by Aleksandra Pakhmutova. Kobzon was then at the very beginning of his career, but was soon to become one of the most famous performers of civic song and Soviet estrada. David MacFadyen, *Red Stars: Personality and the Soviet Popular Song, 1955–1991* (Montreal, 2001), chap. 5. *Cuba, My Love* is also the name of a 1963 musical comedy by Azerbaijani composer Rauf Hajiyevev in which Kobzon starred.



her astonishment that in Fidel Castro's office, as pictured in Soviet newspapers, there was abstract art hanging on the walls (in striking implied contrast, presumably, to Nikita Khrushchev, who would in these same years condemn an exhibit of abstract art as "dog shit").<sup>73</sup> She left the USSR for a better revolution, a better country, and a better man elsewhere.

Barash's memories are not those of a singularly "Soviet" citizen, but of someone now both Soviet and Cuban who is revisiting her past, and justifying it, perhaps, through the lens of a lifetime spent in Havana. Her experience of meeting and marrying a Cuban student was not unique, however. The Soviet-Cuban romance was not only an imagined one. Soviet citizens met, fell in love with, and sometimes married Cuban students who had moved to the Soviet Union to study physics, engineering, and agricultural sciences. In January 1961, Che Guevara announced that approximately 2,600 Cubans would travel that year to socialist countries to receive training. By that fall, 1,000 Cuban students were in the Soviet Union studying in Tbilisi, Tashkent, Krasnodar, and Stavropol.<sup>74</sup>

A year earlier, after reading a newspaper story in which Khrushchev had mentioned the upcoming opening of the University of the Friendship of Peoples in Moscow and provided an address to which interested students could write, a dedicated revolutionary named Pedro had been accepted into the university's initial class of students, arriving in the Soviet Union just months after Mikoian's visit to Havana in the spring of 1960.<sup>75</sup> In his capacity as leader of the Latin American students, Pedro met Irina—a book editor and a dedicated member of the Komsomol—when they were assigned to work together on holiday celebrations. Fellow Soviet students described the relationship as "romantic," as Irina was marrying "a revolutionary"

<sup>73</sup> Interview with Zoia Barash, February 22, 2012, Havana, Cuba. Barash was a film critic and the author of *El cine soviético del principio al fin* (Havana, 2008; 2nd ed., 2011).

<sup>74</sup> Cuban government scholarship grants almost exclusively provided for study in Eastern Bloc institutes and universities. Department of State, "The Communist Totalitarian Government of Cuba as a Source of International Tensions in the Americas," May 15, 1961, National Security Archive, Presidential Directives on National Security, 00664, fiche 203; Zubok, *Zhivago's Children*, 119. By 1970, the numbers had declined; according to one account, 347 Cuban students were studying at Soviet institutes of higher education in that year. A different accounting shows that Latin American students as a whole, including Cubans, constituted the largest group of international students at Lumumba University in 1971. There were 934 of them. Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie pri sovete ministrov SSSR, *Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kul'tura v SSSR* (Moscow, 1971), 217. By the 1980s, 8,000 Cubans were studying at Soviet universities. Jacqueline Loss and José Manuel Prieto, "Introduction," in Loss and Prieto, *Caviar with Rum*, 1–14, here 2. The impact of this experience is evidenced in Cuban fiction. See, in particular, the work of José Manuel Prieto, including *Encyclopedia of a Life in Russia* (New York, 2013; original Spanish ed. 2004).

<sup>75</sup> When Pedro arrived, the university was called the University of the Friendship of Peoples. A year later, it was renamed Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in honor of the Congolese independence leader Patrice Lumumba, who had recently been assassinated. The vast majority of Cuban students were male, as was the case for students from other Third World countries. Katsakioris, "The Soviet-South Encounter," 164 fn. 65. Irina recalled just three or four Russian men who married Cuban women. Pedro himself came to Moscow with a group of fifteen Cubans, of whom only one was female. Pilar V., who studied at Leningrad's Lomonosov University, was one of the small number of Cuban women who studied in the Soviet Union. In an interview, she explained that the reason Cuban women did not marry Russian men is that "Cuban women were too 'hot' and Russian men were too 'cold.'" Interview with Irina R-R. and Pedro B., February 21, 2012, Havana, Cuba; interview with Pilar V., February 22, 2012, Havana, Cuba. On Lumumba University, see Hessler, "Death of an African Student in Moscow," 35–36. On Cuban (post-Soviet) recollections of Soviet women as "exotic and sexualized" and Soviet men as politically and economically powerful but not sexually so, see Jacqueline Loss, "Persistent Matrioshkas," in Loss and Prieto, *Caviar with Rum*, 183–196, here 184.

hailing from “the island of freedom.”<sup>76</sup> Soviet authorities felt otherwise. Friendly relationships were one thing; intimate relations with a foreigner, no matter how admirable he might be, were another. Indeed, one of Irina’s tasks as a Komsomol member had been to discourage marriages between Soviet citizens and foreigners. The Khrushchev era differed from the Stalinist years, however; although Irina’s department threatened her with expulsion, others facilitated her staying, and she and Pedro were married in 1962. Private emotions were more tolerable than they had once been, even when they involved the foreign.

For some women, desire for a specific Cuban man was impossible to separate from the larger possibility for change that he, and implicitly Cuba as a whole, embodied. “I fell in love with the Cuban Revolution and wanted to see it with my own eyes,” one Russian woman said when explaining her own marriage and subsequent move to Cuba.<sup>77</sup> In Cuba, Zoia Barash remembered, it was young people, “beautiful people,” people with beards, who were in charge of the government. “All [Soviet] women wanted to marry Cuban men,” she concluded.<sup>78</sup> Castro, in particular, was a “god” to Russian women; he was “handsome” and well-spoken.<sup>79</sup> Natalia Yolshina concurred: “Cuba! Oh, we loved Cuba! Because Fidel was a national hero; he was handsome, with a beard, and quite the orator.”<sup>80</sup> For some in the USSR, as elsewhere, the romance of the Cuban Revolution was closely tied to the physical magnetism of Fidel Castro.<sup>81</sup>

So, too, if differently, for men. Castro, Gosse argues, was a powerfully transgressive figure in late-1950s America. He was, on the one hand, “a big, physically powerful person” dressed in military clothing. “Yet—and it is hard to convey the force of this in 1950s America—he had a beard. And not just a small goatee, like an Italian count or a beatnik painter in the movies, but a thick untrimmed mass, worn as an explicit pledge of faith rather than a stylistic gesture: to abjure shaving until Batista was overthrown.”<sup>82</sup> In the Cold War Soviet Union, as in Cold War America, excessive hair was frowned upon. Lenin’s goatee had been neatly trimmed; it was Russian orthodox priests who had long, untrimmed hair and beards.<sup>83</sup> Among North American youth, Castro’s beard linked the Cuban Revolution “with a generationally

<sup>76</sup> Interview with Irina R-R. and Pedro B.

<sup>77</sup> Interview with Zoia Barash. This is not a statement from Barash herself but from a neighbor.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid. Barash used the term “Russian,” as is common for Cubans when speaking of the people who lived in the Soviet Union or, indeed, the Soviet bloc. Cuba also had a different kind of advantage for Barash. In contrast to the USSR, where she had experienced antisemitism, in Cuba no one recognized that she was Jewish or discriminated against her because of it.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Natalya Yolshina as cited in Raleigh, *Soviet Baby Boomers*, 151.

<sup>81</sup> Reflecting on his travels around Cuba in the early 1960s, French journalist Victor Franco insisted that the same was true for Cuban women: “Sitting there in front of the television set in *Centro Vasco*, [the young Cuban woman] Anita had eyes and ears for nobody but Fidel. I was forced to admit that Anita was in love with Fidel Castro . . . On television, Fidel plays the role of a young lover planning the future with his fiancée.” Franco, *The Morning After: A French Journalist’s Impressions of Cuba under Castro*, trans. Ivan Kats and Philip Pendered (New York, 1963), 45–46.

<sup>82</sup> Van Gosse, “‘We Are All Highly Adventurous’: Fidel Castro and the Romance of the White Guerrilla, 1957–1958,” in Christian G. Appy, ed., *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945–1966* (Amherst, Mass., 2000), 238–256, here 250.

<sup>83</sup> “The communist regime shared the distaste of Peter the Great for the beard,” Harrison Salisbury writes. Salisbury, *A New Russia?* (1962; repr., New York, 1975), 21.





FIGURE 2: Castro receiving a warm greeting from women in Murmansk, 1963. *Viva Cuba!* (Moscow, 1963), photo essay between pages 19 and 20.

inspired insouciance in defiance of convention.”<sup>84</sup> This was also true in the Soviet Union, where the alliance with Castro “brought back the beard.” Komsomol enthusiasts sometimes anxiously tried to force young men with “Castro” beards to shave them off. “The urgent recommendation of Young Communists for use of a razor and lather met the insurmountable argument: ‘Sorry, but Fidel Castro is my hero. Surely, you do not want to give offense to our Cuban comrade.’”<sup>85</sup>

Cuban revolutionary virility, beards and all, was on frequent display in Soviet newspapers, travel accounts, and photo essays, a replication of what was being promoted in Cuba’s own press. In both Cuba and the USSR, Castro, Che Guevara, and scores of anonymous youthful Cuban revolutionaries were pictured with bristling black beards, berets, and machine guns.<sup>86</sup> The hypermasculinity of Cuban revolutionary leaders has been of particular interest to historians of Cuba for the ways in which it bears on the regime’s hostility to homosexuality.<sup>87</sup> The meaning for Soviet viewers may have been different than it was for Cubans themselves, however. The take-home messages of these youthful, macho images may have made some Soviet

<sup>84</sup> Gosse, “‘We Are All Highly Adventurous,’” 249–250.

<sup>85</sup> Salisbury, *A New Russia?*, 21–22, 57. Another influential beard was that of Ernest Hemingway, who was closely associated with Cuba and also hugely popular among Soviet intellectuals in the early 1960s. Zubok, *Zhivago’s Children*, 174–175; Vail’ and Genis, 60–e, 52–66.

<sup>86</sup> Volodkin and Smirnov, *Kuba 1961*, 28; V. A. Kuzmishev, *Kuba* (Moscow, 1961).

<sup>87</sup> Lillian Guerra, *Visions of Power in Cuba: Revolution, Redemption, and Resistance, 1959–1971* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2012), 245–255; Ian Lumsden, *Machos, Maricones, and Gays: Cuba and Homosexuality* (Philadelphia, 1996).



FIGURE 3: A 1963 celebration of Soviet-Cuban relations held in Moscow's Lenin Stadium. *¡Viva Cuba!* (Moscow, 1963), photo essay between pages 88 and 89.

viewers question Soviet authority, much as the Cuban Revolution itself could do. They were evidence of Soviet-Cuban friendship, but they also reinforced how desperately middle-aged and un-hip the Soviet authorities were. The photo essay *Cuba 1961* (*Kuba 1961*) opened with an image of a smiling, balding, middle-aged Nikita Khrushchev, embracing (as if holding on to a lifeline) a tall, bearded, youthfully glowing Fidel Castro.<sup>88</sup> In a photo taken at the 1963 celebration of Soviet-Cuban relations in Moscow's Lenin Stadium, portly, poorly dressed Soviet leaders in business shirts stand next to a vibrant, young Castro dressed in military fatigues.<sup>89</sup>

Implicit in this contrast between Khrushchev and Castro was a problem inherent to all revolutions: they age. With maturity come the challenges of rule, of state formation, of the practicalities of health care, education, and foreign policy. With aging can also come rigidity, an urge to conserve rather than reform, and disillusionment. The Soviet Union's valuing of age over youthful enthusiasm, and its disjunction in this respect with Cuban sensibilities in the 1960s, was evident in the types of people it sent to teach and work in Cuba. When Soviet citizens first came to Cuba, many Cubans were curious, some sympathetic, and others vehemently opposed to the socialism they promoted. João Gonçalves has explored the controversies accompanying the first significant Cuban experience with Soviet culture and people at the

<sup>88</sup> Volodkin and Smirnov, *Kuba 1961*, 6.

<sup>89</sup> *¡Viva Cuba!*, photo essay between pages 88 and 89. In Cuba, kindergarten and elementary school students were "taught to answer a series of questions, call and response style: 'Who is your father?' teachers asked. 'Fidel,' young students chanted in reply. 'Who is your grandfather?' 'Nikita.'" Bradford, "La Niña Adorada del Mundo Socialista."



February 1960 Soviet Scientific, Technical, and Cultural Exposition in Havana. Accompanying the exhibition were "ninety experts that worked on the installation of the exhibits and . . . fifty-seven officials, security personnel, journalists, interpreters, flight crew, and artists that came for the dedication ceremony."<sup>90</sup> Soviet engineers, teachers, and military experts often (if not always) worked and lived separately from Cubans in a formal relationship that, ironically, resembled that between U.S. advisors, investors, and visitors in the Batista era.<sup>91</sup> The Soviet Union missed an opportunity, Cuban filmmaker Enrique Pineda Barnet suggested in a recent interview, when it sent stiff military advisors, officials, and engineers to Cuba, rather than young enthusiasts to whom Cuban revolutionaries might have related better.<sup>92</sup> Barnet's memories may be influenced by what Soviet advisors were like in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as by his own disappointment with the failed promises of the Cuban-Soviet relationship; several hundred Soviet citizens of Spanish origin (dubbed *Hispanosoviéticos* by Che) traveled to Cuba in the early 1960s, for example, recruited because of their fluency in Spanish and their ability, thereby, to connect with Cubans.<sup>93</sup> The history of Soviet specialists, teachers, and students in Cuba (and of Cubans in the Soviet Union) has yet to be written. Still, in large part, the Soviet regime emphasized sending trained specialists to teach in Cuba, while Cuba was sending students to be trained in the USSR.<sup>94</sup> The Soviets hesitated to take full advantage of what Doris Sommer has called "an erotics of politics," by which romantic passion is used by those in power to conquer and woo "through mutual interest, or 'love,' rather than through coercion."<sup>95</sup> Instead, it was Cuba, the supposed junior in the relationship, who enticed and bewitched. Attracted, but also anxious, Soviet authorities tried to keep passion within bounds both familiar and acceptable. Love Cuba for all her youthful enthusiasm and beauty, Soviet citizens were instructed, but remember that youth requires a steady hand and careful instruction, something the USSR was uniquely positioned to provide.

<sup>90</sup> Gonçalves, "Sputnik Premiers in Havana," 85.

<sup>91</sup> By the 1970s and 1980s, "as many as seven thousand Soviet advisors worked in Cuba," according to Pérez, *Cuba*, 356. See also John Andrew Gustavsen, "Tension under the Sun: Tourism and Identity in Cuba, 1945–2007" (Ph.D. diss., University of Miami, 2009), 337; interview with Enrique Colina, Havana, Cuba, February 18, 2012. Many lived, beginning in the 1970s, in a Soviet-style housing project to the east of Havana called Alamar.

<sup>92</sup> Interview with Enrique Pineda Barnet, Havana, Cuba, February 23, 2012. The ambiguous legacy of the Soviet Union is evident in a documentary about Cuban attitudes toward the Soviet Union, *Los bolos en Cuba y una eterna amistad* (dir. Enrique Colina, RFO/Canal Overseas Productions, 2011). (The film is also sometimes titled *Los rosos en Cuba*.) As described by Colina in an interview, "los bolos" is a Cuban slang term for Russians, implying a sturdy, coarse roughness like a bowling pin.

<sup>93</sup> Young, "To Russia with 'Spain,'" 396, 417. Similarly, in the summer of 1961, 300 recent Soviet university graduates were working in Cuban fields, factories, and universities, where they helped set up engineering and medical programs. Zubok, *Zhivago's Children*, 119.

<sup>94</sup> In August 1962, a large group of Soviet engineers arrived in Havana, where they were received by, among others, Che Guevara, then the minister of industry. A few days after they arrived, the ship that had brought them set sail again, with Cuban youth bound for the Soviet Union to study agricultural administration and mechanization. "Soviet Technicians Arrive in Cuba," August 7, 1962, National Security Archive, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, 00261.

<sup>95</sup> Doris Sommer, *Foundational Fictions: The National Romances of Latin America* (Berkeley, Calif., 1991), 6.

CUBA WAS OSTENSIBLY AN IMPOVERISHED Third World country, but it was also a land of sun and sand with a long legacy of serving as America's sexual playground. Revolution in the tropics proved a titillating and sometimes challenging combination. Cuba promised something new in an era of Cold War competition over the "good life": an enticing, highly gendered blending of socialist revolution and tropical beaches. A 1961 illustrated volume about Cuba included what might be considered a "revolutionary centerfold." In a book in which the vast majority of the images are of men, two pages feature women dressed in army fatigues carrying rifles. These women are, as with so much about Cuba, both object and subject. They are the object of the male gaze, with tight belts emphasizing their womanly silhouettes and dark hair flowing from underneath military caps. But they are also subjects: tough and non-smiling, they stare directly at the viewer.<sup>96</sup> This was consistent with Cuban ideals for the new revolutionary woman, who, as Lillian Guerra has argued, was "a Cuban-style Barbie loaded down with books, broom, toys, rifle, and machete who preferred the *campo* to the *cama* (bed)."<sup>97</sup>

The opening issue of the magazine *Kuba*, which was written and photographed in Cuba but published in the USSR under the auspices of the Soviet-Cuban Friendship Society, explored a different kind of Cuban ideal, focusing on the sexual attractions of the Cuban experience. It included a photo shoot of a bikini-clad model with a flowered hat lounging on a hammock near a thatched hut, water in the near distance. "Tourists come here," the text reads in an echo of the recent pre-revolutionary past.<sup>98</sup> Cuba offered *socialist* eroticism as emblemized by the sensuous, but now socialist, bikini-clad Cuban woman.<sup>99</sup> This was a new version of a literary and historical imagining that has long conceived of the southern tropics as a "distinct moral universe," a universe for which, as Richard Parker has argued in *Beneath the Equator*, sexuality has typically been seen as "a fundamental marker of difference."<sup>100</sup> "Beneath the equator, sin does not exist," the Dutch historian Gaspar von Barlaeus famously asserted upon his return home from Brazil in the seventeenth century.<sup>101</sup>

The "socialist" nature of Cuban eroticism could be hard to determine, however. It was in the realm of sexuality, as well as in expectations and experiences concerning race, that Cuba's emotional norms differed most visibly from Soviet values and modes of expression. The Soviet body was portrayed in print, photographs, film, and art as disciplined, physically fit, and abstemious, not hedonistic or sexual.<sup>102</sup> The Soviet regime's uncertainty about Cuban norms was evident in how sex and sun were

<sup>96</sup> Kuzmishev, *Kuba*, 38–39. See also V. Ivanov, "Na revoliutsionnoi Kube," *Iskusstvo* 8 (1961): 1; and Volodkin and Smirnov, *Kuba 1961*, 32. *Geroicheskii ostrov* softened the transgressive impact of female combatants by telling readers that the women it showed marching in military uniforms were teacher participants in the people's militia. *Geroicheskii ostrov*, 72.

<sup>97</sup> Guerra, *Visions of Power in Cuba*, 243.

<sup>98</sup> Florensii Nova, "Guama: Krasoty kuby mody," *Kuba* 1 (September 1964): 16–24.

<sup>99</sup> On this topic in another context, see Jennifer Ruth Hosek, *Sun, Sex and Socialism: Cuba in the German Imaginary* (Toronto, 2012); and Crowley and Reid, *Pleasures in Socialism*.

<sup>100</sup> Richard Parker, *Beneath the Equator: Cultures of Desire, Male Homosexuality, and Emerging Gay Communities in Brazil* (New York, 1999), 1.

<sup>101</sup> As cited *ibid.*, 1.

<sup>102</sup> Zubok, *Zhivago's Children*, 109. See also Tricia Starks, *The Body Soviet: Propaganda, Hygiene, and the Revolutionary State* (Madison, Wis., 2008); Emma Widdis, *Visions of a New Land: Soviet Film from the Revolution to the Second World War* (New Haven, Conn., 2003).





Удобно расположиться в гамаке, естественных  
изюминках ландшафта, овеянная демонстрацией мо-  
дели знаменитых костюмов.



[KUBA] 21

FIGURE 4: Socialist eroticism in post-revolutionary Cuba. *Cuba* 1 (September 1964): 21.

depicted on television and in film. In contrast to photos of bikini-clad women in the magazine *Kuba*, cinematographic images of a steamy, sexual Cuba were more often depictions of Cuba's pre-revolutionary heritage. *The Cuban Story* (*Kubinskaia novella*), a 1962 Soviet television drama, begins with decadent images of Batista's Cuba, including a nightclub, scantily dressed dancers atop a parade float, and women in elegant close-fitting dresses strolling the streets.<sup>103</sup> Similarly, in one of the most famous scenes from the joint Cuban-Soviet film *I Am Cuba*, the camera descends in a long traveling shot from an opening rooftop image of sensuous bikini-clad women competing in a beauty contest to a scene of privileged guests sipping cocktails and taking photographs, to conclude with the camera diving into a swimming pool. All

<sup>103</sup> *The Cuban Story* [*Kubinskaia novella*] (dir. Sergei Kolosov, 1962).

of it is accompanied by swinging pop music. These images of the decadent eroticism of the tourist experience in Batista-era Cuba are meant to be anti-American. At the same time, they are undeniably attractive. As Denis Dordos and Amy Heller observe, “the film explores (perhaps a bit too enthusiastically for the prescribed purposes of the film) the seductive, decadent (and marvelously photogenic) world of Batista’s Cuba.”<sup>104</sup> This did not go unnoticed by Soviet authorities. *I Am Cuba* was panned in Moscow because it portrayed images of the decadent eroticism of Batista-era Cuba that authorities did not want shown on Soviet screens.<sup>105</sup> Contradictorily, however, the magazine *Kuba*, which bore the imprimatur of the Soviet-Cuban Friendship Society, persisted in its sexualized depictions of socialist Cuba. The April 1965 issue included a story about Carnival, a time when “all of Cuba enjoys itself.” This “contest of beauty” was made more “Soviet” by mention of the participation of “trade unions and social organizations,” but Moscow never saw the likes of bathing suit-clad female pirates on a three-masted float or an Afro-Cuban man in drag wearing a long dress, a cigar clenched firmly between his teeth.<sup>106</sup>

In his remembrances about the making of *I Am Cuba*, Carlos Fariñas, the film’s composer, made a connection between the movie and the real-life experiences of the Soviet filmmakers in Cuba: “At that moment the Soviets discovered in Cuba what was left of the capitalism they never knew. Seeing a luxury hotel, with those beautiful girls in the pool, was a type of tropical erotic pleasure.”<sup>107</sup> The Soviet co-author of the script, Evgenii Evtushenko, discussed his genuine enthusiasm for the Cuban Revolution, and also admitted how often he himself visited Cuban nightclubs and drank Cuban cocktails while writing.<sup>108</sup> Sexual relationships with Cubans were forbidden by Soviet authorities.<sup>109</sup> Public expressions of enthusiasm for Cuba were to be encouraged, but private interests, especially sexual attractions, could not be allowed to take precedence, the regime demanding (if not always receiving) an emotional commitment to the Soviet collective. This was especially true in the case of prostitution. In the Soviet Union, sex outside of marriage was condemned as harmful for the individual and for society, said to distract people from productive activity on behalf of the Soviet project. For the most part, little was done within the USSR to forcibly enforce these sexual standards. But citizens who traveled internationally in pursuit of sexual adventure, be they visiting Cuba or Western Europe, did so in explicit opposition to Soviet norms and instructions.<sup>110</sup> Cuban authorities were themselves working to put an end to prostitution, which was outlawed in 1961.<sup>111</sup> Still,

<sup>104</sup> Dennis Dordos and Amy Heller, “I Am Cuba: The True Story,” booklet included in *I Am Cuba: The Ultimate Edition*.

<sup>105</sup> Interview in *O mamute siberiano*.

<sup>106</sup> Vernardo Kal’ekhas, “Karnavala,” *Kuba* 8 (April 1965): 4–7. For more on trade unions and the Cuban Carnival, see Iu. Pogoso, “Kogda tantsuet vsia Gavana,” *Vokrug sveta*, May 1963, 14–17. Less erotic, but still exotic, images included the ever-present beach with palm trees; A. Sofronov, “V Gavane u družei,” *Ogonek* 9 (February 27, 1966): between pages 16 and 17.

<sup>107</sup> Interview in *O mamute siberiano*.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Interview with Colina.

<sup>110</sup> On views on prostitution in the USSR, see Deborah A. Field, *Private Life and Communist Morality in Khrushchev’s Russia* (New York, 2007), 52–54. On domestic travel within the Soviet Union and sexual attitudes, see Diane P. Koenker, *Club Red: Vacation Travel and the Soviet Union* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2013), 202–203. On international travel and prostitution, see Gorsuch, *All This Is Your World*, 152–155.

<sup>111</sup> Oscar Lewis, Ruth M. Lewis, and Susan M. Rigdon, “The ‘Rehabilitation’ of Prostitutes,” in Aviva



while hundreds of brothels were closed, "in 1964, at least one brothel remained in Havana. Located in Habana Vieja [Old Havana], it was reserved for Russians."<sup>112</sup>

The racialized Cuban body was also on display in the Soviet Union. A 1961 photo album focused on Afro-Cubans as particular victims of American imperialism.<sup>113</sup> The impoverished black body was also sometimes sexualized, as in a *Kuba* magazine photo of Luce Maria, a long-legged Afro-Cuban contemporary dancer who posed in front of tin-roofed shantytown houses.<sup>114</sup> In this image, the eroticization of Afro-Cuban women ricocheted from the Third World to the Second: Luce Maria appears to have been posing as if for the Western male gaze, in a posture emblematic of the sexualization of Afro-Cuban women in colonial and American-dominated Cuba.<sup>115</sup> Her image was transmitted from Cuba to the Soviet Union via a magazine photographed and written in Cuba and published in the USSR, a country with no indigenous black population and little tradition to that point of the sexualization of blacks found elsewhere.<sup>116</sup> As such, a *Kuba* magazine photomontage of whites and blacks dancing together with evident abandon may have titillated Soviet viewers, but it also would have challenged many of them.<sup>117</sup> Soviet citizens were taught to object to the evils of American racism: by definition, only imperialists could be racists, not good Soviet citizens. They often persisted in their own deeply held racist beliefs when confronted with visiting Afro-Cubans and Africans at home or when traveling abroad, however. Race, of course, has long been a part of the exoticization, eroticization, and disciplining of the Third World by the First World, but also, as it turns out, of the Third World by the Second. "Less cultured people," Irina and Pedro reported in an interview, were interested in black Cuban students but quite "cautious."<sup>118</sup> Rokitiński, whose diary entries suggested a devotion to proletarian internationalism, described the black body in highly racialized terms. A four-year-old girl with her "hair gathered in two tiny braids behind and one in front" is said to look like a "small, cute animal." Blacks are described as "very far from European norms of beauty, but very picturesque and sculptural." And in a comparison to another

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Chomsky, Barry Carr, and Pamela Maria Smorkaloff, eds., *The Cuba Reader: History, Culture, Politics* (Durham, N.C., 2003), 395–398, here 395.

<sup>112</sup> Gustavsen, "Tension under the Sun," 188–189.

<sup>113</sup> Volodkin and Smirnov, *Kuba 1961*, 42, 44, 50; Borovik, "Kuba vstrechaet rassvet," 30–32. Descriptions of endemic racism were not incorrect, of course. Afro-Cubans were disproportionately undereducated and unemployed in Batista's Cuba. Legal discrimination was abolished in the 1940 constitution even as racism persisted. Alejandra Bronfman, *Measures of Equality: Social Science, Citizenship, and Race in Cuba, 1902–1940* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2004).

<sup>114</sup> *Kuba*, February 1967, inside back cover.

<sup>115</sup> Kamala Kempadoo, "Continuities and Change: Five Centuries of Prostitution in the Caribbean," in Kempadoo, ed., *Sun, Sex, and Gold: Tourism and Sex Work in the Caribbean* (Lanham, Md., 1999), 3–34, here 12–13. Rosalie Schwartz reminds us that Cuban men contributed to the eroticization of Afro-Cuban women; Schwartz, *Pleasure Island: Tourism and Temptation in Cuba* (Lincoln, Neb., 1997), 86.

<sup>116</sup> On Soviet "blacks," namely internal immigrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus to Moscow and Leningrad, see Jeff Sahadeo, "Soviet 'Blacks' and Place Making in Leningrad and Moscow," *Slavic Review* 71, no. 2 (2012): 331–358. My thanks to Alexey Golubev for his discussions with me about a "colonial boomerang."

<sup>117</sup> "Pel'bo Afrokan sozdatel' Mosambike," *Kuba* 9 (September 1965): n.p.

<sup>118</sup> Interview with Irina R-R. and Pedro B.; on Soviet racism toward black Africans, see Hessler, "Death of an African Student in Moscow." On the same, plus aggression toward other Third World students, including those from Latin America, see Katsakioris, "The Soviet-South Encounter," 154–156.

group whose minority status was often inscribed on their bodies, Rokitiński writes: “Strong, tall blacks are rare. They are often lanky, slightly awkward, thin. In their appearance, many resemble Jews.”<sup>119</sup> Rokitiński knew enough to be somewhat uncomfortable with his observations. He admitted in his diary that his description of the four-year-old might be an “inappropriate comparison,” but his justification for this analogy only underscores his racist perspective: “I need to make the proviso somehow that I love animals and that from ‘my lips’ this comparison is not supposed to sound insulting,” he uncomfortably concludes.<sup>120</sup>

The Cuban body, especially the black one, is where Cuba as Third World object of Soviet verbal and visual power was particularly evident. Cuba’s sometime portrayal as the “adored child” of the socialist world resonated, according to Anita Casavantes Bradford, with long-held North American beliefs that “Cubans’ racial inferiority and political immaturity left them ill-equipped for independence.”<sup>121</sup> Similarly, the Soviet presentation of Cuba as part of the developing world—and as a country in special need of Soviet assistance—relied on gender, but most often on blackness as a shorthand for poverty and the need for intervention. A telling example is a small ceramic figurine produced in the USSR of a tall, hearty white Soviet citizen with his arm around a shorter, more tentative Afro-Cuban. The Soviet man, in his jaunty red cap, proudly carries a book reading “USSR.” The Cuban man, in contrast, looks down and to the side. The “Cuba” book that he carries is in a weakened position, held lower and at an angle, subservient, as Cuba itself was supposed to be, to the power and confident expertise of the USSR.<sup>122</sup> Still, Cuba—both white and black—held a particular place, and one different from Africa’s, in the Soviet imagination of the Third World, in part because of the Caribbean pleasures of sun, sand, and sex. For some Soviet citizens, the Cuban model may have offered a passionate escape from a Soviet straitjacket.

ROMANCE DESCRIBES THE EARLY STAGES of falling in love, sometimes, as in this case, at a distance and in an idealized form. By the late 1960s, however, the Soviet-Cuban relationship might instead be thought of as a “marriage,” if a polygamous one given the Soviet regime’s relationships with other Third World countries and clients. Marriage meant moving in and establishing longer-term knowledge of each other. In contrast to North American and Western European “revolutionary tourists,” who were free to move from one revolutionary hotspot to another—Cuba followed by China, China by the Prague Spring—the Soviet-Cuban relationship was predicated on a long-term commitment. This was a marriage, not a short-term fling, and it had all of the attendant challenges and too few, some might say, of the pleasures. In the early 1960s, Cuba was the favored wife; by the end of the decade, she was just one among many, including India, Peru, and Algeria.

Soviet metaphors, and experiences, of romance and marriage were deeply intertwined with politics. The USSR was not unique in this: Nancy Cott has explored

<sup>119</sup> Rokitiński diary, entries 3291, 3339, 3338.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., entry 3291.

<sup>121</sup> Bradford, “*La Niña Adorada del Mundo Socialista*.”

<sup>122</sup> This figurine, ca. early 1970s, is in the author’s possession.





FIGURE 5: The Soviet presentation of Cuba as part of the developing world—and as a country in special need of Soviet assistance—relied on blackness as a shorthand for poverty and the need for intervention.

the political history of American marriages, Doris Sommer the mutual interdependence of heterosexual passion and patriotism in Latin America, and Elizabeth Povinelli the operation of normative ideas about love and intimacy in liberalism.<sup>123</sup> Soviet romantic enthusiasm for Cuba, combined with ideological and economic support, was supposed to make the USSR, both at home and abroad, appear to be a modern, passionately revolutionary, and at the same time stable elder statesman. Cuban agency challenged this relationship, however. It takes two to divorce, and Cuba was also tiring of the relationship. Cuba was a Third World object of superior Soviet attention and direction, but also an independent agent forging a Cuban-specific path

<sup>123</sup> Nancy F. Cott, *Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation* (Cambridge, Mass., 2002); Sommer, *Foundational Fictions*; Elizabeth A. Povinelli, *The Empire of Love: Toward a Theory of Intimacy, Genealogy, and Carnality* (Durham, N.C., 2006). Key interventions on intimacy and the transnational also have been made by Ann Stoler, including the influential "Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison in North American History and (Post) Colonial Studies," *Journal of American History* 88, no. 3 (2001): 829–865.

to revolutionary modernism. "We're no one's satellite and never will be," Castro proclaimed in March 1965.<sup>124</sup> Indeed, for radical "Third-Worldists" in Western Europe, it was Cuba that was the ideal, not the Soviet Union. West German activists, among others, saw Cuba as an alternative to the authoritarian conformity of the Soviet bloc: an improvised and non-bureaucratic expression of "communism without a party."<sup>125</sup> Within the USSR, however, one of the seeming values of revolutionary Cuba for the Soviet intelligentsia was that it served as a mirror, reflecting the Soviet Union as they wished it might be. Did the Cuban example also provide a more pointed, anti-Soviet, alternative for intellectuals disappointed in Soviet-style socialism? More work remains to be done. A promising place to look further is at Soviet universities. Julie Hessler argues that African students' protests against Soviet racism in Moscow in the early 1960s "helped to broaden Soviet university students' horizons," even as she concludes that moments of activity were largely subsumed "to a humdrum social and cultural polarization" in which Soviet and foreign students "largely went their separate ways."<sup>126</sup> Arne Westad discusses a group of Soviet advisors and academics who in the late 1960s were disappointed by the conservatism of the Brezhnev era and advocated for a more activist Third World policy.<sup>127</sup> The challenges to the status quo, such as they were, came from the intelligentsia and were directed at the leadership rather than at the population as a whole. This is suggestive of the fundamental conservatism of the Soviet sixties, in contrast to the wholehearted youthful challenge to authority that we see in the United States and Western Europe.<sup>128</sup> Beyond the world of the Soviet intellectual, the Soviet regime appears to have successfully combined official support for Third World opposition with the repression of significant popular opposition at home.<sup>129</sup>

Official enthusiasm for Cuba decreased over the 1960s. There was a steady decline after 1962 in the number of articles about Cuba published in *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*, coinciding with Cuba's relationship with China in the 1960s and Cuba's independent actions in Africa.<sup>130</sup> Passionate enthusiasm was downgraded to the cooler, safer, and more familiar relationship of "friendship." The language of "friendship" was a common discursive construct used to describe Soviet relationships with allies and, through the guise of "friendship societies," with pro-Soviet groups in otherwise hostile nations; it implied a cordial but reserved relationship based on cultural exchange and economic and political need.<sup>131</sup> The Soviet-Cuban Friendship Society

<sup>124</sup> Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2002), 104.

<sup>125</sup> Quinn Slobodian, *Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany* (Durham, N.C., 2012), 4, 57.

<sup>126</sup> Hessler, "Death of an African Student in Moscow," 60, 62.

<sup>127</sup> Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 202–206. Hungarian György Pór has similarly been described as an example of an opponent of Hungarian reform socialism who was inspired to greater militancy by Third World radicalism. Gildea, Mark, and Pas, "European Radicals and the 'Third World,'" 452–453.

<sup>128</sup> As Boris Kagarlitsky has argued, "The Soviet intelligentsia constantly criticized [the] leadership. But that same leadership was supposed to become their main audience . . . The movement was essentially elitist. The 'best minds' spoke and the rest listened." Kagarlitsky, "1960s East and West," 98, 99.

<sup>129</sup> There is no mention of Cuba as an alternative model in Vladimir A. Kozlov, Sheila Fitzpatrick, and Sergei V. Mironenko, eds., *Sedition: Everyday Resistance in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and Brezhnev* (New Haven, Conn., 2011).

<sup>130</sup> There were 577 articles in 1964, a nadir of 113 in 1968, and a gradual increase only in the 1970s, when Soviet-Cuban relations re-stabilized. Lévesque, *The USSR and the Cuban Revolution*, 203.

<sup>131</sup> On the establishment of friendship societies beginning in the 1920s, see Michael David-Fox, *Show-*



was established in 1964, suggestive, perhaps, of the increasing formality of the relationship, even as, in testament to the importance of Cuba, one of the Soviet Union's most famous public figures, cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, was made the society's president.<sup>132</sup>

The challenges to the Soviet-Cuban romance in the late 1960s were not only geopolitical. The official language used to describe the Cuban Revolution—that of the heroic leader, worker, soldier, and peasant—while powerfully evocative of the Russian Revolution, was not that of a "modern" and mature Soviet Union, whose citizens were now being promised televisions and refrigerators, not revolution.<sup>133</sup> Soviet economic subsidies of Cuba, including the purchase of Cuban sugar at a cost well above its value on the world market, were a steep price to pay for shortages at home in support of an increasingly intransigent and impoverished island in a distant Caribbean Sea.<sup>134</sup> In the very early 1960s, Cuba had held a unique place in the pantheon of Third World countries as a tropical island of liberty that had things to teach the Soviet Union as well as to learn from it. Gradually, for many, Cuba became one more Third World country that the USSR supported at the expense of people at home. As a subversive poem from the mid-1960s read:

Then Nikita started to fly like a bird  
Around foreign countries  
And wherever he went, he gave a gift:  
So-and-so would get a palace,  
Another a little factory,  
Here they got wheat, there a little steamship—  
Thus he robbed his own people  
So that all this other rabble could eat.<sup>135</sup>

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*casing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921–1941* (New York, 2012), chap. 2.

<sup>132</sup> Letters to the Soviet-Cuban Friendship Society in the mid-1960s remained, unsurprisingly, enthusiastic about Cuba. Ekaterina Gorokhovtseva served as the "Russian mama" of a group of Cuban students living in Uzbekistan from 1961 through 1963. In a 1965 letter, Gorokhovtseva included local newspaper clippings describing her work with Cuban youth, a photo of herself holding the book *Viva Cuba!*, and copies of letters to "Our Dear Mama Katia" from young Cubans who had returned home. Other letters were more expedient. "Like all my comrades, I would like to visit Cuba," petitioned one man hoping to find work in Cuba as a "Soviet specialist" in 1964. Letters to the Friendship Society suggest that asking to travel to Cuba was an acceptable, if not oft-fulfilled, request for young people eager for a view of the world beyond Soviet borders. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, f. 9576, op. 10, d. 39, l. 136 (letter to Friendship Society, 1964); ll. 166–180 (letter, news clippings, and photos sent to Friendship Society, 1965); d. 40, l. 96 (letter to Friendship Society, 1964); l. 46 (letters to Friendship Society, 1964).

<sup>133</sup> Susan E. Reid, "This Is Tomorrow! Becoming a Consumer in the Soviet Sixties," in Gorsuch and Koenker, *The Socialist Sixties*, 25–65; Crowley and Reid, *Pleasures in Socialism*.

<sup>134</sup> Cuban sugar was purchased in amounts well beyond what Soviet citizens needed. Beginning in 1961, and increasing significantly in the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Union replaced the United States as the major purchaser of Cuban sugar exports. Deficit outweighed profit, and as of 1990, Cuba owed 15.5 billion rubles to the USSR. Marifeli Pérez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy* (New York, 1993), 89; Jorge Perez-Lopez Jr., *The Economics of Cuban Sugar* (Pittsburgh, 1991), chap. 9.

<sup>135</sup> Kozlov, Fitzpatrick, and Mironenko, *Sedition*, 19. On mutual disenchantment between Soviet officials and citizens and Third World African and Arab activists, intellectuals, and students in the 1960s, see Katsakioris, "The Soviet-South Encounter."

"Only place outside the Soviet Union I've been is Cuba," a truck driver told Alex Shishin in the late 1970s. "Didn't like it. People I worked with were lazy. Those Negroes danced and sang all day. When it came feeding time, they'd open up their mugs and say, 'Give me.' When I work, I work hard. Only after putting in a good day's work do I expect people to feed me."<sup>136</sup> A satirical version of "Cuba, My Love" reflected this changing perspective: "Cuba, give back our bread / Cuba, take back your sugar / We're fed up with bearded Fidel / Cuba, go fuck yourself [*poshla ty na kher*]."<sup>137</sup>

SVETLANA BOYM HAS ARGUED THAT "the twentieth century began with a futuristic utopia and ended with nostalgia." The 1960s were the turning point. "Optimistic belief in the future was discarded like an outmoded spaceship sometime in the 1960s," Boym concludes.<sup>138</sup> Revolutionary Cuba briefly combined the romantically heroic, the ideologically appropriate, and the mysteriously exotic. In the early 1960s, it was a site—both physical and temporal—of nostalgia about a past that did not exist, an imagined, unrealized socialist utopia. Some hoped that this (imagined) past might provide a blueprint for a better Soviet future. But Cuba also contributed to the eroding of optimistic belief. By the late 1960s, disillusionment with Cuba was one of a number of disappointments—culminating in the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968—that marked the end of the Soviet sixties. Cuba represented the youthful passion, communist romanticism, and internationalism of the Khrushchev-era sixties. In contrast, the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev in the late 1960s was about stability, pragmatism, and Russian nationalism, a social and political embracement of aging heralding the end of what Stephen Lovell has called "the road of hopeful socialist progress."<sup>139</sup>

For both Russian and Cuban citizens in the *post*-Soviet world, however, the 1960s continued to resonate. The histories of the two countries were entangled economically, militarily, and ideologically, and remain entangled in memory. For anxious and uncertain post-Soviet citizens nostalgic for the safety and familiarity of (an imagined) childhood, the sixties were (and for some still are) compelling with their dreamlike combination of youthful optimism, collective sensibility, gravity-defying spaceships, and reassuring economic stability.<sup>140</sup> Post-Soviet nostalgia for the 1960s recalls today's North American and European fascination with the popular culture and swing-

<sup>136</sup> Alex Shishin, *Rossiia: Voices from the Brezhnev Era* (New York, 2006), 118. On this point, see also Rokitianski diary, entries 3237, 3253.

<sup>137</sup> Leonid Parfenov, "Kuba—liubov' moia!," in Parfenov, *Namedni: Nasha era, 1961–1970* (Moscow, 2009), 70. That the skepticism of some citizens was not only about Cuba, but about the socialist project at home, was reflected in a contemporary joke:

Q: What will happen after Cuba builds socialism?

A: It will start importing sugar. (Alexeyeva and Goldberg, *The Thaw Generation*, 104)

<sup>138</sup> Svetlana Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia* (New York, 2002), xiv.

<sup>139</sup> Stephen Lovell, "In Search of an Ending: *Seventeen Moments* and the Seventies," in Gorsuch and Koenker, *The Socialist Sixties*, 303–321.

<sup>140</sup> On post-Soviet nostalgia, if not for the sixties in particular, see Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia*; Maya Nadkarni and Olga Shevchenko, "The Politics of Nostalgia: A Case for Comparative Analysis of Post-Socialist Practices," *Ab Imperio* 2 (2004): 487–519; Thomas Lahusen, "Decay or Endurance? The Ruins of Socialism," *Slavic Review* 65, no. 4 (2006): 736–746; Serguei Alex. Oushakine, "'We're nostalgic but we're not crazy': Retrofitting the Past in Russia," *Russian Review* 66, no. 3 (2007): 451–482; and Kevin



ing optimism of the sixties, but with a post-Soviet sensibility more attracted to solidity than to rebellion. Notably, in the former Soviet Union, nostalgia for a now-missing empire was also key, an empire of which Cuba had been an ambiguous part. "The Russian Federation, with its third-rate world status and almost Third-World living standards, is despised and disparaged," Dmitri Trenin wrote in 2002. "No wonder that the remedy that many propose is to become big again. In other words, back to the U.S.S.R., or better still, to the Russian Empire."<sup>141</sup> Post-Soviet nostalgia was bittersweet as hope was largely vanquished.

This nostalgia has its echo in Cuba itself, where some people still reminisce about the Soviet presence there. Some Cubans, Jacqueline Loss argues, have remained nostalgic for Russian literary, visual, and consumer culture—Soviet science fiction, canned meat, household appliances, and cartoons—even as most "simultaneously critique Soviet ideology."<sup>142</sup> A 2006 Cuban documentary film, *They Would All Be Queens* (*Todas iban ser reinas*), explores the relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union through the lens of the personal, specifically the lives of seven Soviet women who married Cuban men in the 1970s and 1980s and left their homes and families in the USSR to move to a new world of tropical heat, sunny beaches, and comparative poverty.<sup>143</sup> There are some similarities with earlier experiences. As Tatiana Zakharova tells the interviewer in the film, after hearing the song "Guantanamo" over and over as a young person in the Soviet Union, she "fell in love, and I thought, one day I must learn that language." Tatiana did more than learn Spanish. She married a visiting Cuban student and returned to live with him in Cuba, much as Barash and others had done decades earlier. The interviews in the film take place against the backdrop of threadbare Cuban apartments, windows open to sunny skies, and busy front stoops. Interspersed with the interviews are photos of a snowy Soviet Union, and of young brides and grooms in wedding photographs. As in the early 1960s, the family photos often reveal what the women leave largely unsaid, namely the place of race in many of the relationships: many of the photos show white women with Afro-Cuban men.

There are differences, too, from the 1960s. In the less happy narratives, it is now the Soviet Union that is described as the land of plenty and Cuba's revolution that has failed. Some women are nostalgic for the Cuba they encountered when they first arrived, a country economically diminished in the 1990s by the challenges resulting from the withdrawal of Soviet support, a "sadder," more "worried" Cuba in the views

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M. F. Platt, "Russian Empire of Pop: Post-Socialist Nostalgia and Soviet Retro at the 'New Wave' Competition," *Russian Review* 72, no. 3 (2013): 447–469.

<sup>141</sup> Dmitri Trenin, *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and Globalization* (New York, 2002), 27–28.

<sup>142</sup> Loss, *Dreaming in Russian*, 201. On Cuban *Ostalgie* for the Soviet Union, see Loss and Prieto, *Caviar with Rum*, especially the essays by Aurora Jácome, "The Muñequitos Rusos Generation," 27–35, and Yoss, "What the Russians Left Behind," trans. Daniel W. Koon, 211–225; and Nora Gámez Torres, "Cubans Finding Comfort, Nostalgia in Russian Products," *Miami Herald*, November 14, 2014, <http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/hialeah/article3936801.html>.

<sup>143</sup> *Todas iban ser reinas* (dir. Gustavo Pérez, 2006). For a discussion of the meaning of the film in Cuba, see Loss, *Dreaming in Russian*, 41–49. A popular contemporary Russian television show reunited a Cuban man and a Russian woman who met in 1987, had a daughter, but broke up when he returned to Cuba alone; "Kuba—liubov' moia," [http://www.1tv.ru/projects\\_edition/si5685/fi26578](http://www.1tv.ru/projects_edition/si5685/fi26578).

of some of these women.<sup>144</sup> The differences between a comparatively wealthy Soviet metropole and a Third World Cuba are evident in the women's descriptions of their first encounters with the island. Some speak with wonder about the beauty of flowers and palm trees, but others talk about the challenges of blackouts and long lines.

*They Would All Be Queens* is an intimate, often bleak testament to the fact that in Cuba, the past has fallen apart and the future is unknown. In the film, love still exists between former Soviet women and their Cuban husbands and children, and between some women and Cuba itself—"I love this land and I love the Cuban people," one exclaims—but this love is personal, not ideological. For most post-Soviet citizens, Cuba itself is now primarily a place for tourists to enjoy the sun and sand; the Cold War political, economic, and military connections have dissolved with the failure of the Soviet socialist project. Still, as in many long-term relationships, nostalgia remains, if now for the evocative familiarity of a country still inhabiting a socialist aesthetic. In this, some post-Soviet tourists ironically now resemble capitalist tourists from the West, who, as described by Esther Whitfield, experience Cuba as an "ideological theme park" in which "the political project of the revolution" is reduced to "knickknacks."<sup>145</sup> When Russian tourists arrive today at Havana's airport—complete with a 1960s-looking departures board and a large mural of an armed revolutionary posing with Russian-built Cuban aircraft—they sometimes launch once again into the old familiar song: "Cuba, My Love."<sup>146</sup>

<sup>144</sup> For the complexities of culture during the "special period," see Esther Whitfield, *Cuban Currency: The Dollar and "Special Period" Fiction* (Minneapolis, 2008); and Ariana Hernandez-Reguant, ed., *Culture in the Special Period: Culture and Ideology in the 1990s* (New York, 2009).

<sup>145</sup> Whitfield, *Cuban Currency*, 28.

<sup>146</sup> Nick Miroff, "In Cuba, Russian Tourists Peer into Soviet Past," May 12, 2010, NPR Morning Edition, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126759796>.

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**Anne E. Gorsuch** is Professor of History at the University of British Columbia. She is the author of *Youth in Revolutionary Russia: Enthusiasts, Bohemians, and Delinquents* (Indiana University Press, 2000) and *All This Is Your World: Soviet Tourism at Home and Abroad after Stalin* (Oxford University Press, 2011). She is also the co-editor (with Diane P. Koenker) of two volumes, *Turizm: The Russian and East European Tourist under Capitalism and Socialism* (Cornell University Press, 2006) and *The Socialist Sixties: Crossing Borders in the Second World* (Indiana University Press, 2013). She is currently working on two related projects: a history of the Soviet Sixties and a cultural history of the relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba.



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*AHR Exchange*  
**On *The History Manifesto***

Introduction

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Exceptions prove rules. Normally the *AHR* only publishes articles that have undergone a rigorous peer-review process. Normally books are considered only in the book review section, and according to explicit guidelines for reviewing protocol. And normally this scholarly journal does not provide a platform for views of a polemical nature or those currently being mooted in more public venues.

But there is much that is exceptional about *The History Manifesto*: the way its authors, David Armitage and Jo Guldi, have made use of social media and other outlets to publicize the book and disseminate their critique; the clarity, timeliness, and passion of their challenge to today's historians; the conditions of the book's release by Cambridge University Press as an open-access publication; the sheer volume of discussion the book has provoked in the press and on the web; and the range of reactions among historians to their manifesto, many of them quite positive, and others, as exemplified in this Exchange by the strongly worded essay by Deborah Cohen and Peter Mandler, decidedly negative. Accordingly, the Editor accepted Cohen and Mandler's offer to submit a critique of *The History Manifesto* to be published in the context of an *AHR* Exchange, which would include a response from its authors.

Cohen and Mandler's critique does not pretend to offer a book review summarizing the content of *The History Manifesto*, so a few words are in order here by way of providing readers a sense of its challenge to historians. It should be noted, of course, that no summary can take the place of reading Armitage and Guldi's clearly argued work. In short, they charge that in the latter decades of the last century, historians retreated from considerations of the long term (*longue durée*)—significant swaths of historical time beyond the biological life span of an individual—a retreat that has had, they claim, deleterious consequences for the role of history both in the university and in public life. To be sure, they acknowledge a return of the *longue durée* approach in recent years, most notably in the emergence of “big data” as a source and method for analyzing a massive range of historical experience. And in this sense, *The History Manifesto* is as much an enthusiastic endorsement of some current trends, most related to the possibilities of digital research, as it is a criticism of recent practices. But Armitage and Guldi's focus on what they call “short-termism” is fairly relentless. It is largely the source, they argue, of the inability of today's historians

*Note:* The essays in this Exchange are based on the original print edition of *The History Manifesto* and do not reflect the revisions and updates that have subsequently been made to the online edition.

to grapple with long-term problems such as climate change, persistent economic inequality, and the widespread failure of governance, leaving the field open to economists, pundits, and others who lack a critical historical sense. Short-term history is linked in their view to short-term thinking. Indeed, their critique conveys an urgent plea to their fellow historians to mine the deep past in order to address present-day concerns—to abandon the ivory tower for the public arena, to combat paralyzing “mythologies,” dogmatisms, and intellectual complacency, and to engage in “historical thinking, in public and ethical terms, about the shaping of our shared future.” If nothing else, Armitage and Guldi’s *Manifesto* aims to foster a history that, in Simon Schama’s words (which they cite), will “keep people awake at night.”

Wakefulness can take many forms, and Cohen and Mandler’s essay clearly exhibits a troubled sleep. Their criticisms of *The History Manifesto* are unsparing in both tone and content. They reject the authors’ pivotal claim that “short-termism” characterized historical writing in the late decades of the twentieth century, and that this narrowing of temporal optic represented a departure from earlier practice. And, much like Armitage and Guldi, they offer evidence from a large archive of titles of books, journal articles, and dissertations to support their assertions. It will be up to readers, and perhaps subsequent scholars, to decide the validity of these competing claims. In any case, Cohen and Mandler are confident that when Armitage and Guldi’s “supporting evidence” is examined closely, it will fail to confirm their conclusions. They also strongly contest the assumption that long-term approaches are better suited to understanding historical problems and present-day concerns alike. Furthermore, contrary to the *Manifesto*’s claim that historians have retreated into their ivory towers, they point to the various ways in which history today—in fact, more than ever before—plays a role in public life.

Armitage and Guldi are measured and confident in their response, ceding little to the terms of this spirited critique. They acknowledge the “widely divergent” responses elicited by the book, ranging from hearty endorsements to devastating dismissals, but note that it is in the nature of a manifesto to be provocative. They remain unimpressed, however, with Cohen and Mandler’s critique: “As an apology for business as usual and a defense of the status quo,” they write, “their essay is unimpeachable.” This counter-criticism is at the heart of their response: the apparent complacency of Cohen and Mandler, who, they claim, fail even to acknowledge the crisis in the humanities in general, and in the discipline of history in particular. And their wider assertion that our contemporary culture as a whole suffers from “endemic short-termism” can hardly be considered controversial. Among the points Armitage and Guldi emphatically reassert from their manifesto, in the face of Cohen and Mandler’s skepticism, is a ringing endorsement of the special skills and insights that historians can—and should—bring to bear on public issues. As its title affirms, *The History Manifesto* is a call to action.

Whether and how historians will heed this call certainly cannot be determined here. But one cannot fail to highlight an interesting feature of this Exchange. Unlike other controversies among historians, especially those that catch the attention of a wider readership, this one is fundamentally about method—about how historians conceive of and shape the past and demarcate their chronological purview. If nothing else, Armitage and Guldi have forced us to think hard about the most basic of our



concerns: time. They cite this pithy statement from Fernand Braudel: “time sticks to [the historian’s] thinking like soil to a gardener’s spade.” But the evocation of Braudel—this master of the *longue durée*—also suggests a problem with much that is at stake in this Exchange. Some of the dispute here is empirical in nature, hinging upon divergent conclusions from “big data” sources of books, dissertations, and journal articles. But how reliable are these—that is, as *titles*—as an indication of the chronological scope of these works? To take one notable example: to go by the title of Braudel’s *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, considered the ur-example of long-term history, its chronological scope was a mere seventy-one years—the life span of the Spanish monarch. There are rewards and pitfalls in the realm of big data.

“Historians are not soldiers; they don’t fight on a single front, and . . . they certainly don’t need to be led in one direction,” write Cohen and Mandler. “[N]or are they sheep,” respond Armitage and Guldi. “[T]hey may not want to be led, nor can they be herded. Yet, as in any complex community, the individual choices historians make . . . aggregate behind our backs into discernible patterns, even trends.” This Exchange is indeed about these patterns and trends—not only what they are and what they mean, but whether they are in fact discernible. As neither soldiers nor sheep, we are obliged to interrogate what we do, how we do it, and what it means for our times. In the face of the common and understandable reluctance within professions and disciplines to undertake this sort of interrogation, we should be grateful to the participants in this Exchange for helping us, even provoking us, to do just that.

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*AHR Exchange*  
*The History Manifesto: A Critique*

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DEBORAH COHEN AND PETER MANDLER

IT IS PROBABLY IN THE NATURE of manifestos to be one-eyed and just a little authoritarian: they are rallying cries to lead soldiers into battle. For that reason, history is a subject almost uniquely ill-suited to manifestos. Historians are not soldiers; they don't fight on a single front, and—at a time when, more than ever before, historians have been operating in an impressive diversity of modes and theaters—they certainly don't need to be led in one direction. In our critique, we do not dispute the validity of Guldi and Armitage's favored modes of historiography.<sup>1</sup> We have both worked in a variety of time scales (long, short, and medium). We view quantitative and digital methods as useful tools in the historian's repertoire and use them in our own practice (as well as in this critique).<sup>2</sup> We are entirely in favor of the social engagement of scholars outside the academy.

What we object to are the arguments (and where they present any, the evidence) that Guldi and Armitage offer in their attempt to persuade everyone else to follow their own chosen path. When the underpinnings of their manifesto are examined, the supporting evidence either is nonexistent or mandates just the opposite conclusion. This is true for each of their major propositions: the retreat of the *longue durée* they posit, the correlation they draw between the length of time a study covers and its significance, the alleged salience of long-term arguments to policymaking, the presumptions about historians' superiority as arbiters of big data, and the crisis of the humanities that requires the cure they are proposing.<sup>3</sup> *The History Manifesto* offers not, as its authors imagine, a bold new frontier, but rather a narrowing of the public role that historians already occupy and a diminution of the audiences they currently enjoy.

<sup>1</sup> Jo Guldi and David Armitage, *The History Manifesto* (Cambridge, 2014), <http://historymanifesto.cambridge.org/read/>. The page references in parentheses are to the print/PDF edition.

<sup>2</sup> Our reference points, like Guldi's and Armitage's, are Anglo-American. There is much more to be said about other parts of the world where textual evidence is lacking and the prospects of digitization are more distant.

<sup>3</sup> For a much more satisfying discussion of the gains and losses involved in different time scales, see Sebouh David Aslanian, Joyce E. Chaplin, Kristin Mann, and Ann McGrath, "How Size Matters: The Question of Scale in History," *AHR Conversation*, *American Historical Review* 118, no. 5 (December 2013): 1431–1472. For trenchant responses to *The History Manifesto*, see *Modern British Studies at Birmingham's* series "Responding to the History Manifesto," <https://mbsbham.wordpress.com/responding-to-the-history-manifesto/>; Lynn Hunt, "Does History Need a Reset?," forthcoming in *Annales: Histoire, Sciences sociales* 70, no. 2 (April–June 2015); and Claire Lemerrier, "La longue durée: Une histoire sans histoire?," *Devenir historien-ne: Méthodologie de la recherche, historiographie et épistémologie de l'histoire*, <http://devhist.hypotheses.org/2729#more-2729>.



At the heart of *The History Manifesto* is a historiographic account that is both simple and deceptive. In the early and mid-twentieth century, Guldi and Armitage argue, historians told “arching stories of scale” that won them the esteem of the public and influence over policymakers (7). Between 1975 and 2005, they contend, “many if not most” professional historians retreated to short-term studies “on biological time-spans of between five and fifty years” and thus “inflicted upon their discipline habits of microscopic attention that culminated in a sense of practical irrelevance” (7, 84). As evidence for this retreat, they cite the historian Benjamin Schmidt’s data, asserting, “The compression of time in historical work can be illustrated bluntly by the range covered in doctoral dissertations conducted in the United States” (7–8).

Except that it can’t be. Discovering a “transition to the Short Past” in the 1970s requires that Guldi and Armitage ignore the very data they cite (39). Not only does their chart (reproduced here as Figure 1) show nearly the reverse of what they argue, but—improbably—they assign it a meaning contrary to the one that Schmidt himself offers.<sup>4</sup> Since the mid-1960s, there has been a steady rise in the length of time that dissertations cover, measured by either the mean or the median. How Guldi and Armitage manage to convert that expansion into a shrinkage is bewildering.<sup>5</sup> They do no better in characterizing the entire century, asserting that “the average period covered in 1900 was about seventy-five years; by 1975, that had fallen to about thirty years. Only in the twenty-first century did it rebound to between seventy-five and a hundred years” (43). In fact, the mean their chart shows for 1900 is not seventy-five years, but almost exactly fifty years. By 1975, the time period covered was not contracting, but had been on the rise for over a decade. And there has been no rebound in the twenty-first century. According to their chart, the trend has been basically flat since 2000.<sup>6</sup>

For all that Guldi and Armitage exhort their fellow historians to embrace big data in the service of “good, honest history,” their own arguments offer no such thing, ignoring numerous readily available sources from which this information could be gathered (116). To test their thesis about a retreat from the *longue durée*, we made a foray into the sort of systematic research they ought (at a bare minimum) to have conducted before generalizing about historians’ work over a century. To extend Schmidt’s data on dissertations to cover research monographs, we surveyed book reviews published in the *AHR* in eight sample years over a span of eighty years: four

<sup>4</sup> About his own data, Schmidt concludes: “So since about 1965, dissertations have covered longer and longer periods. (The data is sparse, but there’s some reason to think there might even be a trend toward more focused dissertations until the 1970s). [Edit—with parsing of decades, this trend is less dramatic but still present. Graphs later].” Ben Schmidt, “What Years Do Historians Write About?,” May 9, 2013, *Sapping Attention*, <http://sappingattention.blogspot.com/2013/05/what-years-do-historians-write-about.html#more>.

<sup>5</sup> When challenged about this error by Danny Loss on Twitter (@DannyScL), Guldi and Armitage responded in their blog with a celebration of form—“the great opportunities made possible by online publishing [in] correcting a chart”—rather than by addressing the criticism, the kind of elevation of technique over substance that dogs the entire enterprise. Their “correction” only underscores their original misinterpretation, which they mysteriously repeat in the same blog post: “our figure 2, which shows the shortening of time scales in dissertations,” shows nothing of the sort. Guldi and Armitage, “Updating Visualizations and the Power of Open Access Review,” November 20, 2014, <http://historymanifesto.cambridge.org/blog/2014/11/updating-visualizations-and-power-open-access-review/>.

<sup>6</sup> Our thanks to Danny Loss for these observations.




FIGURE 1: Updated visualization, *The History Manifesto*. <http://www.historymanifesto.cambridge.org/blog/2014/11/updated-visualizations-and-power-open-access-review/>. This figure shows the number of years covered in history dissertations in the U.S. The top line shows the mean, the bottom line the median (misabeled in the original). Data from Ben Schmidt, “What Years Do Historians Write About?,” <http://sappingattention.blogspot.com/2013/05/what-years-do-historians-write-about.html#more>.

in the period of Guldi and Armitage’s purported “long-horizon history” (1926, 1936, 1956, and 1966) and four that encompass books written in the era of their “Short Past” (1976, 1986, 1996, and 2006).<sup>7</sup> Our sample amounts to nearly 1,100 books in total.<sup>8</sup>

Based on our research, Guldi and Armitage have the facts backward, as their own chart should have told them. There is no evidence either that historians concentrated on long-horizon research before 1968 or that there was a fall-off afterward, when the great shrinkage supposedly began. Quite the contrary, the longest time scales came

<sup>7</sup> The books reviewed in the 2006 issues of the *AHR* were published in 2004 and 2005 and, given the number of years it takes to bring a scholarly work to fruition, were likely conceived in the mid- to late 1990s.

<sup>8</sup> The parameters of our study, designed to track Schmidt’s sample, are as follows: the works we examined were all by scholars with the Ph.D. in history and/or who were working as academic historians at institutions in North America and Britain; we focused on research monographs, excluding textbooks and national/regional surveys but including biographies; and (like Schmidt) we included only histories of the post-1500 period. We excluded outliers in our sample (chronological time spans of 1,000 years and more), of which there were one in 1926, two in 1966, two in 1976, one in 1996, and four in 2006. Our sample includes all four issues of the *AHR* in 1926, 1936, and 1956; and for 1966–2006, years during which the numbers of books reviewed grew massively and the *AHR* expanded from four to five issues, the first and last issue of each year. This research was conducted by Emily Curtis Walters, a doctoral candidate in the History Department at Northwestern University, who manually coded each book based upon reviews in the professional journals. When data ranges were unclear, we examined the book to establish its time span.






FIGURE 2: Numbers of years covered in research monographs reviewed in the *AHR*, 1926–2006. The top line shows the mean, the bottom line the median.

after 1975, when the numbers of years covered steadily increased, with the median more than doubling between 1966 and 1986. (See Figure 2.) The point is made even more graphically with respect to the “biological time-spans” of five to fifty years that Guldi and Armitage see as the hallmark of the historians’ retreat. As our Figure 3 shows, the percentage of studies conducted on such “biological” time periods declined significantly between 1926 and 2006. Similarly, short time spans of less than five years were the subject of a larger percentage of the monographs published before 1966 than was the case in the period after 1976—entirely predictable given the predominance of political and diplomatic history in those earlier years.<sup>9</sup> In sum, there is much more continuity than change across the twentieth century, and if anything, longer time scales had become more, not less, common as of 1986.

The qualitative evidence is no kinder to Guldi and Armitage’s thesis. The early-twentieth-century champions of long-range history they hold up for emulation frequently worked on different time scales, some exceedingly brief.<sup>10</sup> While it is true that Arthur Schlesinger Sr. and Charles Beard published the “*longue durée* histories

<sup>9</sup> Guldi and Armitage seem now to be retooling their arguments to focus not on the trend lines but on the scatterplot, apparently the concentration of chronologically focused dissertations in the 1970s; “Updating Visualizations and the Power of Open Access Review.” That escape route, however, is cut off by our data, which shows that the percentage of work taking a span of less than five years as its focus was lower in 1976 than in 1966, and lower again in 1986, 1996, and 2006 than in any of the pre-1976 years. Similarly, the percentage of studies spanning more than a century began to climb in the late 1960s.

<sup>10</sup> In addition, it evinces a particular disregard for context (another of the virtues that Guldi and Armitage think historians have to offer policymakers) to wrench figures such as the Fabian reformers Beatrice and Sidney Webb out of their early-twentieth-century setting and declare them representative of the discipline of history (21). Writing in an era before the explosion of higher education and the further specialization of knowledge, the Webbs omnivorously investigated everything from the constitutional problems of cooperative societies to the decline in the birth rate to the rosy prospects for Soviet Russia.




FIGURE 3: Percentage of research monographs reviewed in the *AHR*, 1926–2006, covering “biological time-spans” of five to fifty years.

of American identity” that Guldi and Armitage cite approvingly, both were textbooks—like the vast majority of textbooks then and now, wide-ranging surveys (25). More typical of historical monographs of the time, Schlesinger Sr. also published *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution, 1763–1776*; *A Critical Period in American Religion, 1875–1900*; and *Prelude to Independence: The Newspaper War on Britain, 1764–1776*. Similarly, Beard’s other works include *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (an investigation of the property held by the signers of the Constitution) and *American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932–1940*.<sup>11</sup>

Why do Guldi and Armitage get the history so wrong? To judge by their disregard for the basic rules of evidence, argument, and proof, they don’t seem to have tried very hard to get it right. In the place of cogent intellectual genealogies of the last half-century, they resort to instrumental explanations involving declining job markets, Oedipal crises, and identity politics (42–43, 11). They indulge in irresponsible generalizations that neither a reading of the works cited nor a survey of the historiography can sustain. Thus, they tell us: “With a few exceptions, the classic works of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s concentrated on a particular episode: the identification of a particular disorder within psychology, or the analysis of a particular riot in the labour movement, for instance” (45).<sup>12</sup> They assert that “historians of the

<sup>11</sup> Our thanks to Daniel Immerwahr for these observations.

<sup>12</sup> As “classic” works of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, Guldi and Armitage here cite one article (from 1960), two monographs (1983, 1993), and one edited collection (2012), all about eighteenth-century British riots, which together have garnered 301 citations in the years since they were published, according to Google Scholar. By contrast, see the citations of three works that are undeniably classics of the era (but also long-horizon histories): William H. McNeill’s *Plagues and Peoples* (1977) has been cited 2,821



Short Past tended to outsource” to European social theorists their long-horizon explanatory frameworks: “From 1968 to approximately 2000, many a researcher in those disciplines was thus temporarily relieved of the obligation of original thinking about the past and its significance for the future” (50, 51). Or: “By the end of the 1970s, the tendency to go long began to look tarnished, something grubby that no self-respecting historian would do” (82, unfootnoted).

In fact, to see the years 1975–2005 as abjuring longer-term narratives and “generalisations about the aggregate” requires that Guldi and Armitage ignore the mass of evidence that doesn’t fit: the rise of global history, environmental history, and cultural history, all frequently with long time scales—even the fact that Fernand Braudel’s books were translated into English for the first time in the early 1970s, exactly the moment at which Guldi and Armitage identify the collapse of Anglo-American interest in the *longue durée* (51).<sup>13</sup> It neglects the fact that in this same period, 1975–2005, the geographical range of historical work has widened considerably, as U.S. and Canadian departments especially have moved beyond their traditional redoubts of North America and Europe to explore a fuller spectrum of human experiences across time and around the world.<sup>14</sup>

Most tendentiously, it requires that entire subject areas (particularly the histories of race, gender, and class) be reclassified as “micro” and “Histories of the Short Past,” whether or not they actually are. Guldi and Armitage’s category of “micro-history” includes the genre conventionally known by that name as well as an overflowing grab bag of other sorts of history.<sup>15</sup> Even more bizarre than the criticisms they level at these Short-Pasters are their attempts at characterizing their virtues. The “refinement of the exemplary particular,” “the art of looking closely at all the details,” the attainment of “heights of sophistication in the constrained inspection of experience in the past,” or “the recovery of the subaltern and the patient sifting of the archives”: these apparently are the signal virtues of historians ranging from Theodore Porter to Natalie Zemon Davis to David Roediger (36, 57, 120). If their contributions are made to sound pedestrian, that seems to be Guldi and Armitage’s point.

Throughout *The History Manifesto*, Guldi and Armitage persistently equate long

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times; William Cronon’s *Changes in the Land* (1983) has been cited 1,823 times; Thomas Laqueur’s *Making Sex* (1990) has been cited 3,435 times. Classic works in the genre of microhistory have accrued fewer citations according to Google Scholar: Natalie Zemon Davis’s *The Return of Martin Guerre* (1983), 525 cites; Robert Darnton’s *The Great Cat Massacre* (1984), 1,504 cites; and Carlo Ginzburg’s *The Cheese and the Worms* (English trans. 1989), 844 cites.

<sup>13</sup> Explaining the inconvenient fact of Braudel’s translation history requires some contortionism: “Almost as soon as the *longue durée* was named, it began to dissipate” (11). On the glancing treatment of global history, see pp. 15, 36.

<sup>14</sup> For somewhat contrasting interpretations, see Robert B. Townsend, “Decline of the West or the Rise of the Rest? Data from 2010 Shows Rebalancing of Field Coverage in Departments,” *Perspectives on History*, September 2011, <http://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/september-2011/decline-of-the-west-or-the-rise-of-the-rest>; and Luke Clossey and Nicholas Guyatt, “It’s a Small World after All: The Wider World in Historians’ Peripheral Vision,” *Perspectives on History*, May 2013, <http://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/may-2013/its-a-small-world-after-all>.

<sup>15</sup> On the history of microhistory in both its Italian and North American incarnations, and on its potential for global history, see Francesca Trivellato, “Is There a Future for Italian Microhistory in the Age of Global History?,” *California Italian Studies* 2, no. 1 (2011), <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0z94n9hq>.

with significant. Not until the conclusion (and only then in a quotation from Lynn Hunt) do they acknowledge the fundamental and obvious point: the time scales that scholars adopt depend on the questions they are asking and the subjects they are investigating (119). In general, the shortest time spans have belonged to political history and thematically to studies of war and revolution, but should it really be otherwise?<sup>16</sup> Who could plausibly claim that a five-hundred-year history of rebellion from the Peasants' War of 1525 to the Occupy Movement obviates the need for a history either of the rise of the German Social Democratic Party from the 1860s to 1914 or of the impact of the baby boom on student and popular radicalism in the 1960s? And who could plausibly deny that the latter two studies might be just as convincing, absorbing, and "useful" (and very often more so) to a wide variety of audiences, including but not limited to policymakers? On this point, Guldi and Armitage dodge and weave. They begin with overheated claims about a woeful retreat from the *longue durée*: "evidence of a moral crisis, an inward-looking retreat from commenting on contemporary global issues and alternative futures" (83–84). But in their conclusion, they end up calling weakly for a union of "micro" and "macro" (119), hardly a proclamation worthy of the manifesto label, a point to which we return at the end.

THERE IS NOTHING NEW ABOUT lamenting the specialization of knowledge, but Guldi and Armitage have erected a fantasy on those age-old foundations.<sup>17</sup> Certainly the world of historical research has grown massively since the 1950s, in large measure due to the dramatic expansion of access to higher education. However, it takes a far-fetched interpretation of the steep rise in history Ph.D.'s from the 1960s and early 1970s to imagine that history became less, not more, relevant in public life as the discipline gained more formally trained practitioners, and a more democratic sense of who gets to have a history and to write it. The expansion of universities led to the proliferation of all kinds of history-writing: the short-termist dissertations that Guldi and Armitage cite and long-term studies as well, thus laying the groundwork for the so-called "history boom" of the 1980s and 1990s.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> An observation we derive from our own sample, echoed by Lemercier, "La longue durée."

<sup>17</sup> Ian Tyrrell, *Historians in Public: The Practice of American History, 1890–1970* (Chicago, 2005), chap. 2, offers examples from the 1890s to the 1990s, as well as this sobering conclusion: "So common have criticisms of overspecialization been that their continuing appearance registers a failure of American historians to examine the history of historical practice" (25). And see further his reflections on why historians may be more prone to this kind of self-doubt than other academics (21–22).

<sup>18</sup> The chronology of the expansion of higher education follows different paths in the U.S. and the UK, but in both countries this expansion is roughly paralleled by a growing consumption of history by popular audiences, which suggests to us a connection—rather than a disconnection—between academic and popular history. For a crude measure of the growth of history publishing in the UK, which follows the trajectory of higher education, see Peter Mandler, *History and National Life* (London, 2002), 100–102; and for the U.S., see Robert B. Townsend, "History and the Future of Scholarly Publishing," *Perspectives on History*, October 2003, <http://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/october-2003/history-and-the-future-of-scholarly-publishing>, fig. 3: "Number of New Book Titles Produced in Select Humanities Fields, 1920 to 1995." To tease apart the respective contributions of this body of publishing to direct popular consumption, to the provision of an essential research base for other forms of history for popular consumption, and to purely academic discourse would require a more forensic analysis, but see Tyrrell, *Historians in Public*, for an argument that in most periods these contributions are mutually supportive.



Far from closing themselves off in their professional ivory towers, historians in the last forty years have been reaching larger and ever more diverse publics in a wide array of public theaters: in the classroom, where the number of U.S. humanities students grew rapidly in the supposedly dark days of the “Short Past” from the mid-1970s to the mid-2000s, and where the number of UK humanities students has probably trebled in a period of very rapid expansion; in the media, where in the UK the phenomenon of the “telly don” emerged in precisely this period, and where in the U.S. history programming has been a staple since the 1977 TV miniseries *Roots*; in the new museums devoted to history, such as the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Lower East Side Tenement Museum in the U.S. and the wave of Heritage Lottery Fund foundations in the UK, and older history museums reinvigorated, not least by burgeoning research programs that link with academics; in the widening embrace of “public history” and “heritage” by publics and academics alike in both countries; and among the reading public, as history titles have maintained strong sales even while the publishing industry as a whole has struggled.<sup>19</sup> Historians have recruited these new audiences as the range of acceptable subjects has opened out from the realms of politics, international relations, intellectual life, and governing institutions to encompass economic performance, race, class, gender, family, sexuality, art, and science, and latterly the “inner space” of identities and emotions.<sup>20</sup>

All of this activity is passed over in Guldi and Armitage’s account of history’s “retreat from the public realm,” because their own definition of public engagement is very narrow-gauged (79).<sup>21</sup> By and large, their target audience is not millions of their fellow citizens, but very specifically a set of elites: “activists,” “entrepreneurs,” “CEOs,” policymakers, and politicians (4, 12, 78), or, as Armitage put it in the *Harvard Crimson* recently, “somebody very powerful on Wall Street.”<sup>22</sup> Their conception of appropriate theaters for engagement is not classrooms or museums or the media or reading, but “legislative committees . . . activist campaigns . . . Silicon Valley start-ups” (114).<sup>23</sup> Their ideas about what historians can do for these policy and business

<sup>19</sup> On the reinvigoration of historical societies, see Robin Pogrebin, “These Fusty Names Are History,” *New York Times*, October 26, 2014, F9. On book sales, see the Nielsen figures reported in the *Independent* in 2012: between 2002 and 2011, “sales of history books . . . increased by more than 45% to nearly 5.4 million copies a year—more than double the rate of growth across the publishing industry as a whole.” Cahal Milmo, “Young Historians ‘Are Damaging Academia’ in Their Bid for Stardom,” *Independent*, May 9, 2012, <http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/history/young-historians-are-damaging-academia-in-their-bid-for-stardom-7723284.html>. Although sales figures have contracted in the past two years, “history & military” titles (the Nielsen designation) have maintained their share of the total UK market. E-mails from Hazel Kenyon, Head of Publisher Account Management, Nielsen, December 4, 2014, and from Joanne Kaptanis, Publisher Account Manager, Nielsen, December 5, 2014. Comparable figures for the U.S. were not available from Nielsen without substantial cost. But see Townsend, “History and the Future of Scholarly Publishing,” which suggests that academic history has consistently done better than academic publishing in other fields at reaching non-academic markets in the U.S.

<sup>20</sup> A point that Laurel Thatcher Ulrich makes in *Well-Behaved Women Seldom Make History* (New York, 2008), 39; and see Tyrrell, *Historians in Public*, 254, on “the democratic potential of the newer forms of specialized history,” which he sees as combining since the 1990s with other forms of public outreach.

<sup>21</sup> On this issue, see Matt Houlbrook, “Big Histories, Small Minds,” <http://mbsbham.wordpress.com/responding-to-the-history-manifesto/matt-houlbrook-big-histories-small-minds/>.

<sup>22</sup> Gabrielle M. Williams, “Professors Make Case for ‘Long-Term’ History,” *Harvard Crimson*, November 24, 2014, <http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/11/24/long-term-history-event/>.

<sup>23</sup> The emphasis on historians’ unique (expert) analytical capacities and on their usefulness in elite job markets sits uneasily alongside occasional outbursts of populism such as can be found on pp. 30, 117, and 119.

elites are equally narrow-gauged and unsupported by evidence or logic. The big questions that should grip these policy and business elites are, they argue, questions of the *longue durée*, and the answers can be supplied by the assembly of big data. Here is an explanation for their forced arguments about the short-termism of academic history: they needed to invent a crisis of short-termism in the discipline in order to point clearly toward the advantages of the *longue durée*.

Yet why should policy and business elites be interested in the *longue durée*? It is true that some of the pressing problems of our time are long-term problems—climate change being the obvious one, and the subject of a large portion of *The History Manifesto*'s chapter 3. But even some of the problems cited by Guldi and Armitage as intrinsically *longue durée* strike us as benefiting from “Short Past” answers: the rise of income inequality in the West, for example, a phenomenon of the last thirty-five years and requiring surely as many new studies of neoliberalism, global political economy, and inequality in the “Short Past” as longer-term studies such as Thomas Piketty's *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. And most of the problems that beset policy and business elites today are probably best couched in the five-to-fifty-year “biological time-span” about which Guldi and Armitage are so scornful. We see no evidence (either in *The History Manifesto* or in the real world) that “five hundred years [is] better than five months or five years as a planning horizon,” the slogan emblazoned on the book's print cover.

Indeed, Guldi and Armitage don't offer a single example from the past few decades to prove that there is any correlation whatsoever between the time scale of a study and its significance to public policy. Given that initiatives that seek to bring historians and social scientists in contact with policymakers (such as History & Policy in the UK or the Scholars Strategy Network in the U.S., neither of which is mentioned in *The History Manifesto*) have by now accumulated years of experience on the subject, wouldn't it be useful to consider how expertise has been brought to bear—and what sorts of obstacles such efforts have faced? Sociologists and political scientists, never mind economists (despised and cartoonish in Guldi and Armitage's treatment), have, they acknowledge, decades of experience in this realm. By ignoring other social scientists' efforts to influence policymaking, *The History Manifesto*'s central arguments appear all the more oddly blind to the real constraints of politics, either to historians' ideas being taken up or to the very complex sorts of problems that global warming or disintegrating states pose.

At the same time, Guldi and Armitage omit any discussion of historians who have had a demonstrable influence on policy, perhaps because these examples have little to do with the sort of history they favor. Here, too, the record contradicts their portrait of a profession's turn to insularity and irrelevance beginning in the 1970s. It was in the 1980s that historians in the U.S. first undertook to file their own *amicus* briefs, intervening in judicial proceedings to influence court decisions.<sup>24</sup> A prime example is the Supreme Court's landmark decision in *Lawrence v. Texas* (2003), overturning the country's remaining sodomy laws, where the historians' *amicus* brief

<sup>24</sup> Michael Grossberg, “Friends of the Court: A New Role for Historians,” *Perspectives on History*, November 2010, <http://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/november-2010/friends-of-the-court-a-new-role-for-historians>; Laura Kalman, *The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism* (New Haven, Conn., 1996).



proved pivotal.<sup>25</sup> That brief represented the type of identity history that Guldi and Armitage disparage as “the documenting of the victim under mainstream society” and also involved relatively *longue durée* generalizations (34). Much the same could be said of the *Sears* case, where historian witnesses on both sides dueled over the significance of the past fifty years’ history of women’s work.<sup>26</sup> In Europe, a string of legal and political disputes since the 1980s have drawn on the expertise of historians, almost entirely for the “Short History” skills discounted by Guldi and Armitage: forensic analysis of documentary evidence, arbitrage not of “big data” but of very intense human conflicts, “speaking truth to power” not about the last five hundred years but more often about the last five or fifty. The only case we know of in which a historical commission brought down a government came in 2002, when a group of historians of the Second World War (six years’ duration) reported against the Dutch military’s conduct in the massacre at Srebrenica (a few days’ duration, a few years previously).<sup>27</sup>

Let us suppose, though, that the five-hundred-year “planning horizon” that Guldi and Armitage advocate were desirable. Why should historians be uniquely anointed to command it? There may be a few very long-term (unchanging or consistently changing) factors in human history, though most of the obvious ones Guldi and Armitage are rightly chary of embracing, and they don’t seem particularly congenial to historians—evolutionary psychology, for example, which posits some invariable human traits fixed for all time in the Pleistocene (3, 71, 109), or modernization theory (27–29), which Guldi and Armitage themselves dub “the dirty *longue durée*” (28), without considering its power as a counterexample of historians’ courtship of policymakers gone wrong.<sup>28</sup> We share Guldi and Armitage’s view that historians’ most practical contribution here has been to challenge theories based on invariance or consistent variance, by identifying conjunctures (often unpredictable) that disrupt patterns or introduce novel factors, but then this seems a quintessentially “Short Past” task. Churchill may have said, “The longer you can look back the further you can look forward” (cited approvingly, 14), but how many historians believe this?

Guldi and Armitage have a near-mystic faith in historians’ singular talent for looking into the future. Apparently history, unlike all of the other disciplines, is devoted to “facts” rather than “theories” (3). Alternatively, only historians know, based on the facts, when one theory—apparently applicable for some period of time—has become outmoded and requires replacement by another theory (109). At

<sup>25</sup> *Lawrence v. Texas* (02-102), 539 U.S. 558 (2003) 41 S. W. 3d 349, reversed and remanded; <http://findlawimages.com/efile/supreme/briefs/02-102/02-102.mer.ami.hist.pdf>. On the tensions between scholarship and legal advocacy, see Estelle B. Freedman, *Feminism, Sexuality and Politics: Essays* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2006), chap. 10.

<sup>26</sup> *EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.*, 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1278 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff’d, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988); Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession* (New York, 1998), 502–510.

<sup>27</sup> Hans Blom, “Historical Research Where Scholarship and Politics Meet: The Case of Srebrenica,” in Harriet Jones, Kjell Östberg, and Nico Randeraad, eds., *Contemporary History on Trial: Europe since 1989 and the Role of the Expert Historian* (Manchester, 2007), 104–122. Most of the other cases in this volume draw on the same set of “Short Past” problems and skills: the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, Bloody Sunday, the Algerian War, and so forth.

<sup>28</sup> Guldi and Armitage conveniently exculpate historians from the misadventures of the “dirty *longue durée*,” though of course the economic historian and modernization theorist Walt Rostow (neither mentioned nor cited in *The History Manifesto*) is an obvious example of a historian who used *longue durée* narratives not to speak truth to power but to propagandize for it.

times, history becomes nearly personified as an absolute arbiter, giving clear “directives” based on its “longer perspectives” (70). The facts seem to speak for themselves, and only historians can wrangle them. Thus it has been a failure to properly assemble and analyze the facts about climate change—“the purview of neither science nor economics but of history”—that has explained the failure of climate-change politics (64). Similarly, it was a failure to consult the facts of history regarding the effects of regulation and taxation on economic growth that led to “the policy stalemate of the 1990s,” a stalemate that is “no longer tenable” “because of the evidence about long-term processes amassed by historians” (71).

What accounts for historians’ special predictive powers is that they are somehow, by definition, the preeminent data-handlers, better qualified than anyone else to manipulate huge reservoirs of quantitative or quantifiable evidence. *The History Manifesto* is brimful of contempt for everyone else who seeks to address complex problems, including (or especially) by means of recourse to big data. “Information scientists, environmentalists, and even financial analysts” need us to tell them where their data comes from—they never think about that themselves, apparently (12). Only historians can make expert “claims about causality” (64–65). Only historians can “work with big data that were accrued by human institutions working over time” (105).<sup>29</sup> Or perhaps other specialists can marshal their own data, but only historians have the breadth of vision to do “arbitration” between discrete bodies of data (105, 107). In arbitrating the coming “war between the experts,” “the History departments of major research universities will almost certainly take a lead; it requires talents and training which no other discipline possesses” (107).

Not if Guldi and Armitage’s own displays are any indication. Their debacle with Schmidt’s data on the time span of dissertations is a case in point. So is their travesty of the complex arguments made by economists and economic historians. To say that “the economists conclude that the nineteenth century led to gains in equality, opportunity, and nutrition” is an absurd distortion, given the vociferous debates about these issues in the field (57–58).<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, they misrepresent specific studies even as they attack the field of economics as a whole.<sup>31</sup> Guldi and Armitage can certainly lament the rise of economics as a master discipline in the past half-century. They would land more fearsome blows, though, if they could prove that they understood what they had read, and if they acknowledged that economists’ predom-

<sup>29</sup> The example given is of a paper by geographers who searched a scientific database for keywords to assess changing public opinion over time, which “would never pass muster in a history journal” (105), but the example cited is no more risible than G&A’s own Google n-gram search for “more and more about less” (49, fig. 3). What does an n-gram that demonstrates that the phrase “more and more about less [and less]” reached its high point in 1942, sloping steadily downward thereafter, prove about specialization throughout the twentieth century?

<sup>30</sup> For a review of the state of the field, see Brian A’Hearn, “The British Industrial Revolution in a European Mirror,” in Roderick Floud, Jane Humphries, and Paul Johnson, eds., *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain*, new ed., vol. 1: 1700–1870 (Cambridge, 2014), 1–52.

<sup>31</sup> In particular, see their discussion on pp. 57–59 and the mischaracterization of Joel Mokyr, *The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy* (Princeton, N.J., 2002), and Paul Johnson and Stephen Nicholas, “Male and Female Living Standards in England and Wales, 1812–1857: Evidence from Criminal Height Records,” *Economic History Review* 48, no. 3 (1995): 470–481. For an accounting of these errors and others, see “Jo Guldi’s Curiouser & Curiouser Footnotes,” November 10, 2014, *Pseudoerasmus*, <http://pseudoerasmus.com/2014/11/10/history-manifesto-errors/>. The anonymous economics blogger Pseudoerasmus attributes these mistakes to Guldi, but Armitage obviously shares responsibility.



inance not only owes to their discipline's proximity to the powerful but also reflects the growing sophistication of their data-handling techniques.

Guldi and Armitage have seized upon big data and historians' expertise as the solution not just to the world's problems but to the troubles they see for the discipline of history. *The History Manifesto* is a book in a panic—its authors gripped by a “crisis of the humanities” and grasping desperately at solutions. Once again, Benjamin Schmidt's data on humanities degrees across the U.S. does not support this conclusion. History and the humanities in general have done well to hold their position for the last thirty years, and a similar stability over an even longer period has been evident in the UK, though in the short term the humanities tend not to do well in periods of economic downturn.<sup>32</sup> In this respect, Guldi and Armitage's alarmism smacks of the very short-term thinking they purport to deplore. Worse, by portraying much of the work of historians over the past half-century as irrelevant, even worthless—misrepresentations of the historiography seemingly pitched more to the public than to the profession—they risk contributing to the decline of the humanities they claim to fear.

Since the publication of *The History Manifesto*, Guldi and Armitage have insisted that their purpose was simply to add another tool to the historians' toolbox. That is an ambition no one could fault, though were it their aim, much more useful would have been a tough-minded assessment of big data as a new platform for historical analysis, taking into account the risks and costs, something other than the unqualified encomium to its possibilities now on offer.<sup>33</sup> But such an ecumenical program is not in fact the book's point, and that is not how Armitage and Guldi have characterized their position in the articles they have published since its launch.<sup>34</sup>

If Guldi and Armitage are no longer arguing that long-range histories have particular “moral stakes” that impose a “mandate” upon historians and can claim an *a priori* superiority in policymaking different from studies of other durations (84–85);

<sup>32</sup> Humanities degrees from U.S. universities have retained a stable share of about 17 percent of all degrees since 1970, with a dip in the 1980s and recovery in the 1990s. See National Center for Educational Statistics, Table 289: “Bachelor's, Master's, and Doctor's Degrees Conferred by Degree-Granting Institutions, by Field of Study: Selected Years, 1970–71 through 2009–10,” *Digest of Education Statistics*, [http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11\\_289.asp](http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11_289.asp); and cf. Benjamin Schmidt's statistics, using different categories and a longer time scale, but again showing considerable stability over the last thirty years: Schmidt, “A Crisis in the Humanities?,” *Chronicle Blog Network*, <http://chronicle.com/blognetwork/edgeofthewest/2013/06/10/the-humanities-crisis/>. A similar story can be told about UK universities, where the humanities broadly defined have retained a stable share of about 21 percent of all degrees over the same period. See Peter Mandler, “The Two Cultures Revisited: The Humanities in British Universities since 1945,” Ben Pimlott Memorial Lecture 2014, *Twentieth-Century British History* (forthcoming 2015; available as this article went to press through advance access, <http://tcbh.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/02/17/tcbh.hwu068.full>). As Schmidt points out, thanks to university expansion, the proportion of the college-age population holding humanities degrees has of course increased greatly.

<sup>33</sup> See the roundtable that was held at Columbia University on November 17, 2014: Heyman Center for the Humanities, “A Roundtable on *The History Manifesto*: The Role of History and the Humanities in a Digital Age,” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bAfkRj4nwd4>. For more on the event, see <http://heymancenter.org/events/a-roundtable-on-the-history-manifesto-the-role-of-history-and-the-humanities/>. For a thought-provoking assessment, see Tim Hitchcock, “Big Data, Small Data and Meaning,” November 9, 2014, Historyonics, [http://historyonics.blogspot.com/2014/11/big-data-small-data-and-meaning\\_9.html](http://historyonics.blogspot.com/2014/11/big-data-small-data-and-meaning_9.html).

<sup>34</sup> For example, see Armitage and Guldi, “Bonfire of the Humanities: Public Debate Is Afflicted by Short-Term Thinking—How Did History Abdicate Its Role of Inspiring the Longer View?,” *Aeon*, <http://aeon.co/magazine/society/how-history-forgot-its-role-in-public-debate/>: “Why not toss all those introverted but highly competent monographs and journals articles onto a bonfire of the humanities?”

if they no longer assert that the discipline of history as a whole took a wrong turn in the years 1975–2005; if they recognize that big data are not the only “future of the university,” let alone the only ethical future (115–116, 119); if they acknowledge that the discipline of history has been capacious to its profit and will not benefit from being herded in a single direction: we are wondering what exactly it is they have to say. Our points are simple, and until *The History Manifesto*, we hardly would have thought they needed articulation. Superb history, influential either in academic circles or more broadly in public life, can be conducted on any time scale, from a single day to thousands of years. It is precisely the diversity of our discipline, its rich, humane traditions that speak to multiple audiences on all the scales in which humans feel and think, that have made us an indispensable part of the educational and cultural landscape over the past generation. Nurturing and, where necessary, defending these traditions is “the future of the university,” and the job for us all.

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**Deborah Cohen** is the Peter B. Ritzma Professor of Humanities and Professor of History at Northwestern University. Her most recent book is *Family Secrets: Shame and Privacy in Modern Britain* (Oxford University Press, 2013).

**Peter Mandler** is Professor of Modern Cultural History at Cambridge University and Bailey Lecturer in History at Gonville and Caius College. His most recent book is *Return from the Natives: How Margaret Mead Won the Second World War and Lost the Cold War* (Yale University Press, 2013).



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*AHR Exchange*  
*The History Manifesto: A Reply to Deborah Cohen and  
Peter Mandler*

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DAVID ARMITAGE AND JO GULDI

IT IS IN THE NATURE OF MANIFESTOS to be hopeful, forward-looking, and somewhat provocative. As the name suggests, manifestos strive to be open, to make evident what might otherwise be obscure. Ever since Marx and Engels irreversibly reconfigured the genre's authoritative, sovereign form in the mid-nineteenth century, manifestos have been both rhetorical and practical, diagnostic as well as reformative: they discern problems and offer sometimes utopian solutions. They generally try to rise above perceived divisions to mobilize a community or conjure one where it had not existed before. Because they are not meant to sustain the status quo but rather to imagine new possibilities, they are generally exhortatory in tone.<sup>1</sup> Often short, punchy, and direct, such manifestations can be unsettling. Any manifesto worth its salt will likely invigorate many readers only at the cost of disturbing others. That has not deterred revolutionaries or artists from writing manifestos; when the time is ripe, even historians have been known to produce them.<sup>2</sup>

*The History Manifesto* deliberately adopts many of the features of the genre. The book is literally open, in the sense that it is available through open access for free download—a first for its publisher, Cambridge University Press—with the aim of reaching the widest possible readership, both academic and non-academic.<sup>3</sup> It diagnoses a crisis of the humanities in general, and for history in particular. It then proposes one set of solutions that draws upon new possibilities for researching, writing, and disseminating history, not least by using digital methods and data. The book concentrates on what joins all historians together—what our shared and distinctive practices are and how they might be extended—rather than on the distinctions be-

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<sup>1</sup> Martin Puchner, *Poetry of the Revolution: Marx, Manifestos, and the Avant-Gardes* (Princeton, N.J., 2006).

<sup>2</sup> For example, and to take only nominal instances, Keith Jenkins, Sue Morgan, and Alun Munslow, eds., *Manifestos for History* (London, 2007); Ivan Jablonka, *L'histoire est une littérature contemporaine: Manifeste pour les sciences sociales* (Paris, 2014).

<sup>3</sup> Jo Guldi and David Armitage, *The History Manifesto* (Cambridge, 2014), <http://historymanifesto.cambridge.org>. Cambridge University Press's second open-access monograph makes the broader case for open-access publication in the humanities: Martin Paul Eve, *Open Access and the Humanities: Contexts, Controversies and the Future* (Cambridge, 2014), <http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO9781316161012>.

tween various subfields. It has some of the rhetorical urgency that is suited to the genre, if still rather uncommon in professional historical writing. It has already elicited widely divergent reactions around the world, from Chile to Pakistan, and across the critical spectrum, from the wildly enthusiastic to the devastatingly dismissive.<sup>4</sup> The book came out within weeks of two other Anglophone efforts to survey the past, present, and future of historical writing and its place in the world, by Lynn Hunt and Hayden White.<sup>5</sup> One historical manifesto may be regarded as an event; three look like a movement.<sup>6</sup>

Deborah Cohen and Peter Mandler's vigorous response to *The History Manifesto* is among the most negative the book has received so far. By using language such as "deceptive," "irresponsible," "overheated," "a fantasy," "blind," "mystic," "debauched," "travesty," and "a book in a panic," Cohen and Mandler suspend their interpretive charity. They write as hanging judges, not recording angels. If this were a regularly commissioned book review in the *AHR*, Cohen and Mandler would have been expected to "explain the basic argument of [the] book, assess its strengths and weaknesses, and place the work in historiographical context."<sup>7</sup> However, because this is an unsolicited "critique," and not a review, they have not been held to the journal's strict guidelines. It may be worth recalling here R. H. Tawney's famous admonition: "An erring colleague is not an Amalekite to be smitten hip and thigh. My correction of some . . . misconceptions has, I trust, been free from the needless and unpleasing asperity into which criticism, to the injury of its cause, is liable on occasion to lapse."<sup>8</sup> Cohen and Mandler cite only other negative reviews of *The History Manifesto*, but not any of the more balanced or positive scholarly assessments that variously judge it to be "ambitious," "stunning," "big, bold, [and] visionary," "concise, impassioned and readable," "feisty and suggestive," "exciting," "irrefutable . . . compelling," and "enormously timely . . . excellent."<sup>9</sup>

<sup>4</sup> A full list of reviews and responses can be found at <http://scholar.harvard.edu/armitage/publications/history-manifesto>.

<sup>5</sup> Lynn Hunt, *Writing History in the Global Era* (New York, 2014); Hayden White, *The Practical Past* (Evanston, Ill., 2014). See also Jablonka, *L'histoire est une littérature contemporaine*; Serge Gruzinski, *L'histoire, pour quoi faire?* (Paris, 2015).

<sup>6</sup> Samuel Moyn, "Bonfire of the Humanities," *The Nation* 300, no. 6 (February 9, 2015): 27–32, <http://www.thenation.com/article/195553/bonfire-humanities>.

<sup>7</sup> "Book Reviewing in the *AHR*," <http://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/american-historical-review/book-review-guide>, emphasis added.

<sup>8</sup> R. H. Tawney, "The Rise of the Gentry: A Postscript," *Economic History Review* 7, no. 1 (1954): 91–97, here 97.

<sup>9</sup> David Abulafia, "Lucky Jim and La Longue Durée," *Standpoint* 67 (November 2014), <http://www.standpointmag.co.uk/node/5784/full>; Judith A. Bennett, review for the *Journal of Pacific History* 50, no. 1 (March 2015): 98–99; Virginia Berridge, review for *E-International Relations*, January 18, 2015, <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/01/18/review-the-history-manifesto/>; Richard Blakemore, "Some Thoughts on *The History Manifesto*," *historywomble*, October 14, 2014, <http://historywomble.wordpress.com/2014/10/14/some-thoughts-on-the-history-manifesto/>; Tom Cutterham, "Historians Getting Things Done," *Oxonian Review* 26, no. 2 (October 27, 2014), <http://www.oxonianreview.org/wp/historians-getting-things-done/>; Dan Edelstein, "Intellectual History and Digital Humanities," *Modern Intellectual History* 12 (January 21, 2015), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1479244314000833>; James Everest, "The Return of the *Longue Durée*," *Review 31*, January 21, 2015, <http://review31.co.uk/article/view/299/the-return-of-the-longue-duree>; Paul Lay, "Return of the Narrative," *Literary Review* 425 (October 2014): 1, <http://www.exacteditions.com/browse/327/342/40262/3/3>; Scott McLemee, "The History Manifesto," *Inside Higher Ed*, September 17, 2014, <https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2014/09/17/review-jo-guldi-and-david-armitage-history-manifesto>; Moyn, "Bonfire of the Humanities"; Garrett Dash Nelson, "Taking the Long View," *Edge Effects*, November 20, 2014, <http://edgeeffects.net/taking-the-long-view/>; Yvonne Perkins, review for



Because Cohen and Mandler's is the longest and most wide-ranging reply to date, it is the closest to a counter-manifesto the book has yet inspired.<sup>10</sup> As an apology for business as usual and a defense of the status quo, their essay is unimpeachable. They highlight diversity rather than commonality, perceive no need for change, and foresee few, if any, new directions for our profession. But does this place sufficient faith in historians' ability to speak to multiple publics, within and beyond the academy? And is it an adequate response to both the pressures and the opportunities facing historians in the early twenty-first century?

*The History Manifesto* argues that it is not. The book presents two broad arguments to suggest a need for change and the potential for innovation. The first treats the challenges facing history departments as part of a wider "crisis of the humanities" and of an endemic institutional short-termism in our culture beyond the university that is now widely diagnosed and debated.<sup>11</sup> The second examines the possibilities for new kinds of research opened up by the availability of digital data, the tools to analyze it, and the methods of communicating that analysis. On the first set of questions, Cohen and Mandler are upbeat to the point of complacency. They dismiss the "crisis of the humanities" in barely a sentence, yet do so only shortly after the American Historical Association presented evidence of a "seven-year slide" in undergraduate enrollments in history.<sup>12</sup> Their insouciance on this point hardly does justice to the widespread concerns and animated debates about declining enrollments, pressures from public funders, the corporatization of the university, the instrumentalization of humanities disciplines, and a host of other factors that have put fellow historians and humanists on the defensive from Australia to Mexico as well as in the United States and the United Kingdom.<sup>13</sup>

To bolster confidence about our field, Cohen and Mandler highlight a range of

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*Stumbling through the Past*, November 27, 2014, <http://stumblingpast.wordpress.com/2014/11/27/review-the-history-manifesto/>; David Reynolds, "The Return of Big History: The Long Past Is the Antidote to Short-Termism," *New Statesman* 5246 (January 23–29, 2015): 36–38, <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/01/return-big-history-long-past-antidote-short-termism>; John Tosh, review for *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* 19 (February 13, 2015), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642529.2015.1005377>; Rowan Williams, "Books of the Year: NS Friends and Contributors Choose Their Favourite Reading of 2014," *New Statesman* 5236 (November 14–20, 2014): 42, <http://www.newstatesman.com/culture/2014/11/books-year-ns-friends-and-contributors-choose-their-favourite-reading-2014>.

<sup>10</sup> See also the critical dossier by Lynn Hunt, Christian Lamouroux, Claire Lemerrier, Claudia Moatti, and Francesca Trivellato on David Armitage and Jo Guldi, "Le retour de la longue durée: Une perspective anglo-saxonne," forthcoming in *Annales: Histoire, Sciences sociales* 70, no. 2 (April–June 2015), with reply: Armitage and Guldi, "Pour une 'histoire ambitieuse,'" *ibid.*, [http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/armitage/files/Annales\\_reply.pdf](http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/armitage/files/Annales_reply.pdf).

<sup>11</sup> See, for example, Alfred Rappaport, *Saving Capitalism from Short-Termism: How to Build Long-Term Value and Take Back Our Financial Future* (New York, 2011); Pascal Lamy et al., *Now for the Long Term: The Report of the Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations* (Oxford, 2013); Schumpeter, "The Tyranny of the Long Term," *Economist*, November 22, 2014, <http://www.economist.com/news/business/21633805-lets-not-get-carried-away-bashing-short-termism-tyranny-long-term>.

<sup>12</sup> Allen Mikaelian, "Drilling Down into the Latest Undergraduate Data: History Bachelors Decline, but Several Upward Trends Persist," *AHA Perspectives*, November 2014, <http://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/november-2014/drilling-down-into-the-latest-undergraduate-data>.

<sup>13</sup> See, among many recent works, Martha C. Nussbaum, *Not for Profit: Why Democracies Need the Humanities* (Princeton, N.J., 2010); Andrew McGettigan, *The Great University Gamble: Money, Markets and the Future of Higher Education* (London, 2013); Ben Etherington, "Universities and the Block," *Sydney Review of Books*, May 23, 2014, <http://www.sydneyreviewofbooks.com/universities-and-the-block/>; Erika Pani, "Soft Science: The Humanities in Mexico" (unpublished paper).

areas where historians have been more publicly engaged since the 1970s. Yet to show that history has become more popular in some circles—however reassuring and even inspiring that might be—fails to address one of *The History Manifesto*'s central contentions: that the major institutions that shape most people's lives, most of the time—governments, corporations, NGOs, international agencies, and the like—often lack a sense of history and do not engage the expertise of historians as they gather information, formulate policy, or make far-reaching decisions. The contribution of historians to legal processes (noted by Cohen and Mandler), whether as expert witnesses or as the signatories of *amicus* briefs, runs counter to this trend. Indeed, this is one of the areas where longer histories have effected major change, for example, in the deliberations of the Waitangi Tribunal in New Zealand and similar discussions of indigenous land claims in Australia and Canada. Such historical interventions were more common in the age of Tawney and Lewis Mumford, for example. They are now relatively rare, perhaps because the experience of historians who did not speak truth to power but were instead co-opted served to inoculate others against engagement that informs democratic decision-making.

Whatever the reasons, the prominence of historians in the worlds of museums, media, and publishing still hardly matches the daily influence of other academics, most notably economists but also political scientists and lawyers, in the practices of modern governance.<sup>14</sup> It was not ever thus. *The History Manifesto* argues that historians retreated from this broader public conversation. More recent data from the *New York Times* partly confirms this hypothesis. Citations of historians in the newspaper's pages consistently outnumbered those of economists until the mid-1960s, when citations from economists took off. There was a brief resurgence among historians in the early 2000s, but in the aftermath of the financial crisis, economists have returned to prominence.<sup>15</sup> (See Figure 1.) This data drawn from a single source in a single country is clearly more indicative than definitive. What it indicates probably says more about the success of economists in riding the waves of economic cycles than it does about any failure by historians to move with the times.


*The History Manifesto*'s confidence in history and historians was addressed just as much to "fellow citizens" as to any alleged "set of elites" (an odd assemblage that for Cohen and Mandler includes activists as well as CEOs). Cohen and Mandler are correct not to underestimate the difficulties of bringing history to bear in the workings of those institutions. Nonetheless, as Virginia Berridge, a leading British figure at the intersection of history and policy, has recently written, "Statistics and long-term trends do convince policy makers." Historians adept at the analysis of data and the presentation of longer trends therefore have an opportunity to address "future policy agendas; they have the ideal combination of evidence and skills to do so."<sup>16</sup> Cohen and Mandler might still brand this as elitist, but few readers of the *AHR* are

<sup>14</sup> Marion Fourcade, Étienne Ollion, and Yann Algan, "The Superiority of Economists," MaxPo Discussion Paper 14/3, Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies, November 2014, [http://www.maxpo.eu/pub/maxpo\\_dp/maxpodp14-3.pdf](http://www.maxpo.eu/pub/maxpo_dp/maxpodp14-3.pdf).

<sup>15</sup> Justin Wolfers, "How Economists Came to Dominate the Conversation," *The Upshot*, *New York Times*, January 23, 2015, [www.nytimes.com/2015/01/24/upshot/how-economists-came-to-dominate-the-conversation.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/24/upshot/how-economists-came-to-dominate-the-conversation.html).

<sup>16</sup> Berridge, review of *The History Manifesto*. See also Virginia Berridge, "History Matters? History's Role in Health Policy Making," *Medical History* 52, no. 3 (July 2008): 311–326; Ann McGrath, "Is History Good Medicine?," *Journal of Australian Studies* 38, no. 4 (2014): 396–414; Alix Green, "History as





Three-year average of mentions.

Source: New York Times Chronicle Tool

FIGURE 1: Three-year average of mentions of economists, historians, and other social scientists in the *New York Times*, 1851–2014. Interest in what economists have to say rises and falls with the economy. As measured by mentions in the *NYT*, other professions are not as notable.

likely to recommend that less history, rather than more, be brought to bear upon the world's most pressing problems. *The History Manifesto* endorses the more generous conception of what John Tosh has recently called “critical public history”: that is, “knowledge about the past which is made freely available on the widest possible terms” by historians as citizen scholars and not solely directed toward fellow academics.<sup>17</sup>

Cohen and Mandler do not share *The History Manifesto*'s confidence that historians could be critical arbiters of the data deluge all around us. They are almost silent on the potential of new sources of data and the digital methods used to analyze them beyond finding them merely “useful.” They seem content to cede control and assessment of that data to almost anybody other than historians and scorn the idea that we might have skills we can transfer from traditional sources to new forms of evidence, in greater volume and on longer time scales. Indeed, they mock the notion that we have any special capacities at all, finding such self-confidence in our profession a “near-mystic faith,” even though Mandler himself has written elsewhere

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Expertise and the Influence of Political Culture on Advice for Policy since Fulton,” *Contemporary British History* 29, no. 1 (January 2015): 27–50.

<sup>17</sup> John Tosh, “Public History, Civic Engagement and the Historical Profession in Britain,” *History* 99, no. 335 (April 2014): 191–212, here 192–193, 194. See also James Grossman and Jason Steinhauer, “Historians and Public Culture: Widening the Circle of Advocacy,” *AHA Perspectives*, November 2014, <http://historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/november-2014/historians-and-public-culture>.

about historians' "unique set of skills—forensic and investigative, interdisciplinary, evaluative and interpretive."<sup>18</sup>

*The History Manifesto* argues that historians' distinctive techniques can now be extended and supplemented by digital tools and methods, as historians apply their strengths in handling sources critically, parsing causation and correlation, drawing on multiple methodologies, and appraising evidence in novel ways. Distant reading, data visualization, and digital tools designed specifically to answer historical questions can extend our grasp of the past in ways that supplement rather than supplant the traditional capacities of historians.<sup>19</sup> As Mandler's own judgment of those skills as "unique" implies, confidence in the peculiar capacities of historians is hardly mystical. That is true even when they are applied not just to the past but also to the future. "The future is not my period," Sir Tom Devine quipped during the debate on the Scottish independence referendum last year: that might sum up the current attitude of most professional historians.<sup>20</sup> However, as Hayden White, Reinhart Koselleck, and other historians of historiography have amply documented, the future was part of Western historians' purview until the discipline narrowed its ethical ambit to the past alone over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.<sup>21</sup>

When seen over the *longue durée* in this way, it is hardly absurd to suggest that historians might once again extend their ethical commitments forward in time. Of course, we have no privileged access to the future. However, with a becoming sense of modesty, we might still make better futurists than others precisely because we are used to determining constraints for plausible explanations, dealing with information deficits (as well as information overloads), and engaging in complex and multicausal analysis along overlapping time scales.<sup>22</sup> In these regards, historians are well-equipped to imagine futures that are open but not infinitely so, that emerge from the present, and that are shaped but not determined by history. As Richard Neustadt and Ernest May classically put it in *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* (1986), "the future has no place to come from but the past."<sup>23</sup> Those who study the past may accordingly be more reliable guides to determining which futures are plausibly imaginable and which are not.

"Start the story as far back as it properly goes," Neustadt and May urged those

<sup>18</sup> Peter Mandler, "The Responsibility of the Historian," in Harriet Jones, Kjell Östberg, and Nico Randeraad, eds., *Contemporary History on Trial: Europe since 1989 and the Role of the Expert Historian* (Manchester, 2007), 12–26, here 24.

<sup>19</sup> Emma Rothschild, "The Future of History," in Karl Grandin, ed., *Going Digital: Evolutionary and Revolutionary Aspects of Digitization* (Stockholm, 2011), 280–294; Edelstein, "Intellectual History and Digital Humanities."

<sup>20</sup> Tom Devine, "Today Is the Most Important Date since 1707 Act of Union," *Scotsman*, October 15, 2014, <http://www.scotsman.com/news/tom-devine-today-is-the-most-important-date-since-1707-act-of-union-1-2576105>.

<sup>21</sup> Hayden V. White, "The Burden of History," *History and Theory* 5, no. 2 (1966): 111–134; Reinhart Koselleck, "Historia Magistra Vitae: The Dissolution of the Topos into the Perspective of a Modernized Historical Process," in Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. Keith Tribe (New York, 2004), 26–42. See also the essays by David C. Engerman, Jenny Andersson, Matthew Connelly, Matt Fay, Giulia Ferrini, Micki Kaufman, Will Leonard, Harrison Monsky, Ryan Musto, Taunton Paine, Nicholas Standish, Lydia Walker, and Manu Goswami in the *AHR* Forum "Histories of the Future," *American Historical Review* 117, no. 5 (December 2012): 1402–1485.

<sup>22</sup> David J. Staley, *History and Future: Using Historical Thinking to Imagine the Future* (Lanham, Md., 2007).

<sup>23</sup> Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* (New York, 1986), 251.



who rely on history; do not “foreshorten this history in ways that may distort it.”<sup>24</sup> Their focus was on particular kinds of strategic decisions, and not so much on the “megatrends” that now overshadow most short-term calculations.<sup>25</sup> *The History Manifesto* isolated three problems of this kind—climate change, economic inequality, and global governance—though there are plenty of other examples that could be adduced: public health crises, resource scarcity, the challenges of urbanization, aging populations, and declining tax bases, to name only a few—that would be susceptible to historical analysis. In the three cases emphasized in the book (chap. 3), starting the story demanded going back centuries rather than decades, to reconstruct unfolding processes rather than more bounded events or crises, *longue durées* rather than short pasts.

*The History Manifesto* celebrates the achievements and virtues of microhistory and argues that “short-term analysis and the long-term overview should work together to produce a more intense, sensitive, and ethical synthesis of data” (130). Cohen and Mandler manage to misread these affirmations as “pedestrian” and “weak.” But there is surely a greater danger in going too short rather than too long, of stopping one’s “history too early” when the problem at hand demands reconstruction of long-range connections, tracing tangled chains of causality, and juggling multiple temporalities.<sup>26</sup> Historians will naturally pursue different kinds of projects at different points in their careers, as the examples of Arthur Schlesinger Sr. and Charles Beard, cited both in *The History Manifesto* and by Cohen and Mandler, show. The main thrust of the book was nonetheless to affirm the greater possibilities that are now emerging for writing such extensive histories earlier rather than later in historians’ careers. The aim was accordingly not to constrain ambition but to encourage it, and not to truncate historical inquiries—particularly by younger researchers—when they require pursuit over larger expanses of time or space.

The return of the *longue durée* is a palpable and welcome feature of contemporary historical writing. Determining exactly when the rebound began, and whether it has been the work of years or decades, depends on which data—and which parts of that data—the historian focuses on. A much bigger sample than Cohen and Mandler’s, drawing on date ranges in the titles of roughly 68,000 history doctoral dissertations in ProQuest, as well as in 80,000 historical articles and reviews of historical monographs published in journals from 1920 to 2014 and available through JSTOR, does suggest that those spans began to expand in the 1970s. They still reached a median range of about seventy-five years by the late 1990s, with a slight uptick only in the current decade. (See Figure 2.) Date ranges in 15,000 articles and book reviews published in the *AHR* in the same period are consistent with this broad tendency.<sup>27</sup> (See Figure 3.) Most striking of all is the contraction of time scales visible in history doctoral dissertations from the U.S. between 1920 and 2014. (See Figure 4.) The median date range for history dissertations in the 1920s reached as high as eighty years before falling to closer to thirty in the 1960s. It began to rise again in the 1970s,

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 236.

<sup>25</sup> Lamy et al., *Now for the Long Term*; Bjørn Lomborg, ed., *Global Problems, Smart Solutions: Costs and Benefits* (Cambridge, 2013).

<sup>26</sup> David Nirenberg, *Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition* (New York, 2013), 5.

<sup>27</sup> We are very grateful to Zachary Davis for his invaluable assistance in compiling and visualizing this data.




FIGURE 2: Time scales covered in JSTOR articles + JSTOR book reviews + ProQuest dissertations, 1920–2014.

with a peak around sixty years in the late 1990s. Only in the last few years has it breached a median of eighty years again.

The increasing inclination to go long is even more pronounced in the articles and books reviewed in historical journals in JSTOR. The average biological time span of roughly seventy-five years was breached only in the late 1980s, but it has been climbing ever since, with a more dramatic expansion of temporal horizons in the last five years. (See Figure 5.) As we point out in the book (40–51), some kinds of evidence—historians’ memoirs, handbooks of historical practice, protests against overspecialization—indicated an inflection point for the “Short Past” around 1968. These larger datasets suggest an alternative chronology but an identical morphology. Time scales contracted and have since widened, with their greatest expansion in the last few years, just as *The History Manifesto* observed. The central question, then, is not *whether* the *longue durée* returned, but exactly *when* it started to come back.

There is also more than one possible interpretation of Benjamin Schmidt’s data on the time spans covered by dissertations in history in the United States. Using Cohen and Mandler’s logic that more humanities degrees mean more historians, even as the relative number of history undergraduates has declined, one can argue that the explosion in the number of history dissertations meant that in absolute, if not in relative, terms, there were simply more covering short *durées* after the 1970s. As Schmidt himself has noted, writers of dissertations treating earlier periods covered longer time spans: “Dissertations about the late middle ages typically cover a century . . . the lengths are possibly a bit longer around 1000, and they drop dramatically immediately after the renaissance, where they plateau at about 60 years for






FIGURE 3: Time scales covered by articles and book reviews in the *American Historical Review*, 1920–2014. Jagged line = mean time range for a given year. Straight line = smoothed mean. Gray area: margin of error.

most of the early modern period.”<sup>28</sup> The major shift was toward more contemporary topics. Such presentism is its own form of short-termism. It need not entail a shortening of the period under study, but it is certainly a contraction of the historian’s temporal horizon to the more recent past. The perspective of the *longue durée* can help to ameliorate or overcome that particular form of historical myopia.

Historians are not soldiers, nor are they sheep: they may not want to be led, nor can they be herded. Yet, as in any complex community, the individual choices historians make—about the questions they tackle, the debates into which they intervene, the sources they deploy, and the tools they employ—aggregate behind our backs into discernible patterns, even trends. Like transnational history, transtemporal history—the movement toward longer time scales—is one of those trends.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Ben Schmidt, “What Years Do Historians Write About?,” *Sapping Attention*, May 9, 2013, <http://sappingattention.blogspot.com/2013/05/what-years-do-historians-write-about.html#more>.

<sup>29</sup> C. A. Bayly, Sven Beckert, Matthew Connolly, Isabel Hofmeyr, Wendy Kozol, and Patricia Seed,




FIGURE 4: Median time scales covered by approximately 68,000 U.S. doctoral dissertations in history, 1920–2014.

It is not entirely novel—it is more of a return than a turn, in the classic historiographical sense—but it is cumulative, it is ongoing, and it shows little sign of abating.<sup>30</sup> It also is not confined to history departments, as the response to Thomas Piketty's *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* (2013) across the social sciences intimates.<sup>31</sup>

Superb works of history on increasingly *longue durées* are appearing in almost every field, on subjects ranging from copyright to climate change, from property to philology, and from Native American history to sustainability.<sup>32</sup> *The History Man-*

"On Transnational History," *AHR Conversation*, *American Historical Review* 111, no. 5 (December 2006): 1441–1464; Sebouh David Aslanian, Joyce E. Chaplin, Kristin Mann, and Ann McGrath, "How Size Matters: The Question of Scale in History," *AHR Conversation*, *American Historical Review* 118, no. 5 (December 2013): 1431–1472.

<sup>30</sup> Armitage and Guldi, "Le retour de la longue durée."

<sup>31</sup> Mike Savage, "Piketty's Challenge for Sociology," *British Journal of Sociology* 65, no. 4 (December 2014): 591–606.

<sup>32</sup> To the works we cite in *The History Manifesto*, 85–86, add now Peter Baldwin, *The Copyright Wars*:






FIGURE 5: Time scales covered in JSTOR articles and book reviews, 1950–2014. Jagged line = mean time range for a given year. Straight line = smoothed mean. Grey area: margin of error.

*ifesto* firmly encourages more research along these lines, but not by telling historians to do something they are not already doing or by urging the impossible. Instead, the book discerns an optimistic and creative tendency, aims to give it more energy, and affirms the new directions emerging in our field. That is both continuous with current practice and true to some of the most enduring traditions of historical writing. It also runs with the grain of our larger ethical commitments as historians to multiple publics, living as well as dead, and to the deep past rather than just to the immediate present. For, as one distinguished historian—indeed, a contributor to this *AHR* Ex-

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*Three Centuries of Trans-Atlantic Battle* (Princeton, N.J., 2014); John L. Brooke, *Climate Change and the Course of Global History: A Rough Journey* (Cambridge, 2014); Jeremy L. Caradonna, *Sustainability: A History* (Oxford, 2014); Andrew Fitzmaurice, *Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 1500–2000* (Cambridge, 2014); James Turner, *Philology: The Forgotten Origins of the Modern Humanities* (Princeton, N.J., 2014); Jace Weaver, *The Red Atlantic: American Indigenes and the Making of the Modern World, 1000–1927* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2014), among many other examples.

change—has bracingly asserted against the short-termism of our times, “There can be no higher responsibility for the historian than to remember the long term.”<sup>33</sup>

<sup>33</sup> “Each time a politician or a lobbyist or a journalist comes to us, seeking to borrow our authority, our time and resources for a campaign on the grounds that the public is—today, in the short-term—clamouring for it, we have to try to remember that the greater public interest is in the long term integrity of our craft. There can be no higher responsibility for the historian than to remember the long term.” Mandler, “The Responsibility of the Historian,” 25.

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**David Armitage** is the Lloyd C. Blankfein Professor of History and Chair (2012–2014, 2015–2016) of the Department of History at Harvard University. Among his books are *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), *The Declaration of Independence: A Global History* (Harvard University Press, 2007), *Foundations of Modern International Thought* (Cambridge University Press, 2013), and, with Jo Guldi, *The History Manifesto* (Cambridge University Press, 2014). His latest book, *Civil War: A History in Ideas*, will appear in 2016 from Alfred A. Knopf, and he is now completing an edition of John Locke’s colonial writings for Oxford University Press.

**Jo Guldi** is Hans Rothfels Assistant Professor of the History of Britain and Its Empire at Brown University, an alumna of the Harvard Society of Fellows, and a graduate of the History Department at the University of California, Berkeley. She is the author of *Roads to Power: Britain Invents the Infrastructure State* (Harvard University Press, 2012), as well as *What Is the Spatial Turn?* (UVA Scholars Lab, 2012) and the digital software toolkit for big history, *Paper Machines*. She is currently working on a transnational history of land reform movements since 1870.



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## Featured Reviews

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RENS BOD. *A New History of the Humanities: The Search for Principles and Patterns from Antiquity to the Present*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. xv, 384. \$74.00.

JAMES TURNER. *Philology: The Forgotten Origins of the Modern Humanities*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014. Pp. xxiv, 550. \$35.00.

Rens Bod and James Turner each embarked a number of years ago on a dauntingly difficult project for which there was no precedent: to trace the history of the humanities across two millennia and many divergent disciplines. Imagine their surprise to discover one another only shortly before their books appeared in print at about the same time. These two remarkable studies illustrate the fragmentation of the humanities into separate disciplines and professional contexts, discernible in the significant differences in their treatments of the topic and in their separate but parallel geneeses. At the same time, both books have much in common, from their commitment to a nuanced portrayal of a complex web of intellectual and institutional developments, to their call for a greater appreciation of the very durable achievements of humanistic inquiry. Taken singly or together, these volumes contribute a timely historical dimension to the current debates swirling around about the nature and value of the humanities. The disciplinary formations visible in universities today (which also vary by country) date from the relatively recent past (especially 1850–1900), but both authors show how they are rooted in much longer intellectual traditions.

Defining the humanities is a significant initial hurdle in writing their history. Turner and Bod have taken opposite tacks on this point. Turner's method is to start from one ancient term and field of interest—philology—and to trace its disciplinary descendants in three chronological segments: down to 1800, 1800–1850, and 1850–ca. 1910. In Hellenistic antiquity, philology encompassed four areas: language theory, rhetoric, textual criticism, and grammar. By the time of the Renaissance, philology had expanded to encompass all fields useful in interpreting antiquity, including history, chronology, poetry, and the antiquarian study of physical as well as textual remains. By the eighteenth century, the tools devised for the study of antiquity were applied to

modern European, Near Eastern, and Amerindian languages and cultures, generating a wide range of fields that were professionalized in the late nineteenth century as archaeology, biblical philology, comparative linguistics, comparative religion, anthropology, literature and its many component parts (criticism, literary history, rhetoric), history, art history, and classics (which had become by 1900 just one humanistic discipline alongside many others). By the end of the nineteenth century, “the rubric ‘humanities’ came to label most of the new disciplines spawned by philology” (p. 234). Turner notes some discrepancies nonetheless: anthropology, theoretical linguistics, and biblical criticism are not usually labeled “humanities” even though they descended from philology, while music and philosophy, often classified as humanities, are not related to philology in Turner's view and do not feature in his account as a result. Music moved away from its original classification as a mathematical field of the *quadrivium* only in the eighteenth century (as Bod discusses). Turner points out that philosophy is not exclusively grouped with the humanities in Irish and British universities and argues that philosophy ended up in the humanities in American universities “from administrative convenience and accident of timing” (p. 381). During the late nineteenth century, American universities were shedding their explicitly religious ties, but parents, teachers, and students still felt the need for morally uplifting and character-forming instruction. They turned to the humanities especially to fill that need; courses in literature and art history, for example, often developed a spiritual angle in the late nineteenth century. Philosophy, with its tradition of moral reasoning, easily fit that profile and thus entered the humanities. In seeing philosophy and philology as opposites brought into the same disciplinary category by historical circumstance, Turner privileges a modern sense of the difference between

these approaches and downplays the ways in which the two fields were also intertwined in the Renaissance humanist project of teaching morality through the philosophical study of philosophical texts.

By contrast with Turner's focus on the long career of one ancient discipline, Rens Bod starts from the current academic landscape to identify areas of study in the past and in non-European cultures, taking what he calls a "pragmatic stance": "the humanities are the disciplines that are taught and studied at humanities faculties" (p. 2). Of course Bod is well aware that disciplinary classifications vary today by national tradition and even within some countries from one institution to another. In practice Bod has selected fields that are in the humanities by broad current consensus and that suit his purposes. With a systematic approach Bod proceeds through four periods—ancient, medieval, early modern, and modern—to examine roughly eight different fields: linguistics (or the study of language), historiography (or the writing of history), philology and textual reconstruction, musicology, art theory, logic, rhetoric, and poetics (these last two are replaced by literary and theater studies and by media and cultural studies in the modern section). Bod, too, omits philosophy as a discipline; he considers that it subtends all the humanistic fields and he discusses philosophies of language, art, or history in the relevant sections. Bod explains the absence of theology in similar terms, as omnipresent in the premodern periods and therefore not in need of separate treatment. Thus religious and biblical studies and area studies more generally, which loom large in Turner's account, hardly appear in Bod's, in keeping perhaps also with their low visibility in humanities faculties today in Europe.

Bod and Turner have also defined their geographical scope very differently. After the first two chapters tracing the expansion of philology between antiquity and the seventeenth century, Turner focuses on the English-speaking Atlantic world: England, Ireland, Scotland, and North America. He argues that modern Anglo-American humanities were formed from "the heterogeneous stew of British philological erudition" in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (p. 2). This tight focus on a geography interconnected by language, culture, and dense political and commercial interaction enables Turner to follow the formation of the intellectual and professional categories of the humanities through the twists and turns of the impact of individuals, institutions, and larger historical forces (e.g., imperial expansion, developments on the continent, reforms in higher education). More than once Turner notes the role of the "peripheral" contexts in embracing new developments. For example, the study of English as opposed to Latin rhetoric began in Scotland in the eighteenth century to improve the mastery of what was a foreign language to many Scots. Irish and American institutions similarly taught rhetoric from English authors in order to attune their graduates to the English elite. But Turner distinguishes this attention to literary texts as models to imitate from the teaching of litera-

ture as an object of analysis, which began in the nineteenth century (e.g., with George Ticknor's courses on French and Spanish literature at Harvard in 1819). Turner argues that in the late nineteenth century Oxford and Cambridge resisted the formation of alternatives to the classical curriculum and the introduction of the German model of classical philology with its emphasis on contextual analysis. On the one hand the students there were reluctant to enter new fields of study, which were less prestigious than the traditional classical tripos, and on the other hand, the Oxbridge dons were generalists devoted to their teaching habits and reluctant to embrace a new research program. University College London was instead the first British institution to welcome German philology. Meanwhile, Americans, who had no local access to the tools of scholarship, studied in Europe (especially after the Cunard Line began reliable steamship service in 1840) and brought back with them German models of scholarship and professionalization along with purchases of new and rare books. Turner also tracks the fitful reception of German higher criticism. First anthologized in English (with strategic omissions) in New York in 1829 and then the object of public indignation when widely disseminated in London in 1860, it was nonetheless adopted in the British academy by 1890, but spread more slowly in the U.S., where biblical studies were taught principally in seminaries. Turner's expert focus enables him to offer a richly contextualized account of differentiated reactions and interactions.

Bod, by contrast, casts a global net by complementing his main focus on Europe with sections on the different humanistic fields in China, India, and the Arab world, with occasional references to Africa. Although his treatments of non-Western developments become thinner for the later two periods, Bod has clearly mastered a vast swath of secondary and primary sources available on these areas in European languages. Bod draws special attention, for example, to the rule-based grammar of Sanskrit devised by Panini in India ca. 500 B.C.E., unrivaled until the modern period in its ability to describe a natural language by rules alone. He contrasts Panini with the eighth-century Persian Sibawayh whose description of Arabic was principally example-based, including an enumeration of peculiarities and exceptions to the grammatical concepts that he drew from the Greek Dionysius Thrax. In historiography Bod highlights the *isnad*, the Islamic notion of the chain of transmission that accompanied *hadith* or holy sayings in order to validate them. He also notes how the pattern of "rise, peak, and decline" (p. 21) appealed to historians in different contexts, including Sima Qian in ancient China and Herodotus in Greece, Ibn Khaldun in fourteenth-century Islam, and a number of early modern Europeans. Bod follows modern categories (of disciplines and themes) to identify promising areas for comparisons, which he then carries out with sensitivity to the terms and motives specific to each context. But he is less interested in the specifics of transmissions and interactions than in seeing what he calls meta-patterns



that become visible by comparing humanistic disciplines on a grand scale. For example, Bod notes an overall pattern of cyclical shifts from descriptive humanities (in antiquity) to prescriptive (in the Middle Ages) back to description in the early modern period. Similarly he emphasizes the move from rule-based to example-based approaches (and sometimes back again) in linguistics and music, among other disciplines. Although Bod acknowledges the role of pattern-rejecting trends in the humanities, he is himself a pattern-seeker especially interested in pattern-seeking as a humanistic activity.

Strikingly, both authors have opted for a *longue durée* perspective, although neither makes any broad methodological claim for the merit of that over other time frames; this distinguishes their work from studies limited to a particular time and place like Jan Eckel's *Geist der Zeit: Deutsche Geisteswissenschaften seit 1870* (2008). Turner uses the 2,000-year span to emphasize the common ancestry of so many of the modern humanities. Through the processes of fragmentation, reconfiguration, and estrangement that shaped the humanistic disciplines over hundreds of years, Turner identifies the persistence of the defining features of philology: concerns for authentication, dating, and interpretation through the careful scrutiny and comparison of particulars studied in their cultural context. Comparative philological thinking created an awareness of cultural distance between the Renaissance and antiquity (first classical then biblical antiquity), then between Europe and the cultures of other continents (resulting in comparative linguistics and cultural anthropology), and was transferred from texts to images and artifacts with the formation of art history and archaeology. Turner highlights the presence of this single mental toolkit across so many disciplines through the careers of individuals who were involved in multiple fields, not only in the early modern period when we expect it, but also precisely during the period when modern disciplinary distinctions became institutionalized. For example, the Scottish biblical scholar William Robertson Smith drew the attention of philologists to comparative religion and anthropology; Charles Eliot Norton was a central figure in art history, archaeology, and Dante studies in the U.S.; and the German-born Friedrich Max Müller spent his career in Britain working in Sanskrit studies, linguistics, and comparative religion. James Turner is a distinguished intellectual historian well known to the history profession, especially in the United States. He has written landmark books on attitudes toward animal suffering in nineteenth-century Britain and America, the rise of unbelief in the United States, the career of Charles Eliot Norton, and the history of American higher education. In those and this new book he is a consummate practitioner of the philological mindset that he studies.

By contrast, Rens Bod is a computational linguist by training. In his first book, *Beyond Grammar: An Experience-Based Theory of Language* (1998), Bod argued that accumulated language experiences analyzed elec-

tronically (notably with a "Data Oriented Parsing" method of his devising) describe a language better than any grammar. Bod has proceeded by applying a systematic set of questions (listed in Appendix A along with 15 follow-up questions) to uncover the methods and/or principles applied and the answers and patterns reached in each of the disciplines and contexts he considers. Bod uses the long time frame to highlight a continuous tradition of pattern-seeking in the humanities because "the quest for patterns . . . can be found in all disciplines, periods, and regions," not only in the study of nature but also in the study of "texts, languages, literature, music, art, theatre, and the past" (pp. 7, 9). Bod's method of celebrating the humanities is to emphasize features typically associated with success in the natural sciences. He argues that in most humanistic fields one can find a historical trend toward increased formalization of rules and patterns, and elements of progress measured by increased problem-solving capacity. Linguistics offers a splendid example of a field that considers itself progressive through the elucidation of rules, hence the appeal of Panini who accomplished the feat of a complete rule-based grammar in a time and place far remote from our own. Bod brings special expertise and enthusiasm to the history of his own field of training. He also emphasizes that the humanities have made crucial contributions to knowledge that deserve greater appreciation. For example, humanist philology was crucial in the overthrow of Aristotle, a step toward modernity that is usually solely credited to the "Scientific Revolution"; early modern historiography played a central role in breaking the constraints of the biblical time frame; and stemmatic philology is a "completed discipline" that offers a quasi-scientific method for the study of the transmission of texts. For Bod the big picture points to the absence of a radical dichotomy between the humanities and the sciences, except for a greater attention to exceptions in the former. Bod has written in the heroic mode, highlighting great achievements above all, but he does so responsibly. His accounts seem generally well founded within the constraints of a broad synthetic approach. Imbued with a strong sense of method, Bod is also careful to acknowledge that his history is selective, that the answers to some questions are uncertain, and that there is insufficient evidence to support some tempting conclusions.

Whether or not they were initially motivated by a sense of crisis in the humanities, both books will surely be read in that context. Bod's celebratory tone might help draw broader attention to the achievements of the humanities, but the nature of the book (though impressively well written by the author in English) and its price tag will probably ensure that it will mostly be read by those already persuaded of the merits of these fields. Bod's book is designed as an opening salvo in a grand project to develop the history of the humanities as a subfield on par with (and potentially in close alliance with) the history of science, with a view to building a history of knowledge-making more generally. He lays out the broadest possible contours of the field in order

to invite further study, but judging from the collective projects he has organized so far, he does not enjoin others to take the same broad approach. Three conferences since 2008 have resulted in a series of volumes he co-edited with his colleagues Jaap Maat and Thijs Weststeijn in a series published by the University of Chicago: *The Making of the Humanities*, volume 1: *Early Modern Europe* (2010); volume 2: *From Early Modern to Modern Disciplines* (2012); and volume 3: *The Making of the Modern Humanities* (2014). Further conferences are planned for Baltimore 2016, Oxford 2017, and Beijing 2018. A new journal, *History of the Humanities*, will publish its first issue in 2016. The existing volumes organized by field within broad chronological categories bring together scholars from a wide range of disciplines all working on the intellectual and institutional history of various areas of knowledge. Bod is clearly committed to a pluralist interpretation of the humanities, though his own interests tend toward the pattern-seeking and the computational. In his wide embrace, the history of the humanities can certainly serve as a welcome venue to motivate new research projects and encourage collaborations. Bod's energetic initiatives are a fine example of the shifting categories of research, like those tracked by Turner in earlier periods, though it is hard to decide whether the lasting effect will be fragmentation (creating yet another subfield with professional journal and conferences) or consolidation (by giving those studying the history of humanistic fields an intellectual community they did not have before).

Turner does not pursue the history of the humanities far into the twentieth century. He stops before philology began its decline, the effects of which can be measured by the recent renaming of the American Philological Association (founded in 1869) as the Society for

Classical Studies, a title constructed by analogy with area studies that emphasize the field's embrace of all those modern offshoots of philology (history, archaeology, art history, and literary interpretation) rather than the original core concerns of textual emendation, authentication, and dating. Turner notes that the humanistic disciplines as we know them were formed within the last 150 years at most. They are bound together by their shared philological ancestry even more than by the interdisciplinary initiatives that began in the early twentieth century, soon after professional specialization was established. Practitioners of the humanities today should therefore be open to further reconfigurations, including possible consolidations, of their disciplines in the future.

These books illustrate the value of a historical approach to the humanities in explaining both the long continuities and the contingent peculiarities behind the current web of academic disciplines. They also exemplify the distance that has formed through specialization within the humanities, notably between history and linguistics, which represent contrasting methodologies in the spectrum of disciplines descended from philology. The humanities will of course continue to evolve. Let us hope that their evolution is driven principally by the intellectual initiatives of their practitioners, not only by the introduction of new methods and sub-disciplines, but also by the revitalization of traditional ones, and combinations of old and new. The possibilities are many, as those involved in the edited volume *World Philology* (2015) illustrate by combining Bod's global perspective with Turner's disciplinary focus.

ANN BLAIR  
Harvard University

CLAUDIO LOMNITZ. *The Return of Comrade Ricardo Flores Magón*. New York: Zone Books, 2014. Pp. xlii, 594. \$34.95.

Ricardo Flores Magón followed the path to the "dustbin of history" long before Bolshevik Leon Trotsky had consigned the despised rival Mensheviks to that fate in the Russian Revolution of 1917. Flores Magón and his two brothers, Enrique and Jesús, led a small group of anarchists, organized as the *Partido Liberal Mexicano* (PLM) on the eve of and during the Mexican Revolution, ranting and railing to no avail, first against the longtime dictator Porfirio Díaz and then against successive, corrupted regimes during a series of civil wars from 1910 through the early 1920s. Despite themselves, the Flores Magón brothers posthumously were elevated to the pantheon of official heroes of the revolution, obtaining the title of "precursors" decades after the victorious revolutionary faction had cast them into oblivion. They reached this hallowed place so ironically, at the behest of the most cynical of the revolutionaries

who comprised the Party of the Institutionalized Revolution (PRI), which ruled Mexico for 80 years.

The brothers Magón had quite a story. Claudio Lomnitz, a historian-anthropologist and one of Mexico's preeminent public intellectuals, tells it beautifully and compellingly in minute detail. Lomnitz spruces up the Flores Magón brothers, labeling theirs the "story of a transnational revolutionary network" (p. xiii) that thought of itself collectively as the servant of an ideal. Idealists of this sort are, generally speaking, quite boring, but this cast of characters was anything but dull (think of the film *Reds* [1981]), ranging from errant muckraking journalists to unconventional females. There were blood feuds, conspiracies, backstabbing, betrayals, vitriol, high principles, soap opera-like romances, bravery, ineptness, and brilliance. Lomnitz reveals every, often fascinating, personality quirk of the brothers and their group. Not only does he deftly por-



tray the individuals, but he also captures the sense of the tumultuous times both in Mexico and the United States.

The PLM was comprised of two overlapping circles. One consisted of the central committee of the PLM, Ricardo Flores Magón, his companion María Brousse, his brother Enrique, Librado and Concha Rivera, Antonio Villarreal, Juan and Manuel Sarabia, Anselmo Figueroa, Praxedis Guerrero, Antonio de P. Araujo, William C. Owen, Blas Lara, and Jesús M. Rangel, among others. The second group included Americans, mostly from Los Angeles: John Kenneth Turner, his wife Ethel Duffy Turner, and John Murray—all writers or journalists—and the sponsors, heiress Elizabeth Trowbridge, Frances Nacke Noel, and P. D. Noel, a union leader and business person, respectively. From 1908 they were involved in an unending melodrama of petty and major disagreements, fleeting successes, and ultimate failure.

Surprisingly, three women, Elizabeth Trowbridge, Ethel Duffy Turner, and Frances Noel, were the primary backers of what they called “The Mexican Cause.” They regarded the Mexican men of the PLM with almost worshipful eyes. Trowbridge went so far as to marry Manuel Sarabia, apparently regaling in her living with an outlaw revolutionary. She eventually expended her considerable inherited fortune on the cause. The Americans were, to Lomnitz’s mind, taken not so much by Mexico, about which they knew absolutely nothing, but rather by the romance of the Mexican exiles. Lomnitz sees other connections as well, such as their opposition to Mexican slavery, their rebellious socialism, and their indignation against the blatant violations of theirs and the Mexican exiles’ civil rights.

At the heart and soul of the PLM was Ricardo Flores Magón. Trowbridge wrote of him: “‘The two chief characteristics of the man are his perfect mastery over self, and his courage and devotion in the cause of the oppressed’” (pp. 20–21). In truth he was an ideological martinet, intolerant of disagreement, and relentlessly meanspirited toward those who deviated from his righteous, designated path. At one point Ricardo ordered the execution of two of his closest and dearest allies, who he believed had betrayed the cause. This pure revolutionary, however, built his myth on half-truths. Ricardo’s life story, and that of his brothers, was constructed of whole cloth. They claimed their origins as *hijos del pueblo* (sons of the people), but in fact they were the children of an upper-middle-class landowner in Oaxaca. Neither were the Flores Magóns descendants of the Aztecs, as they had also claimed. They modified the tale of their parents’ romantic meeting during the war against the French to exclude the fact that their father was already married and that they were the “natural children of a common-law union” (p. 43). Their mother was a widow who apparently abandoned her other two children (as their father had also left his two children) to take up with Teodoro Flores Magón. The brothers’ lives were enmeshed in a cover-up from the beginning. Teodoro, furthermore, had sided with

Porfirio Díaz during the latter’s first, unsuccessful rebellion in 1876. The brothers ignored that their father had early on supported the tyrant whom they later opposed so vehemently.

The Mexican Liberals began their protests as a generation shut out of power with the third re-election of Díaz in 1892. The Mexican government jailed Jesús and Ricardo that year for the first time. Jesús had helped found an opposition newspaper, *El Demócrata*, which exposed the tragedy of the massacre of rebels in the pueblo of Tomochic, Chihuahua. Lomnitz portrays these 1890s Liberals as prolonged students, taking years to finish their educations, working their way through but not up in the government bureaucracy, increasingly politicized by the inequities and oppression they saw all around them. During the 1890s “they became impassioned . . . and increasingly viewed themselves as the true heirs of the nationalist spirit that Díaz and his friends had betrayed” (p. 80). The 1890s Liberals shared similar backgrounds with the petty bourgeois winners of the Mexican Revolution, such as Álvaro Obregón and Plutarco Elías Calles, both of whom the Magonistas reviled. Ultimately, of course, Obregón and Calles grew rich and powerful (before being assassinated and exiled, respectively), while the Flores Magón brothers spent much of their lives impoverished or in jail. As the protests against the Díaz dictatorship grew stronger after 1900, the Liberals divided into two factions, one radical, led by the Flores Magóns, the members of which became anarchists, and another comprised of moderate liberals, who joined with Francisco Madero and his successors.

What brought the Flores Magón brothers to national notoriety was *Regeneración*, the weekly journal they founded in 1900. Within months they were in jail, but for about a year or so (1900–1901) *Regeneración* shone in opposition to the dictatorship. Ricardo then devoted the next two decades trying to recapture those all too brief moments of national attention and meaningful writing. At the same time the liberals set out to establish a new political party. The Díaz regime greeted the emergent liberals in the years 1900 to 1903 with relentless repression, fearing that if combined with the concurrent rebellion in the state of Guerrero, the mostly urban and northern-based liberals would pose a nascent threat. Díaz crushed both.

In September 1906 the PLM instigated a revolt that failed miserably. Most of the party’s following was in the north of the country with a strong contingent in Veracruz. But the rebels evidently did not maintain secrecy and both the Mexican and the U.S. governments stepped in to quash their plans. The PLM kept trying until mid-1907, when its leaders retreated, in exile, into their previous state of opposition. But the unsuccessful revolt tore apart the PLM, as its members divided ferociously over whether armed revolt was the correct path. Ricardo favored exile and reestablishment of the newspaper. The infighting was brutal. Ricardo decided that the members of the junta of the party were too valuable to sacrifice and consequently would stay in the

United States. Without the junta in place Ricardo feared (and experience had taught him) that the PLM would factionalize, fall into disorganization or, worst of all, drift into an unsavory reformist alliance with the likes of Francisco I. Madero, who later emerged as the leader of the 1910 revolution. Ricardo stayed in Los Angeles through it all: the new revolt of 1908, the Revolution of 1910, and throughout the decade-long fighting from 1910 to 1920.

In the case of the PLM, the Díaz government proved remarkably adept at repressing the movement, using an impressive intelligence network in Mexico and the Mexican consuls and private detectives in the United States. Díaz also won the support of the major newspapers by giving lucrative concessions to landowners William Randolph Hearst and Harrison Gray Otis. The deck was stacked against the PLM.

The failures of 1906 and 1908 were followed by yet another even grander failure in 1910 and 1911, when the revolution erupted and the rebels led by Francisco I. Madero, scion of one of the richest families in Mexico, ousted Porfirio Díaz. Ricardo and two of his closest allies, Antonio I. Villarreal and Librado Rivera, had just months before the outbreak of hostilities been released from prison after three years. But their years in prison and their ideology created for them a world not quite understanding of the practicalities of Mexican politics, which were most importantly local. Madero had been out in the countryside gaining support during all the years Ricardo and the others were in jail. He built a political machine, the Anti-Reelectionist Party.

But interestingly enough Ricardo realized long before Madero that Díaz could not be defeated through democratic means and that military action was required. He also believed that peasants and workers in a vast movement should take property directly. Merely overthrowing Díaz by military force would not be sufficient, but Ricardo would not compromise his ideals and therefore would not ally with Madero and his Anti-Reelectionists, even if only temporarily. This caused a split in his ranks, for many of his group wanted "in" on the revolution. Ricardo saw the revolution as a long, drawn-out process deeply ingrained with hatred. Contradictorily, Ricardo refused to go to war himself and sought to keep the others in the PLM leadership from battle as well.

The opposition to Díaz divided into three groups in 1910. First were the Madero moderates, who sought free and fair elections, freedom of the press, and the right to organize. Second were the socialists, including Jesús Flores Magón, who believed that Mexico was not sufficiently industrialized for socialism and that achieving a moderate program was a good initial step. They were willing to cooperate with Madero. Third was the smallest group, the anarchists, including Ricardo and the followers of Emiliano Zapata, the peasant revolutionary. Iron-willed Ricardo broke with Madero and as a consequence irretrievably split the PLM. Ricardo would thereafter operate at the margins of the revo-

lution. To him it was galling indeed that the rich boy Madero had stolen his revolution.

The PLM enjoyed brief success when its rebels took Mexicali in February 1911. But even this fleeting victory and the subsequent occupation of Tijuana, boded ill for the PLM, for it brought on the wrath of Madero and tore the PLM apart. Jesús and others became traitors to the true cause. In addition, as Lomnitz observes, the temporary victory in Baja California was not the accomplishment of Mexicans but rather a rag-tag group of American sympathizers and mercenaries.

The question that arises is: why did this movement, built over more than a decade, lose influence so quickly and thoroughly? The PLM was not a factor in the revolution after 1911. Ricardo and his loyalists blamed betrayal and persecution for their decline. To be sure, the U.S. government pursued the PLM relentlessly from 1906 to 1911 and then again during the Red Scare of the late 1910s and early 1920s. But there were other factors that were more important. Ricardo incorrectly poured his efforts into propaganda instead of military operations. However, the Mexican Revolution was to be won by force of arms not the printing press. To make matters worse, there was no military talent among the PLM. Lomnitz focuses on an even more crucial oversight: Ricardo and his followers simply misunderstood the basis of the Díaz regime and the workings of Mexican politics. The dictatorship was not omnipotent, as they had thought, but rather it was built on an ongoing series of negotiations with different influential groups. Furthermore, all politics in Mexico were local and this made for innumerable, often contradictory, alliances. The PLM's one victory—in Baja California—was so isolated from the main events of the revolution that it hardly counted at all. Ultimately they failed there as well, mostly because they misunderstood local interests. Finally, Ricardo was adamantly, unbendingly devoted to his ideological views. He refused to return to Mexico either to run for office in democratic elections or to lead a military force. But he could not win a revolution *in absentia*. The revolutionaries who emerged victorious were notoriously non-ideological. Lomnitz describes the anarchist program of September 23, 1911 as "one of the purest and most beautiful ideological statements of the Mexican Revolution" (p. 391). Unfortunately for the PLM it was also indicative of Ricardo's lack of touch with reality.

After 1912, the PLM was no longer a threat to any faction of the revolution or counterrevolution though this did not prevent its persecution by the U.S. government. Even when out of jail Ricardo and his minions lived wretchedly. As Lomnitz writes, "Indeed, if poverty spoke for [their] honesty, sacrifice, determination, and sense of purpose" it also led to a "downward spiral of attachment to asceticism, recriminations against the impure, and progressive collective impotence" (p. 441). In 1916 the U.S. government jailed Ricardo and Enrique (Jesús was long-ago estranged). Eventually Ricardo and Enrique fell out over personal matters. Ricardo died in Leavenworth prison in 1922. He gained



the spotlight one more time, when, after his body was returned to Mexico—hence the title *The Return of Comrade Ricardo Flores Magón*—some of his adherents claimed he had been assassinated. Ricardo thus became a martyr, the very thought of which would have made him cringe. Enrique went on to become the mythmaker, allying with the revolutionary state, to memorialize his brother and their movement.

Lomnitz wonderfully captures the personalities of the PLM on both sides of the border. He reveals their strengths and weaknesses, follies and futilities with an admirable evenhandedness. He adeptly evokes the shadowy world of revolutionary exiles. The Flores

Magóns were no one's heroes, and counted among history's losers. Would the PLMers have wanted it any other way?

Historians know so very little about how revolutionaries act and think, especially those who lost. Lomnitz does us a great service by illuminating the psychologies and everyday lives of a small, and for a brief period effective, band of intellectuals; one, perhaps small, example of what it was like to live in times of profound upheaval.

MARK WASSERMAN  
Rutgers University

ELIZABETH LUNBECK. *The Americanization of Narcissism*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014. Pp. 367. \$35.00.

On November 26, 2014, Canadian radio host Jian Ghomeshi was released on bail following a court appearance in Toronto to face five criminal charges involving sexual assault and choking. The charges came a month after he was fired from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), Canada's public broadcaster. The CBC had dismissed Ghomeshi when, its spokespeople said, they were confronted with "graphic evidence" that Ghomeshi had physically injured a woman (Ian Austen, "Jian Ghomeshi, Canadian Radio Host Facing Sexual Assault Charges, Is Granted Bail," *New York Times*, November 26, 2014). In the weeks leading up to his court appearance nine other women came forward with similar allegations, some dating back a decade. Ghomeshi pleaded not guilty to all formal legal charges. He freely admitted that he enjoyed "rough sex," but insisted it was always consensual (Anne Kingston, "Jian Ghomeshi: How He Got Away with It," *Maclean's*, November 6, 2014).

Jian Ghomeshi was big news on both sides of the border. Ghomeshi had been the host of the radio program "Q With Jian Ghomeshi" since its inception in 2007. "Q" mainly featured interviews with a wide variety of artists, writers, actors, filmmakers, and musicians and, besides being one of the CBC's most successful programs ever, was the network's flagship show. It was also syndicated on 180 radio stations in the United States through Public Radio International (PRI). "Q" was "one of the faster-growing public radio programs in the U.S.," a PRI official stated, with 858,800 U.S. listeners and a live taping in Los Angeles on October 16, 2014 (Kingston). The "Q" YouTube channel averaged 1.5 million hits per month. Until women began coming forward with stories of abuse in 2014, Ghomeshi's fame was ascending in Canada and the United States.

What his mass listening audience did not know, however, was that Ghomeshi, according to a former "Q" producer, was "a narcissist. Very self involved" (Jonathan Gatehouse, et al., "Why No One Stopped Him,"

*Maclean's*, November 17, 2014). Experts agreed. One Vancouver-based physician referred to Ghomeshi's "overweening narcissism," which featured the abundant "pathological quirks of an apparently disturbed and charismatic individual" (Gabor Maté, "Jian Ghomeshi and the Problem of Narcissistic Male Rage," *Toronto Star*, November 4, 2014). A Canadian journalist called him manipulative, "self-absorbed," and "deceitful" (Rick Salutin, "Mystery of the Ghomeshi Interviews," *Toronto Star*, December 11, 2014). Radio was the ideal medium for Ghomeshi whose soothing voice created what observers called an "illusion of intimacy." Behind his easy-going, tolerant, and approachable image, however, Ghomeshi was a coddled star who quickly gained a reputation at the CBC for being merciless toward staffers who openly disagreed with him. A "Q" producer said: "You get along with Jian or Jian would get you fired" (Kingston, "Busted: The Toxic CBC Environment that Abetted Jian Ghomeshi," *Maclean's*, December 19, 2014). CBC employees who had been targets of Ghomeshi's sexual attentions at work quickly learned that complaining would likely be career-ending.

There was an eerie, if uncanny, similarity between the testimony of people who knew or worked with Ghomeshi and the traits that the historian Christopher Lasch cited as characteristic of the typical narcissistic personality in late-twentieth-century America. Lasch's *The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations* was published in 1979 and was heralded at the time by none other than U.S. president Jimmy Carter. Ghomeshi might not be American himself, but he certainly fits Lasch's description of a narcissist as someone who benefited from the "cult of celebrity," the peculiar process whereby modern-day Americans (and Canadians for that matter) projected their dreams of fame and glory onto media stars (Lasch, p. 21). Yet he was also an example of how contemporary society tended to thrust people like Ghomeshi into "po-

sitions of eminence" (Lasch, p. 231). As he basked in the glow of an ever-growing group of admirers and appreciative CBC brass, Ghomeshi was one of the "beautiful people," to borrow Lasch's terminology, demanding nothing less of his co-workers than unstinting praise. He was a grim example of how ambition, self-centeredness, and seductive charm could easily morph into what the field now calls narcissistic personality disorder.

Lasch's *Culture of Narcissism* was one of the most brilliant books in a series that dated back to the writings of social scientists Daniel Bell, Philip Rieff, and David Riesman. They and Lasch had warned that the rise of affluence in the twentieth century was paving the way for national decline. Unprecedented abundance of goods and services, abetted by expanding bureaucracies, professions, media, corporations, and educational institutions, was allegedly producing a new kind of national character, which differed substantially from that of pre-World War II history. Increasingly, the argument went, narcissistic traits such as insatiable tastes and a belief in entitlement and immediate gratification were replacing the values of thrift, sobriety, independence, self-sacrifice, and deferral of gratification that had made the country great. To this group of writers, postwar Americans rarely had to worry, like their ancestors had, about food, clothing, and shelter. In the words of economist John Kenneth Galbraith, "When man has satisfied his physical needs, then psychologically grounded desires take over." "These," Galbraith warned in 1958, "can never be satisfied." (*The Affluent Society* [1958], p. 117). Advertising took it from there: Madison Avenue steadily distorted the distinction between needs and wants. In 1966 Rieff predicted the rise of "psychological man," a person of "leisure, released by technology from the regimental discipline of work so as to secure his sense of well-being" (*The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith after Freud*, pp. 10, 236). According to Rieff, therapists encouraged "psychological man" to think he was discontented and to seek out treatment in an effort to be happier. In 1979 Lasch echoed Rieff's loathing of everyday Americans' reliance on expert advice in an effort to achieve emotional health. Lasch wrote that the emergence of psychological man, "[p]lagued by anxiety, depression, vague discontents, [and] a sense of inner emptiness," signaled a major turning point in modern history (Lasch, p. 13). Leading the way, Lasch asserted, were the narcissists whose shallowness, grandiosity, superficial seductiveness, and intense needs for approval and admiration outfitted them emotionally for success in the corporate, political, government, educational, and entertainment worlds of late-twentieth-century America.

Lasch's overall emphasis on narcissism as a cause of national decline is the topic and target of Elizabeth Lunbeck's *The Americanization of Narcissism*. Lunbeck's objective is to "wrest [the concept of] narcissism from the 'realm of pathology'" (p. 104). Lasch's "seamless combination of psychoanalysis and social criticism," according to Lunbeck, is "outdated" (pp. 16, 17).

She takes issue with the theory that society is dominated by "the vacuous consumer, the 'ego-addled' brat, and the preening celebrity," and argues that some of the features of narcissism are not only healthy in individuals, but also socially beneficial. Approvingly she quotes *New York Times* columnist David Brooks who in 2012 advocated a culture that "'gives two cheers to [narcissistic] grandiosity'" (p. 253). Besides, as *Time* magazine asked, how is posting photos on Facebook more worrying than couples in the 1960s "'trapping friends in their houses to watch their terrible vacation slide shows?'" (p. 264). Are not "selfies" just innocent fun? Ditto for shopping: to Lunbeck, consumers flocking en masse to the mall was "a legitimate indulgence and a harmless means to pursue pleasure" (p. 269), not a sign of civilization's collapse. Where Lasch saw shopaholics, Lunbeck sees people expressing and feeling better about themselves. In the words of a Cincinnati store manager in 1978, "'Fashion is saying . . . Why can't I have fun? I've earned it. I've gotten my head together, now I can enjoy it'" (p. 164).

Lunbeck's attack on Lasch rests on her careful and thoughtful discussion of twentieth-century psychoanalytic writings on narcissism. Early followers of Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, tended to subscribe to the master's definition of narcissism as an emotional state mired in pathology. According to classical psychoanalysis, narcissism was fundamentally opposed to the achievement of normal loving relations with other people, notably members of the opposite sex. Narcissists proved unable to "'move on to a fuller life,'" in the words of analyst Heinz Kohut (p. 72), because they failed to develop beyond the grandiosity of self which is typically associated with infancy. As a result, adult narcissists viewed others as extensions of themselves and hence were prone to tyrannize the people around them. Narcissism, Freud and his followers argued, was closely linked to homosexuality and its echoes of childhood auto-erotism. Orthodox analysts also insisted that women, with their greater interest in fashion, shopping, and physical beauty, tended to be more narcissistic than men.

Yet, Lunbeck argues, psychoanalytic theorizing about narcissism was more diverse than the writings of Freud might suggest. She unearths a strong current of clinical commentary that stressed that narcissism could be healthy. Analysts Kohut, Otto Kernberg, Joan Riviere, and Erik Erikson acknowledged the narcissist's aggressiveness and hostility, but also described the narcissist's self-absorption as a painful search for personal identity. As one psychologist remarked: "'Healthy narcissism can help you succeed.'" Successful people allegedly feel good about themselves, which "'radiates an inviting glow that improves personal and professional relationships'" (p. 254). Americans struggling to achieve self-esteem was "not cause for alarm," Lunbeck concludes, but at worst a benign, well-intentioned enterprise (p. 266).

Lunbeck is right about two things: one, Lasch's reliance on psychoanalysis is indeed dated; and two, some



of the traits identified with narcissism—ambition, creativity, and an interest in self-analysis—are hardly antisocial in themselves. As she puts it, high self-esteem is not necessarily a liability in the CEO of a major company. Some narcissistic traits can be advantageous. People who lead their lives as if they had meaning are often individuals on a journey of personal discovery, the outcome of which can benefit society by improving productivity and inspiring others to live fuller lives.

It is also certainly true that some tenets of pre-1970s psychoanalysis—the conflation of homosexuality and classical narcissism and blaming mothers for breeding narcissism in their children—have not aged well. Yet, narcissism as a concept stripped of its Freudian trappings is still valid. Emotional shallowness is shallowness whether or not one had troubled relations with one's parents in early childhood. Lasch's use of narcissism as a tool for analyzing American culture was first and foremost socio-historical, not clinical: his interest did not lie in getting Americans to crowd analysts' offices, but in identifying the historical forces responsible for shaping contemporary lives. "Modern capitalist society," Lasch wrote, not only elevated Ghomeshi-like people into prominent positions, but it also "elicit[ed] and reinforce[d] narcissistic traits in everyone" by fostering "many varieties of bureaucratic dependence" (Lasch, p. 232). Lasch, far from being simply a hide-bound traditionalist, urged Americans to question the root historical forces that tore asunder the communal bonds governing personal relations. By squarely indicting the consumerism and bureaucracy that accompanied late-twentieth-century capitalism, Lasch was trying to sustain a serious debate over the economic and social factors that had transformed life over the same period. Had Lasch lived long enough to learn turn-of-the-millennium Americans were "bowling alone" in Robert D. Putnam's words, he would not have been surprised by the finding.

Lunbeck's argument would have been much more convincing if she had discussed more fully the whole question of how "healthy" mass narcissism really is. Other than brief attempts to vindicate shopping and the popular concept of self-esteem, she does not grapple with the many present-day trends that suggest a grimmer picture of narcissism. Take the sheer size of America's enormous "caring industry" that had emerged by the early twenty-first century. This industry consisted of roughly 50,000 marriage and family counselors, 77,000 clinical psychologists, 192,000 clinical social workers, 105,000 mental health counselors, 17,000 nurse psychotherapists, and 30,000 life coaches (Ronald W. Dworkin, "The Rise of the Caring Industry," *Policy Review* 161 [June/July 2010]). "We live in an age consumed by worship of the psyche," wrote historian Eva S. Moskowitz in 2001, "a belief that feelings are sacred and sal-

vation lies in self-esteem, that happiness is the ultimate goal and psychological healing the means" (*In Therapy We Trust: America's Obsession with Self-Fulfillment*, p. 1). Yet the data tell us that this quest for "psychological healing" has not delivered the goods. A World Health Organization study released in 2004 showed that rates of most mental illnesses were higher in the United States than in any other countries in the world. Evidence indicates that one in four Americans suffers from depression, anxiety, substance abuse, or an eating disorder, but experts insist this is likely an underestimate. As for marriage, studies show that one of every two marriages fails in the United States (although the divorce rate for first marriages is as low as 30 percent). Americans are also choosing to remain unmarried like never before. The data conflict sharply with Lunbeck's insistence that America is full of self-actualizing people having fun discovering the "something great inside" themselves. In particular, close to a million Americans flock to counselors' offices every year in search of advice for a troubled marriage. According to University of Minnesota professor William J. Doherty, a leading national expert on marriage and the family, some therapists today talk about "starter marriages" or "leasing a marriage," a sure sign, he maintains, of how far consumerism has poisoned attitudes toward the institution ("How Therapists Harm Marriages and What We Can Do about It," *Journal of Couple and Relationship Therapy* 1 [2002]: 9, 10). Either this "caring industry," then, is a response to sheer public demand, or it has managed to hoodwink Americans into believing that they cannot do without such "caring" services, but either way it is difficult to argue that these statistics taken together mean that Americans feel good about themselves. Lasch's warnings about the perils of a therapeutic society appear to have been vindicated.

It is worth repeating that Lunbeck does not fundamentally dispute Lasch's description of Americans as narcissistic. Lunbeck's disagreement with Lasch has to do with their different value judgments about narcissism. Her thesis that Americans could use more, not less narcissism flies in the face of the stubborn findings that the more Americans search for high self-esteem, psychological health, and personal confidence the more elusive these goals become. When it comes to its "worship of the psyche," society seems to be governed by the law of diminishing returns: the more effort Americans expend on the search for contentment the more miserable they are. The fallout is the serial unhappiness that has gripped the nation and the dominance of the narcissistic type in today's society. His own career may be in tatters, but we have not seen or heard the last of the Jian Ghomeshis of the world.

IAN DOWBIGGIN

*University of Prince Edward Island*

THOMAS PIKETTY. *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. Translated by ARTHUR GOLDHAMMER. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014. Pp. viii, 685. \$39.95.

It is difficult to think of a recent book by a social scientist, and impossible to think of one by an economist, that is of as much potential interest to historians as Thomas Piketty's *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. Its central question is an inherently historical one about the relationship between capital accumulation and inequality in the very long run. And the theory that Piketty proposes by way of an answer—that rising inequality is inherent to the dynamics of capitalism—depends for its persuasiveness on the historical analysis he draws on to substantiate it. The book also deserves historians' attention for Piketty's admonishment of economists for "their absurd claim to greater scientific legitimacy, despite the fact that they know almost nothing about anything" (p. 32), and his enthusiasm for the study of history as an antidote. Indeed, in Piketty's mind, his book is "as much a work of history as of economics" (p. 33).

Certainly historians will learn a great deal from the impressive research program that Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, Anthony Atkinson, and others have undertaken on the history of inequality. Yet if Piketty had wanted to write a book that was just about inequality, he would not have called it "*Capital*." He has bigger fish to fry—no less than the relationship between economic growth, capital accumulation, and inequality—but the book disappoints when it comes to linking its larger claims to historical analysis.

The crucial question that Piketty addresses is whether, in the process of economic development, the convergence or divergence of incomes and wealth dominates. Piketty argues that the "lessons of history" reveal capitalism's structural tendency to generate higher levels of inequality over time, belying the claims of optimists embodied in the so-called Kuznets curve, that inequality increases during the early stage of economic growth but declines later on. Instead, what Piketty describes as "the fundamental force for divergence" kicks in when the economy grows slowly—when the growth rate ( $g$ ) is lower than the return on capital ( $r$ )—which he claims is the rule in capitalism. That means that over time the capital stock takes on "disproportionate importance" relative to economic output and returns to capitalists increase relative to returns to labor.

Most of *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* is taken up with an analysis of historical trends to support the book's controversial claim that capitalism breeds inequality. Piketty begins with economic growth, claiming that, despite "the spectacular increase in standards of living since the Industrial Revolution" (p. 87), growth rates will decline in the future. He contends that population growth "explains" half of the economic growth that has occurred in the world since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and suggests the implausibility of

equally high rates of population growth in the future. Yet his analysis elides the complexity of the historical relationship between population and economic growth; as Piketty's nemesis, Simon Kuznets, pointed out many years ago, the historical association between population growth and economic growth is loose over time and across countries and, even when it exists, does not necessarily imply causation (Kuznets, "Population and Economic Growth," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 111, no. 3 [1967]: 170–193). It is for this reason that historians tend to look to growth in output per head, rather than the number of heads, for explanations of economic growth.

When Piketty turns to productivity growth, he is also confident that it will be lower in the future than the past but, in historical terms, he is on still thinner ice. He never actually offers any explanation of "the spectacular increase in per capita output" (p. 93) in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, so it is unclear what basis he has for concluding that the forces that drove economic growth in the past will no longer operate in the future. Strikingly, when Piketty alludes to the dynamics that foster economic growth—technology, innovation, knowledge diffusion—there is one word that he never uses: capital.

There have been serious debates in economic history about the importance of capital formation in the process of economic development, with the Industrial Revolution being an especially striking case in point. Yet Piketty omits any historical analysis of the productive role of capital—capital to buy machines or to hold inventories—capital, that is, in the most prosaic sense of the term. The omission puts him on an entirely different wavelength than historians who study the role of capital in the economies of the past, and surely explains why he relies so little on their work.

The modest attention that Piketty pays to the role that capital plays in the process of economic development stems from his definition of capital as "the sum total of nonhuman assets that can be owned and exchanged on some market" (p. 46). Thus, capital can include machines and inventories but it can also include residential property and financial assets. Indeed, Piketty's capital is so encompassing as to be amorphous, which explains why in part II, on the historical dynamics of capital, we experience a growing sense of abstraction.

As a historian of capital, Piketty is a "lumper" not a "splitter" with his sights set on measuring the historical relationship between aggregate capital and national income. Prior to World War I, what Piketty emphasizes is the overall stability of the capital-income ratio. Then history changes radically with the shocks of World War I and the Depression and we witness a collapse in the capital-income ratio in Europe—where "[b]y the mid-



dle of the twentieth century, capital had largely disappeared" (p. 118)—and in the U.S. Then, in the aftermath of World War II, we observe a resurgence of the capital-income ratio to levels that were close to those recorded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

For explaining these "metamorphoses of capital," Piketty highlights the importance of both contingency and structure. It is contingency—the "shocks to capital" from war and depression—that accounts for the "dizzying fall" in the capital-income ratio in the interwar period in Europe. And it is structure, expressed in a simple accounting identity that links the capital-income ratio to growth and savings,  $\beta = s/g$ , that explains normalcy (p. 183). But Piketty provides little help in accounting for how shocks to capital feed into a decline in his capital-income ratios. His text is confined to general statements that apply to all of interwar Europe and do little to illuminate some of the startling declines his data suggest (p. 116). The reader is left to guess what is going on in the big swirling bucket of "other domestic capital" that lumps together blast furnaces, jewelry, bank accounts, and schools.

When Piketty moves from contingency to structure, from chaos to normalcy, it initially seems easier to follow changes in the capital-income ratio. He claims that "capital's comeback" since the 1970s can be explained by "slower growth coupled with continued high savings" consistent with the simple formula above. However, we soon realize that  $\beta = s/g$  is not a straightforward accounting identity since Piketty's capital-income ratio is influenced by the valuations assigned to capital. And so, since the 1970s, the rising market valuations of corporate stocks and housing contribute to the rising capital-income ratios that Piketty's graphs show (pp. 187–191).

Piketty recognizes that estimating all forms of capital at market prices at a given point in time "introduces an element of arbitrariness (markets are often capricious)" but, he asks, "how else could one possibly add up hectares of farmland, square meters of real estate, and blast furnaces?" (p. 149). Yet, by lumping so much together, and measuring it at market value, he obscures as much as he reveals about the dynamics of capital. In particular, it is hard to know what variations in Piketty's capital-income ratio imply for the economy's capacity to produce goods and services. In principle, an increase in the capital-income ratio could be a positive sign, an indication that the economy is moving to a more productive phase, characterized by higher capital intensity. Piketty recognizes this possibility when he says that "capital is potentially useful to everyone, and provided that things are properly organized, everyone can benefit from it" (p. 167) but he provides no help in determining when "things" might be "properly organized." We are left with a substantial ambiguity: an increase in Piketty's capital-income ratio might result from more assets being put to work to produce greater output or from higher valuations being assigned to existing assets.

Unfortunately, which scenario we are in makes a major difference to how we perceive the rate of return paid

to capitalists. Is it the cost to society of moving to a higher level of economic development, as apologists of capital claim, or a measure of rentiers' gains on everyone else's backs, as critics of capitalism contend? Piketty cannot seem to make up his mind which scenario he believes more plausible—he pulls back from the brink of heterodoxy several times to emphasize the risk-bearing and entrepreneurial role of capital—but, in the end, it is the lack of clarity in his analysis, rather than his ideology, that weighs on his book on capital.

Talk of the rewards to capital brings me to the final step in Piketty's analysis, where he moves from capital to inequality. He does so based on an analysis of the rate of return on capital,  $r$ , which, when multiplied by the capital-income ratio, gives us  $\alpha$ , the share of national income that goes to capital. Thus we have the final link in his logical chain— $\alpha = r \times \beta$ —which links growth to development to inequality. Consistent with his broad definition of capital, the rate of return thereon is equally encompassing (p. 54), and he estimates it over a long period of time based on French and British data.

On the face of it, the main conclusion he draws from this exercise is a striking one: the "pure return on capital" is extremely stable over time, oscillating "around a central value of 4–5 percent a year for more than two centuries" (p. 202). However, when one remembers that he is using market valuations of capital, the result is less surprising. If Jane Austen and Honoré de Balzac were right that the capital value of an asset bears some consistent relationship to the income it generates (p. 53), then the income that an asset generates should bear some consistent relationship to its capital value (Irving Fisher, *The Rate of Interest: Its Nature, Determination and Relation to Economic Phenomena* [1907], p. 13).

If, in Piketty's *Capital*, the value of capital and the return on capital are two sides of the same coin, the need for a theory of the rate of return on capital is not clear. Nevertheless, having characterized historical trends in the return on capital, Piketty seeks to explain them. It is at this late stage that the question of "What is capital used for?" becomes central, since Piketty considers it crucial for determining the rate of return on capital. Yet here he confronts the handicap of having written a book in which the main references to "factory" are to Père Goriot's pasta making, quite an accomplishment for a book that takes us from pre-industrial to post-industrial economies! Having said so little about the productive role of capital, Piketty flails about, now that he needs it, asking us to imagine all kinds of different societies, in the abstract, in which capital could or would be used in one way or another as a factor of production to earn a return (pp. 212–215). Yet, what about the returns in actual economies in which capital has been used, perhaps in the past?

Since Piketty's discussion of the determinants of the rate of return on capital is so inconclusive, we do not know if we should be concerned if returns to capital are falling or rising. As he shows, the significant diminution

of income inequality over the twentieth century largely reflects a decrease in top incomes from capital. He claims there was nothing natural about the decline; it was caused above all else by political change and, specifically, by “new public policies enacted in this period (from rent control to nationalizations and the inflation-induced euthanasia of the rentier class that lived on government debt)” (p. 275). So much for the causes of the decline in the return to capital, but when it comes to its economic implications Piketty’s analysis leaves us in the dark.

And what of the recent resurgence of income inequality? If this book has sold like hot cakes, it is because so many people, especially Americans, want to understand why inequality has increased lately. However, in a surprising and ironic denouement worthy of the great novels that Piketty is fond of citing, we learn that a rising share of income going to capital is not the primary explanation of growing income inequality in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Instead, he suggests we look to the massive growth in the inequality of labor income in Anglophone countries driven by an explosion of rewards to executives of their largest firms. Perhaps most surprisingly of all, Piketty portrays the rise of the “supermanager” as having little to do with the dynamics of capital. One wonders, however, about a theory of capital that cannot explain how senior corporate executives have used their control of America’s so-called capitalist corporations to systematically enrich themselves. Perhaps it is missing a fundamental law or two.

What then should we make of Piketty’s study? It is a stimulating book: Piketty deals with big questions, he

has thought deeply about them, and writes about them in an engaging way. He is articulate about the limitations of data and the way they are constructed. When it comes to historical phenomena, there is no question that what he says about inequality is of much interest to historians. If I have been critical of Piketty’s book, it is because I have read it as a book about capital, which is what the author intended it to be. And, from that perspective, the book seems to abstract from, rather than resolve, important questions for the history of capitalism.

Piketty believes that to address fundamental questions about capitalism, one needs to be a historian as well as an economist. What he does not acknowledge is that some of what he has learned as an economist is an obstacle to learning from history and nowhere is conventional economics weaker than when it comes to capital. Irving Fisher tried to cover up this weakness with fables of orchards and the fruits of a bounteous nature for explaining the productivity of capital. Still, he never overcame it and neither does Piketty. No matter how much data you marshal, they are only interesting if you make sense of them, and the lumbering, amorphous concept of capital that pervades Piketty’s book is just not up to the task. And so, notwithstanding this book, capital remains the blind spot of capitalism. So it will remain until economists prove willing not only to do the laborious work of creating vast historical datasets, but also to reconsider the suitability of their existing economic concepts and tools for learning about the past.

MARY O’SULLIVAN  
*University of Geneva*



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# Reviews of Books

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## METHODS/THEORY

PETER CHARLES HOFFER. *Clio among the Muses: Essays on History and the Humanities*. New York: New York University Press, 2014. Pp. ix, 187. \$29.00.

Margaret MacMillan warned us in *Dangerous Games: The Uses and Abuses of History* (2008) a few years back that academic historical inquiry was becoming alarmingly self-referential. Acting as if they own the past, she wrote, historians produce specialized works for their peers in the academy. Most of MacMillan's readers surely took this as a call for academic historians to reach beyond the academy to engage the general public. Now the prolific historian and keen observer of historical matters Peter Charles Hoffer expands Macmillan's broadside to convincingly demonstrate that "history is not a standalone discipline." History has maintained a "complicated partnership" with its "modern sister disciplines" (p. viii)—its fellow contemporary muses—of religion, philosophy, social science, literature, biography, policy studies, and the law.

In a series of essays Hoffer employs a synecdochical approach, emphasizing selected representative occasions when history and its companions have been in dialogue, rather than attempting to survey the entirety of their interaction. This is a sensible way to proceed, and it enables Hoffer to romp nimbly over a vast intellectual terrain. Nowhere is this more evident than in his excellent treatment of the complicated relationship between history and philosophy. In this essay, Hoffer fruitfully explores such topics as the extent to which history has been viewed as a moral enterprise, the place of moral judgment in historical accounts, the question of causation, and the relationship of past ideas and the mind of the historian.

Similarly rewarding are Hoffer's other cross-disciplinary explorations. Of history and literature Hoffer writes, since "[w]riting history is a literary act . . . history and literature cannot live apart from each other" (p. 72). In his exploration of history and policy studies, Hoffer includes insightful observations about war in both historical inquiry and policy studies, as well as a valuable discussion of the lessons of history using the work of Paul Kennedy and Niall Ferguson as exemplars. Finally, Hoffer turns to history and the law, which treats

historians employed as expert witnesses, and the question of reparations.

As helpful as Hoffer's method is, it also conspires at times to make his arguments somewhat idiosyncratic. This is most apparent in the first of *Clio's* companions that he surveys: religion. After a very brief treatment of religiously oriented efforts to explore the meaning of history, he presents "evolutionism" as a foil to faith-based history. This approach to historical change dispenses with religion altogether. Somewhat predictably, Hoffer then offers a *via media* approach based on the late Stephen Jay Gould's notion of "non-overlapping magisteria" (p. 21). In this conception, history and religion operate sovereignly in separate realms of inquiry. Where does this leave Hoffer and us? Religious sensibility, presumably sanitized from the contamination of providentialism and exclusivist religious claims, can empower the historical vision, as it once did in the past. It is debatable, however, whether Hoffer's approach enables him to explore the intersection of history and religion adequately. For example, where are the likes of George Marsden, Mark Noll, or even Richard Bushman, historians who have spoken to the question of religiously inflected history in much more depth than Christopher Lasch or Eugene D. Genovese, whom Hoffer does mention? If evolutionary biology offers the best example of a devastating critique of religious views of history, should not there be more mention of historians who adopt this framework? Perhaps advocates of big history? And is the approach of non-overlapping magisteria really attainable as a practical matter—or even desirable—for those historians who have deep-seated religious convictions? *Clio* exacts a price of admission on all of us. But can we—indeed, ought we—compartmentalize history and religion to the exclusion of the historian's private religious commitments? This is not to dismiss Hoffer's argument, which readers may well find more congenial to that implied in the above questioning. It is, however, to suggest that the same synecdochical method might well produce a different narrative based on other points of intersection and emphases. Obviously, Hoffer does not presume to supply readers with exhaustive analysis. Nor should he. But readers may wish he had said more in this essay.

None of this should detract from the fact that this is an engaging book of enormous intellectual breadth and

insight. Hoffer has read widely and made a strong case that history “should stand at the center of our quest for a truly humane spirit” (p. 154). He performs a real service by reminding us that “the study of history is something unique, ennobling, and necessary” (p. viii). And Hoffer’s powerful concluding words challenge and inspire: “History matters because we want it to matter; because it honors human longing and endeavor, and doing it rightly becomes a grave command we issue to ourselves” (p. 154).

DONALD A. YERXA,  
*Emeritus*  
*Eastern Nazarene College*

DAVID HOWES and CONSTANCE CLASSEN. *Ways of Sensing: Understanding the Senses in Society*. New York: Routledge, 2014. Pp. vii, 200. Cloth \$130.00, paper \$39.95.

David Howes and Constance Classen are two of the lodestones in sensory studies. Indeed their many works have opened up considerable space for new scholars and discussion in numerous areas related to the senses over the past two decades. This new short volume acts, in many ways, as a wonderful introduction to the field. Its lucid prose, and clear argumentation makes it the perfect text for upper-level or graduate courses, but also lends itself to an easy read over the summer months. Its core is very much the questions pressing sensory studies: What is the nature of sensation? How is it understood not merely as one among other cultural phenomena, but in fact the fundamental epistemological and experiential foundation for the building of myriad cultural forms as much as individual lives? This is no small order. Howes and Classen carry it off well, without descending into the nitty-gritties of phenomenological, anthropological, or cultural theory, but by laying out a clear presentation of what is at stake by presenting an analytical framework built around the sensorium, rather than senses themselves. It is the kind of text to which instructors could attach more disciplinary sources, like those of Alain Corbin, Robert Jütte, or Mark M. Smith. While it makes no new profound claims for sensory scholars its succinct and easily accessible summation of what is at stake in the study of the senses makes this an important work, one each sensory scholar should have on their shelf.

In their introduction Howes and Classen grapple with the core argument of the book: sensing is culturally constructed and shapes everything which follows it. Human physiology and neurology are understood within the bounds of cultural processes and ways of understanding, which are themselves dependent upon sensing. The discussion in the “Art and Medicine” chapters turns on the questions of the relationship between the senses and self as a sensible thing, and how percipients conceive of processes of natural change and motion, whether within themselves or the world exterior to them. Howes and Classen are careful to position Western visuality in art against that of the Navajo and the

notion of transience. Likewise, non-Western medicine appears as a counterpoint in healing practices, highlighting the important place all the senses have outside of overly institutionalized western practices. The section on “Politics and Law” focuses more on how sociability as much as governance is shaped by our sensory expectations and experiences and on the ways that society seeks to control and monitor ways of sensing. In the third section, “Marketing and Psychology,” Howes and Classen discuss how we as human beings deploy sensory experiences to shape and alter the actions of others, arguing clearly that we cannot detach one sense from the other in neat, packaged discussions.

The last chapter, on synaesthesia, warrants some attention: it is theoretically charged and important on a number of fronts. First, the topic itself is not commonly seen in sensory studies discussions, and so a dedicated section on it is extremely welcome. But more critical is the way in which Howes and Classen employ the topic to further their core argument, that sensing is culturally constructed and that to attribute sensation to purely physiological and neurological processes is not only restricting, but also highly problematic. In many ways all sensory study is synaesthetic to some degree. We can discuss sight, smell, hearing, taste, and touch on their own, but in reality, as most sensory scholars have come to agree, the sensorium (to use Walter J. Ong’s term) lies at the real heart of the matter. Synaesthesia in this sense is anything but the aberrant or abnormal of neuropsychologists, rather it is the normative condition that is expressed and understood culturally as a matter of degree, and that adds deep and enriching layers to our accounts of sensory experience. Perhaps the most fruitful assertion is that the very concept of synaesthesia as aberrant or degenerate, is itself the product of changing views on the senses in Western culture that associate it with superstition, irrationality, and primitive cultures. The nineteenth century and twentieth firmly rendered synaesthesia, once the common modality of sensory experience in a variety of cultures, something that could be treated, or even classified as a condition. The senses, like the individual, have become self-contained: leakage out of their tight physiological boxes was a sign of physical and cognitive problems, of fanciful thinking, rather than something to be “taken seriously.” This last chapter turns all of these claims on their heads. Each of these chapters moves analysis away from particular senses, and likewise disciplinary boundaries and conceits, to present the sensorium itself as the cultural totality of a “way” of sensing.

There are some issues with the book, however. In some respects it is not clear what distinguishes chapter 3 from chapter 4: one is politics, the other law, but these subjects are so fluid. Both discuss regulation, and while the quandary is not so much the senses per se, what Howes and Classen actually mean by political and legal ends up being blurred by their very argument. In some respects the two operate on the same subject, albeit in analytically opposed motions. Hierarchy, especially social and political, only appears briefly in the epigraphs



of the political chapter. While the implicit assault on philosophical aesthetics is well warranted, there are moments when the flattening of historical subjects creates some problems, as at page 40 on medicine, and at page 19 on reformation. This becomes somewhat more evident in chapter 5, which would have benefited perhaps from more historical backing. Lastly, the volume lacks a nice firm conclusion. Chapter 6 does some of the work to tie up the ends presented in the other chapters, but it does not really satisfactorily sum up the entire theoretical stakes laid out in the book. As it is the book is left open ended, which in its own way is perhaps Clasen and Howes's point.

Regardless, *Ways of Sensing: Understanding the Senses in Society* is a must-read for established scholars in sensory studies. It provides a clear argumentative framework for the field as it moves from infancy into adolescence. At the book's core is a very simple but precise argument: sensing is culturally constructed and shapes everything that follows it; its study is "relevant to the study of *any and all* cultural fields" (p. 13).

MATTHEW MILNER  
McGill University

HOWARD EILAND and MICHAEL W. JENNINGS. *Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014. Pp. 755. \$39.95.

The work of Walter Benjamin has come down to us in English translation as a teasingly incomplete promissory note for a philosophical vision of modernity. Until the publication of Benjamin's four-volume *Selected Writings* (1996–2003) and *Arcades Project* (1999) (the German *Werke* and *Nachlass* comprise 21 volumes) under the editorship of Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, Benjamin's significance remained more a rumor and a hope than a palpable reality. Yet that ambitious project of introducing Benjamin to English-language readership has come to shape and determine the way Benjamin's works are read by that audience. The very question-frame and meaning of Benjamin scholarship has been shaped by such a project, so much so that this new intellectual biography by Eiland and Jennings, *Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life*, appears as a kind of capstone to their professional ambitions of presenting a vision of Benjamin's thought for this and the coming generation. In this substantial volume they succeed in doing just that.

The book not only offers a detailed and comprehensive account of Benjamin's life—his daily preoccupations, habits, worries, projects, hopes, and fears—but it also presents a reliable and informative account of his many and diverse intellectual projects and publishing ventures. Benjamin was, above all things, a *writer*, and the authors here craft a wonderfully thoughtful account of precisely how Benjamin's life was sacrificed (sometimes harshly and at the expense of those closest to him) to this life of writing. Abjuring the arcane, academic presentation of Benjamin's work as a unified "theory" of modern life, Eiland and Jennings succeed in offering

an immensely readable and fascinating portrait of this difficult and wildly contradictory figure. They offer a rigorously *chronological* summary of his many liaisons with friends, family, lovers, publishers, and other contemporaries (his list of acquaintances extends from Siegfried Kracauer and Ernst Bloch to Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, Bertolt Brecht, Paul Valéry, Georges Bataille, Rainer Maria Rilke, Franz Rosenzweig, Leo Strauss, and what seems like virtually every major intellectual-cultural figure of the 1920s and 1930s). But the authors also provide insightful accounts of his writings on classical figures like Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich von Schlegel, Franz Kafka, Charles Baudelaire, and Alexander von Humboldt, and on contemporary writers such as Marcel Proust, Karl Kraus, Stefan George, and Hugo von Hofmannsthal. It is this emphasis on organizing their analysis "in a rigorously chronological manner" (p. 7) that will perhaps open their project to critical scrutiny.

While we learn a vast amount about Benjamin's life—his ambivalence about personal and professional commitment, his obsessive need for particular writing implements and paper, his wanderlust for travel to isolated islands, his gambling addiction and drug abuse, his constant financial worries—at times it seems as if the biography takes precedence over the intellectual achievements and their meaning. Moreover, in an effort to provide such detailed accounts about daily life and its struggles, the major political-historical events of the twentieth century (World War I, the Weimar deluge, the Nazi takeover, Joseph Stalin's victory over Leon Trotsky, the pathway to World War II) withdraw into the background. One could imagine a very different intellectual biography of Benjamin that gave precedence to his writings and tried to situate them more expansively within the intellectual-political currents of the day.

And while I think such a criticism is fair, I also want to acknowledge the importance of this magisterial contribution to Benjamin studies today. Eiland and Jennings's work is deeply learned and critically astute. Not only do they attend to the historicity of the life and work, but they also go beyond this to attain a brilliant psychological portrait of a man torn between competing claims of theological and political critiques (Gershom Gerhard Scholem's and Brecht's, respectively) of modern bourgeois existence. Their "Benjamin" shows himself to be a mass of ambiguities and contradictions, a thinker who is skeptical of theory, a critic who balks at the bankruptcy of most cultural analysis, the bourgeois intellectual committed to Marxist revolution who sits at the seashore while donning a jacket and tie. Under their keenly detailed analysis, "Benjamin the man remains elusive . . . he remains a contradiction" (pp. 3–5). Throughout this profoundly moving and sensitive portrait, Benjamin shows himself to be a kind of tragic figure, a man whose insights and perspicacity can do little to save him from the vast network of intersecting forces and energies that will ultimately bring on his collapse.

Out of his lifelong depression and bouts of immo-

bility, Benjamin the man was able to fashion a child's world of play and fascination for micrological detail and out of this immersion in the spatio-temporal plasticity of toys, games, puppets, chess pieces, dolls, books, masks, and bagatelles, he crafted *Denkbilder* (figures of thought) that opened up a revolutionary world of change and transformation rooted in a new experience of time. If Benjamin's work continues to speak to us today—and Eiland and Jennings's biography clearly shows that it does—then it rests in this profound insight into temporality as the site of human freedom and liberation. For all his tragic experience and insight, Benjamin was a poet of hope who sought “[t]he redemption of the past in constellation with the now” (p. 291). In trolling through the past for, as he put it in a 1929 essay, “an image that flashes up at the moment of its recognizability” (p. 660), Benjamin locates a “spark of hope” that opens us to a “messianic time” to which we can only accede if we find the “gateway” to “genuine historical existence,” where tragedy and festival come together and confront one another. It is in the space of this contradiction that we need to begin to read Benjamin again, venturing upon a path whose impasses and blockages are formidable indeed. One of Eiland and Jennings's great accomplishments lies in helping us to find a way onto this path without seeking to “overcome” these impediments, but rather insisting on abiding in them as a way to reclaim Benjamin's authentic legacy.

CHARLES BAMBACH  
University of Texas at Dallas

ANDREW L. RUSSELL. *Open Standards and the Digital Age: History, Ideology, and Networks*. (Cambridge Studies in the Emergence of Global Enterprise.) New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Pp. xvii, 306. Cloth \$90.00, paper \$32.99, e-book \$72.00.

Historians have paid increased attention to the role of technical and operational standards over the past decade, recognizing that such codifications of practices in the development and deployment of technologies and other activities shaped the form of what was implemented and sped up appropriation. Andrew L. Russell's book explores the historical forces that shaped today's concept of “open world,” an approach to technical standards, most often associated with how the Internet emerged and functions (p. 2). Applying a “social construction of technology” approach (p. 3), he explores the nineteenth- and twentieth-century origins of standards and the interaction of engineers, scientists, government regulators, politicians, professional societies, and large corporations in the creation of standards, largely in the fields of computing and communications. He describes the operation of these agents across multiple technologies and industries as mutually constitutive and socially constructed. Their work in the process helped shape modern society. Russell studies several questions: “Who designed the digital foundations of open systems” (p. 4), how did these evolve over time, and what about them remained similar?

To answer these questions, he explores the ideologies of protagonists by examining what engineers and regulators wrote and said. Russell's second approach is to explore the way ideologies were implemented. The lion's share of his discussion involves this second issue as it concerned the creation, deployment, and subsequent critique of standards. He explains that from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century, criticisms of existing systems and standards embodied a rejection of notions of centralized control by many institutional participants, such as AT&T's form of telephony, later of IBM in mainframes and Microsoft in software. That rejection led increasingly to the current style of trying to manage technologies and their standards as “open systems.” He demonstrates that this notion had a long history predating the Internet. Russell pays attention to the dialogue leading to open systems and to negotiations among contested ideologies and constituencies. He shows it was a complex process involving many agents, concentrating largely on how this played out in American communications, but with a flourishing tip of the hat to European activities, too. The author describes how the ideology of open standards came into being, and how a consensus about communications networks standardization evolved.

Chapter 1 describes the emergence of American expectations for open communications, challenged by institutions such as AT&T and others. The second and third chapters explore the role of engineers between the 1880s and the 1930s that brought order to the process of setting technical standards. Chapter 4 explains the role of the American telephone industry in shaping standards, and chapter 5, the emergence of alliances among smaller firms, engineers, regulators, and counterculture information technology experts (think “hackers”) who resisted the dominance of such firms as AT&T and IBM. The next three chapters explore the rise of consensus building with communications networks that developed between the start of the 1970s and the end of the century. Russell extends the discussion beyond the traditional history of the Internet to demonstrate how networks evolved globally, expanding our current understanding of the wider history of the “Net.” But he also documents how the Internet's early technical features were created largely by autocratic styles of management that contradict our image of the Internet as some free-spirited, open technopia. In short, the Internet was the byproduct of a much larger process—cause and consequence—of the shifting of international standards away from the formal American approaches of the pre-1970s to a new regime less precise in building consensus and more ad hoc in approach.

This book is a major contribution to both the history of the Internet and the role of technical standards. Russell deals with a set of complex issues, grounding these in the prior work of historians of technology, using language that makes this book accessible to a larger audience than just experts on the Internet or computing. Tightly argued and well informed, this book constitutes a major step forward in our understanding of three is-



sues: how the Internet evolved, the role of technical standards in American communications, and the complexity and collaborative activities of diverse individuals and institutions. Russell provides a useful explanation of how the modern world acquired key components of its contemporary communications infrastructure. Quite simply, this is an important book that deserves to be read by historians of computing, communications, modern technologies, business, post-1865 American society, and by those concerned with our current governance of technological issues.

JAMES W. CORTADA  
University of Minnesota

CHRISTIAN DELAGE. *Caught on Camera: Film in the Courtroom from the Nuremberg Trials to the Trials of the Khmer Rouge*. Edited and translated by RALPH SCHOOLCRAFT and MARY BYRD KELLY. (Critical Authors and Issues.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. Pp. vi, 315. \$59.95.

The American public first saw footage of German concentration camps in April 1945. The images of starved bodies and corpses shocked viewers, putting to rest any lingering doubts about the enormity of Nazi war crimes, and bolstering support for a then-upcoming international tribunal to bring those most responsible to justice. Not only was film used as evidence, exhibit, and testimony at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and subsequent trials against Nazi officials, but such trials were also subject to the camera's gaze, enabling the documentation of the court's proceedings and their circulation to a wider public.

While other scholars have focused on film-as-evidence or trial-as-film, Christian Delage, a historian and documentary filmmaker, addresses both in this meticulously researched book. Tracing the double history of the use of film in legal cases and the filming of court proceedings, Delage reveals how what we see on film in and of human rights trials is a modern construction rooted in the Holocaust and its aftermath. Through the use of correspondence, court records, film, and other archival sources, Delage painstakingly recreates how the Holocaust was documented on film, when, by whom, and for what legal and political purposes. In so doing, he uncovers the ways in which judges, lawyers, filmmakers (including soon-to-be famous Hollywood directors), national agencies, and intergovernmental bodies each played a hand in determining film's evidential and archival qualities in the human rights courtroom.

Although Delage begins with a detailed discussion of the portrayal of court proceedings in Fritz Lang's 1936 film *Fury*, the book's real focus is on the use of film to document Nazi death camps and to record the trials of those most responsible for such horrors. Here, *Caught on Camera: Film in the Courtroom from the Nuremberg Trials to the Trials of the Khmer Rouge* devotes the bulk of its attention to high-profile trials, such as the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, and the subsequent cases of Adolf Eichmann, Klaus Barbie, Paul

Touvier, and Maurice-Arthur-Jean Papon. (Originally published in French, it is perhaps only fitting that *Caught on Camera* pays significant attention to the French courtroom.) In this emphasis on Nazi war criminals, Delage has given the book a misleadingly ambitious subtitle; the scant ten-page account of the filming of Tuol Sleng prison chief Duch's trial in Cambodia seems tacked on, begging further comparison and analysis, while there is no discussion of comparable trials of human rights violators in Latin America. Similarly, Delage shies away from any wide-reaching conclusions about the current ubiquity of cameras and their implications for what is and can be documented, circulated, and used as legal evidence.

Still, despite these omissions, *Caught on Camera* will be of interest to anyone wanting a historical lens through which to analyze our culture's current obsession with cell phone-generated footage and its potential to transform adjudication for human rights abuse. Indeed, those immersed in ongoing discussions surrounding the use of amateur video and social media as legal evidence will find interesting parallels in the debate Delage chronicles regarding the evidential qualities of what was then a relatively new—and suspicious—medium. The main contribution of this book is Delage's argument that there is a seamless interplay between film *in* the court and film *of* the court. This assertion adds a much-needed perspective to discussions over new media, realism, and evidence in the wake of widespread human rights abuse.

Given that Delage devotes a chapter to documentary archives, he surprisingly leaves out some crucial details regarding the longevity of filmed trials. The footage of the Eichmann trial has now been placed on YouTube by Yad Vashem, where it can be watched by anyone in the world with an Internet connection. By contrast, many of the audiovisual records created by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission remain unprocessed, inaccessible, or embargoed; still others were made public only after freedom of information requests and prolonged litigation. The archives of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia await an uncertain fate in the hands of the country's prime minister, himself a former Khmer Rouge member. Extensive film documentation of the twentieth century's most heinous human rights violations is meaningless if the archives hosting such documentation are not supported, preserved, and made publicly accessible.

MICHELLE CASWELL  
University of California, Los Angeles

#### COMPARATIVE/WORLD/TRANSNATIONAL

STEPHEN C. NEFF. *Justice among Nations: A History of International Law*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014. Pp. viii, 628. \$45.00.

In *Justice among Nations: A History of International Law*, Stephen C. Neff offers a broad interpretative history of international law from ancient times to the twen-

ty-first century, taking the reader through what he identifies as the key landmarks. More than simply a chronological account of the law of nations, this tome aims at a historical exploration of the various ways in which conceptions of justice have played in relations between nations and how international law has been made, interpreted, and applied in practice.

The book opens with a discussion of the early principles of interstate relations, from those of Ancient Mesopotamia to those of Buddhist India and of Chinese Confucian thought. Much of the discussion on the antecedents of modern international law focuses on more familiar histories of Ancient Greece and imperial Rome, highlighting the Greek origins of international law and Roman *ius gentium* (law of nations). Neff offers a detailed account of how historical events in medieval Europe shaped international law: the Roman Catholic papacy and the notion of the universal empire, natural law and Christian ethics, the development of maritime law and just-war doctrine (which he considers the crowning achievement of the *ius gentium* in the Middle Ages).

Several chapters of the book are devoted to exploring natural law in European Enlightenment thought and how it influenced the theory and practice of international law in the realms of national sovereignty, war, and statecraft. Neff categorizes thinkers such as Hugo Grotius and Francis Bacon into rationalists whose positions on international law placed emphasis on natural law, and into pragmatists who emphasized state practice. He concludes that for the most part, international law has not developed as a judge-made corpus. Rather, the major builders of the field were systematic thinkers in the rationalist tradition and pragmatists who paid attention to treaties, national legislation, and the whole range of statecraft.

In the nineteenth century, international law embraced the fashionable positivist philosophy of the age, the creed of science and progress. This period witnessed the professionalization of the field of international law and the ascendancy of international lawyers in the public service who were more concerned with codifying and systematizing international law than with critiquing it. The era was also marked by the rise of international law principles such as the sovereign equality and fundamental rights of states.

The twentieth century and specifically the post-World War II era ushered in significant developments in the adjudication of international disputes, with the establishment of the World Courts, the Nuremberg Tribunal, and the International Criminal Court. This was accompanied by the emergence of new norms such as universal jurisdiction and humanitarian intervention. The twentieth century was also marked by what Neff describes as the arrival of the "Third World," with the assertion of the right to self-determination of peoples. Neff concludes that the history of international law has not been a steady progressive march but a more complicated record of competing visions of ordering relations between states. A key strength of this book is

Neff's strenuous effort to write a history of international law that appeals to both specialists and general readers. This requires a delicate balancing act, at which the book largely succeeds. As the author rightly notes, the history of international law is too important to confine to the province of the profession's elites.

*Justice among Nations* does not aspire to offer a comprehensive history of all international legal doctrines and practices throughout the whole of history. But even in its limited goal of charting a rapid journey through the centuries of international law, there are notable omissions. The neglect of areas such as diplomatic law inevitably obscures practices of treaty-making in international law that could have drawn attention to legal encounters between European states and the "more exotic cultures" of Africa, Asia, and the New World in the imperial age (p. 107).

Outside the fleeting reference to ancient China and India in its early pages, the book offers little insight into non-European perspectives on the making and practices of international law. There is passing mention of the indigenous societies of the New World but only in the context of European "discoveries" and the ensuing rivalries between European states. Yet, we now know, for example, that long before European contact, indigenous nations of the New World were governed by customs and codes of conduct, inscribed in wampum belts, that guided their treaties with each other and later European settlers. Episodes such as the fifteenth-century Great Law of Peace that created the Iroquois Confederacy of Six Nations deserve a place in the annals of the law of nations.

Overall, *Justice among Nations* is an important contribution to the scholarship on international law. What the book lacks in depth it compensates for in its breadth. Neff offers a compelling account of the evolution of international law and shows that the history of international law can be told as a single unitary story. Still, we can imagine that in the twenty-first century a more representative global history of international law is also possible.

BONNY IBHAWOH  
McMaster University

ALESSANDRO STANZIANI. *Bondage: Labor and Rights in Eurasia from the Sixteenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries*. (International Studies in Social History, no. 24.) New York: Berghahn Books, 2014. Pp. vii, 258. \$95.00.

In *Bondage: Labor and Rights in Eurasia from the Sixteenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries*, Alessandro Stanziani argues against the idea—common, he says, since the eighteenth century—of a world of labor defined by two opposite poles: a free, progressive West, and a backward, serfdom-oriented Russia. This stark contrast between free labor and unfree labor, he argues, is a false opposition. Instead, labor practices were not simply free or slave, but instead existed along a spectrum from free to unfree, or even existed together. In this accounting, the West and Russia therefore represent



different parts of this spectrum rather than absolute opposites. Stanziani approaches the idea from both directions, arguing both that Russian serfdom was less unfree than its opponents claimed and also that the free labor of the West was in reality often significantly unfree. He structures his argument in three parts. In part I, Stanziani looks at eighteenth-century conceptions of free and unfree labor, and their reception in Western Europe and Russia. In part II, he focuses on Russian slavery and serfdom. He places Russian slavery in the context of Eurasian slave systems more broadly, and approaches serfdom first as a system of limiting peasant mobility, and then as a system of overseeing or controlling labor. In both cases, he argues that using the words “slavery” and “serfdom” obscures the particularities of Russia’s systems of unfree labor rather than illuminates their place on the spectrum of labor practices. Those words relegate Russian labor relations to the ultimate of unfreedom, rather than allowing for real investigation of their relationship to other forms of labor. In part III, he moves to the nominally “free” West, focusing on England’s Master and Servant Acts, on France’s variant of indentured labor (*engagement* or *engagisme*), and then on slave and indenture practices in two Indian Ocean colonies, Mauritius and Réunion Island. Taken together, these sections present a spectrum of labor relations in which “Russia looks like an extreme variant of the European model instead of its opposite” (p. 167).

I am in broad sympathy with the goals of Stanziani’s book, because a tendency to reify a story of Russia’s backwardness and practices of self-enslavement has often limited historians’ views of Russia’s imperial past. Furthermore, Stanziani gets at another persistent problem of works on imperial Russian history when he describes his book as “an effort to escape explanations of non-European realities in terms of missing factors (missing in relationship to a mythical, stylized West)” (p. 140). His book is absolutely an effort to grapple with both sides of this problem: to look at what Russia was, rather than what it lacked, and to break apart the idea of “the West.” It may also be impossible to write a book as ambitious as this one, both in its chronological coverage (the title promises coverage from the sixteenth to the early twentieth centuries; individual chapter titles promise coverage back to the fourteenth century, and actually go back even farther in time) and its geographical scope (all of Eurasia including the Indian Oceanic world, with occasional forays to the Atlantic world, as well), without introducing a few errors into the text. The text, however, has enough inconsistencies, if not outright errors, that its larger goal is undermined. There are strange omissions: although Stanziani does not focus on Atlantic world slavery, it is nonetheless odd to see a discussion of the productive possibilities of unfree labor without reference to Robert W. Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman’s *Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery* (1974) and the controversies around it. There are errors in Russian usage: household servants are referred to not as *dvorovye liudi*,

but as *dvornye liudi*. There are problems with citations: a paragraph about early-seventeenth-century policy ends with a footnote that lists two laws (one mis-cited) and an archival collection from two centuries later (pp. 105, 123 n. 36). These sorts of errors, along with the book’s poor copy-editing, individually seem like relatively minor problems. But there are other claims that are even more problematic. Twice, Stanziani suggests that in the decades before the 1861 emancipation, “half of the peasantry” of Russia “had been emancipated from their obligations toward private owners,” and this meant that “Russian emancipation was already in progress before the official abolition of serfdom” (pp. 6, 119). But this is wrong even by the argument of the book itself. Stanziani lists many instances of peasants transferring from private estates to state lands, but their numbers amount to not even 10 percent of the total private peasant population of the time. Perhaps Stanziani is referring instead to the fact that more than half the total peasant population of Russia was, at the time, not on private estates? That did not, however, mean that “half of the peasantry” shifted their position during this period. These inconsistencies and inaccuracies do a disservice to an argument that is worth making; the promised second volume will, one hopes, take greater care.

ALISON K. SMITH  
University of Toronto

ROBERT K. BATCHELOR. *London: The Selden Map and the Making of a Global City, 1549–1689*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014. Pp. vi, 334. \$45.00.

TIMOTHY BROOK. *Mr. Selden’s Map of China: Decoding the Secrets of a Vanished Cartographer*. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013. Pp. xxiv, 211. \$25.00.

A surprising discovery was made at the Bodleian Library in 2008: a skillfully drawn Chinese wall map, dating to the seventeenth century, that shows East and Southeast Asia from a maritime point of view. Marginalizing the Middle Kingdom in favor of port cities and sailing routes, its sea-centered focus and framework have no known parallel in Chinese cartographic culture of the time. Little is known of the map’s origins. Possibly confiscated by the English pilot John Saris during a raid in the Spice Islands in the early 1600s, it was eventually acquired by the pioneering Orientalist John Selden (who read Arabic, Hebrew, and Persian, though not Chinese). Selden donated his books and artifacts to Oxford, where his map attracted serious interest for a time. In 1687, librarian Thomas Hyde worked closely with a visiting Chinese Jesuit, Michael Shen Fuzong, to read and annotate its labels. Before long, though, the Selden map slipped into obscurity.

Robert K. Batchelor deserves the field’s thanks for noticing a reference to the long-forgotten map while conducting research at Oxford on the history of early modern London. David Helliwell, the librarian who located the item for Batchelor, summoned Timothy

Brook to see it as well. All three men were riveted, and word of the find spread quickly. In 2011, an international symposium at Oxford marked the public debut of the newly restored map. It has since caused a stir at conferences from Atlanta to Taipei. The books under review represent a first taste of what may well be a good deal of scholarship to come.

The books could hardly be more different. China historian Timothy Brook has written a lively, personal account, presenting the map's sheer existence as a problem and inviting readers to travel with him back in time—and east toward China—in search of answers to its riddles. Batchelor, by contrast, situates Selden's map squarely in Selden's world. A historian of early modern Britain, he finds in this artifact less a problem than a solution: a master key for unlocking Asia's importance to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century London. Men like Selden, Batchelor writes, “learned from the very process of obtaining such texts . . . to build new kinds of selves and new kinds of institutions appropriate to the world of exchange they encountered in maritime Asia” (p. 14).

For those interested in the cartographic object itself, Brook's account is the place to start. After explaining what makes Selden's map unusual—to the point of declaring it the most important Chinese map of the last seven centuries—the author offers an engaging account of the life and career of John Selden, highlighting his achievements as a pioneer Orientalist and his famous debate with the Dutch legal scholar Hugo Grotius over the nature of sovereignty at sea. Brook then recreates the encounter between Thomas Hyde and Michael Shen at Oxford, noting that the excitement of such efforts to translate and understand esoteric maps and books from Asia was already fading by the end of Hyde's career; by the turn of the eighteenth century, “[t]hings Oriental were becoming things ornamental” (Brook, p. 64).

Chapter 4 takes another leap back, into London of the 1610s, to imagine the encounter between Thomas Smythe, governor of the East India Company, and John Saris, the pilot who may have carried the map back from Asia. This gives Brook an opportunity to survey the Indies trade, a subject on which he has written with flair in *Vermeer's Hat* (2009). Along the way he introduces stranded pilot Will Adams, sea lord Li Dan, Dan's chosen heir (and lover?) Zheng Zhilong, and the curmudgeonly English factor Richard Cocks; as colorful a cast of characters as any historian could hope for.

Chapter 5 takes the compass rose on the Selden map as a device for exploring navigation practices in Asian waters. Here we meet a more stately set of actors, including Zhang Xie (author of a singularly useful compendium on Chinese seafaring) and William Laud (who donated a rare copy of a Chinese rutter to the Bodleian in 1639). After helpfully explaining the different ways that directions were reckoned and compasses boxed in East and West, Brook concludes that the ruled scale and compass are “tell-tale signs that the Selden cartographer had seen European sea charts” (p. 109).

This provides a segue to chapter 6, a virtual tour of the maritime system of which the Selden map is said to be the first fully visualized version. Brook's narration of each route in that system will be deeply rewarding for those who enjoy poring over the chart and making sense of its geography. Another richly informative chapter explains the land-centered traditions of official Chinese cartography. All this prepares the way for a dramatic conclusion, where the author unpacks six “secrets” of the Selden map: its marginalizing of China, its “stunning” accuracy, its magnetic signature, its shrinking of the South China Sea, and (most speculatively) its possible date and place of origin.

Robert Batchelor has written a very different sort of book. *London: The Selden Map and the Making of a Global City, 1549–1689* argues that encounters with the Ming and Mogul trading systems played a fundamental role in early modern London's cultural, intellectual, and political formation. Through engaging with their counterparts in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean, English merchants discovered not only new sources of wealth but also new models of sovereignty and subjectivity. The “classic signifiers of modernity—the [joint-stock] corporation, the nation, the rule of law, the [absolutist] state, and political revolution”—must all be considered “in relation to changes in Asia” (Batchelor, p. 22).

Batchelor makes his case in five dense chapters, each centering on a major turning point in British history from 1549 to 1689. Most do not make for easy reading. London's rise is refracted through the writings of John Cabot, Peter Heylyn, Juan González de Mendoza, John Ogilby, Giovanni Botero, Richard Hakluyt, and many more, thinkers with whom the ideal reader will already be acquainted. (Neither of these books has a bibliography; its absence is particularly unfortunate here.) That said, those with the background and perseverance to follow Batchelor's peregrinations are rewarded with a unique perspective on the conflicts and debates that coursed through London's streets over those 140 years.

Engaging with Asia naturally required translation, a key concept for this account. Batchelor defines the term broadly, to cover how meaning gets handed down over time as well as how it gets handed across political, economic, linguistic, and cultural boundaries. In his view, the passion of people like Selden for collecting and trying to understand texts from the other side of the world was in turn bound up with attempts to establish new kinds of authority. Investments in Orientalism represented “efforts by overseas merchants in particular . . . to find an epistemological grounding for their own activities” distinct from the imperial center (Batchelor, p. 107). Ironically, the seeming universality of the novel institutions that were forged in that process—a translatability that has helped earn those institutions the title of “modern”—masks the pervasive effort of cross-cultural interpretation that was required to produce them in the first place.

If translation is one key term for this text, a second is the notion of emporium. The voyages of Francis



Drake and Thomas Cavendish held great symbolic value for Londoners, Batchelor tells us, because they suggested a new way of grounding the national autonomy of England in a global economy of exchange. This was not a desire for empire, he insists; “Cavendish’s report portrayed the global economy as emporial rather than imperial” (p. 71). Indeed, “the concept of empire gives only dim insight into the shifts occurring in this period” (p. 68).

Finally, alongside translation and emporium *London* highlights the importance of data. Interestingly, this term is first introduced in the context of Asian developments. When the Ming opened official trade with their neighbors in the 1560s, maps of a new style, printed in south China, became gifts that overseas Chinese merchants could use to help establish trade relationships. Typically accompanied by population and administrative data, they offered an effective means for merchants from southern ports to promote the potential for trade with the mainland. More subtly, in Batchelor’s view, such images also conveyed a conception of sovereignty from the ground up, in effect positing “a model for building a rationalized and unified state out of urban commerce, based on data and relationships rather than a simple assertion of sovereignty embodied in the figure of an emperor” (Batchelor, p. 93).

Batchelor sees something analogous to this in Selden’s vision of sovereignty at sea, based not on fiat from on high but on “real and sustainable relationships of dominion, mutually defined through contracts and the careful collection of data about the customs surrounding the routes and ports of Asia” (Batchelor, p. 113). He even sees similar practices undergirding Newtonian science, to the extent that it relied on the collection of place-specific measurements from a far-flung network of collaborators. The broader ground for Isaac Newton’s decentralized “system of the world,” in Batchelor’s view, emerged from the long-term processes of data collection that had begun sweeping London and its universities during the previous century.

Quite apart from advancing these provocative arguments, Batchelor has done much to make the Selden map (as well as contemporary English charts) legible to contemporary readers. His reproductions are helpfully diagrammed, overlaid with outlines, labels, and keys to guide readers in finding the features that matter. Since Brook does not offer this kind of annotation, I found myself referring to Batchelor’s doctored maps when reading both books. Readers familiar with East Asian languages will likewise appreciate Batchelor’s frequent inclusion of Chinese characters. Taken together, these two distinctive volumes provide an abundance of tools—and complementary frameworks—for historians in any field who are intrigued by this latest archival find from Oxford.

KÄREN WIGEN  
Stanford University

ASHLEY JACKSON. *Buildings of Empire*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. xiv, 317. \$34.95.

In *Buildings of Empire* Ashley Jackson offers twelve case studies of British architectural creations ranging over five continents. Unlike other books on this topic, his is organized not by topic but by individual buildings and the settlements surrounding them. It is an intriguingly idiosyncratic assortment. Absent are the usual suspects such as the Victoria Memorial in Calcutta or the Baker’s Union Buildings in Pretoria; instead Jackson chooses the Viceregal Lodge in Simla and the Gordon Memorial College in Khartoum. Other chapters are devoted to Dublin Castle; Spanish Town, Jamaica and Williamsburg, Virginia; Fort St. Angelo, Malta; the Botanic Gardens in Christchurch, New Zealand; the Gezira Sporting Club, Cairo; the Kuala Lumpur Railway Station, Malaya; the Royal Exhibition Building in Melbourne; Raffles Hotel, Singapore; Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, Hong Kong; and the British Empire Stadium, Wembley. The book is copiously illustrated: the color photographs are excellent, but many of the black and white, though well chosen, are, alas, fuzzy.

As Jackson notes in his preface, the book is emphatically not intended as an architectural history of the British Empire. This is ground that has already been well covered by a number of scholars, the most important of whom he cites. He provides rather “an exploration of British colonization and imperial rule, from Europe to the Caribbean to Asia and the Far East, viewed through a series of significant buildings and building sites” (p. viii). His perspective is that of the *longue durée* beginning with Dublin Castle in the twelfth century and stretching to the handover of Hong Kong in the late twentieth. He seems to have traveled to almost every corner of the former empire.

Jackson’s approach is to introduce a building, then elaborate on its place over time and space, bringing the story right up to the present. In the chapters on Spanish Town/Williamsburg and Christchurch this becomes more a history of the settlements rather than of single buildings or a complex of buildings. In all cases he offers a huge amount of detail—sometimes almost more than one can comfortably absorb—mostly drawn from secondary works but also from archives, periodicals, websites, and his own visits. Occasionally the text seems insufficiently sourced, however.

Perhaps because it was new to me, I found Fort St. Angelo on Malta one of his most interesting choices as well as one of his most original, highlighting the naval component of imperialism that is often referred to but less often documented so thoroughly. In fact, the history of the fort is a history of the whole complex of fortifications guarding Grand Harbour, and begins long before there was a British Empire. Malta eventually became the home of the Knights Hospitallers of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem after their expulsion from the Holy Land. The order perpetuated the spirit of the Crusades in its determination to halt the spread of Islam in the Mediterranean, a mission that reached its climax with the Great Siege of 1565 and the eventual defeat of the Turks. The British took over the island from the French during the Napoleonic Wars, seeing it as the key

to the control of the Mediterranean. Indeed it would have been instructive here to compare Grand Harbour with Trincomalee in Ceylon, acquired at the same time and which served the same strategic purpose in the Indian Ocean. During World War II Malta and its forts suffered a second “great siege” with saturation bombing that reached its peak in 1942.

Contrast this history of relentless warfare with the chapter devoted to the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). Trudging past the ads plastered on the endless walkways at Heathrow, I never suspected the extent to which HSBC symbolized the global reach achieved by imperial capital without ever firing a shot. The bank was founded in Hong Kong itself in 1864 by local merchants, but staff were recruited and trained in London and very much imbued with the public-school ethos. Earlier buildings were demolished when they were no longer adequate to their purpose, and in 1983 construction began on the present structure designed by Norman Foster. When completed two years later, thanks to the complexity of the project, the problems of coordinating engineering and design projects across three continents, and the need for unheard of quantities of steel aluminum and glass, it was the world’s most expensive building. It rises 586 feet above ground with foundations 111 feet below, commanding a spectacular view across Victoria Harbour toward the Chinese mainland, a shimmering monument, its interior transparent through its glass carapace. As Jackson comments, it is “dominated internally by an atrium that spans eleven floors, making it look a bit like a set from *Star Wars*” (p. 222).

Jackson’s strongest suit is history. Collectively, these studies illuminate many aspects of British imperial history as the sites evolved over time and often in very particular ways. While this approach is very informative, Jackson offers little in the way of new insights into the topic. His concluding chapter brings his collective stories up to the present rather than offering more general conclusions about imperial buildings and architecture. Nor can he match the verbal *tours de force* of pros like Jan Morris whose studies of imperialism in all its facets continue both to illuminate and to dazzle.

EUGENIA W. HERBERT  
Mount Holyoke College

JOHN-PAUL GHOBRIAL. *The Whispers of Cities: Information Flows in Istanbul, London, and Paris in the Age of William Trumbull*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. xii, 192. \$99.00.

John-Paul Ghobrial’s book investigates the movement of information between Europe and the Ottoman Empire in the late seventeenth century. Through a close analysis of an immense range of documents and correspondence left by William Trumbull, English ambassador to Istanbul from 1687 to 1692, as well as newsletters, personal papers, and documents sourced from other individuals, Ghobrial traces how knowledge of the Ottoman world was transmitted and consumed by

Europeans, as well as the reverse movement of knowledge about Europeans to the Ottoman world.

Although there is now a fairly extensive historiography discussing how knowledge about the Ottoman Empire was consumed by Europeans, such as in the works of Nabil Matar, Daniel Goffman, and Sonia Anderson, little is known about the central topic of this book: how information was acquired at ground level, and how information networks then disseminated that information throughout Europe. In addition, there has been little prior research discussing how Ottoman officials and subjects themselves obtained information about Europe. One of the brilliant aspects of this work is Ghobrial’s ability to trace tenuous clues through little-known sources to uncover unofficial sources and even oral dialogue. For example, he has extracted details of private conversations in letters, diaries, and diplomatic reports, on occasion unearthing several accounts of the same exchange. In some instances, these include closely recorded transcripts of what was said. His research also encompasses the knowledge networks of English and French ambassadors, as well as details about less prominent individuals attached to Trumbull’s information network. The complexity of the information networks analyzed by Ghobrial is illustrated by two charts, one that details personal networks (p. 110) and another that traces the circulation of information from Istanbul to London (p. 149).

Perhaps the most fascinating section of the book is his discussion of dragomans, the multiethnic and polyglot interpreters and guides who facilitated interactions, exchanges, and conversations between Europeans and Ottomans. This book demonstrates the complex yet close ties between officials, diplomats, merchants, and a host of lesser functionaries and ordinary people as sources of information. Many of these intermediaries, such as Trumbull’s wife Katherine, had unofficial roles that were not noted in official documents, but who nonetheless supplied valuable knowledge and information about the workings of Ottoman society that ended up in official accounts and diplomatic reports sent to London via the Levant Company, or in individual correspondence. Much of this information was finally published in Ambassador Paul Rycaut’s seventeenth-century narrative of Turkish history, which became a primary source of knowledge about the Turks for Europeans. This book also contains a number of fascinating and unexpected revelations, such as the account of an Ottoman official stationed in Tunis who wrote to Trumbull rather than relying on Turkish contacts in order to obtain accurate information about events in Istanbul, or the discussion of Trumbull’s personal friendship with the provincial governor Receb Paşa.

In addition to unearthing the networks through which information flowed, Ghobrial has been able to trace the transmission of narrative accounts and in some instances discover their original sources. This requires a very sophisticated knowledge of the complexities of personal interactions and the idiosyncrasies of



individuals, as when Ghobrial is able to identify Thomas Coke, Secretary of the Levant Company, an intriguing individual himself, as one of Trumbull's anonymous informants through a combination of knowledge about what information was available to Coke and familiarity with his handwriting. Ghobrial argues that the flow of information, based on individual connections and contacts, had a central role in shaping understanding between Europe and the Ottoman Empire. He is careful to avoid making claims about the accuracy of information; rather, his focus is on its transmission. Nonetheless, he ably demonstrates the coherence of narratives across European and Ottoman sources, suggesting the reliability of the transmission of narratives to Europeans.

In discussing the multiple sources of information and the role of multilingual informants in both the Ottoman court and in the European embassies in Istanbul, Ghobrial demonstrates that he himself is a polyglot. This very learned work employs sources from several countries and multiple languages, including archives located in London, Paris, and Istanbul, and primary and secondary sources in English, French, Italian, German, Spanish, Arabic, and Turkish. For non-specialists, definitions of less-commonly known terms such as *reis efendi* (secretary of state) or *kaymakam* (deputy to the Grand Vizier) would have been useful, and the index does not give full credit to the compendium of subjects addressed in the book. In general, however, this book gives us an accomplished, fascinating, and much-needed glimpse into the heretofore unknown day-to-day functioning of European diplomacy in Istanbul.

ANNA SURANYI  
Endicott College

AARON SPENCER FOGLEMAN. *Two Troubled Souls: An Eighteenth-Century Couple's Spiritual Journey in the Atlantic World*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013. Pp. xiii, 321. \$39.95.

*Two Colorful Souls* might be a more fitting title for this immensely entertaining book. Maria Barbara Knoll and Jean-François Reynier, who married in 1740, lived tumultuous lives and embarked on a number of adventures throughout the Atlantic world, from inadvertently booking passage on a Caribbean smuggler's ship to paddling up the Suriname River in a *schul*.

Raised in Switzerland, the son of an apothecary, Reynier was a French-speaking Huguenot; Knoll was from the German territories and was probably Lutheran. Their paths crossed when they ended up at the Moravian settlement of Marienborn in Wetteravia in 1739. They married the following year not out of love but because Moravian leaders had chosen these two strangers to wed and the Lord had confirmed their union in the Lot. It proved to be an explosive pairing of two talented but discordant individuals: Knoll was a pious, idealistic, and strong-willed person who found solace in the religious communal lifestyle. Her husband was a stubborn, mentally unbalanced, and equally ide-

alistic person who preferred finding religious fulfillment outside the cloistered walls of the *Ortsgemeine*, or congregation town.

Aaron Spencer Fogleman expertly recounts the resulting fireworks in a 321-page book that represents microhistory at its finest. And what an entertaining story it is. Before ending up at Marienborn, Reynier was already well traveled. He migrated to Pennsylvania in the early 1730s as an indentured servant; entered Ephrata in 1734; withdrew to a hut in the wilderness, where he lived on acorns; was forcibly returned to Ephrata where he endured several beatings as treatment for "madness"; then scampered off to Georgia, where he wanted to meet Count Nicolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf, the Moravian leader. Stops in London and, finally, Marienborn followed.

The Reyniers were equally peripatetic during their years together. In October 1740, only a few months after marrying, the Reyniers landed in Suriname, where they served as missionaries in that dangerous and remote South American colony. Later stops included St. Thomas, Bethlehem, Oley, Pennsylvania, and Georgia again, where Reynier died in 1775 and Knoll in 1777.

*Two Troubled Souls: An Eighteenth-Century Couple's Spiritual Journey in the Atlantic World* is exhaustively researched and beautifully written, packed with telling, even novelistic, details. As with any biography, the challenge is to determine the larger meaning of the Reyniers's lives. There were plenty of possibilities. For starters, their story offers a fascinating—and rare—glimpse into the dynamics of an eighteenth-century marriage. The couple clashed repeatedly over where and how to live, and Fogleman is able to reconstruct the power struggle that took place, with the couple periodically separating and reuniting.

Fogleman decided to reach for something loftier, however: "The purpose of this book is to enhance our understanding of the Atlantic World by investigating the experiences of a married couple who engaged with so many of its structures" (p. 10). Yet his treatment of the literature is cursory, and the Atlantic world in the book's pages is amorphous; Fogleman asserts in one short paragraph that individual men and women have received far too little attention from historians, and the endnotes have little to add. The book's conclusion is barely more than a page, with the author asking: "What do these two lives show us about the Atlantic World, so much of which they explored?" His answer: "As two Europeans coming from different places and backgrounds, they show us how those who journeyed into the eighteenth-century Atlantic World with grand plans to change it (or no plans at all) could be changed themselves" (p. 259).

Fogleman's unsatisfying answer raises a question: How can you try to change a system that you do not know even exists? As the author concedes, the Reyniers had no comprehension of an Atlantic world, and they hardly set out to change it. Their mission was saving souls, and themselves. Admittedly, the Atlantic system did change them in one important respect: these mis-

sionaries came to embrace slavery. But that is hardly a revelation; historians have long documented such an effect.

The Reyniers's importance seems to lie elsewhere. These were devout individuals who eagerly sought out religious radicals, and *Two Troubled Souls* offers a riveting look into the Protestant world of the eighteenth century. The couple rubbed shoulders with some of the leading Protestant figures of the day, including Zinzendorf, Georg Conrad Beissel, and John Wesley, as well as more obscure ones like Jacob Kimmel. Fogleman does an outstanding job of recreating the colorful religious milieu of Pennsylvania and Georgia, where the Reyniers spent time not only at well-known places like Ephrata but lesser-known ones like Oley. The details are often salacious but pertinent, as Fogleman recounts the sexual practices of the Moravians and the hypocrisy of men like Beissel, who preached celibacy but enjoyed nocturnal visits to sisters' beds. Equally important, the Reyniers's story takes readers into the complex world of religious radicals. Pietists and others fought not just state churches but themselves.

S. SCOTT ROHRER  
*Independent Scholar*

ROBERT DARNTON, *Censors at Work: How States Shaped Literature*. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2014. Pp. 316. \$27.95.

As Robert Darnton comments in the conclusion to this passionate and provocative book, which should become required reading for all students of censorship, the censorship debate all too often descends into a crude trading of contraries: "the normative versus the relative, the empirical versus the theoretical, the liberal versus the poststructural." Rejecting these "either/or alternatives" and the sterility they foster, he prefers "to shift the ground of the debate" (p. 243) by promising "a history of censorship in a new key, one that is both comparative and ethnographic" (p. 15), and one that re-engages with "the complexities of experience" (p. 243). The results are transformative, but they also raise an unavoidable question.

The book's "ethnographic" quality is its most Darn-tonesque (he has now surely earned the honor of the adjective). In this mode, we find him emerging from the archives not so much as an anthropologist with a wealth of field observations, but as an investigative journalist with a fund of eye-opening, human interest stories. Because they put pay to "the great-men, great-books version of literary history" (p. 69), they of course make some serious historiographical points as well. Consequently, we hear less about Voltaire in the chapter on mid-eighteenth-century France, and more about Marie-Madeleine Bonafon, the chambermaid author of the seditiously salacious *Tanastés: Conte allégorique* (1745); less about Thomas Babington Macaulay and his minute-men in nineteenth-century India, and more about James Long, the Irish missionary and dedicated liberal who catalogued books as an exercise in surveil-

lance on behalf of the imperial state; less about Christa Wolf's compromising negotiations with the censors in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and more about Hans-Jürgen Wesener and Christina Horn, the once-shadowy censors who found themselves in a no less-tangled set of relationships than the regime's most famous author.

This detailed ethnography underpins one of the book's central arguments. The question "What is censorship?" is, as Darnton rightly insists, badly posed in so far as it assumes that censorship can be clearly defined once and for all, and so "understood as an autonomous phenomenon, which operates everywhere in the same way, no matter what the context" (p. 229). By contrast, his "ethnographic view" shows how each of the three censorship regimes he considers—Bourbon France, India under the Raj, and the GDR—shaped and were shaped by their own specific cultural systems, which "pervade[d] institutions, color[ed] human relations, and reach[e]d into the hidden workings of the soul" (p. 243). But his ethnography does more than this. Countering the view favored by some literary theorists and Marxist critics of the market, who regard censorship as all-pervasive and encompassing all forms of constraint on writing or speech, Darnton the ethnographer treats censorship as a matter of state, linking it firmly to official forms of power, and thereby avoiding the risk of "trivialization" (p. 229). There is quite clearly a difference in kind, not just in degree, between a commercial publisher deciding to reject a manuscript, and an authoritarian regime imprisoning Mademoiselle Bonafon for 13 years, or sentencing Mukunda Lal Das to "three years of 'rigorous imprisonment' for singing suggestive songs" and Walter Janka to "five years of solitary confinement for publishing an author who fell out of favour (Lukács)" (p. 230).

For Darnton the ethnographer, then, censorship is about state power, but, as Darnton the comparatist demonstrates, this does not in any way simplify our understanding of its machinations. What his comparisons across three centuries yield is a compelling body of evidence that contradicts the popular, and often scholarly, image of the censor as a slow-witted or omnipotent bureaucrat and the equally mythical image of the writer as a heroically pure or helpless victim. "Because complicity, collaboration, and negotiation pervaded the way authors and censors operated," Darnton remarks, "it would be misleading to characterize censorship simply as a contest between creation and oppression" (p. 234). Instead, he shows us censors who, while engaging in extended negotiations with often willing authors, wrote reports that read more like book reviews; and he reveals the inner workings of three distinct systems where repression was inseparable from a curiously high-minded "struggle over meaning" and the endlessly protean questions of literary value (p. 230). In fact, as Darnton notes, "seen from the inside, and especially from the censor's point of view, censorship can appear to be co-extensive with literature" (p. 234), hence his subtitle "How States Shaped Literature." This conclusion is



borne out not only in Darnton's France, India, and East Germany, but also (as I discovered when working on *The Literature Police: Apartheid Censorship and its Cultural Consequences* [2009]) in apartheid South Africa, and (as Nicole Moore has shown in *The Censor's Library* [2012]) in Australia as well.

For all these reasons, *Censors at Work: How States Shaped Literature* is indeed "a history of censorship in a new key." Its comparative method also raises a question, however. Comparing moments in the past, even across three centuries, is one thing, but Darnton also wants to look back "in order to gain some perspective on the current situation" (p. 13). So what does his history lesson tell us about today's world? In his view, it shows that "state intervention in the literary realm went far beyond the blue-penciling of texts"; "it extended to the shaping of literature itself as a force at work throughout the social order." He then asks, "If states wielded such power in the age of print, what will restrain them from abusing it in the age of the Internet?" (p. 20). This is clearly not yesterday's question, as the cases of Edward Snowden and the Saudi blogger Raif Badawi attest. Yet because some of the greatest threats to the freedom of expression today come not from the state, but from non-state actors who use violence or the threat of violence to shut down voices they do not like, we surely need to shift the ground of the debate once again: think only of Wendy Doniger's India or, worse still, *Charlie Hebdo's* France.

PETER D. McDONALD

*St Hugh's College, University of Oxford*

JOHN A. BRITTON. *Cables, Crises, and the Press: The Geopolitics of the New International Information System in the Americas, 1866–1903*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2013. Pp. xiii, 473. \$60.00.

The introduction, conclusion, and 13 narrative chapters of *Cables, Crises, and the Press: The Geopolitics of the New International Information System in the Americas, 1866–1903* constitute an important and impressive contribution toward understanding global media over the last thirty-odd years of the nineteenth century. This book draws upon politics, diplomacy, press coverage, popular literature, and public opinion regarding hemispheric crises and conflicts that occurred in places such as Chile, Venezuela, Argentina, and Cuba. Those tensions rapidly reached much of the world, largely due to the global expansion of undersea cable and continental telegraph systems and networks. The interplay between global politics and finance, the rising influence of newspapers, the impact on global trade, and the dawning realization of politicians and diplomats that their ignorance of the global reach and potential power of rapid global electrical communication systems could easily place their careers and administrations in peril are carefully, thoroughly, and persuasively analyzed and explained. Furthermore, John A. Britton sustains this narrative in ways that keep the reader engaged and awaiting the next crisis, allowing the reader to savor

both the details of a case and the overarching global transformations evident in this study.

One of those transformations is the inexorable transition from local and national news politics, and bilateral relations to the complexities of international news and diplomacy that marks geopolitics. In ways and particularly at speeds not seen prior to the rise of global cables and telegraphy, any and seemingly every local political event, coup, crisis, or conflict now had the potential to flow into an increasingly complex and interconnected world of geopolitics. The inhabitants of this new world included presidents, prime ministers, secretaries of state, foreign ministers, and various consuls and attachés, all finding themselves doing new things such as crafting treaties by telegraph (as one example, see the discussion in chapter 3 of the 1881 "wire treaty" that negotiated the border of Chile and Argentina). The new telegraphers also included reporters, novelists, boosters, industrialists, entrepreneurs, and propagandists. Government leaders were often challenged by this new and rapid world of global dialogue, with some politicians—including more than a few Latin American politicians—quickly proving skilled at communicating effectively in this new arena. Others foundered in this new domain. Among the most unusual examples of a diplomat ensnared in the web of cables and telegraphy was U.S. Secretary of State Richard Olney, who at one point during the Venezuelan boundary crisis of 1895–1896 directly involved journalists and newspapers in diplomatic negotiations with Great Britain, a disastrous move that created "unorthodox negotiations that led to sensitive information being placed on the front pages of newspapers" and advanced a style of statecraft that, as Britton aptly notes, "seems almost absurd to the historian" (p. 165).

Another American diplomatic practice regarding global electrical communication that seems almost absurd, and has been a running theme throughout American diplomacy since the emergence of global electrical communication, is the astonishing cheapness of the U.S. government regarding diplomatic telegram and cable costs. Britton stresses throughout the book that these costs were high for all users, yet at the same time, the American foreign service has, more often than not, been burdened with especial financial restraints on the amount of funds available for cable and telegraph needs. This made the U.S. State Department telegraphically parsimonious, which in turn created a dependence on others for sharing tidbits from their own electrical discourse: newspapers, financiers, the British, industrialists, and the occasional propagandist and rabble-rouser. Information may no longer have been scarce, but it remained precious when measured by the costs of using the new global media. At the height of the 1898 Spanish-American War, managing editor of the *New York Journal* Arthur Brisbane estimated that the paper averaged \$3,000 per day above normal operating expenditures, and that over several months, these extra costs "were enough to eliminate" newspaper profits;

some of the largest expenditures for papers were telegraph and cable costs (p. 233).

In addition to the central story of geopolitics, the press, and global media, Britton does an exemplary job detailing the nuances, challenges, differences, and technical hurdles of the cable and telegraph systems. A fascinating passage describes the different systems of undersea cable technologies and the peculiar challenges of being a good “mirror man” who could, on the cable systems with mirror galvanometers, accurately read the mirror movement as it cast a faint light back and forth on a horizontal strip of letters and thus conveyed the message. One mirror man working in South America later went to work in an office on the Irish coast and found the galvanometers worked differently in a different part of the world, leading him to retrain himself for the local conditions (pp. 47–50). This is one of several accounts and stories that remind the reader that one must avoid the misconceptions that global electrical media always work the same way; always run without error, malfunction, or breakdown; and are always universally and immediately adopted and put into practice by everyone, everywhere, all around the world. This is not true now, and it was not true then: Britton reminds us that global media, in the past as well as in the present, are not only global, but also local and contingent. In conclusion, *Cables, Crises, and the Press* is a superb contribution to the literature on geopolitics and global media.

JAMES SCHWOCH  
Northwestern University

JAN MARTIN LEMNITZER. *Power, Law and the End of Privateering*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Pp. xii, 254. \$95.00.

In this excellent monograph, Jan Martin Lemnitzer offers a study of the first global norms of maritime war, created in the mid-nineteenth century. Seeking to rescue these norms from the condescension of posterity, Lemnitzer presents the regime of maritime law as a transformative instance of global governance that marked the universalization of the European Law of Nations, successfully regulated naval warfare for 60 years until its collapse in World War I, and proved foundational for present-day international law. He also casts the creation of this regime as a product of a pioneering act of quasi-instantaneous law-making with universal ambition, involving a multilateral treaty agreed upon at a major international congress to which non-signatory states were invited to accede.

Arranged chronologically and divided into seven chapters, the book first explores the origins of the Declaration of Paris, which was signed by seven powers (Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Sardinia-Piedmont, and the Ottoman Empire) at the end of the Crimean War in 1856 and stipulated rules governing the conduct of naval war. The book then traces discussions of this declaration and the issue of maritime law during the next 15 years, from the initial American diplomatic

response and a second follow-up U.S. initiative in 1859, which inspired a truly international campaign by activists in the city-state of Bremen, to the U.S. Civil War, to the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and the Franco-German War of 1870–1871.

*Power, Law and the End of Privateering* offers a comprehensive interpretation of the issues at stake. Lemnitzer’s key contention is that the Declaration of Paris was the result of a British initiative. The initiative was rooted in a concern over the threat that U.S. privateering could pose to British trade in wartime, and it expressed a willingness to break with traditional British positions on neutral rights to counteract that threat. As far as British statesmen were concerned (and here Lemnitzer solves an issue that has long vexed historians), the main goal of the declaration was to force the United States, a non-signatory nation, into renouncing the practice of privateering. The Americans, in turn, rose to defend it, or to tie its end to a radical restriction of belligerents’ rights through the granting of immunity to all private property except contraband. American proposals resonated with the interests of most maritime nations and with merchant communities everywhere. Ironically, American proposals were considered seriously even in Britain. Between 1856 and 1871, Lemnitzer shows, it remained an open question whether the American case would result in an overhaul of the framework of the Declaration of Paris. In the meantime, privateering as a practice of war came to an end, largely because the declaration’s signatories and newly acceding parties came to close their ports in wartime to privateers (and thus not because of the transition to steam, as is usually argued, for example, in John W. Coogan’s masterful study of Britain, the United States, and maritime rights before and during World War I).

Lemnitzer offers a complex account of the deliberations over maritime law in the 1850s and 1860s, and the shifting configurations of power and interest driving them. He draws attention to many issues, including the relevance of matters of maritime law, war, and trade for great power politics during an era of near continuous wars or diplomatic crises; the beleaguered position of the British Empire as the global empire concerned with the wartime vulnerability of its trade and facing the specter of possible isolation over norms of naval war; the importance of both transatlantic diplomacy and the Concert of Europe in an age of globalization and transnational mobilization; and the agency of smaller states such as the Scandinavian powers or Bremen, and, for that matter, of the Central European monarchies of Prussia or Austria (which, far from being fixated on continental power, had a clear sense of their commercial interests in a globalizing world).

This, then, is an impressive feat of international history. While paying the most attention to the British, Lemnitzer moves back and forth between the various big powers and also covers smaller states. He draws on vast multinational, multilingual research, including work in British, German, French, U.S., and Austrian archives. The focus is on diplomacy and high politics, on



statesmen and the opinion-makers and public activists influencing them, while also allowing for discussions of actual conducts of war. Throughout, the analysis foregrounds the rationality of the actors involved and their utilitarian calculations—ranging from naval strategy and diplomatic imperatives to economic interests—in explicit counterpoint to an emphasis on ideological commitments (for example, to “liberalism”).

Jan Lemnitzer has offered an outstanding account of the making of laws of maritime warfare in the nineteenth century that will lay the groundwork for all subsequent scholarship. Following in his footsteps, future scholars might want to pay more attention to developments before the Crimean War, the conflict with which Lemnitzer opens. They might also want to flesh out his sketch of the flourishing of the newly created legal regime after 1871 and its eventual collapse. And they would do well to ponder Lemnitzer’s observation that the breakdown of maritime law in 1914 resulted primarily from the collapse of the “community of states” that supported it, and to explore the making and unmaking of those larger bonds that help to define this very community as such. These bonds preceded and were reinforced by the instrumental debates over geopolitics, laws, and interests, which are at the center of this remarkable monograph.

DIRK BÖNKER  
Duke University

PAUL D. ESCOTT. *Uncommonly Savage: Civil War and Remembrance in Spain and the United States*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2014. Pp. 267. \$74.95.

Of all wars, contends Paul D. Escott, civil wars “create the deepest scars” (p. 1). Their divisive effects are compounded by the fact that the competing sides regard one another as traitors within the national family. Whatever one thinks of this judgment, there is no doubt that the two internecine contests at the center of this lively comparative study were ferociously fought and enormously damaging in terms of their respective historical legacies. Scholars now estimate that at least 750,000 combatants and perhaps 50,000 civilians perished in the American Civil War of 1861–1865. Roughly 325,000 people died in the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939 and another 50,000 were executed after the conflict had ended. The North’s victory in the United States spawned generations of southern bitterness without ensuring justice and security for four million liberated blacks. Francisco Franco’s triumph over the Republicans poisoned the nation’s polity for decades, rendering hollow the dictator’s claims to have restored order and morality to Spain.

While Escott understandably bemoans the human cost of these internal wars, he views the American experience as a broadly hopeful precedent for modern Spaniards in their continuing attempts to overcome the still-visible effects of their civil war. Owing largely to major social and economic change since 1945 and the political impact of the civil rights movement, he con-

tends, modern southerners are no longer in the grip of the Lost Cause, a potent strain of cultural memory that bolstered the creation and maintenance of a racially segregated society below the Mason-Dixon line. Spain, Escott observes, has experienced a raft of modernizing changes of its own since the 1950s, including mass tourism and secularization. Those changes, he concludes, suggest “that Spain can recover from its historical wounds in fewer generations than those that marked the United States’ slow progress” (p. 215).

Although the book lacks a clear intellectual rationale (one wonders whether it makes sense to compare the Spanish Civil War to its American forerunner instead of, say, to its more contemporaneous Greek counterpart), it does represent a useful contribution to the burgeoning scholarly literature on historical memory as a transnational phenomenon. During the course of his analysis, Escott develops a number of telling comparative points. He demonstrates, for example, the importance of political parties in the construction of durable group narratives, the central role played by the dead in generating conflicting memories of civil wars, and the contribution of divisive postbellum eras to the contested legacy of such conflicts. His suggestion that Spain’s transition from dictatorship to democracy in the late 1970s and early 1980s can be seen to have had a similarly transformative effect on cultural memory as the civil rights movement in the United States is particularly valid. So too is his observation that liberalization in both societies was hindered, in the South after 1865 and in Spain after the Transition.

The book’s weakest aspect is its treatment of the American North. Escott contends that the victorious Yankees lost the peace to defeated southerners in part because northerners lacked a commitment to racial equality and proved incapable of transmitting a memory of the Union War strong enough to compete with the South’s Lost Cause or with reconciliatory competitors. Much recent scholarship, however, indicates that many Union veterans—the principal carriers of northern war memory—regarded emancipation as a major achievement, second only to saving the republic; that they provided relatively positive support for blacks into the 1880s and 1890s; and that they rejected completely white southerners’ claims to have fought for a cause as valid as their own.

Escott does not attempt a sustained comparison of veterans’ activities in the United States and Spain. This is unfortunate, for the key distinction between the two cases is the relative absence of a desire for postwar vengeance in the American North as compared with Franco’s Spain. Escott explains the different responses of the two victors by alluding to northern racism and the constraints of American federalism. These points certainly have merit but they do not in themselves explain why the majority of northerners opposed the imposition of a harsh peace on the former Confederates in the early years of Reconstruction, the kind of peace that the Generalissimo’s regime inflicted on its Republican foes. Probing Union veterans’ (and northern civilians’)

attitudes toward the South would have helped to provide a fuller and more convincing explanation of the North's remarkably lenient attitude toward the late rebels. So would a glance at Franco's counterpart, Abraham Lincoln. Escott has written extensively on the Great Emancipator and once again criticizes the president, not entirely without justification, for his racial conservatism. In this significant study, however, Escott might have benefited from considering the import of Lincoln's second inaugural speech in comparative context, most particularly, his eloquent call for charitable treatment of the vanquished.

ROBERT COOK  
University of Sussex

DAVID N. LIVINGSTONE, *Dealing with Darwin: Place, Politics, and Rhetoric in Religious Engagements with Evolution*. (Medicine, Science, and Religion in Historical Context.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. Pp. x, 265. \$39.95.

Discussion about the Christian response to Charles Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection tends to succumb quickly to caricature, polemic, and polarization. It is often assumed that an inevitable antagonism existed between the champions of science and the advocates of Christianity, an assumption actively fostered in the late nineteenth century by Andrew Dickson White and John William Draper, and nourished in more recent times by the rise of "creation science" and its younger cousin, "intelligent design." While militant Darwinians like John Tyndall and Thomas Henry Huxley wanted to portray the relationship between science and religion as one of "warfare," the historical reality was far more complex. Darwinism found supporters as well as critics among the devout, and evolution by natural selection proved acceptable to a variety of Christian commentators. David N. Livingstone took up this subject nearly 30 years ago in his *Darwin's Forgotten Defenders: The Encounter between Evangelical Theology and Evolutionary Thought* (1987).

In his latest work, presented as the Gifford Lectures for 2014, Livingstone focuses on a single religious tradition, Presbyterianism, and examines how scientists, theologians, and churchmen formed in a common ecclesiastical and intellectual mold came to terms with Darwinism in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The existence of a Scottish and Presbyterian diaspora across the British Isles and the North Atlantic enables Livingstone to compare and contrast the responses to Darwin in Edinburgh; Belfast; Toronto; Columbia, South Carolina; and Princeton, New Jersey. He shows that in spite of a shared heritage in Calvinist theology, Scottish Common Sense philosophy, and Presbyterian polity, reactions to Darwinism in these different centers diverged widely. In Edinburgh, Scotland's intellectual elite quickly came to terms with evolutionary biology, and in Henry Drummond's best-selling *Natural Law in the Spiritual World* (1883) evolution and Christianity were effectively merged. It was the application of evo-

lution to biblical anthropology and the religion of ancient Israel in the work of William Robertson Smith that aroused a storm of protest. In Belfast, by contrast, an inflammatory address by Tyndall to the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1874 triggered decades of resistance to what was perceived as materialistic science by Presbyterian apologists like Robert Watts. In Canada, Sir John William Dawson in Montreal kept up a steady, if lonely, criticism of Darwinism, but the faculty of Knox College, Toronto, eschewed controversy and found evolutionary metaphysics theologically useful. Not so the Presbyterians of South Carolina, where James Woodrow lost his chair at Columbia's Southern Presbyterian Theological Seminary for advocating the separation of theology and science and for supporting Darwin. At Princeton, meanwhile, respectful debate between Charles Hodge and James McCosh resulted in an accommodation with evolution: Princeton's theologians and scientists concluded that evolution, shorn of natural selection, was acceptable to Calvinist orthodoxy. Here Livingstone shows that Hodge, who described Darwinism as "atheism," and McCosh, who deployed a much more irenic rhetoric, were closer in outlook than might be assumed.

As well as dealing with events and personalities, including the wonderful vignette of Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield's expertise in the breeding of shorthorn cattle, Livingstone's five case studies deftly set the scene in each place, capturing the intellectual background and the preoccupations of the different communities: the fraught ecclesiastical politics of Edinburgh a generation after the Disruption in the Church of Scotland; the sectarian divide between Protestants and Roman Catholics in Belfast; the Anglophile outlook of Toronto; the concern in South Carolina to defend southern chivalry and civilization; the preoccupation with Christian apologetics in Princeton.

Careful attention to context is the key to Livingstone's analysis and to his argument that place and, consequently, politics determines how texts are read and received, what can be said, and how what is said may then be heard. Particular circumstances created "speech spaces" in which some arguments could be persuasively and successfully advanced while others could hardly be uttered. It may be noted that the easy traffic of news, books, and personnel across the North Atlantic world meant that preachers and professors addressed an audience that was both thoroughly international and inescapably local. Here, personal convictions, political astuteness, and rhetorical skill could come into play, ensuring that McCosh could move successfully from Scotland to Ulster to Princeton, while Watts became increasingly isolated in Belfast, estranged from the Edinburgh establishment and, eventually, disappointed even with Princeton's fidelity to the old paths.

As a piece of historical analysis, this is a splendid contribution to the study of the reception of Darwinism in the late nineteenth century. The opening and concluding chapters that frame the case studies demonstrate that the insights derived from this exploration of Pres-



byterianism are capable of very much wider application, and are of continuing relevance and importance.

MARTIN WELLINGS

*Wesley Memorial Church, Oxford*

RENÉE WORRINGER. *Ottomans Imagining Japan: East, Middle East, and Non-Western Modernity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century*. (Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Pp. xviii, 350. \$100.00.

The purpose of Renée Worringer's study is to recover various aspects of a strong Japan *imagined* by different segments of a troubled Ottoman society. After an introductory chapter that lays out the issues and source materials involved, the next four (of nine) chapters focus on the period between 1876 and 1909, the reign of autocratic Sultan Abdülhamid II, who was interested in top-down modernization and disinterested in political reform. During the same short time period, Japan was in the midst of a sweeping change from feudalism, based on the samurai system, to a centralized oligarchy ruling on behalf of a constitutional monarch, the Meiji emperor. Rapid development of military power made Japan capable of soundly defeating Qing China (1895) and tsarist Russia (1905). Global reactions *to* and lessons extracted *from* Japan's defeat of Russia combine into a weighty, recurrent theme throughout the book. An Asian constitutional state had defeated a European imperial state. The sun appeared to be rising again in the "East"; Asian solidarity might now push back the relatively recent advances of the "West." Worringer asks what this potential reversal of fortunes meant for Ottomans who straddled Asia and Europe.

Using Ottoman Turkish and Arabic archival documents, newspapers, books, and essays, as well as appropriate secondary sources, Worringer pieces together imagined Japans that were sometimes contradictory to each other or incompatible with actual events. One of these imagined Japans was the product of pan-Islamists who expected the imminent conversion to Islam by Japan's pagan emperor and people, an unfounded hope nurtured by Japanese rumors. The politically activist Young Turks saw another Japan, one with an idealized, seamless nationalism embedded in the educational system. This view provided them with a model for an Ottoman constitutional regime led by the "fittest" men, like themselves, who were influenced by positivism and Social Darwinism. Another less idealized but still imagined Japan belonged to the sultan and his close advisors. They saw essential organizing principles of Japanese cultural and spiritual unity that centered on the figure of the emperor, a politically useful parallel for the sultan. Abdülhamid's censorship of the press curbed discussion of the Meiji Constitution that might increase support for the reinstatement of a shelved Ottoman constitution. The Sublime Porte deliberately failed to negotiate a treaty with Japan for fear of igniting a conflict with expansionist Russia. The sultan and his advisors also had strong misgivings about

Japan's repeated demands for a treaty that would include capitulation benefits—especially extraterritoriality—such as European powers enjoyed in Ottoman domains. Abdülhamid came to think that Japan was, by virtue of its geographic location, protected from incessant European interference that he had to endure largely as a result of existing capitulations.

The Japanese made demands for extraterritoriality very close to the time when they themselves denied that privilege to all foreigners (1885). Egyptian journalists would soon point to Japan's freedom from European debt and its newly won freedom from the decades-old Unequal Treaties as an explanation for their success, while Ottoman Egypt itself had been occupied by Britain since 1882, largely due to its non-repayment of European debt. That analysis, however, did not make it clear how Egypt could follow Japan's example.

Chapters 6 through 8 take on specific topics while the ninth provides a conclusion. Chapter 6 covers the regime of a Young Turk offshoot, the Committee of Union and Progress (Unionists), who were able in 1908 to restore the Ottoman constitution and then force Abdülhamid to abdicate in 1909. Unionists dominated the Ottoman government from 1909 into the Great War. This secular and elitist administration very soon attracted opposition from pan-Islamists, minorities, and those who wanted not just a constitution but also democracy, including many disillusioned Young Turks. Just about everyone selectively drew upon Japanese inspiration to make an argument for a cause; information on Japan was becoming more accurate but it was still *imagined* to suit the objective. Chapter 7 demonstrates how a seemingly monolithic Japan served as a contrast with the diversity of ethnic, linguistic, and religious identities among Ottomans, especially Arabs and Christians. The Unionists themselves were drawn increasingly to a post-Ottoman form of Turkism or pan-Turkism, often with unsettling racial implications that contributed to the Armenian genocide during World War I. Chapter 8 deals with Egyptian anti-imperial separatism from Istanbul and anti-imperial nationalism against the British. Journalists in Cairo developed a discourse on Japan along similar lines as the rest of the empire, and with a blind eye to Japan's emerging imperialist goals.

This study is part of the Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History series, tapping into a currently popular and important transnational trend that strains everyone's linguistic abilities. Worringer's impressive use of Ottoman Turkish and Arabic documents allows her to illustrate and defend her basic thesis that is expressed in the book's title. The concluding chapter serves as an epilogue, tracing continued republican Turkish and colonized Arabic references to Japan into the interwar period, even as Japanese imperialism contradicted the ideals of the Meiji Constitution. The author argues in this last chapter that imagined Japans provided a basis for discourse on global—as opposed to Western—modernity. In addition to this perhaps provocative conclusion, the author has throughout the book skillfully ne-

gotiated several issues of general scholarly interest, such as wide-ranging and ever-changing perceptions of the “other,” the hall of mirrors constructed by diplomats, discourses of empire and nation, and identities built on education, religion, and language.

PATRICIA RISSO  
University of New Mexico

DAVID W. ELLWOOD. *The Shock of America: Europe and the Challenge of the Century*. (Oxford History of Modern Europe.) New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 592. \$65.00.

This wide-ranging volume describes how in the long twentieth century “American symbols and stories, images, products, and people acquired a form of power that sooner or later penetrated every debate on the Old World’s prospects” (p. 1). The book’s main concern is with a form of “soft power” that has operated to influence economy and culture. Direct American interventions in war and occupation, and in international policy on trade, labor, and industry, are well described. However, these only provide background for how America has worked in Western Europe both as a pervasive cultural force by means of its consumer products and media (film in particular) and as a vast source of myth and symbols. The concentration is on Germany, Austria, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. The chronology is determined by three general periods of war: 1898–1941, 1941–1960, and 1989–2009 (post-Cold War).

During times of direct American interventions, but also, as David W. Ellwood argues, during times of American isolation, the United States figured in European discourses on the future, and in debates over capitalism, technology, and consumerism. Even before the Spanish-American War era that begins the book, European culture was saturated with clichés and stereotypes about the U.S. After 1898, as Western Europeans began to question their own creation of modernity, “America itself became a metaphor” for modernity and a touchstone for its contestation (p. 32). Utopian visions of America pervaded those discussions of social and economic policy seen as socially progressive or growth oriented. Dystopian views served anti-modernism. Friedrich Nietzsche decried the American obsession with products, and historian Fritz Stern critiqued U.S. mechanization and materialism. On the positive side, Antonio Gramsci saw in Fordism a model for a fairer share for workers and Leon Trotsky predicted the future triumph of Americanized Bolshevism. Oswald Spengler and Martin Heidegger also associated American capitalism and Bolshevism, but decried their common feature of decadent standardization and collectivization. Adolf Hitler’s emphasis on spirit, culture, and national consciousness appeared to some as the perfect antidote to Franklin D. Roosevelt and his America, while H. G. Wells, Léon Blum, and David Lloyd George all saw the New Deal as a model for social justice.

Ellwood’s previous scholarship has concentrated on

the liberation of Italy and Western European reconstruction in the post-World War II era. *The Shock of America: Europe and the Challenge of the Century* concentrates on cultural and social developments of this period. It draws on a growing corpus of European scholarship on the effects of the occupation and post-occupation. In the months just after the war, Germany, Italy, and Austria had become a world of horrors to which American actions contributed through intended callousness in some cases, and through ineptitude and neglect in others. The story in Britain is far different, but even there Americans seemed to take on some of the affects of an occupying army, unconsciously flaunting their access to the same consumer goods denied a people who remained strictly rationed for some time. The combination of desire and derision this created marked the onset of Western Europe’s creation of its own consumer society in the late twentieth century and its ongoing angst over the results.

In the last section Ellwood describes the relationship between globalization and Americanization, arguing that the tensions that characterized Western Europeans’ views of America during the twentieth century have become internationalized. The incursion of American soft power on a global scale has clearly become a matter of hard power conflict. As in the Europe of the 1920s, American influence of the post-1989 era has been feverishly consumer and media driven, now resting on the Internet, with chaotic impacts. In both Western and Eastern Europe, globalization has unleashed a new yet familiar wave of identity politics with worrisome consequences. At the same time, Ellwood writes, globalization has confirmed the Western European commitment to its own covenant with capitalism: a balance between the doctrine of profit, growth, and consumption, and the ideal of social protection and security. The post-2008 revived Thatcherism has not upended this. Volker Berghahn contends, and Ellwood agrees, that in Europe, as elsewhere in the world, American soft power is contracting (p. 517).

This is a central text for anyone who seeks to study Europe’s fractured relationship with modernity or to understand the relationship between America and Western Europe in the modern world. Ellwood describes his book as a “life time’s project” and its contribution is equal to such an undertaking (p. 582). Its scope is massive, resting on the analysis of hundreds of scholarly works in at least four languages and drawing from substantial, wide-ranging, original research. Ellwood is generous and informative in his employment of the works of others. His bibliography will be very useful to any student of modern history. This reader was disappointed with the break in narrative from 1960 to 1989, the era of countercultures and protest movements influenced by transatlantic trends. It was perhaps a matter of book length. Had another 100 pages or more been allotted, I would happily have read them.

MARTHA L. HILDRETH  
University of Nevada, Reno



JONATHAN GORRY. *Cold War Christians and the Spectre of Nuclear Deterrence, 1945–1959*. (Histories of the Sacred and Secular, 1700–2000.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Pp. x, 216. \$85.00.

Through much of the Cold War, the threat to use nuclear weapons was implicit, and sometimes explicit. And yet those weapons have never been fired in anger since Nagasaki. A so-called nuclear taboo took hold, a habit of nuclear non-use that has, so far, become entrenched and strengthened into a self-imposed prohibition and stigmatization of the use of nuclear weapons. But that was by no means preordained. During much of the period covered by this book, mainstream political figures were insisting that nuclear weapons should be used just like any other weapons of war.

Today, the author writes, the use of nuclear weapons has become “practically unthinkable” (p. 1). The explanations for why that has happened vary. Has it been purely a matter of realist self-interest derived from the fear of retaliation? Has morality factored prominently in denuclearization? In *Cold War Christians and the Spectre of Nuclear Deterrence, 1945–1959*, Jonathan Gorry sets out to examine how Christians reacted to and influenced the nuclear age during the formative years of the nuclear taboo from the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945 through 1959. The book’s main aim is “to explore Christian understandings of ethical citizenship in a nuclear context” (p. 12). The opening chapters trace the origins of the Christian presumption against war, the development of the notion of just war, and the forming of international Christian coalitions ready to confront the kind of global challenges raised by the tumult in Europe in the early twentieth century.

By the time the Cold War was starting in earnest, undeniably manifested in the Berlin Blockade of 1948, Gorry writes, three interpretations of “responsible citizenship” had taken shape. They were: “First, a citizenship that believed war could never be just (pacifism). Second, a citizenship that thought war, even total war fought with nuclear weapons, was sometimes unavoidable (just war). And finally, a new citizenship that felt unable to condemn the possibility of all war fighting yet firmly believed the exercise of nuclear force could never be morally permissible (nuclear pacifism)” (p. 80).

The book proceeds to map out the internal intellectual and moral struggles of groups like the British Council of Churches (BCC) in the early years of the nuclear age, with early debates largely failing to take hold in public consciousness. But when President Truman announced in January 1950 that the United States would proceed with developing thermonuclear weapons, the vast scale of the new weapons, beside which even the bombs used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki paled, thrust nuclear weapons into the public consciousness. The thermonuclear revolution brought with it new levels of indiscrimination, disproportionality, and abhorrence. And that, Gorry writes, “raised a fresh set of ethical questions for Christians” (p. 173).

The book’s final section deals with the emergence of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). There was initially tension, as the CND argued for disarmament while the churches were still grappling with the moral dilemmas of nuclear defense (p. 148). The rise of CND coincided with a shift in nuclear strategy away from so-called massive retaliation and toward a graduated response championed early by Sir Anthony Buzzard and later manifested in the Kennedy administration’s adoption of what it called a strategy of flexible response. But Buzzard played an equally important role, discussed at length, in bridging the divide between church and state on the matter of nuclear strategy. Gorry writes that “Sir Anthony can be remembered as a norm entrepreneur whose role was to make the idea of nuclear use more tolerable” (p. 175).

The book’s substance is more narrowly focused than its title suggests. It puts strong emphasis on British and Protestant Christian organizations such as the BCC and World Council of Churches. Some international voices, such as the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, make appearances, but notably absent are other significant voices, such as the Vatican and Pope Pius XII.

Much of the book lays out the story of how British church institutions—especially the BCC—reacted to nuclear technology and nuclear policies, and of how the churches tried to reconcile their ethics and belief systems with the new nuclear reality. Gorry contends that the purpose of the theorizing being done by groups such as BCC “was to find a way of squaring a realistic conception of international relations with a growing acceptance that nuclear weapons potentially changed everything” (p. 180). Strikingly rare is evidence of practical ways in which Christian thought influenced that technology and those policies, although Gorry does raise the important but largely amorphous factor of how Christian thinking “gave spiritual or religious succor to nuclear deterrence and nuclear war-fighting policies” (p. 179).

Much of the book has a decidedly bureaucratic slant, focusing on commissions, study groups, and council deliberations, as organizations such as the BCC struggled to frame and articulate responses to the existence of nuclear weapons. Those difficult debates manifested themselves in a steady stream of pamphlets and reports that provide the evidentiary core of the study.

*Cold War Christians and the Spectre of Nuclear Deterrence* provides an interesting contribution to a much-overlooked aspect of the nuclear age.

DAVID COLEMAN  
University of Virginia

AIYAZ HUSAIN. *Mapping the End of Empire: American and British Strategic Visions in the Postwar World*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014. Pp. 364. \$49.95.

This is an original and provocative book that at first glance appears to be composed of quite conventional

elements. Who would have thought that a study of geopolitics and strategy, grounded in the records of the Cold War—era Anglo-American foreign policy and defense establishments, and which frequently invokes the “official mind” of U.S. and British statecraft could say something new about the challenges confronting Western officials and anticolonial nationalists in the immediate postwar world? Surely this must hark back to the most traditional “chaps with maps” kind of diplomatic history. Not so. Aiyaz Husain has given us a subtle and persuasive examination of how geographical knowledge and geographically based perceptions of interests fostered different and conflicting world views in Washington and London as the East-West conflict deepened and the process of European imperial retreat began in earnest.

Husain explains how the “mental maps” internalized by Anglo-American policymakers shaped their world views and helped them to define their nations’ interests and to frame policy and institutional options in a disorienting new world. By 1945, U.S. interests and obligations spanned the globe, a perception President Franklin Roosevelt encouraged Americans to embrace and that was reinforced through the maps they consumed voraciously in the pages of wartime issues of periodicals like *National Geographic* magazine. Rather than emphasize the need to secure regional trading blocs or territorial arrangements, U.S. statesmen in the early postwar years concentrated on building the global architecture of containment and establishing multilateral institutions to facilitate the orderly dissolution of the European empires. This American globalism, Husain demonstrates, contrasted sharply with the regional emphases of British strategists in the postwar years. The mental maps that guided policymakers in London led them to place renewed emphasis on Britain’s imperial and Commonwealth assets, a world view which led them to “[pare] down the key geographical nodes that anchored British defense planning and draw spatial linkages between them” (p. 4).

These new spatial linkages were most evident in the way the Labour government of Clement Attlee identified the postwar imperial crises in Palestine and Kashmir as inextricably interwoven. By 1948, British policymakers perceived an “arc of crisis,” extending through Britain’s dependencies and client states in the Muslim world from the Levant to the Himalayas, that endangered its vital interests in that region. “Should a Muslim revolt consume the heartlands of Islam,” Husain writes, “Britain would only have its relationships with those states to contain and subdue it” (p. 9). For their part, the Americans predictably saw the crises seething in the Near East and the subcontinent through a global lens. The Palestine crisis, they believed most importantly, challenged their ability to guarantee the flow of Middle Eastern oil to the West and secure the regional military facilities with which to contain Soviet power. Kashmir was of secondary interest to the United States, which valued South Asia primarily because of “the region’s proximity to the Middle East, its large

pool of manual labor, its mineral resources, and its potential as a market for stimulating the economic recovery of Europe and Great Britain” (p. 13). U.S. policymakers were content to follow the British lead where the volatile crisis over the political disposition of Kashmir was concerned.

Husain’s agenda is not limited to the geographic bases of Anglo-American diplomacy in the Levant and South Asia. He contends that mental maps and geographic perceptions of power and interest shaped the actions of Dutch statesmen as they clung doggedly to a vision of the Netherlands’ colonial future in the East Indies and French officials as they worked in vain to secure their political dominance in Syria and Lebanon. Whereas the British rather gracefully conceded their global role after 1945 and embraced a judicious regionalism, Husain chides the Dutch and French for “failing to recalibrate imperial footprints in accordance with a new era of rapid change for colonial powers” (p. 273).

But Husain is not content to examine merely the “official mind” of U.S. and European statesmen. He also parses the geographically informed world views of nationalist leaders like David Ben-Gurion and Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Their visions for new states carved from British Palestine and India underscore the importance of mental maps in defining the aspirations of postwar independence leaders along the Cold War’s periphery.

At times, Husain’s drive to establish a grand synthesis that integrates the stories of Anglo-American foreign policymakers and anticolonial nationalists, limns the emergence of geopolitics as an academic field, and attempts to reconfigure the histories of decolonization, the early Cold War, and the establishment of the United Nations falls prey to its own ambitions. It is simply beyond the author to give each of these subjects its due or weave them into a seamless whole. Nevertheless, Husain’s study provides a sophisticated template for those seeking to explore further the signal roles of geography and mental maps in shaping modern international history.

W. TAYLOR FAIN

*University of North Carolina, Wilmington*

BRIAN REGAL. *Searching for Sasquatch: Crackpots, Eggheads, and Cryptozoology*. (Palgrave Studies in the History of Science and Technology.) Paperback ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Pp. x, 249. \$30.00.

Cryptozoology has been described as the converse of paleontology: that is to say, paleontologists study creatures for which there is evidence, but which no one (at least no human who could leave a record) has ever seen, while cryptozoologists study creatures that have frequently been seen, but for which there is no evidence. Of course there are many other differences between these fields, including the one conspicuously, if facetiously, signaled in Brian Regal’s subtitle. Paleontologists tend to be conventionally credentialed scientists; cryptozoologists, however, tend to be amateur enthu-



siasts. This dichotomy is especially marked among the subset of cryptozoologists who are the focus of Regal's work: those interested in (or often, in his words, obsessed with) the humanlike creature known variously as "sasquatch," "yeti," and "bigfoot," among other things.

Although they have evaded conventional documentation with impressive success, there is a sense in which these so-called anomalous primates are far from mysterious. If their numerous appearances have largely been ignored by scientific journals, popular media have given them more than their share of ink. For this reason, even in the absence of reliable photographs, everyone knows what they look like. The star of a recent series of advertisements for beef jerky was immediately recognizable as sasquatch. He is large, hairy, bipedal, and prelinguistic; perhaps less characteristically, he invariably outsmarts then overpowers the *Homo sapiens* individuals who torment him.

It is the quest documented in *Searching for Sasquatch: Crackpots, Eggheads, and Cryptozoology* that has made this image so widely familiar. Regal traces the efforts, beginning in the period after the Second World War, of a series of enthusiasts not only to encounter this elusive creature, but also to bring him (as in the advertisement, the default sex is male) back, or at least to return with persuasive evidence of his existence. The targets of this persuasion were mainstream scientists, whose indifference to cryptozoological efforts was a constant source of irritation, and of even stronger feelings. Regal presents this implicit disparagement as a relatively novel phenomenon, linking the twentieth-century hunt for anomalous primates to the long natural history tradition that stretched back through the medieval period to Pliny and Aristotle. This tradition, which predates the modern distinction between amateur naturalist and professional scientist, provides many examples both of near- or half-human creatures and of creatures like the unicorn whose existence resisted conventional proof. Although its authority and prestige decreased as zoology displaced natural history, anomalous primates continued to figure in nineteenth-century scientific discourse. Some quarian taxonomists postulated the existence of an aquatic primate that would fill an empty slot in their elaborately structured system; in the wake of Darwinian evolutionary theory, a series of putative "missing links" fascinated elite zoologists as well as the patrons and proprietors of sideshows.

A cast of odd and dedicated characters is at the heart of this study. Regal laments that some of their papers have disappeared or become otherwise inaccessible, making aspects of their lives as elusive as their quarry, but sufficient material remains to support detailed accounts of individual careers in the context of the changing position of cryptozoology. After an initial account of the search for the Himalayan yeti, Regal narrows his focus to the sasquatch of North America. He offers capsule biographies of a number of sasquatch aficionados, as well as blow-by-blow descriptions of their internequine struggles, some of which threatened to end in court. Grover Krantz emerges as the most compelling

figure. After a difficult early life he earned a doctorate in anthropology then joined the faculty of Washington State University, where he taught until he retired. Yet his status as an academic did not validate his views on sasquatch; on the contrary, his abominable snowman (ABSM) enthusiasm served to undermine his academic position. As was the case with other cryptozoologists, issues of simple credulity were exacerbated by attempts to define evolutionary descent. Sasquatch researchers occasionally conflated anomalous primates with Neanderthals, but more commonly preferred to assign them deeper roots. The long-extinct Asian ape *Gigantopithecus* was a favorite candidate, as it was with paleoanthropologists who hoped to find a non-African ancestor for humans.

As Regal notes, the study of cryptozoology raises important questions with regard to the history of science "about the relation between amateur naturalists and professional, academic scientists; about the demarcation of science and pseudoscience; and about the location of the seat of intellectual authority" (p. 11). But *Searching for Sasquatch* does not really address these questions. Although his occasionally satiric tone superficially separates him from his subject and his subjects, in fact Regal is too close to them. Statements like "This book is unconcerned with proving whether Bigfoot is real or not. I leave that burden to others" (p. 6) are less than neutral. Overall, the book is more chronicle than argument, and often Regal seems overwhelmed by the sheer bulk of the material he has unearthed. The chapters are structured around individuals and episodes, which means that some material is repeated. So to some extent *Searching for Sasquatch* represents a missed opportunity, but it has certainly provided an opportunity for others.

HARRIET RITVO

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

PAULA A. MICHAELS. *Lamaze: An International History*. (Oxford Studies in International History.) New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. xv, 240. \$29.95.

In 1951, the French obstetrician Fernand Lamaze traveled to the Soviet Union and witnessed a birth with psychoprophylactic techniques. Inspired, he returned to France to spread the word and then became an international apostle of the method. In this fascinating and judiciously argued work, Paula A. Michaels details not just Lamaze's initial conversion but also the political, social, and economic pressures that led to sometimes subtle, other times substantial, variations in what was considered "natural" childbirth as it moved from country to country and decade to decade.

Michaels terms this study "an international history" and the source base and its impressive linguistic array back this assertion. American, British, French, and Russian archival sources are joined with periodicals as well as interviews, films, memoirs, feminist treatises, training manuals, and medical literature. The investigation starts with a history of the various, usually phar-

macological, often controversial, methods of alleviating women's suffering as background to the development by 1930s British physician Grantly Dick-Read of the first psychological approach to managing labor, what he coined "natural childbirth." Dick-Read, convinced that birth was a natural process akin to a bowel movement, believed that it was fear and tension in the cervix that produced pain in birth. In an argument framed by anxieties over racial degeneracy, Dick-Read proposed that pre-natal education and relaxation exercises would eliminate panic, reduce pain, and ultimately lead to higher birthrates.

While Dick-Read fought an imagined demographic catastrophe, the development of Soviet non-pharmacological management of birth took place in the shadow of the approximately 27 million Soviet deaths of World War II and the shortages of drugs that plagued the post-war years. In the Ukrainian city of Kharkov, the psychologist I. Z. Vel'vovskii confronted the specter of overly medicalized birth from the viewpoint of his training in hypnotherapy and through the lens of Pavlovian reflexology. Like Dick-Read but independent of his influence, Vel'vovskii theorized that distress, born of a collective reflex of women to cultural, social, and historical cues about the difficulties of childbirth, distorted women's natural impulses and led to difficult labors. Proper preparation could help, with first-time mothers at least, to create a painless birth experience. Ironically, the land that gestated the theories of Lamaze would not be a place for their ready and easy adoption. Lack of trained personnel and an incomplete push for even basic necessities in maternal care meant that Vel'vovskii's theories, while officially embraced, were never fully implemented in the USSR.

In France, the provenance of psychoprophylaxis in Pavlovian and, especially, communist thought led to a ready application and even a politically inclined push by leftist women. As Michaels deftly shows, the method Lamaze implemented was not without its modifications from the Soviet model. Lamaze added intense, in-depth prenatal instruction for a full three months, more than double the Soviet recommendations. He continued to depict pain as a collective reflex, but argued that by harnessing women's intellects it could be overcome. In addition to a faith in women's rationality, the French added a faith in husbands, who were not segregated but urged to become full participants.

Having set up the British, Soviet, and French contexts, Michaels explores the interactions of the three and the further spread of what became known simply as "Lamaze." Dick-Read reappears as a disgruntled critic of the French and Soviet doctors whom he accuses of stealing his ideas. The Americans embrace the techniques of the Soviets through French intermediaries who helpfully drop Pavlov from their descriptions. Finally, the counterculture's embrace of "natural" childbirth brought Lamaze to its heyday of acceptance in the American 1970s, even as the practice of psychoprophylaxis came under attack in France in a parsimonious insurance system's attempt to limit women's choices.

The conclusion gives voice to many themes discussed throughout the book, and posits big ideas regarding the influences of capitalism, choice, and freedom on the quality of women's care. Against the backdrop of the international movements of "natural" childbirth are discussions of women as passive or active patients (and the simplicity of that binary), the role of technology and medicine in the modification of birth practice, the pathologizing of women's health, and the prickly issue of finding women's "satisfaction" with their birth experience.

While a discussion of the safety of epidurals is included with the description of their introduction to birth practice, similar material on the safety of "natural" birth and its later manifestations is not fully revealed. It might have been instructive to have further detail on the research from advocates of Dick-Read's and Lamaze's methods and the changes in the scientific justification of those methods over time.

Overall, this is an enjoyable and absorbing read. Michaels writes well, and because the arguments are so clearly made and provocatively posed, this would be an excellent book for gender and medicine courses at the undergraduate and graduate levels. Students would read this book, and scholars interested in the history of gender and medicine should as well.

TRICIA STARKS  
University of Arkansas

KATHERINE C. EPSTEIN. *Torpedo: Inventing the Military-Industrial Complex in the United States and Great Britain*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014. Pp. 305. \$45.00.

For the last three decades or so, historians have struggled to define and explain the origins of the "military-industrial complex" so famously articulated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his 1961 Farewell Address. Katherine C. Epstein's important new book significantly expands both the scale and scope of the historiographical discussion in a way that will influence how future scholars approach the subject.

Earlier scholars of the military-industrial complex and its origins identified and explained the basic processes and industrial relationships used by governments in the mid- to late nineteenth century when procuring advanced military technology. Epstein builds the core of her narrative around the idea of command technology, a concept first articulated by William McNeill in *The Pursuit of Power* (1982), arguing that naval weaponry, especially torpedoes, had gotten so sophisticated by the end of the nineteenth century that navies could no longer simply contract for the weapons they wanted and introduce them into their fleets. Staying on the cutting edge of technological change now meant that governments had to partner with private enterprise and invest in the research and development phase of weapons design. The resulting partnerships were fraught with error and misunderstandings, including several high-profile lawsuits. But Epstein convincingly suggests that this



is the point where the modern incarnation of the military-industrial complex emerged.

By focusing on torpedoes in intense detail, Epstein is able to offer a more refined explanation of command technology. One of the important concepts she develops is the idea of servant technology, the information generated when evaluating new technology that in turn is used to improve subsequent generations of that technology. The servant technology had a unique commodity value that affected design, implementation, and adoption, and Epstein repeatedly describes its value to the emerging military-industrial complex. Epstein also devotes significant time to intellectual property issues, demonstrating that the extent to which a government incorporated intellectual property rewards into its research and development process directly affected the efficiency with which it introduced new technologies to the fleet.

*Torpedo: Inventing the Military-Industrial Complex in the United States and Great Britain* expands the scholarly conversation in two important ways. First, unlike much of the existing literature, this study is comparative, following torpedo development in both the United States and Great Britain. Both countries experimented with or considered many of the same technologies, sometimes from the same companies, but they did so in very different ways. The British had a more robust research and development apparatus in place, which allowed for more methodical evaluation and introduction of torpedo technologies. The Americans, lacking those resources, more often placed their faith in large technological leaps, which proved problematic in the long run. Both competed or interacted with other nation-states and international companies as they perfected their torpedoes. The comparison is useful because it requires the reader to take a global view when assessing the impact of bureaucratic and industrial culture on the weapons development process.

The second reason this book is so significant is that it expands the study of the military-industrial complex to more deliberately draw upon a wide array of historical subfields. Epstein effectively mines the literature and sources associated with military history, business history, policy history, legal history, and the history of science and technology. The intersection of these subfields, which she describes as lying at “the heart of the modern relationship between the state and society,” results in a level of analysis that is much more nuanced than the earlier literature on the subject (p. 2). That analysis is bolstered by solid and substantial engagement with archival materials from all of these subfields.

One of the dangers of studies that devote so much time and attention to technical minutiae, in this case of torpedo development, is that it risks becoming irrelevant to all but the most dedicated historians of the field, here, those of nineteenth-century naval technology. Epstein avoids this pitfall by regularly placing her story in the larger context of business practices of the period, industrial developments, and an evolving global legal environment. Where the narrative really shines,

though, is in its systematic discussion of the impact of rapidly changing torpedo technology on naval strategy and tactics in the Royal Navy. Epstein clearly links what could have been a narrowly focused topic to force structure, deployment of the fleet, ship design, and ongoing tactical debates. In doing so, she contributes significantly to a larger historical discussion challenging the orthodoxy of the primacy of the battleship in pre-World War I British strategic thinking.

This important book can be a bit dense at times, but it will be essential for historians working on the military-industrial complex, the history of technology, intellectual property law, and British naval strategy. I highly recommend it.

KURT HACKEMER

University of South Dakota

## ASIA

VIREN MURTHY and AXEL SCHNEIDER, editors. *The Challenge of Linear Time: Nationhood and the Politics of History in East Asia*. (Leiden Series in Comparative Historiography, no. 7.) Boston, Mass.: Brill, 2014. Pp. ix, 301. \$149.00.

This book has an attractive title as well as a few interesting chapters. It begins with Naoki Sakai's reflection on intellectual culture in 1930s Japan. The key figures under discussion are Ienaga Saburō, Maruyama Masao, and Tanabe Hajime; the first two were historians and the third was a philosopher. Just as Japan was transformed from a modern nation to a multiethnic empire, that period saw an influx of ideas. Many ideologies exerted influences in the country and each produced a following. Therefore, Sakai argues, it is hard to identify, much less categorize, the stage where Japan, or the world at large, stood in the evolution of history. He thus proposes that perhaps one should “hesitate” before readily applying existing concepts, or “civilizational categories,” to analyzing the change of history and society (p. 47).

Sakai's thoughtful discussion is followed by Viren Murthy's study of Tan Sitong (1865–1898), a leading reformer and social thinker of Qing China. The focus of Murthy's essay is on Tan's *Renxue*, or *A Study of Cosmic Love*, which, to Murthy, “was one of the first works to radically reinterpret classical Chinese texts in the framework of modern Western philosophy and science” (p. 49). Murthy contends that Tan's work represented a new turn in Chinese intellectual history, in that “evidential learning,” which had flourished from the late seventeenth century, gave way to the renewed interest in New Text Confucianism in the nineteenth century. This observation, of course, is not new, because it has been established in Chinese scholarship as well as through the works of Benjamin A. Elman and others in the United States. Yet Murthy seems to have more to offer, which is to examine how Tan introduced evolutionism, or “progressive time-history” (p. 65), and accommodated this Western idea with Buddhist, Daoist,

and Confucianist elements. In so doing, Murthy argues, Tan was able to advocate such concepts as modernity, democracy, and equality. But this accommodation also caused him to be criticized by Zhang Taiyan (1869–1936), another scholar in the late Qing. While receptive to the idea of evolution, Zhang appeared less optimistic than Tan about the prospect of historical development.

The third essay in part I is written by Axel Schneider, but is a reprint from another anthology, *Transforming History: The Making of a Modern Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China* (2011), edited by Brian Moloughney and Peter Zarrow. The protagonist treated by Schneider is Liu Yizheng (1880–1956), a Chinese historian whose major text is also analyzed by Ya-pei Kuo in this book, to which I will turn below. Sun Ge's essay on Takeuchi Yoshimi (1910–1977) completes this part, commenting on Takeuchi's most noted text, "Overcoming Modernity" (1959). As a controversial figure in postwar Japan, Takeuchi sharply criticized the modernization project launched in Meiji Japan. His criticism has been read variously, but overall, Sun contends, Takeuchi challenged the "evolutionary vision of history" that had once dominated prewar Japan (p. 122). His debate with Tōyama Shigeki, a Marxist historian who remained committed to the belief, was but one example.

The first article in part II of the book, written by Takahiro Nakajima, is also on Takeuchi Yoshimi. It centers on Takeuchi's career in the 1960s when he protested against the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Continuing his radical stance, Takeuchi called for Japanese citizens to reflect on their war experience and pass the reflections on to postwar generations in order to make amends in Japan's relationship with China. But in the end, Nakajima believes, Takeuchi failed to see any hope for his dream's realization and became rather pessimistic. He thus developed an "eschatological view of history," or an idea that opposes historicism and historical evolution. The following essay, by Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, jumps the reader from postwar Japan to China during the Cultural Revolution. It is an analysis of the campaign, occurring in the mid-1970s, against Lin Biao and Confucius, one of the last political movements waged largely by Mao Zedong's associates before Mao's death. What interests Weigelin-Schwiedrzik is how the campaign built and expanded on the notion of evolutionary history, for the thrust of the campaign was to criticize Confucius and compare him with Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai for their interest in "restoration" rather than revolution. In pursuing this interest and unfolding the discussion of it, Weigelin-Schwiedrzik relies on as well as engages Wang Gungwu's and others' previous analysis of how Chinese Marxists used the past to serve the need of current political needs.

Part III presents two studies that show a different side of historical practice, Lung-hsin Liu's study of popular history in Republican China and Haiyan Lee's analysis of museum exhibits in Communist China. The former is a detailed account of how, from the 1930s, after China faced and resisted Japan's invasion, histo-

rians and writers made a concerted effort to popularize historical knowledge in helping the cause of national salvation. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, the latter offers an in-depth and insightful analysis of how the Water Dungeon exhibit and the Rent Collection Courtyard sculpture expounded and bolstered the idea of class struggle in explaining historical progress for the ordinary Chinese. The fourth and the last part of the book is also on China. Tze-ki Hon's examination of the *National Essence* journal (*Guocui xuebao*) returns us to the early twentieth century, whereas Ya-pei Kuo shifts the attention to Liu Yizheng's *A History of Chinese Culture*, which appeared in the 1920s. Both chapters seem to pursue a similar goal, which is to attempt a different narrative in delineating the changes of modern Chinese historiography. As Chinese historians were drawn to such new ideas as historical evolution, even the need of revolution, they also conscientiously harked back to the past in search of useful elements. The *National Essence* scholars, notes Hon, hoped to revive the culture and institutions of China's antiquity, whereas Liu's writing of *A History of Chinese Culture* was aimed, according to Kuo, to turn it into "a counter narrative to the May Fourth account of history and culture" (p. 286).

Like many anthologies, the chapters included in this book vary in quality as well as in length. While they are informative and interesting in their own right, they are not necessarily helpful for illustrating the title and theme of the book (in my above summary, I have tried hard to look for and flesh out the relevant content). First, the book's title is a bit misleading. It is supposed to be a book on nationhood and history in East Asia, but most essays are on China and none on Korea. Second, *The Challenge of Linear Time: Nationhood and the Politics of History in East Asia* suggests that the book is to reveal that, although the idea of linear development of history, or historical evolution, shaped the historical mind and practices in modern China and Japan, not all historical thinkers in the region were sold on the idea. The introduction states that while the chapters "develop the idea that the dominance of linear temporality and progressive history [*sic*]," their subjects also "resist linear forms of historical writing and historical presentation" (p. 2). But if "nationhood" was a central concern for the historical works discussed in the book, then the concept of linear time invariably loomed large in the background, if it did not also underpin the whole enterprise. For whether one perceived the course of national history as progressive (e.g., the Marxists) or retrogressive (e.g., the *National Essence* group) or even eschatological (e.g., Takeuchi Yoshimi), such perception remained gripped by the linear conception of time. In other words, questioning the advent of modernity, and the Asian path to modernity in particular, is not the same as challenging linear history; one could instead argue that those Asian historians and thinkers appeared rather anxious for moving their nations ahead on the linear path of development.

Careful readers, too, will be somewhat puzzled by the book's organization and its section headings. As al-



luded to above, there are two chapters on Takeuchi Yoshimi but they are placed in two different sections and, more oddly, his name also appears differently each time: one follows the Japanese custom as shown above, which is more common in academic writings these days, whereas the other presents him as Yoshimi Takeuchi. Part II is called “The Burden of the Past and the Hope for a Better Future.” But the two chapters in it hardly point to “a better future”: Nakajima actually discusses Takeuchi’s eschatological view of history and life, and Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, judging from her writing, does not and would not (!) take the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius as anything hopeful for a “better future.” Likewise, part IV’s heading contains the word “spatial.” However, the discussion of “spatial boundary” is nowhere to be found in either Hon or Kuo’s essay. All in all, though the study of comparative historiography is a field deserving exploration and promotion, this book, despite its intriguing title, fails to deliver what it is supposed to, as it is inadequately conceived and crudely edited.

Q. EDWARD WANG  
Rowan University

WEI-CHENG LIN. *Building a Sacred Mountain: The Buddhist Architecture of China’s Mount Wutai*. (Art History Publication Initiative.) Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2014. Pp. xi, 321. \$60.00.

Mount Wutai has been the most important sacred mountain in East Asia for almost a millennium and a half. The main question animating this historically and theoretically rich study is how this came to be, especially in light of the fact that this mountain had no sacred pedigree. Thus, unlike other sacred sites, like Jerusalem, that present us with a mytho-historical stratigraphy of competing religious claims, Mount Wutai appears *nigh ex nihilo* in the mid-sixth century as the abode of the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī. How and why this happened raises two other questions: How was Buddhist sacrality revealed on the mountain? And how was it maintained and transformed over time?

In exploring these questions Wei-Cheng Lin takes the novel approach of focusing on monastic architecture in order to broaden the long-running discussion about how Chinese came to be Buddhists. Most notable in this regard is that he completely ignores the Sinification paradigm. Thus rather than reiterating the chauvinistic model whereby Buddhism became inevitably more “Chinese” on account of Han culture and society, Lin explores instead how Mount Wutai became a sacred mountain, and stayed one, within solely Buddhist discourses. To that end the first chapter explores the function of pagodas, monasteries, and ultimately the Buddhist cityscapes of the Northern Wei dynasty (386–534) as the medium through which the Dharmic divine was seen, visualized, and experienced. And as such the built environment was a key component in the process of Buddhization.

Yet, even so, why would anyone build monasteries in

such a remote mountain range? One reason to do so was the *Flower Garland Sutra*, which was translated into Chinese around 420, and elliptically identified the mountain with Mañjuśrī. It still took more than a century for the mountain to enter the official Chinese record, however, and in explaining that lag Lin provides a fascinating portrait of how translation history and doctrinal reinterpretation within shifting historical realities were to shape the cult of Wutaishan. Key factors in this regard were the fall of the Northern Wei, their replacement by the fervently Buddhist Eastern Wei (534–549) and Northern Qi (550–577), and the subsequent Buddhist purges of the Northern Zhou (557–581). That the Dharma came to be so violently persecuted was, however, perhaps not a surprise for many Chinese Buddhists, since during the sixth century their tradition had become shot through with an “end times” rhetoric. So much so that practice had shifted from liturgies in monasteries to monks retreating to mountains to meditate, and undertaking large-scale projects of building massive Buddhist monuments in the mountains and carving the Buddhist canon into stone so that the Dharma could survive the coming apocalypse.

It was precisely in that hothouse atmosphere that the first visions of Mañjuśrī at Wutaishan began to appear in the sixth century. And in turn it was those visions, and the presence of the divine that they confirmed, that came to be the basis for the built environment of Mount Wutai. But as Lin keenly observes, this environment and how it was both constructed and understood was continually changing on account not only of new visions, new texts, and new teachings, but also of the ever-shifting political winds. Most notable in terms of all of those factors was the reign of Empress Wu Zeitan (r. 690–705), who, in her storied machinations to make herself the Buddhist ruler of China, not only came to elevate the sacred standing of Mount Wutai, but also made it a central node in the ever-evolving power grid of the Chinese state. But even so, as Lin shows, the evolution of the mountain’s sanctity still remained largely in the hands of Buddhists on account of the tradition of “virtual monasteries” (*huasi*), which were visions that pilgrims had of fully realized monasteries, that in turn became the basis for actual monasteries that confirmed the sacrality of the mountain and created the spatiality of its sacredness.

Yet even these sacred stories and their institutionalizations were apt to change. And this was especially the case when Tantric Buddhism came to dominate Chinese court life at the end of the eighth century. Thus, on the basis of new texts the worship of Mañjuśrī was made an empire-wide mandate and the mountain itself was transformed into a tantric mandala at the center of the Chinese Buddhist world through new visions and monasteries. And as a result, Wutaishan, its cult, and its architecture, came to be at the heart of everything Chinese.

By the end of the eighth century, however, the Tang dynasty was being challenged both internally and externally, including by the Tibetans, who in 824 asked the

Chinese court for an image of Mount Wutai. Whether this representation came to be the basis for the famous murals of Wutaishan at the Mogao Caves is unknown; however, these paintings provide a powerful coda as to how Mount Wutai had become a free-floating signifier. It was a signifier that, as Lin well shows, came to be understood for the first time in its totality, albeit one shaped again by its particular local realities. As Lin's insightful work makes abundantly clear, through the ontology of Wutaishan—from mountain, to monastery, to mandala, to mural, and from vision to built environment—Mount Wutai was always something like a “virtual mountain.”

JOHAN ELVERSKOG  
Southern Methodist University

PATRICIA BUCKLEY EBREY. *Emperor Huizong*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014. Pp. xxix, 661. \$45.00.

In *Emperor Huizong*, Patricia Buckley Ebrey has projected the history of the late Northern Song dynasty upon a wide screen, building an epic narrative around the eponymous monarch and his court during a reign of epochal importance. Not since Ray Huang's *1587, A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline* (1981) has a major scholar attempted to write a Chinese monarch's biography for a broader audience of non-specialists. This will be essential reading for undergraduate courses, for no other single volume presents such a richly detailed picture of court culture in Song China, or illustrates the personal and political stresses of ruling an empire. Ebrey vividly captures Huizong's (r. 1100–1126) outsized role in cultural life: as a creator, patron, and collector of painting, calligraphy, poetry, and scholarship; as a practitioner and promoter of Daoism as both personal piety and state religion; as the center of and a participant in imperial spectacles and musical performances; and as the initiator of a monumental palace- and garden-building program.

Ebrey has succeeded in rehabilitating Huizong's long-maligned historical image by collecting an impressively broad corpus of extant primary sources, organizing them thematically and diachronically, and approaching them in a fresh light. Her willingness to challenge the tired clichés and moralistic denunciations that have surrounded Huizong since the twelfth century is the book's most valuable contribution. According to conventional historical wisdom, Huizong was a decadent and negligent aesthete whose corrupt and power-hungry courtiers, extensive Daoist patronage, extravagant cultural projects, and disastrous foreign policies precipitated the near collapse of the dynasty with the Jurchen invasion of 1125–1127. Rather than reading his reign as an irreversible declension narrative, Ebrey has “tried to look at Huizong's world through his eyes and keep in mind what he knew at the time” (p. 505). In its ambition and fair-mindedness, Ebrey's revisionist project has surpassed all previous narrative histories of Hui-

zong's reign, including my own, which appeared in Volume V, Part I of the *Cambridge History of China* (2009).

Ebrey's reading of Huizong's life is humanistic and psychologizing, attempting to reimagine the personality traits, genuine feelings, and private thoughts that mostly remained hidden beneath the grand façades of emperorship. The story begins with a highly speculative reconstruction of the emperor's early years in the capital and the palace, from his childhood as an imperial prince to his unlikely enthronement after the untimely death of his older brother Zhezong (r. 1085–1100). Ebrey deftly cuts through the complexities of factional politics, and explains why Huizong chose to continue to expand the state activist “New Policies” of his father, Emperor Shenzong (r. 1067–1085), and entrusted the long-serving councilor Cai Jing (1047–1126) with management of his government. The book concludes with a meticulous reconstruction of the Jurchen invasion, the siege and fall of Kaifeng, the dynasty's near collapse, and Huizong's remaining years in captivity.

In her introduction, Ebrey concedes that “today's readers may wonder how much of what Huizong did was a public performance, scripted by court officials, and how much reflected his personal feelings” (p. xvi). At various points in this book, Ebrey foregrounds either the emperor's outward surfaces or his private personality as the primary explanation for how and why he was operating as he did within the ritual, religious, and cultural spheres of rulership. For example, Ebrey is more explicitly aware of the multiple roles that the emperor played as a self-styled Daoist-sage ruler, and as the high center of imperial ritual in which participants could be “performing different scripts and . . . giving them different meanings” (p. 184). In a similar vein, Ebrey sees Huizong's lifelong belief in Daoism “not only as a means to personal goals, but also as a set of techniques that could help him rule” (p. 157). However, when reevaluating Huizong's patronage of Divine Empyrean Daoism as the state religion, Ebrey sees him as “motivated above all by religious convictions” as opposed to cynical or autocratic urges (p. 369). In addressing Huizong's multiple roles as a patron of an imperial painting school and workshop, as well as a painter and calligrapher in his own right, Ebrey concludes that “he crafted a persona of his own choosing” that enabled him to display a mastery of the arts of the brush (p. 239). Similarly, Ebrey sees Huizong's obsession with building monumental edifices and encyclopedic collections of objects and texts as expressions of his own personal passions, rather than as performances of emperorship that were designed to communicate narrower messages to specific audiences.

Ebrey's positivistic and humanistic reading of Huizong's biography assumes that he was motivated by recognizably human drives, with intellectual passions, political ambition, and artistic talent counterbalanced by the character flaws of vanity and hubris, which her readers could find comprehensible and even sympathetic. This approach succeeds admirably in immersing the reader in Huizong's world, by collapsing the distance



between his time and our own, but it also effaces the specific cultural contexts in which the emperor and his court were operating, and obscures the textual and visual enterprises in which emperorship was imagined and articulated. Rather than reading a sense of interiority into these corpora of primary sources by imagining what Huizong's true motives and personal principles might have been, it would be equally possible to reinterpret them as rhetorical performances and ritualized representations of rulership, mediated by generic conventions and cultural repertoires. Perhaps the tensions between private personality and public performance, which Ebrey locates within Huizong the historic individual, actually existed at the historiographic level, as constructions of texts and images in which these various forms of imperial subjectivity were embedded and manifested. Conceiving the emperor as an object of historical knowledge involves reading against primary sources that were not intended to reflect the inner workings of an individual personality and mind. These methodological and theoretical cavils will not diminish the magnitude of Ebrey's achievement in *Emperor Huizong*, nor will they detract from its status as a cornerstone of scholarship on the political culture of early modern China.

ARI DANIEL LEVINE  
University of Georgia

DAVID B. HONEY. *The Southern Garden Poetry Society: Literary Culture and Social Memory in Guangdong*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2013. Pp. xiv, 258. \$45.00.

In the waning years of the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) a poet, Sun Fen (1335/38–1390/93), built the Southern Garden (Nanyuan) at a site a little beyond the south gate of the small port city Guangzhou. He assembled friends there in the Veranda for Screening the Wind. They enjoyed views of the Pearl River, shared drinks and food, sang about the sights and the seasons, and contributed to the making of the “Southern Muse,” an “epic of Guangdong” with specific references to local flora, fauna, climate, and creatures (p. ix) that David B. Honey, quoting Pauline Yu, argues functions as “an extended narrative that can provide origins, structure, and meaning” (p. x) to the Cantonese culture. Five some centuries later, the garden and the veranda lay in ruins. The river was miles away. Guangzhou became a large port in global trade. A Republic had displaced the Qing, and a standardized national language movement had overtaken the country. Through all those changes large and small, Honey argues, Cantonese poets wrote regulated verses to socialize and to engage with their times. The Southern Garden continuously functioned as the locus in the making of a regional culture that was rooted in centuries of poetic genealogy and intertextual references.

To make sense of that literary culture, Honey combs through Southern Garden poems from the Ming to the Republic to identify works associated with the site.

“Nanyuan” turned out to be more an anthologized construct than a physical gathering place (chap. 2). Beyond Sun Fen and his friends, Nanyuan gained significance mainly as a product of textual references about the shared remembrances and presumed sociality associated with it (chaps. 3 and 4). Deploying enormous erudition, Honey peels back intertextual references layer by layer to make sense of generations of Southern Garden verses bearing the Nanyuan name. He shows that the Southern Garden sustained social memories from the Ming (chap. 5) through the Qing (chap. 6) into the Republican period (chap. 7). Honey offers exquisite translations, rich explications, and helpful commentaries of selected poetic projects. To bring together lives and works, Honey provides biographical sketches of the poets. Major Southern Garden figures—Qu Dajun (1630–1696), for example—had lived through dynastic transitions under resistance regimes, thereby becoming targets of imperial censorship. Such men, furthermore, expressed themselves through obfuscated allusions, providing dubious textual links to social and literary events while moving across spaces under assumed names. Honey cuts through the agenda of the censors as well as the anthologists to situate the lines of these poets. He renders intelligible some of the most opaque verses that otherwise would have resisted comprehension.

The volume departs from established historical scholarship on Ming-Qing poetics in several ways. Historians of the Ming have shed much light on the close connections between the contentiousness of Ming court politics and the proliferation of literary societies across the empire, connections that help to explain the factionalized politics of aesthetic taste and the workings of the civil service examinations system. Frederic Wakeman showed, in addition, that the seventeenth century marked a turning point—and a moment of discontinuity—in late imperial Chinese literary culture and politics (*The Great Enterprise: the Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China* [1985], chap. 4). Before the fall of the Ming, regional literati formed poetry societies to critique court politics and to carry out gentry home rule. Upon the rise of the Qing, the new rulers effectively suppressed the organization of local initiatives whether they were in the guise of aesthetic self-expression or not.

Most historians draw their conclusions based on studies of the affluent and sophisticated Jiangnan region. Honey examines Guangdong, a maritime frontier with a distinct language. Cantonese sojourners in the foreign linguistic environments of the dynastic capitals of imperial China were “stamped as culturally backward and racially distinct southerners,” but “strove to win careers as scholar-officials” (p. ix). Zhang Jiuling (678–740) was the first Southern Garden man ever to rise above such prejudices in court. Centuries later, the South took pride in the painter, calligrapher, and poet Li Jian (1747–1799), an eccentric who roamed among local minorities, berated a visiting Jiangnan master, and never did leave the area (pp. 121–122). Did the South-

ern Muse constitute its own regionally informed practice of aesthetic criticism? Did the “epic of Guangdong” find a way to versify the region’s changing place on the cultural map? Honey examines the making of the Southern Garden canon as its poets lived with these issues. The volume is best appreciated as a learned contribution that celebrates the most “memorable lines” (p. 116) that have ever been written in the Chinese South.

WEN-HSIN YEH  
*University of California, Berkeley*

CHRISTOPHER A. DAILY. *Robert Morrison and the Protestant Plan for China*. (Royal Asiatic Society Books.) Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013. Pp. xiii, 261. \$60.00.

If there is one date indelibly ingrained in the historiography of Protestant Christianity in China, it is the year 1807, when, with the arrival of Robert Morrison, the missionary activity of Protestants in the Qing Empire began. It is that date, along with the pioneering enterprise of Morrison, that Christopher A. Daily seeks to place into a wider perspective in his illuminating study. His intention is not to belittle Morrison’s achievements, although Daily distances himself explicitly from earlier hagiographical approaches to Morrison’s mission. Rather, Daily’s aim is to uncover the influences that shaped Morrison’s strategy in China. For this reason his book is not a biography in any conventional sense of the term.

With the above in mind, the reader will be less surprised that the first two chapters, comprising upward of a third of the book’s pages, are not devoted to Morrison at all. They trace the strategy of the London Missionary Society (LMS), the organization that dispatched Morrison to China. This is important and eye-opening because at the time of Morrison’s acceptance into the LMS, the society had just undergone a fundamental re-orientation. Its early approach, shaped by its director Thomas Haweis, was to send forth “godly mechanics.” Such missionaries lacked any intellectual preparation, but, it was hoped, would impress the “heathen” through their technical equipment and skills. After this strategy had shipwrecked both in the South Seas and in South Africa (the former analyzed by Daily in more detail, the latter rather briefly), the solution was to provide future missionaries with sound academic training before dispatching them to their mission fields. It is intriguing to see how the LMS appears as a global institution able to apply fruitfully lessons from its (negative) experiences in some mission fields to other target areas. This is an aspect of the story that Daily does not address explicitly; yet it is important, as we know little about the global dimension of missionary societies, and his monograph may stimulate further inquiry into this matter.

The appointment of David Bogue as tutor to missionary students in May 1800 became the visible embodiment of this change. Within his already existing academy at Gosport, Bogue established a training course for

prospective LMS missionaries. Daily analyzes the Gosport curriculum and the missionary strategy developed by Bogue in great detail. Bogue suggested a three-step approach, beginning with the missionaries immersing themselves in the language of their mission field. Next, they were to translate the Bible and Christian literature into that language; and finally, they would establish an academy to train future indigenous missionaries. Contrary to what the title of Daily’s book suggests, this was not a plan specifically for China; but owing to its strategic importance for world evangelization, China occupied a central place in Bogue’s thinking, and hence was selected as Morrison’s destination.

In the remaining three chapters, Daily demonstrates how Morrison remained faithful to Bogue’s blueprint in carrying out his evangelizing work in China. His activities were determined by a number of factors beyond his control, which Daily notes but tends to downplay: most importantly, Christianity had been declared illegal in the Qing Empire, therefore both direct evangelization and the publication of Christian literature were illegal. Morrison’s reliance on literary work and his subsequent focus on ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia were an immediate consequence of that obstacle. That Morrison initially received little support from Western merchants in Canton and Portuguese Macao, the only possible places of residence for Europeans on the China coast, added to his difficulties.

And yet Daily’s argument, that Morrison, even under these adverse circumstances, remained under the continued influence of Bogue’s master plan, is convincing. Morrison spent years studying Chinese and even longer on his Bible translation, which he completed with the collaboration of William Milne. In translating supplementary Christian writings, Morrison even slavishly followed the order outlined by Bogue. Finally, Morrison and Milne set up the Anglo-Chinese College in Malacca as a training ground for Chinese evangelists. One of these was Liang Afa, a pivotal figure in the history of Protestant Christianity in China.

Daily’s monograph is based on in-depth scrutiny of the archival record, with no theoretical pretensions and little recourse to the intercultural implications of mission work. For this reason his conclusion that “the Gosport programme and Morrison’s mission had been a success” (p. 191) is too bold. Successful evangelization required more than the availability of a Chinese Bible and other Protestant texts as well as a number of converts. It depended on the ability of all of these to address the Chinese on their own cultural terms. And whether Christianity would have been able to penetrate China had not “Western” imperialism radically altered the political and legal framework is a moot point. This is not to diminish the merits of Daily’s study, which shows how the beginnings of the Chinese Protestant Church were the fruits of a broader strategy developed by an unconventional British mission theorist.

THORALF KLEIN  
*Loughborough University*



MICHELLE T. KING, *Between Birth and Death: Female Infanticide in Nineteenth-Century China*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2014. Pp. xiii, 250. Cloth \$50.00, e-book \$50.00.

This elegantly written, strikingly illustrated book analyzes foreign and domestic perceptions of infanticide in China, with a focus on the years between the First Opium War and the Nanjing Decade. The chapters spiral outward from that intimate moment between birth and death. After a discussion of the choices mothers made amid the expectations of their husbands and elders, Michelle T. King moves to the efforts of local elite men to persuade people to raise their daughters. Here, she judiciously places opposition to infanticide in its wider context; in one philanthropist's list, "drowning daughters" features as the tenth of twenty-eight problems, just ahead of "the private slaughter [of beef]" (p. 68). Other philanthropists gave away anti-infanticide tracts at their civil service examination site, with the obvious purpose of accruing good karma before entering their exam cubicles (p. 57). Next, King critiques the efforts of Western Sinologues to quantify Chinese infanticides. A fourth chapter concerns the extraordinary transnational phenomenon of the *Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance* (Holy Childhood Association). Following in the footsteps of Henrietta Harrison, King shows how this Catholic organization convinced European children that by donating pennies, they could rescue the souls of China's babies. A final chapter argues that in the Republican period, infanticide became a question of women's status, modernity, and national strength. In a delightful example of where enthusiastic extrapolation can lead us, King cites a 1924 lecture in which Sun Yat-sen, no less, projected that a century hence, the United States would have grown to one billion people, and that the Chinese people, hopelessly outnumbered, would be assimilated and absorbed (pp. 170–171). This sequence of chapters adds up to the argument that infanticide was transformed from a local issue for families and the occasional philanthropist to an international question that defined judgments of China's status as civilized or barbarous, doomed or vigorous.

*Between Birth and Death: Female Infanticide in Nineteenth-Century China* can be profitably read in conjunction with David E. Mungello's *Drowning Girls in China: Female Infanticide since 1650* (2008). King shares key parts of Mungello's source base, but has tracked down the long-lost Chinese originals of an influential compilation by a French Jesuit. Where Mungello writes with admiration for the foreign champions of Chinese baby girls, King's probing critique emphasizes their linguistic limitations. Thus, she faults Father Gabriel Palâtre for mistaking an author's name for that of a place (pp. 102–104), and two paragraphs and a full-page illustration gleefully demonstrate that the Belgian sinologist Charles de Harlez "wrote [Chinese] in a hand worse than an earnest schoolchild's." King thinks this a "wonderful visual metaphor for the cultural transla-

tion of knowledge about infanticide in China as it moved to the West" (p. 108).

King understands Western "experts" who tried to count infanticides in China as primarily concerned with establishing Western moral superiority over China (p. 78). This bold claim is surprisingly thinly supported. If we do not see our own scholarly efforts as mere political exercises—with the goal of, say, arguing against "a presumed Eurocentric monopoly on moral righteousness" (p. 188)—our Victorian antecedents deserve the same consideration. In my reading, their interviews, birth histories, and collations of Chinese sources remain among the best evidence on the frequency and patterns of infanticide in nineteenth-century China; I am grateful to King for restoring these remarkable studies to us.

King marvels that infanticide "remains for most people a historical curiosity when it occurs in Western societies, not one of its historical fixtures," and posits that the association of China with infanticide should be understood as a "product of historical processes of the nineteenth century" (p. 3). There is another way to resolve this puzzle: outright infanticide in nineteenth-century Europe was much rarer than in China. In nineteenth-century England, for example, "infanticides by commission" peaked at several hundred per year according to one estimate (R. Sauer, "Infanticide and Abortion in Nineteenth-Century Britain," *Population Studies* 3, no. 1 [1978]: 92). This translates into 0.03 percent of all births. The Chinese informants of one American missionary, discussed by King, believed that in their hometowns in Fujian and Guangdong, between 10 and 80 percent of girls were killed at birth (pp. 92–98).

It is true that other nineteenth-century European methods of postpartum family planning could reach the same order of magnitude as Chinese infanticide. In some areas, more than a tenth of infants were abandoned to foundling homes or hastened to an early grave by mortal neglect. But for Christians concerned with the eternal life of the soul, there was a world of difference between the death of a baptized child and the intentional killing of a "heathen" newborn.

The world view of infanticidal parents deserves to be understood on its own terms as well. Here, the sources grant us only brief glimpses. Morality tales, designed to drive home the horror of infanticide, often emphasized maternal anguish. Only two Qing-period women speak to us directly in *Between Birth and Death*. One, captured by the pen of her son many decades after she drowned her firstborn daughter, looks back on that day with pain and regret. The other, an informant of a missionary, evidently found infanticide far less wrenching. Such emotional distance still existed in Deng Xiaoping's China. King cites a rural woman who in 1989 told a visiting journalist that "'Doing' a baby girl is not a big thing around here" (p. 180). Even in a 1997 survey, 69 percent of Chinese respondents felt that abortion was not equivalent to killing an infant, and 73 percent thought that it was not equivalent to killing a human being (p. 182); to this reader at least, this implies that

4 percent of this (small) sample did not consider infants human beings.

That some Chinese parents have drawn the lines of personhood in different places than some nineteenth-century Christians does not make them less caring or morally inferior. Americans today, however, often see Chinese treatment of baby girls in precisely those terms. *Between Birth and Death* argues that this discourse must be understood as part of a longer history of fraught cross-cultural perceptions.

FABIAN DRIXLER  
Yale University

ELIZABETH J. REMICK. *Regulating Prostitution in China: Gender and Local Statebuilding, 1900–1937*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2014. Pp. xv, 270. \$45.00.

Eschewing theoretical cant and abstruse number crunching, Elizabeth J. Remick has written the kind of political science that historians like: one that is richly documented in archives and other primary sources and tells an important story about historical change that is interesting in its own right but also of broader comparative significance. Remick's excellent book brings the perspective of gender to bear on state building in early-twentieth-century China through case studies of the regulation of prostitution in three cities, Hangzhou, Kunming, and Guangzhou, each of which exemplifies a distinct approach to the issue.

Prostitution in modern Shanghai is already the topic of several major studies (by Christian Henriot, Gail Hershat, and Catherine Yeh), but as Remick points out, Shanghai was exceptional in so many ways that it can hardly represent anything other than itself. Shanghai's political administration was divided in three, with the "Chinese city" overshadowed by the French and international concessions, each of which had its own regulatory regime. Remick does our field a great service by casting her spotlight on the diversity of regulatory policy in cities that were under Chinese control.

Moreover, Remick's focus is not on the discourses or the social history of the sex trade, but rather on the political economy whereby regulatory initiatives shaped the nature of modernizing municipal and provincial regimes. Her study thereby complements important work on modern Chinese urban history by such scholars as Qin Shao, Kristin Stapleton, David Strand, and Di Wang, and on state building by Prasenjit Duara, Julia Strauss, Philip Thai, and others.

What does prostitution have to do with state building? As Remick explains, the European model of regulation that was imported to China via Japan (as part of modern police reforms), and which was applied with some variation throughout the country, involved registration, licensing, segregation, medical examinations, and tax collection, all of which created new roles for police and other officials, as well as new institutions and infrastructure. Regulation also created a new fiscal resource that could be tapped to finance government op-

erations. The widespread adoption of the European regulatory model at the provincial and especially municipal levels in China coincided with broader state-building efforts, of which it constituted an integral part. In some cities, government budgets became heavily reliant on prostitution revenue.

In China, the early twentieth century was an era of weak central governments and political fragmentation, which made it possible for individual provinces and cities to pursue their own agendas. Remick's case studies illustrate three variations on the theme of regulation. Hangzhou was a typical site of "light regulation," which was the most common pattern throughout China, punctuated by occasional experiments with prohibition. This model involved a moderate, relatively non-intrusive combination of registration, taxation, and infrequent inspections and medical examinations, along with the establishment of a rescue home (*jiliangsuo*) for women seeking to escape the trade; it did not attempt to derive significant revenue from the sex trade. Remick characterizes light regulation as a version of the "harm reduction" approach toward prostitution seen (for example) in some European countries today.

Kunming, in contrast, was a site of "coercion-intensive regulation," in which the goal was to quarantine the sex trade in narrowly circumscribed zones (including brothels managed by the police themselves). The coercion-intensive model was rare. It prioritized social control and public morality over revenue collection, with an emphasis on spatial segregation, the policing of territorial boundaries, the arrest and punishment of unregistered sex workers, and frequent and intrusive medical inspections. The principal state-building effect of these policies was a dramatic elaboration and expansion of police functions.

The polar opposite of Kunming was Guangzhou, the outstanding exemplar of "revenue-intensive regulation," which transformed the sex trade into an indispensable fiscal pillar of modernization in what became one of the most modern cities in Republican-era China. In addition to registration fees, municipal authorities collected a lucrative sales tax levied on each sexual encounter. During the heyday of Guomindang rule in Guangzhou, the government became so dependent on the "per trick" tax that when sex workers went on strike (to protest an order that they pay a new fee to re-register), panicked officials quickly capitulated and urged them to return to work. Without prostitution revenues, "the entire municipal budget would have been crippled" (p. 146). Remick uses this episode to show how normalized the sex trade had become in Guangzhou, with government officials actively promoting prostitution, and sex workers striking and negotiating much like any other labor cohort.

Remick's book is fascinating and persuasive. I would have welcomed a clearer sense of exactly what persuaded particular governments to opt for any one version of regulation over the others and why local policies changed over time. In Guangzhou's case, the urgent fiscal needs of the young Guomindang state (to finance



the Northern Expedition, among other priorities) help explain why a revenue intensive policy was adopted there. But it is far less clear why the authorities in Kunming opted for such a uniquely draconian approach and kept it in place for so many decades.

Remick ends her study with sobering reflections on the current situation in China, where debates about regulation versus prohibition of a once-again-flourishing sex trade seem to recapitulate those of the Republican era. From a comparative standpoint, she observes, the historical record is one of flux between legalization/regulation and prohibition, and in practice, the effects of legalization and regulation are heavily conditioned by context, i.e., by the specific social, economic, and legal circumstances in which such policies are implemented. Nevertheless, Remick concludes (quoting Churchill on democracy) that of all the available policy approaches toward prostitution, regulation is probably the least bad.

MATTHEW H. SOMMER  
Stanford University

HIRAKU SHIMODA. *Lost and Found: Recovering Regional Identity in Imperial Japan*. (Harvard East Asian Monographs, no. 364.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, distributed by Harvard University Press, 2014. Pp. viii, 159. \$39.95.

Every revolution has its losers, and if they do not leave, the question of what to do with them remains long after the smoke has cleared. Of at least equal importance for Hiraku Shimoda is the means by which the losers try to craft their own redemption. Shimoda provides his readers with a lucid and engrossing account of how these matters were resolved in the aftermath of Japan's Meiji Restoration (1868).

Chief among the losers was the domain of Aizu, located in north-central Honshu. Aizu's lord (*daimyō*) was Matsudaira Katamori, a close confidante of the shogun and in the years immediately preceding the Meiji Restoration the designated Kyoto Protector, responsible for the safety of the emperor and his court and for policing the city of Kyoto. From about 1864, as the power of the Tokugawa Shogunate waned, Kyoto became the locus of convoluted political machinations among rival domains for influence over the court. That struggle gave rise to a secret alliance in 1866 between Satsuma and Chōshū. They led a movement aimed at the complete destruction of the Tokugawa Shogunate (*bakufu*) and confiscation of Tokugawa lands. Katamori opposed these goals, urged the shogun to settle the matter in a military confrontation, and committed 1,500 Aizu samurai to the decisive battle of Toba-Fushimi in early 1868. Together with other pro-Tokugawa *daimyō*, he lost, and retreated with his surviving samurai to Aizu.

The victors claimed they acted in accordance with the will of the new Meiji emperor. To legitimize their control of the government, they declared their vanquished foes "rebels" and "enemies of the court," and sought to

make an example of Aizu. Nine months after the battle of Toba-Fushimi, government troops reached the Aizu capital of Wakamatsu, besieged the town, forced the surrender of the domain, arrested Katamori, and scattered the 4,000 or so surviving Aizu samurai to three relocation camps in Aizu, Tokyo, and Takada. In 1869 Katamori's infant son Keisaburō was given *daimyō* status, and granted a tiny fief in the far north of Honshu. Most of the Aizu samurai were moved there. Those who did not starve were allowed to stay or move back to Aizu in 1871. What had been Aizu domain was subjected to occupation and then incorporated into Fukushima Prefecture in 1876. Shimoda notes that Aizu as a political entity disappeared and has never been revived.

It is precisely in that extinction, Shimoda maintains, that a new Aizu identity, much stronger than the pre-Meiji one, was forged. The absence of a physical Aizu, he asserts, required the construction of an Aizu identity in the realm of memory, through memorials to the Aizu war dead, the re-creation of Aizu's past through historiography, and the confirmation of a collective past. Most of the book is a detailed examination of how Aizu samurai and their descendants strove to overcome the labels of "rebel" and "traitor" and to recover their local and national identities, and how those efforts first clashed with and eventually augmented the national narrative that the Japanese government sought to construct.

I do have a couple of minor quibbles. First, Shimoda seems a bit too eager to contrast the relative weakness of "Aizu-ness" before the Meiji Restoration with its growing strength thereafter. He uses eyewitness accounts to highlight the indifference of Aizu commoners to the destruction of Wakamatsu and the departure of their erstwhile samurai superiors. Yet Teruko Craig notes in her excellent translation *Remembering Aizu: The Testament of Shiba Gorō* (1999) that Aizu's 7,000 defenders included 3,000 peasant recruits (Shiba himself reports 2,700). It would seem that indifference among pre-Meiji commoners was not quite universal. Secondly, Shimoda acknowledges considerable embellishment of Aizu history in the effort to construct a noble past, but states that these attempts were sincere, and therefore not to be confused with mere "invention of tradition" (p. 96). A dollop of self-delusion may be necessary to inventing tradition, but that is not inconsistent with sincerity.

However we label it, Shimoda illuminates the process over a period of over 80 years by which *Aizuppo* (men of Aizu) successfully pursued redemption, in their own eyes and in the eyes of the rest of the nation. Much was made of the "Aizu spirit," a set of characteristics that included martial valor, stubbornness, loyalty, tradition, and indifference to hardship. By 1918, Aizu adherence to tradition was presented by some local historians as an antidote to the perceived modern ailments of the nation as a whole. Perhaps more effective was the effort, begun in 1904, to undermine the standard designation of Aizu as a rebel domain. In that year Kitahara Masanaga, a leader in Aizu's defense back in 1868 and

author of an Aizu-boosting history of the Meiji Restoration, published four letters written by the emperor Kōmei (the Meiji emperor's immediate predecessor) to Katamori thanking him for his service to the emperor as Kyoto Protector. Kitahara used the letters as evidence that Aizu was an imperial loyalist domain all along, differing with other domains only in the perception of how best to serve the new Meiji emperor.

The recasting of Aizu's rebellion as an expression of imperial loyalism initially persuaded very few officials in Tokyo. But as the threat of internal rebellion faded, so did the imperative to label the vanquished as anti-imperial rebels. In that scheme's place, a new national narrative developed that portrayed the Meiji Restoration as a crucible that led to the unity of all Japanese under the benevolent gaze of the emperor. That historiographical shift proved much more hospitable to the reinterpretation, even the valorization, of Aizu's role in the restoration. By the 1930s, stories of Aizu derring-do and group suicide were included in history textbooks as examples of Japanese virtue; "Aizu-ness" was incorporated into the broader concept of "Japanese-ness." Finally, in June 1941, a long-term goal of Aizu apologists was realized: all references to Aizu as a rebel domain and all intimations of disloyalty to the imperial cause were purged from official histories and history textbooks. I find no room to disagree with Shimoda's conclusion: Aizu regionalism had been housebroken to the service of Japanese nationalism not through pressure from above, but at the insistence of the *Aizuppo* themselves.

NEIL L. WATERS,  
Emeritus  
Middlebury College

TAKASHI NISHIYAMA. *Engineering War and Peace in Modern Japan, 1868–1964*. (Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of Technology.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. Pp. xii, 264. \$55.00, e-book \$55.00.

Takashi Nishiyama's book on the role of technology and engineering in modern Japan connects with ongoing debates over the role of war in driving technological innovation. Nishiyama argues that Japan's so-called postwar economic miracle derived more from rapid military industrialization in the 1930s than from postwar policies: "Japan's defeat fortuitously empowered the communities of former military engineers for postwar buildup" (p. 189). The author details links between technological research and development in universities, private industries, and the military, but abandons notions of techno-nationalism that feature in earlier studies of military connections with the technological transformation of Japan. Instead Nishiyama stresses attitudes that tend to characterize engineering communities throughout the world: pragmatic professionalism and concern with mundane problem solving.

*Engineering War and Peace in Modern Japan, 1868–1964* begins with the history of engineering education

in Japan between the 1870s, when Japan began to turn to the West for assistance in building up its industry and military, and the early 1940s, when Japan went to war with the West. The author notes that, in contrast to Europe and the United States, Japan considered professional training in engineering more important than science, medicine, or law. The focus on engineering education and infrastructure building adds a new dimension to our understanding of Japan's modernization. Nishiyama shows how war, with its increasing dependence on technology, contributed to a substantial expansion of engineering education throughout the nation. "In 1890, the total number of engineers with university degrees was 314"; this grew steadily to 41,080 in 1934 (p. 16). The outbreak of war against China in 1937 led to a government policy to mobilize engineers for "national defense," in effect transforming Tokyo Imperial University, other national and private universities, and technical schools into mass-production centers for engineers. Nonetheless, Nishiyama argues that the massive expansion of engineering education was too little and too late: by 1938 "the nation was already heavily involved in the war with China and was badly prepared for the subsequent modern war of science and technology against the Allies" (p. 22).

Two early chapters examine the early-twentieth-century development of Japanese aviation technology leading to the development of the sophisticated Zero Fighter as well as to equally sophisticated kamikaze-suicide planes and gliders. The attempt by engineers to maximize survivability for kamikaze operators complicates the usual story of heroic sacrifice for the imperial nation. The author also skillfully shows how interservice rivalry undermined Japan's war effort. Nishiyama digs into the "quiet, subterranean war" between competing army and navy research institutes for the best engineering graduates. This focus on military rivalries is important, but it makes it easy to lose sight of the research and development carried out by the aviation industry itself. I particularly missed discussion on Nakajima Chikuhei and the ill-fated attempt to produce a transcontinental bomber, the *Fugaku*, a project that paralleled the army's attempt to fly a long-range plane "one way into the skyscrapers of New York City" (p. 82).

The major concern of Nishiyama's book is with areas of continuity of wartime technical expertise and experience into postwar Japan. Three chapters are devoted to the experiences of former military engineers who helped to develop Japan's postwar railroad industry. Nishiyama gives special attention to the prewar origins of Japan's super-express train, the Shinkansen, that went into operation in 1964 (chap. 7). Interestingly, former navy aeronautical engineers, including Miki Tadanao, used techniques from the wartime aircraft industry, including the streamlined design of fighter planes, to boost overland speed and safety. Nonetheless, the Shinkansen project, which Nishiyama labeled "a technological and cultural product of defeat" (p. 188), did not proceed smoothly nor did it have unan-



imous support. Even in postwar Japan, tensions between former army and navy engineers hampered the project with competing priorities and technical solutions; as in the prewar period, Japan's fabled central planning was nowhere to be seen.

Nishiyama's conclusion also cautions against a simple reading of the legacy of war and defeat. "The conversion of military technology after defeat was a value-laden, internally conflicting and contingent process" (p. 184). The technical knowledge of Japan's engineering communities proved indispensable for national projects both before and after 1945, but internal rivalries in the engineering community (often more pragmatic than ideological) made Japan's technological development more haphazard and unsystematic than they are usually portrayed as being.

Nishiyama is to be praised for the variety of sources he uses to study the role of engineers in the creation of modern Japan, both in times of war and peace. In particular, his work has benefited from personal interviews and correspondence with 18 former military engineers and their relatives, many connected with the Shinkansen project. This, along with reference to biographies and autobiographies, allows the author to construct a more human account of these technical problem solvers and their ability to adapt to the new demands of peacetime. The author may wish, in the future, to broaden the account to include other transwar engineering projects. For example, many prewar Home Ministry engineers, including Katahira Nobutaka, Kishida Akira, and Takano Tsutomu, went on to play major roles in the planning and construction of the Meishin and Tomei expressways. Wartime engineers also helped to foster Japan's postwar automobile industry, including Fuji Heavy Industries (Subaru) and Honda. The argument can also be expanded geographically. Nishiyama stresses the insular nature of Japan as a factor in hindering the sort of brain drain that characterized early postwar Germany. This may be true, but the book makes little mention of the South Manchurian Railroad and its high-speed (140 km/h) Asia Express and other massive construction projects in areas in East Asia under Japanese control. The prewar legacy of Japanese engineering to contemporary Asia is another topic that requires attention, especially given the gigantic presence of China in the world of engineering today.

M. WILLIAM STEELE

*International Christian University*

ROBERT STOLZ. *Bad Water: Nature, Pollution, and Politics in Japan, 1870–1950*. (Asia-Pacific: Culture, Politics, and Society.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2014. Pp. xi, 269. Cloth \$89.95, paper \$24.95.

Like Caesar's Gaul, Robert Stolz's *Bad Water: Nature, Pollution, and Politics in Japan, 1870–1950* is divided into three parts: intellectual history, environmental studies, and critical thought from Karl Marx to Harry D. Harootunian. The author aims to explore "Japan's environmental turn, a broad historical moment [at the

end of the nineteenth century] when Japanese thinkers and activists experienced nature as alienated from themselves and were forced to rebuild the connections" (p. 6). He then asks, "What sort of conceptions of nature can be the basis of a new politics adequate to the environmental crisis?" (p. 10). The most sustained and original parts of this deeply researched, relentlessly argued volume address the environmental ideas of the reformer and ecologist Tanaka Shōzō (1841–1913), the journalist and anarchist Ishikawa Sanshirō (1876–1956), and Kurosawa Torizō (1885–1982), founder of Snow Brand Dairy, for many years Japan's largest.

Starting in 1877 the Ashio Copper Mine north of Tokyo contaminated the Watarase and Tone Rivers with copper waste and, during repeated floods in the 1890s, polluted nearby lands worked by hundreds of thousands of farmers. The earliest of modern Japan's environmental disasters, Ashio prompted Tanaka to make "a key breakthrough in environmental thought when he argued that humans could neither transcend nature nor completely control it" (p. 15). Until the early 1890s Tanaka was a loyal member of the Constitutional Reform Party "committed to Japan's modernization," but once he confronted the Ashio crisis, his career thereafter showed "the limits of liberalism and its autonomous, private individual to deal with the unprecedented horrors of industrial pollution" (p. 66). In speeches to the national parliament (Diet) Tanaka argued that "the government has been completely overrun by the private power of the Furukawa zaibatsu," owners of the Ashio mine (p. 71), leading to Tanaka's theory of "national death" (*bōkokuron*) in which a public Japan no longer existed; instead corruption, bribery, and private gain now ruled. In 1901 Tanaka and the socialist Kōtoku Shūsui (1871–1911) made a quixotic appeal (*jikiso*) to the Meiji emperor to remove the poisoned earth and make the Watarase River pure again. When this petition failed, Stolz notes, Tanaka abandoned "Meiji liberalism to develop a radical environmental politics" (p. 79).

Nominally to cope with the ongoing pollution crisis but actually to impose a new flood-control regime, the Meiji government in 1902 proposed a thorough reengineering of the Kanto plain that included constructing a flood-control reservoir for the Tone and Watarase Rivers. The plan called for purchasing, destroying, and flooding Yanaka village after resettling its inhabitants. In opposing this project, Tanaka turned to "nature as the necessary source of human freedom, a basis for politics different from both the state and capitalism" (p. 86). Such state intervention in the flows of nature, he believed, could only lead to ecological and social poison (*doku*). Whereas the government regarded "nature as a passive object to be manipulated by humans," Tanaka "argued for an active nature in constant motion" (p. 93). Positing the superiority of nature over law, Tanaka held that the land itself was the basis of true freedom, what Stolz characterizes as a doctrine of "environmental rights" (p. 110). Far from glorifying Japan's agrarian past, the author concludes, Tanaka stands out as an en-

vironmental thinker for “his modern vision of ‘ecocide,’ the possible extinction of a nature capable of supporting life and freedom” (p. 98).

The journalist Ishikawa Sanshirō witnessed the Meiji state’s destruction of levees protecting Yanaka village in 1906 to build the flood-control reservoir and, following in Tanaka’s footsteps, developed a theory of democracy as a return to the soil based on “the life of the people attached to the earth” (*domin kurashī*), a variant on *demokurashī* for democracy (p. 119). Rejecting socialism because of its promise of subjugating nature, in 1920 Ishikawa promoted a theory of “natural democracy” in which “all industry, trade, politics, and education should be done in the service of cultivating the earth (*chi o tagayasu*). This is our ideal society—an industry of agri-cultivation (*kōjijigvō*). This is *demokurashī*” (p. 128). Ishikawa differed from agrarian fundamentalists (*nōhonshugisha*) in seeking a return to “mutually beneficial relations between humans and environment” (p. 140) that he believed existed in premodern times, whereas in Stolz’s view fundamentalists represented “a cultural atavism or pathological antimodernism” (p. 140) of steep hierarchy beneath a sovereign emperor. During World War II Ishikawa refused rations and continued to farm, living off the land; after 1945 he put faith in local anarchist practices and separated “the world of work from the world of capitalism,” relying “on a rather ahistorical concept of ‘life’” (p. 157).

Kurosawa Torizō, by contrast, thought small-scale dairy farming was the solution to Japan’s environmental crisis, what the author calls “an ecology of autonomy” (p. 162). Kurosawa regarded Danish dairy farming as superior to livestock ranching for Hokkaido and hoped to turn Japan’s northern island into “the Denmark of Japan” (p. 170) as an antidote to Tanaka’s warnings of “national death.” During national general mobilization for war, this ecology of personal autonomy “blurred into the ecology of *national autarky*” (p. 161) as the dairy industry submitted to state controls. After 1945 Kurosawa sought to restore agricultural cooperatives, but American occupiers promoted entrepreneurial individuals as the basis of postwar capitalism. Nonetheless, small-scale labor-intensive dairy farming soon gave way to mechanized, capital-intensive industry, what Stolz calls the “manipulation of nature by humans to produce a nature most conducive to capital accumulation” (p. 189).

*Bad Water* excels in analyzing the ideas of Tanaka, Ishikawa, and Kurosawa, frequently from the vantage of pure history of thought. As environmental history, the book is episodic in treatment, often relying on the insights of other scholars for its narrative thread. Stolz undertakes frequent forays into Western critical thought that sometimes illuminate his arguments but just as often deflect attention from his main points. As intellectual history, this book is a sound achievement in

an area of modern Japanese thought too lightly regarded before now.

TOM HAVENS

Northeastern University

TODD A. HENRY. *Assimilating Seoul: Japanese Rule and the Politics of Public Space in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945*. (Asia Pacific Modern, no. 12.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2014. Pp. xviii, 299. \$49.95.

Todd A. Henry’s *Assimilating Seoul: Japanese Rule and the Politics of Public Space in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945* analyzes ways in which the architects of the Japanese empire worked to reorder life in Korea’s capital as it was lived under their rule. He frames his study chronologically, dividing it into three parts: 1910–1925, 1925–1937, and 1937–1945. Henry thematically examines power relations between colonizer and colonized through considerations of toponymy, religious practice, industrial exhibition, sanitary systems, and patriotic performance, among other things. His assessment of Japanese peoples’ efforts and effects in Korea at the time thus meshes well with other studies of urban existence on a regional and global scale that similarly take up Gilles Deleuze’s fascination with such “assemblages” in light of modernity’s colonial, reordering gaze. As such, Henry’s history of Japanese-occupied/reconfigured Seoul during the first half of the twentieth century reads best with texts ranging from David Prochaska’s *Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870–1920* (1990) to Leo Ou-Fan Lee’s *Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930–1945* (1999). It also engages well with examinations of Japanese modernity in the empire’s homeland urban areas such as Louise Young’s recent and wonderful, *Beyond the Metropolis: Second Cities and Modern Life in Interwar Japan* (2013). It is a most welcome addition to the field of Korean studies.

Henry makes use of a rich array of Korean- and Japanese-language source material, much of which appears for the first time in English, for which he is to be commended. In particular, in the third chapter of *Assimilating Seoul*, Henry lavishly describes various industrial exhibitions held in what for centuries had been the Korean monarchy’s seat of power, Kyongbok Palace. Nicely explaining the summary effect of the Japanese colonial rulers’ use of this significant spot as a “desacraliz[ing]” process (p. 92), Henry’s examination of modernity’s display wares in 1907, 1915, and 1929—mediated through their Japanese producers—introduces readers to small but significant features of daily life histories such as rooftop beer-garden spots and times and locations of dancing-girl revues as well as which toothbrushes and cigarettes were most popular. Henry is careful, furthermore, to chronicle the economics and demographics of these details, including understanding how these displays drew visitors from throughout Korea, not just the capital city. He notes, for example, that at the 1915 exhibition, “during the first forty-eight days



of this fifty-one-day event, almost 70 percent of 790,000 total admissions were made by individuals residing outside the capital city. Newspaper reports [in Korean and Japanese] referred to most participants of group visits as local notables" (p. 106). Thus, while it remains essential today to recognize antagonistic and violent workings of the era of Japanese colonial rule in Korea—something Henry's study in no way devalues—it remains equally significant to understand, as Henry's analysis does, how the lived life of this period took place: simply put, how power functioned. Throughout, Henry's textured discussion of multiple features of existence brings such realities into tactile relief.

Arguably of most analytic importance is Henry's treatment of the place and practice of Japanese Shintō in colonized Seoul (chaps. 2 and 5). Though Japanese colonizers were hard-pressed to define Koreans as without organized religious practice—a justification that Christian missionaries throughout the world at the time used to prove other colonizers' superiority over the colonized—Henry's study reveals ways in which Japanese colonizers nonetheless worked to define their presumed ethnic supremacy through the introduction of state Shintō. This took time, however, and was only partially accomplished. In the early phase of colonial control, Henry explains, "[t]he colonial state would have preferred to represent Japanese settlers as a unified national community of reverent subjects, especially to newly colonized Koreans" (p. 67). This was not to be achieved so simply, though. "Boisterous" Japanese, for example, liked things such as sumo wrestling and parades of pretty women in the mix of faith, making all in all for what Henry describes as at best "[u]n-even manifestations of national identity among settlers" during the initial stages of colonized Korea (p. 71) (here the University of California Press is to be thanked for allowing Henry to include such excellent photographs).

As the Japanese state expanded throughout Eurasia and the Pacific and headed into its period of total war, however, what Henry describes as "imperial subjectification" went into high gear, Japan increasingly policed compliance with its "'Shintōization' of [Korean] households" (p. 169). Despite efforts, for example, by Korean Confucian scholars among others to oppose things such as the requirement of a miniature shrine in the household, Henry notes that the reach of the Japanese state even included rewriting Confucian bowing practices into "emperor worship," making "locating and analyzing resistance . . . that much more difficult" and that much more difficult to assess historically. For example, Japanese officials documented the success of Shintō's spread—whether actual or not—through "statistical increases" that they measured by Koreans' bowing at shrines, a measure that leaves a "far messier and less comforting reality of imperial subjectification" (p. 170) on the one hand, yet, on the other hand, makes it almost impossible to demonstrate the substance of resistance. One is left to wonder what Koreans thought about while being forced to bow at a shrine as the Japanese official counted his presence there as belief.

Henry smartly leaves such questions unanswered because they are unanswerable. He shows that countless aspects of urban daily life became newly configured under Japanese control over Seoul—streets, shops, lighting systems, and transportation—yet he shows, too, that many Seoulites assimilated these features of modernity to their lives without losing themselves.

ALEXIS DUDDEN

*University of Connecticut*

ROBERT CRIBB, HELEN GILBERT, and HELEN TIFFIN. *Wild Man from Borneo: A Cultural History of the Orangutan*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2014. Pp. xii, 318. \$54.00.

This joint-authored, multidisciplinary study offers a wonderful introduction to the promise and challenge of investigating human-animal histories. This particular work provides nothing less than a history of the hyphen within the "human-animal" formulation, by examining "the changing pattern of ways human beings . . . have grappled with the specific and unsettling similarities and differences between orangutans and humans" (p. 249).

The authors tread carefully through the range of source material that this history of grappling has yielded, which includes scientific inquiry across four centuries and virtually every possible form of cultural production—including philosophy, novels, theater, cinema, exhibitions, painting, and travel writing—a range that clearly establishes the enduring importance of the orangutan and its discontents to the history of creative reflection and artistic expression. The finest line the authors draw (and blur) through this literature is that between scientific and non-scientific discourse. As they carefully explain, the book "interwine[s]" the "history of developing scientific knowledge of the orangutan . . . with the history of the representation of orangutans in key areas of human culture" (p. 7). They further note: "The 'truth' of a cultural history . . . lies not in biological or behavioral 'facts' alone, but in recording the various ways in which orangutans have been perceived and represented in a number of disciplines, discourses, and domains of practice" (p. 8). Such distinctions, made and unmade in successive close readings, work to carve out distinctive arenas of discourse, through which the book unfolds, without explicitly granting any one of them greater truth-value than the others.

The book is thus organized largely, if not exclusively, by disciplinary focus, but also chronologically, and it leads the reader toward the present through three chapters on the history of scientific classification, two on representations of the orangutan in literature, and one on representations "on stage and screen." Three non-disciplinary chapters then follow, addressing zoos, conservation, and recent and contemporary reprisals of enduring themes in human-orangutan history.

The story begins with a history of the question "What is an orangutan?" and the fascinating attempts to answer it, which alternately asserted and denied the an-

imal's "possible human status" (p. 19). Early eyewitness accounts, often only fleeting and sometimes fictionalized, animated and hindered early efforts at classification. In the absence of specimens, behavioral analysis focused on human-orangutan similarity over difference. The eventual acquisition of specimens, the earliest of which were cadavers, shifted the method and emphasis of classification to anatomy and difference, seemingly "dispel[ling] the myth of the almost human 'orang outang'" (p. 29); the term literally means "forest man" (p. 12). But anatomy's early triumph was tentative, for an emerging market in living specimens prompted reconsideration of the human-orangutan divide, both in scientific circles, and more widely throughout the post-Darwinian world. Thus, "[w]ith science and religion both unable to provide absolute answers, it fell to literature to explore the possible meanings of the uncertain boundary between humans and apes" (p. 106).

"Representation" of the orangutan in literature took two broad forms. In one, orangutans "offer[ed] commentary on Western society, either by directly addressing a human audience or by behaving in ways that highlight human shortcomings"; in another, orangutans "dramatize[d] an encounter between Western society and animality or savagery" (p. 128). The same, it appears, held for representations on stage and screen. These representational histories, initially prompted by encounters with living orangutans, unfolded in environments of increasing isolation from them. Over time there thus appears to be an inverse relationship between the volume of orangutan-related cultural production and human proximity to real orangutans. One does wonder, however, if this relationship is an artifice of the way the text sequences the authors' three areas of specialization, or if it is simply a matter of the authors following the representations wherever they find them to be most pronounced.

Either way, the book's geography shifts significantly over time and across genres, from points of contact and scientific inquiry near and within orangutan habitats connected to early modern empires, to French and English novels of the nineteenth century, and then to the American stage, cinema, and zoo of the twentieth, before turning to the problems of conservation in the Indonesia of today. One can discern, without much difficulty, a shifting political geography of uneven globalization underlying the movement through time and space, which becomes ever more tightly articulated, if no less uneven politically, as the book approaches the present.

The book may be, most fundamentally, about what "representation" means in these unevenly linked contexts. The dual meaning of the term becomes especially important when the authors note how conservationists seek to represent orangutans in a juridical sense, but can only do so by circulating representations of the orangutan that are, in some cases, not so different from those analyzed in previous chapters on literary and philosophical discourse (p. 231).

If this book signals a new monographic turn toward single-animal inquiry in animal studies, one hopes that the trend benefits from the relatively theory-heavy beginning of animal studies (and post-humanism), especially in comparison with its sibling new discipline, food studies, in which the single-foodstuff study predominated at an early stage, only all too often unreflectively. The two fields would do well to learn from one another.

MARK SWISLOCKI

New York University Abu Dhabi

## OCEANIA AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

RAINER F. BUSCHMANN, EDWARD R. SLACK JR., and JAMES B. TUELLER. *Navigating the Spanish Lake: The Pacific in the Iberian World, 1521–1898*. (Perspectives on the Global Past.) Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2014. Pp. xii, 182. \$47.00.

*Navigating the Spanish Lake: The Pacific in the Iberian World, 1521–1898* is a co-authored work that captures what the famed Manila Galleons of the early modern world represented: tightly packed cargoes and detailed itineraries outlining peregrinations across a large geography. With three authors at the helm, *Navigating the Spanish Lake* is both a work of rich archival detail and the minutiae of lives. It embraces pensions, petitions, baptismal names, and census rolls, as well as grand speculations on the Iberian empire encompassing both the Pacific and Atlantic, from Castile to New Spain and Acapulco, from Manila and Guam and the Marianas.

*Navigating the Spanish Lake* is an entwined collaboration. The authors speak as "we" throughout, though it seems clear that different interests and approaches are being employed. One section is highly conceptual and concerns the administrative imaginaries and ideologies supporting the very "Spanish Lake" idea; another is a cogent analysis of Chinese mestizo regiments in defense of Manila; another reconstructs Chamorro populations with demographic data, while offering in parallel a colorful ramble through naming conventions and changing dietary habits, with tactile elaborations on stewed chicken, pickled fish, and localized spirits.

The main framework begins with a challenging assertion: ventures into the "Spanish Lake" were only partly about mastering the Pacific. Rather, they were parts of global claims and colonies whereby Spain—which touches the Pacific not at all—was made contiguous to distant territories by empire in the Americas and a continuous sense of linkage through the galleon trade from New Spain (Mexico) to the Philippines. Indeed, "Spanish expeditions to Easter Island and Tahiti were not exploring a new world; rather, they sought to extend the defensive perimeter of the Americas" (p. 47).

One of the authors' key points is that this empire was, if not exactly a fiction, certainly a contingent and ever-shifting array of strong and weak emplacements and outposts, circulations of labor and administrators, traders, and missionaries, highly dependent on the local



populations. It is not surprising that “[t]he Spanish presence in the Pacific Ocean was accidental, never encompassing, largely imaginary, and in the end unsustainable” (p. 3).

In fact, the middle section of the book extensively underscores the key role of non-Spanish actors in the shaping of the Spanish Lake. Notable are the Chinese mestizos in building up and defending the Philippines, with reference to the complex, comparative racial typologies employed in the islands, and the tenuous alliances, rivalries, and conflicts between the different communities. The Philippines, rather than being truly Spanish, were a locale of “archipelagic Hispanization” (p. 63), involving Malay, Micronesian, Chinese, Indio, and *sangle*y peoples, constantly negotiating for social status and political power. This is illustrated through character portraits and reconstructions of the Real Príncipe Chinese mestizo regiment during the Seven Years’ War, and the roles of institutional military and patronage ranks to advance social mobility, even in the face of demonstrative and well-maintained racial inequalities.

The idea that this was some sort of imperial domain was contested especially with the arrival of the British and French, and a shift away from the Pacific as a place of Spanish rule and treasure, to one—in an Enlightenment era—of science, exploration, and self-discovery. The evolving narratives about identity, civilization, nationalist history, subjectivity, and social status are developed through figures both well and lesser known in concurrent and successive debate: Alvaro de Mendaña and Pedro Fernández de Quirós, Diego Luis de San Vitores, Alexander von Humboldt, Bernardo de Iriarte, José de Vargas Ponce, Alejandro Malaspina, Antonio Tuason, and a host of others.

Still, the book is less about day-to-day characters than the vision of the Spanish Lake itself. Notably, Spanish erudites were ever present, yet, regrettably, never as prolific as their other European counterparts in publishing accounts, allowing significant Spanish accomplishments to be overtaken by the Black Legend of cruelty and Inquisition that for so long submerged Spanish historiography about the Pacific. These narratives are also abetted by a running chronicle throughout the book of Spanish weaknesses around the Seven Years’ War, during which period Manila was occupied by the British, and the fairly complete humiliation of the Spanish American War, extending a broader pattern of colonial fragmentation already long unrolling in the Americas.

A vivid chronicle, *Navigating the Spanish Lake* traces an almost imagined empire from the cartographical and ideological to the imperial-nationalist. Through political and military chronicles, the social and cultural history of new populations emerges to frame a Hispanized rather than Spanish domain. The multi-perspectival views of the Chamorro experience in Guam and the Marianas are exemplary of the book’s consistent theme: “It is the compromises in Guam’s history that preserve the continuities” (p. 117). All of the stories gather

around a vital portrait, as the title indicates, of the Pacific “in” a constantly redefined Iberian world.

MATT MATSUDA  
Rutgers University

CAROL A. MACLENNAN. *Sovereign Sugar: Industry and Environment in Hawai‘i*. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2014. Pp. x, 378. \$39.00.

Carol A. MacLennan’s 378-page book contains 11 chapters and 11 indexes. This monograph provides a solid introduction for those who are unfamiliar with the impact of the sugar industry in Hawai‘i. For those with a fundamental knowledge of this history, MacLennan provides information generally already known about this industry and time period, such as the influence of missionary settlers, the development of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association, and the shape and form of plantation life and culture. While MacLennan outlines admirable and exciting aims in the introduction to develop an eco-industrial and environmental history of the sugar industry in Hawai‘i, she spends the majority of the book focused on the elites (albeit a diverse and not always unified group until the 1910s) who developed the sugar industry into “the most productive plantation system in the twentieth century” (p. 282).

Instead of fully analyzing all aspects of forest, land, and water history in Hawai‘i, such as specific non-elite actions and ground-level impacts on everyday people in the islands, these environmental topics serve as lenses through which to view the overall history of the long-term preeminence and legacy of the sugar industry on the economy, society, and eco-environment of Hawai‘i. MacLennan does not talk in-depth about the direct environmental consequences of the sugar industry in the Hawaiian Islands until chapter 9. At this point of the work, she focuses on soil erosion, deforestation, and pests that both developed from and impacted the sugar industry.

While she makes other interesting points throughout the book, such as the “waves of influence” in the islands in chapter 1 and additional crops cultivated in Hawai‘i besides sugar in chapter 7, the bulk of the information in this book does not provide drastically new perspectives or theoretical approaches on this subject area. In the wider historiography of Hawai‘i and the Pacific, recent scholars have focused on issues of U.S. empire, indigenous rights, settler colonialism, militarism, and tourism. If MacLennan truly focused on eco-issues throughout the book, she could have provided an important contribution to the growing analysis of environmental impact and indigenous issues in the region.

I believe chapter 10 highlights the real crux of MacLennan’s analysis, examining the “cooperative relationship between planters and the state to create government policies necessary to support economic development” (p. 220). The eventual ascendancy and supremacy of the sugar industry stemmed from the collaboration of the main sugar agencies along with a favorable local government that provided abundant and

necessary land, water, and labor for this mono-crop agriculture to thrive. Chapter 11 also highlights the book's overall focus on the development of "private control over public resources. The history of natural resource policy in Hawai'i is best told as a story of policy capture in which the sugar industry created the conditions for its access to natural resources" (p. 249). By the 1920s, forest management, water laws, and public land policies all supported the needs of the sugar industry. If MacLennan started off the monograph under the premise that "[t]he unique constellation of Hawaiian independence, missionary evangelical and cultural zeal, and merchant encroachment into the native economy set a stage on which the modern Hawaiian nation unfolded" (p. 280), the reader would be more prepared for the actual contents of chapters that describe the rise and reign of the sugar industry until the 1960s.

In the end, MacLennan does a great job detailing the diverse, and not always inevitable development of the seemingly dominant sugar industry in Hawai'i, especially from the mid-nineteenth century to the 1910s. She highlights the participation and influence of Native Hawaiian, Chinese, German, and British businesspeople in the early stages of cane cultivation, as well as the history of other tropical ventures in the region (such as cattle, pineapples, and coffee). MacLennan also describes the transition in public land policy and environmental management from the goals of the Hawaiian monarchy (agriculture for international recognition as an equal independent nation) to the motivations of a U.S. territory (supporting the profitability of the sugar industry), including the 1895 Land Act, homesteading programs, sanitation, and social welfare programs in the plantations, negotiations over the Reciprocity Treaty, and the development of the Hawaiian Homes Commission.

This work could benefit from more non-elite voices and a review of more recent research on this topic and time period in the last decade. While MacLennan's work is not groundbreaking, she does provide much detail on the development of the sugar industry for anyone with a desire for a comprehensive reference on this history.

JOANNA POBLETE  
University of Wyoming

#### CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

JACE WEAVER. *The Red Atlantic: American Indigenes and the Making of the Modern World, 1000–1927*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014. Pp. xiv, 340. \$29.95.

Jace Weaver argues that "[t]he Atlantic formed a multilane, two-way bridge across which traveled ideas and things that changed both Europeans and American indigenes" (p. 30). In *The Red Atlantic: American Indigenes and the Making of the Modern World, 1000–1927*, however, Weaver focuses less upon these broad processes than upon the familiar story of native peoples

who crossed the Atlantic: atypical figures including diplomats and emissaries, soldiers and sailors, captives and slaves, and performers and celebrities. Despite its arresting title, Weaver's book fails because of limitations in the author's conceptualization of a "Red Atlantic," because of significant weaknesses in the research upon which the book is based, and because the author has little to say that has not been said before.

The Red Atlantic, Weaver asserts, "encompasse[d] the Atlantic and its major adjacent bodies of water" (p. 15). Chronologically it began "in the year 1000 C.E. when Indians first encountered Europeans in the persons of the Vikings," and Columbus's voyage "constituted a're-inauguration" of the Red Atlantic almost five centuries later. It ended "in 1927, when Charles Lindbergh's solo flight signaled forever a change in how people interacted with the Atlantic (although regular transatlantic plane service would not begin until 1939)" (p. 16), though Weaver's case for the significance of this date is not convincing. The Red Atlantic's beginning and end rest, in Weaver's hands, upon events initiated by non-Indian actors.

In any event, the Red Atlantic, Weaver argues, became "after a certain point in history, so pervasive" that "Native Americans did not have to journey abroad to participate in it" (p. 24). Indeed, it is so vast that it is difficult to discern what is not included: the exploitation of New World resources and the exchange of ideas and technologies and languages, to be sure, though Weaver says relatively little about these subjects. Atlantic travelers are a key part of the story he tells, but so are Kiowa and Comanche prisoners at Fort Marion; Colonel Pratt and the Carlisle Indian school; Voltaire's *Candide* (1759); George Catlin and his "Indian Curiosities" (p. 198); as well as Kahnawakes in Khartoum who were afraid of crocodiles; Indians marching on point in Cuba; and Amerindian servicemen during the First World War.

Weaver's understanding of a Red Atlantic is overly broad and vaguely defined. He is less interested in an *indigenous* Atlantic than in the interactions between native travelers and their European captors, employers, patrons, and hosts. Beyond these conceptual problems, the book suffers from significant shortcomings in terms of its scholarship. In his preface, Weaver mentions the many archives and museums he visited to conduct his research (p. xiii). But of the book's almost 800 endnotes, only one cites an archival source (p. 292, n. 35). Four other notes might do so, but it is impossible to tell because the citations are incomplete (p. 294, n. 79, 81, 82, and 84). The book is disorganized, repetitious, and marred by a distracting number of small factual errors: the Stamp Act, for example, was enacted in 1765, not 1767; "Croatoan" and "Croatan" are two different things; and the Sullivan Campaign targeted the Senecas primarily, and not the Six Nations as a whole during the American Revolution. Long recitations of familiar stories do not help him advance his argument. Weaver is careless in his citations. To support his claim that 600,000 native slaves were sent from America across the



Atlantic, for instance, he asserts that “this estimate is based on my reading of the British, French, and Spanish sources,” though he does not tell us what these sources were, and that “I have also run the estimate by several historians of the field who agree that it is reasonable,” without telling us who those scholars were and why we should believe them (pp. 281–282, n. 31).

There are other research problems. Weaver makes frequent use of encyclopedias. He cites Wikipedia twice. His reading is remarkably narrow given the breadth of his subject. More than one in ten of his notes cites books by Alden T. Vaughan, Carolyn Thomas Foreman, or Kate Flint that cover substantially the same ground as *The Red Atlantic*. Weaver quotes very extensively from secondary sources, even when there is no compelling reason to do so. It is one thing to write a synthetic account, but this book all too often appears like a cut-and-paste job.

One need not focus on the relatively small numbers of native peoples who crossed the ocean to understand the enormous impact Indians had upon the Atlantic world. Weaver never explores in any significant way how native peoples made use of the Atlantic, how they understood it, and what it meant to them. He says little about the actions of native peoples that shaped the course of transatlantic European empires in the colonies. Instead, he focuses most often on Indians who traveled voluntarily or against their will across the ocean, relying heavily and unimaginatively upon the works of historians who have already explored many of the questions he asks. Reconstructing the contours of the Red Atlantic is an important historical undertaking, but Weaver’s work disappointingly adds little to that project.

MICHAEL LEROY OBERG

State University of New York, College at Geneseo

GARY CLAYTON ANDERSON. *Ethnic Cleansing and the Indian: The Crime That Should Haunt America*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014. Pp. ix, 462. \$29.95.

The term “ethnic cleansing” first came into widespread usage during the violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s. As the former Yugoslavia collapsed in the aftermath of the Cold War and various ethnic populations sought independence, paramilitary groups sought to remove different ethnicities from the territory they controlled through intimidation, terror, mass murder, mass rape, and forced dispossession and exile. “Ethnic cleansing” became synonymous with the worst excesses of the violence in Bosnia and became part of our modern lexicon of atrocity and horror. In *Ethnic Cleansing and the Indian: The Crime That Should Haunt America*, historian Gary Clayton Anderson makes the case for retroactively using the concept of ethnic cleansing to explain the history of post-contact Native America. In recent years, this topic has been the subject of a great deal of attention as scholars and activists have sought to describe and contextualize the experiences of the Native peoples of the Americas around such issues

as colonialism, displacement, assimilation, and genocide. Anderson’s work places him squarely within this larger dialogue.

Since the 1990s, the use of the word “genocide” has proliferated and has resulted in a growing body of scholarship on the nature of genocide and mass-atrocity crimes. Given the contested terrain of North American history, it is not surprising that within this emerging body of work a number of scholars have applied these concepts to the experiences of indigenous populations and have often characterized these as constituting genocide. Anderson directly challenges these assertions by specifically arguing that Native America experienced ethnic cleansing, not genocide. He begins by briefly defining the concepts of “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing,” but unfortunately Anderson never adequately grapples with the complexities of these two ideas. For example, in the introduction Anderson asserts that “[g]enocide will never become a widely accepted characterization for what happened in North America, because large numbers of Indians survived and because policies of mass murder on a scale similar to events in central Europe, Cambodia, or Rwanda were never implemented” (p. 4). This is a somewhat surprising claim given the number of scholars—from David Stannard and Russell Thornton, to Ward Churchill, Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, Robert K. Hitchcock, Alfred A. Cave, Carroll P. Kakel, Dirk Moses, and Ben Kiernan, among many others—who have declared that Native Americans were the victims of genocide. More importantly, however, this assertion is problematic given the fact that any particular claim of genocide is not necessarily invalidated because of Native American survivors. There were many Armenian survivors of the Armenian genocide, Jewish survivors of the Holocaust, and Tutsi survivors of the Rwandan genocide, yet the genocidal nature of those cases is not contested. Genocide is generally defined in terms of intent, not lethality or scale.

Anderson reiterates this same claim in his chapter on ethnic cleansing in California, in which he argues against assertions of genocide in that state since most Native deaths resulted from disease; yet here again this does not necessarily refute the notion of genocide. Certainly, deaths from disease are not genocidal unless intentionally caused, but there is plenty of evidence of genocidal intent and action on the part of the state government and numerous volunteer militias that engaged in wholesale massacres justified through dehumanizing and exterminatory rhetoric. While I do not necessarily disagree with many of Anderson’s assertions and conclusions in regards to the formal and informal policies toward Native Americans, I do think the issues are more complex than his thesis suggests. The meaning of genocide, and to a lesser extent ethnic cleansing, continue to evolve and change as scholars theorize and international courts define and redefine what is and is not genocide. But even among legal experts there is no unanimity, and various court decisions have only served to highlight this reality. *Ethnic Cleansing and the Indian*

would have benefited from a more nuanced treatment of the concepts of ethnic cleansing and genocide as they relate to Native America.

The strength of Anderson's work lies not in his discussion and framing of the nature of genocide and of ethnic cleansing, but rather in his subsequent description of the people, politics, policies, and conflicts that very often shaped the nature of the relationship between Natives and European colonists. It is here that Anderson's ability and experience as a historian of Native America comes to the fore. It is a long and involved history that spans several hundred years, an entire continent, many different regions and tribes as well as many individuals. Anderson moves easily and effectively through this vast terrain, and his expertise and treatment of this history more than offsets any earlier weaknesses. His work is a depressing compilation of case after case in which Native Americans were slowly and inexorably dispossessed of their autonomy, their land, and all too often their lives. Rich in detail, Anderson comprehensively illustrates the various ways in which federal policy evolved to fit changing circumstances and pressures, yet consistently resulted in forced displacement.

From the colonial era through Andrew Jackson's policy of coercive relocation and the era of forced assimilation and allotment, Gary Anderson compellingly forces the reader to confront the harsh reality of American Indian policy and its destructive impact on Native Americans. In some ways, the reader is left with the sense that the question of genocide versus ethnic cleansing is ultimately not as important as acknowledging the duplicity and injustice experienced by Native Americans in the tarnished history of colonial North America and the United States.

ALEX ALVAREZ  
Northern Arizona University

KATHLEEN DONEGAN, *Seasons of Misery: Catastrophe and Colonial Settlement in Early America*. (Early American Studies.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. Pp. 260. \$49.95.

Historians have written countless volumes on the transfer of English cultural ways to North America, but few have focused on the earliest years of that transfer, those moments of dislocation colonizers endured as they established outposts on the continental littoral. Settlers in these initial stages worried about their very survival, not of the prospect of recreating their homeland on the western shores of the Atlantic. What, in these moments of fear and death, did it mean to be English in a supposed wilderness? Kathleen Donegan's *Seasons of Misery: Catastrophe and Colonial Settlement in Early America* attempts to answer that question. With keen insight and engaging prose, Donegan examines how "English settlers became colonial through the acute bodily experiences and mental ruptures they experienced in their first years on Native American ground" (p. 2). Through a literary analysis of the writings of Englishmen in Ro-

anoke, Jamestown, Plymouth, and Barbados, she tells an arresting story about the transformative power of trauma in new settlements.

Donegan's perceptive reinterpretations of classic colonial texts reward close reading. Her narrative is one of recurrent suffering so acute as to be almost incomprehensible to those who endured it. This approach sheds light on sources like Governor Ralph Lane's puzzling letters from Roanoke, which often failed to distinguish between what happened and what he intended to have happened. Donegan emphasizes their origins in what she dubs a colonial "chaos zone" in which "the ability to understand what is happening is recurrently and threateningly disturbed" (p. 34). As such, Lane found assessing the facts on the ground in this "chaos zone" difficult and the task of communicating them to an English audience nearly impossible.

Donegan's examination of George Percy's *A Trew Relacyon* (written in 1625) proves similarly fruitful. Historians have long relied on Percy's account of early Jamestown as the most descriptive report of that colony's early agonies, particularly its vivid portrayal of the terrible winter of 1609–1610. Donegan shows that pulling these "'vivid passages' from their surrounding discourse obscures the deeper relationship between the suffering of the Starving Time and the widespread violence in the early years of settlement in Virginia" (p. 90). Percy's story of enduring such privation, and that some of his countrymen resorted to cannibalism to survive, accompanied examples of atrocities he and his fellow colonizers inflicted upon Native Americans. The "catastrophic discourse" running throughout the *Trewe Relyacon* "effectively collapse[d] the boundary between misery and brutality" (p. 90), while rendering "the settlement as a place beyond thresholds" (p. 115). The colony became a space where unaccountable suffering could lead to both acts of violence against Indians and cannibalism for which the colonizers were unaccountable. Catastrophe removed agency. Donegan's persuasive interpretation of Percy's tale should be a must-read for scholars writing and lecturing about Jamestown's starving times.

One of the pleasures of *Seasons of Misery* is the author's keen eye for detail, which is particularly apparent in her discussion of William Bradford's *Of Plymouth Plantation*. Living in what his compatriot Thomas Morton called a "'new-found Golgotha'" (p. 132), Bradford wrote of a settlement seemingly overrun with bodies. Finding themselves (in Bradford's famous words) "'scarce able to bury the dead'" (p. 118), the colonizers put them to use: at one point they propped up corpses in the woods with muskets in an effort to convince the Indians they had more soldiers than they actually did (p. 137). Donegan uses this well-chosen anecdote to show how misery complicated the providentialism of the English. If scores of Native Americans dying from European diseases looked to the colonizers like God clearing the land for His chosen people, then their own rampant mortality looked like a withdrawal of His favor. Ultimately, Bradford turned away from the dead,



focusing in his text on the strength of the faithful few who persevered and endured. This strategy allowed him to minimize the violence settlers inflicted upon nearby Indians. The disembodied head of Massachusetts sachem Witawamut, posted on a pike outside Plymouth fort by triumphant English soldiers, became no different than the deceased decoys set up in the woods (pp. 144–145). Here, too, Donegan's discussion of *Of Plymouth Plantation* should change the way scholars read this founding early American text.

Not all of *Seasons of Misery* hits the mark, however. Chapter 4 on Barbados focuses primarily on Richard Ligon's 1657 history of the island. Written more than a quarter century after the first English incursions there, Ligon's work fits poorly in a book so focused on the agonies of initial settlement. More problematic is Donegan's discussion of "coloniality" and "becoming colonial" throughout the book. Despite the centrality of these concepts to her thesis, she fails to define these terms in the context of her study. Nor does she address the extensive literature on settler colonialism until the afterword. These choices blunt the power of Donegan's argument about the role that the experience of misery played in creating colonial identities in English America.

These qualms aside, *Seasons of Misery* is a smart, provocative work that belongs on the bookshelf of scholars working in the fields of seventeenth-century Anglo-American history, literature, and culture, as well as scholars interested in the cultural history of violence.

JOHN SMOLENSKI

*University of California, Davis*

JEFFREY GLOVER. *Paper Sovereigns: Anglo-Native Treaties and the Law of Nations, 1604–1664*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. Pp. viii, 312. \$59.95.

Treaties have been a fundamental component of relations between Indians and non-Natives in North America from first contacts to the present. They have received considerable scholarly attention and currently feature in a major exhibit at the National Museum of the American Indian in Washington, D.C. Until recently, however, historians have viewed them as instruments of colonial and national domination and dispossession rather than as cultural encounters between sovereign nations, and have concentrated on treaty making in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Focusing on diplomatic encounters during the seventeenth century, Jeffrey Glover, an English professor, examines Indian diplomacy at a time when Native nations still held considerable power and European colonists often had to negotiate on Indian terms. Indians and Europeans each brought their own protocols and understandings to treaty making, creating new forms of diplomacy, and each had to adjust to new realities and expectations. Instead of domineering Europeans dictating terms to gullible Natives, treaty making on the east coast involved a delicate, and often carefully cho-

reographed, cultural and political dance as English colonists dealt with different Indian nations pursuing their own, sometimes shifting, agendas, while the royal government and foreign rivals watched from the wings.

Acknowledging Native perspectives as key to interpreting treaties, Glover includes indigenous policies, rituals, pictographs, ceremonies, dances, feasting, speeches, gift giving, kinship alliances, and even shouts, chants, and gestures in his reconstruction of east coast diplomacy. To the English, pictographs and "x" marks placed on treaties signified assent to the terms and to cessions of land; to Indians the treaty and the marks they made often had very different meanings, perhaps conferring usufruct rights rather than possession and perhaps representing the intentions of individuals rather than sachems or entire groups. Indian communities not only "faced east from Indian country" to the English, but they also dealt with other Indian allies and enemies. Those Indian-Indian interactions shaped relations with the English, just as the English made Indian treaties with an eye on other European powers.

The book's core contribution is a close reading and analysis of the documents the English produced and the purposes they served. Although colonists and Indians also made treaties to establish trade and alliances, the crown was primarily concerned with acquiring territory. In accordance with the law of nations, colonists tried to establish a legitimate claim to the land in the eyes of the king and against actual or potential European rivals by securing Indian consent to settling or selling the land and by documenting the process. The goal of seventeenth-century English records of treaty making, therefore, was not to render Indians absent or silent but to include them and, ideally, their words. Colonists pointed to narratives, journals, and letters, as well as legal documents, to justify and defend their possession of the land, and Glover does an admirable job of identifying intention and deciphering meaning in documents whose purpose often determined what was said and how it was said.

Like the Indians, Europeans employed ritual and performance acted out on a North American stage for a European audience as tools of diplomacy. Treating Powhatan as a king and Pocahontas as a princess during her (fatal) visit to England was a strategy crafted with Spanish rivals in mind: by recognizing the Indians as royalty, the English enhanced the legitimacy of their own claims to the land that the Indians bestowed upon them. In Maryland, the English recognized the authority of the Susquehannocks over other tribes so that the Susquehannocks could then relinquish that authority, and other peoples' lands, to the English. (They employed a similar strategy in their dealings with the Iroquois in the eighteenth century.) The English gave rights to Indians so that the Indians could give rights to them.

Treaties, of course, were mechanisms of dispossession and colonial control. Yet, Indians sometimes used treaties to their own advantage. In the 1640s, the Narragansetts signed a series of submissive treaties with the

colonies but then simply delayed carrying out the terms. Such non-compliance was not sufficient cause for a war, which the Indians knew the colonists would have to justify to the home government, and the Narragansetts secured 30 years of relative independence from colonial incursions: "a people of the book, found themselves outwitted in transatlantic correspondence by a nation whose leaders could not read or write alphabetic letters" (p. 222). Indian participants not only brought their own traditions, experiences, and understandings to the treaty game, but they also played the game to their own advantage and sometimes, however briefly, they won.

Historians may find distracting the frequent use of the authorial first person and repeated signaling of what the author will argue, is arguing, or has argued. Sometimes the analysis of text and performance overwhelms, and thus obscures, the story of what actually happened. But setting aside stylistic annoyances, historians will find *Paper Sovereigns: Anglo-Native Treaties and the Law of Nations, 1604–1664* a nuanced and thoughtful examination of the formative period of treaty making.

COLIN G. CALLOWAY  
Dartmouth College

JULIE A. FISHER and DAVID J. SILVERMAN. *Ninigret, Sachem of the Niantics and Narragansetts: Diplomacy, War, and the Balance of Power in Seventeenth-Century New England and Indian Country*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2014. Pp. xxiv, 190. \$27.95.

Ninigret, the subject of Julie A. Fisher and David J. Silverman's "political biography" (p. ix), is perhaps the least understood sachem (Indian political leader) in seventeenth-century New England. By any measure, he was the most powerful and, along with his rival Uncas, the most prominent sachem for most of the period between the Pequot War (1637) and King Philip's War (1675–1676). Complementing Michael Leroy Oberg's biography (*Uncas: First of the Mohegans* [2003]), Fisher and Silverman further enhance our understanding of how Native American motives and actions, as fully as those of the English, shaped New England's history.

*Ninigret, Sachem of the Niantics and Narragansetts: Diplomacy, War, and the Balance of Power in Seventeenth-Century New England and Indian Country* begins by situating the Narragansetts in the early seventeenth century when epidemics and the arrival of Dutch and English outsiders triggered upheavals within indigenous groupings and created power vacuums among them. Several years of violence and diplomatic maneuvering by Natives and Europeans in Narragansett Bay and the wampum-rich coast of Long Island Sound culminated in the Pequots' defeat in 1637. Far from being orchestrated by expansionist colonists, the authors assert, the "Pequot War, in all its phases, was an outgrowth of indigenous politics" (p. 32). While the Narragansetts successfully deflected English hostility toward the Pequots, the Mohegans used the English so as to replace the Pequots as the major indigenous power in Connecticut. Setting their sights on the Nar-

ragansetts, Uncas and the Mohegans then involved the United Colonies in their murder of the Narragansett sachem, Miantonomi, in 1643, sharpening a Mohegan-Narragansett rivalry that would define regional politics for the next quarter century.

As these events unfolded, Ninigret came of age and assumed the sachemship of the Eastern Niantics, thereby gaining influence among the Narragansetts, to whom the smaller Eastern Niantics were closely tied. Proving himself to be bolder and shrewder than Miantonomi's heirs, he soon became the effective leader of all Narragansetts. Cultivating or strengthening ties with New Netherland, the Mohawk Iroquois, the Pocumtucks, Rhode Island, and an English government never happy with the United Colonies' (especially Massachusetts's) independent ways, Ninigret assembled counterweights to the pressures applied by the colonies and Uncas. At the same time, he competed with the Mohegans, sometimes violently, for support and tributary control of other Native communities on both sides of Long Island Sound. When not disdainfully repudiating the United Colonies' repeated diplomatic and military efforts to extract huge wampum payments or prevent violence, Ninigret made token concessions and promises that he then ignored. The authors argue persuasively that, far from inconsistent or erratic, Ninigret always prioritized his own interests and those of the Eastern Niantics and Narragansetts. Above all this meant avenging the humiliating dishonor of Miantonomi's death at Uncas's hands. Although he never quashed Uncas, Ninigret's relentless effort and his flouting of English demands deepened his support among the Narragansetts and their allies. Although these events will be familiar to many readers, the authors' focus on Ninigret and the Narragansetts presents an important new perspective.

Still more striking is Fisher and Silverman's treatment of the decade leading up to and through King Philip's War. Intensified English challenges to indigenous lands, sovereignty, and sachems' authority aroused anger among Indians throughout the region. Several extraordinary meetings in 1669 brought Narragansetts, Mohegans, and other longtime enemies together to discuss Native responses; one meeting included Ninigret and Uncas in the same room! But two developments dashed the possibility of pan-Indian resistance to English expansionism. First, the Mohawks, now closely allied with New York, made clear that they would not join an Indian uprising in New England, thereby removing the ultimate deterrent to a colonial war against the Narragansetts. Second, the likely instigator of anti-English resistance was Philip, principal sachem of the Wampanoags, whose father had allied with Plymouth colony a half-century earlier after being humiliated by the Narragansetts. Now the young, charismatic Philip was drawing support even from most Narragansetts, superseding the elderly Ninigret as the latter had once supplanted more established sachems. Remaining with the Eastern Niantics, Ninigret supported the English in a war that finally crushed the Nar-



ragansetts as a regional power. As he had anticipated, the Mohawks contributed critically to this outcome. Ninigret died in fall 1676 as the war wound down.

This final section is distinguished by its sustained look *inside* local Native communities and families, fleshing out the tensions and conflicts that pressured Ninigret and other sachems into making fateful decisions. Such pressures figure less prominently in preceding chapters, where sachems often seem to wield uncontested power, collecting tribute, bullying, and waging deadly violence like twentieth-century organized crime bosses. To be sure, the early chapters occasionally evoke indigenous perspectives, as in the authors' characterization of Narragansetts' understanding the Treaty of Hartford (1638) "less as a binding agreement than as a symbol of peace" (p. 42) upon which subsequent relations could be enriched. An otherwise error-free book attributes a clause in that treaty to the yet-to-be-established United Colonies (p. 71).

These limitations aside, *Ninigret, Sachem of the Niantics and Narragansetts* sheds powerful new light on a major figure and the tumultuous world he helped to shape. It is a must-read for anyone interested in colonial and/or Native American history.

NEAL SALISBURY  
Smith College

SUSANAH SHAW ROMNEY. *New Netherland Connections: Intimate Networks and Atlantic Ties in Seventeenth-Century America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 2014. Pp. xviii, 318. \$45.00.

In *New Netherland Connections: Intimate Networks and Atlantic Ties in Seventeenth-Century America*, Susanah Shaw Romney makes this deceptively simple statement: "Only by taking seriously the intimate networks people created together can we understand the origins of empire in the early modern world" (p. 305). Yet this sentence belies her many interesting, engaging, and complex stories about intimate networks that were at once commercial, familial, imperial, gendered, racialized, and class based. Romney, indeed, takes these various networks quite seriously.

To explore the meaning of Dutch commercial growth, Romney introduces a fascinating analysis of Johannes Vermeer's *Officer and a Laughing Girl*. She argues that Vermeer demonstrated the close connections between "the intimate and the imperial" in the guise of the officer and the girl: "she is reaching out to a man" but "she is also reaching out to the world of imperial trade" through this familiar gesture (p. 4). The painting symbolizes a trading network that "cannot be fully understood without bearing in mind the correlations between intimacy and empire" (p. 5). This trope of empire being inextricably linked to the personal is one she returns to throughout the book.

Romney begins her study of this nascent empire by looking in depth at the first stage of "Amsterdam's in-

timate Atlantic" and then at the ties between mother country and colony, as she explores how there were "intricate webs of connections radiating in all directions" (p. 67). She examines "maritime Amsterdammers" at every level—powerful leaders of the West India Company (WIC), merchants who traveled the high seas in search of profit, and ordinary sailors and soldiers who worked the ships. Underpinning it all were personal bonds created by marriage and family, connections among and between this motley crew of adventurers. She puts women front and center. Both in the Netherlands and in New Netherland, they looked after houses, families, and complex financial issues. In the process, women assumed important, often powerful roles in the development of imperial economies. Women "used tools and worked within constraints common to their contemporaries," but they also "took advantage of the new opportunities afforded by transatlantic shipping" (p. 119). Because gender often takes a backseat in analyses of empire, I particularly welcome this insight.

Romney then turns her focus to the role of Native Americans and slaves in this web of empire. The Dutch well understood the importance of integrating their intimate networks with long-standing social networks and economic associations of Native peoples to create profitable personal connections. Refusing to romanticize these relationships, she points out that even though these ties "were distant, violent, exploitative, intimate, and everything in between" (p. 123), trade joined everyone in the region in a single network and forced people into interpersonal networks that proved both successful (they allowed New Netherland to participate in a trade system that reached far into the interior) and unfavorable (close relations fostered fear and distrust between the two groups). She argues that this intimacy led people to dislike each other. Apparently the adage that familiarity breeds contempt proved true. I was disappointed that women generally disappear from this part of Romney's analysis (except when she is discussing sexual relations between Dutch men and Native women), because it is a topic worth expanding.

Next, Romney explores the creation of an African community through the granting of "half freedom" to a small community of slaves. She argues that this group has a presence in early records that most slaves do not and is important because "[t]he lives of these Africans show how intimate networks provided the framework both for survival and for the creation of social hierarchy" (p. 192). While Romney cautions her readers that most Africans remained trapped within racial hierarchies and within the institution of slavery, she argues that the importance of this freedom lies with "the heart of the African population itself" (p. 195); that is, their own intimate networks enabled them to integrate into the local economy and society, to work together, and to resist colonial authority. Familiarity did not breed contempt in this case, which stands in stark contrast to the Native American relationships, which I would have liked Romney to explore a bit more.

Romney ends the book by analyzing the transition from New Netherland to New York through the lens of five people who exemplified the interplay between the intimate and the imperial at this crucial moment. While she returns to the role of close connections, familial relations, political power, and gender, this approach allows for a more intimate analysis of the broad patterns she has laid out thus far. These five people, relatively unknown and powerless in the traditional sense, might have remained silent but “[t]hey were able to speak because of the power and trust latent in their extensive webs of connections among the elite of New Amsterdam society. Yet they spoke safely because that power remained unofficial” (p. 295). I generally found this last chapter interesting, but it was not entirely successful. I wanted to know why she chose these five people, and I was disappointed in her tale of Lydia van Dyck de Meyer and Hillegond Megapolensis van Ruyven’s role in the negotiations between English and Dutch in the last days of New Netherland. Apparently these women “walked across the no-man’s-land between the fort and the English forces” (p. 290) to broker a peaceful transfer of power. For her that reveals the importance of gender, family connections, and intimate ties. Probably. I understand the impossibility of knowing the details, yet it remains a point more asserted than proved.

Romney confidently claims that her book “suggests a new model for the exploration of immediate relationships in early modern empires” (p. 18). Despite my minor criticisms, I agree. Her research was prodigious and convincing, and Romney is a strong writer who has a way with metaphors and turns of phrases. She provides some of the most thought-provoking footnotes I have read in a long time. If she hits her thesis too hard and too frequently (which I think she does), her argument is persuasive. I walked away from this book indeed convinced that she has given historians a new way of conceptualizing and understanding Atlantic world empires.

VIVIAN BRUCE CONGER  
*Ithaca College*

TED BINNEMA. *“Enlightened Zeal”: The Hudson’s Bay Company and Scientific Networks, 1670–1870*. Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press, 2014. Pp. xvi, 458. \$37.95.

The Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) held a royal charter to trade in the bay’s watershed from 1670, and its territories expanded, after an 1821 merger with the North West Company, along the Arctic and Pacific coasts. Ted Binnema surveys the HBC’s involvement with learned communities in Britain, Canada, and the United States from the HBC’s founding until its monopoly was ended and its territories transferred to the Dominion of Canada in 1870. The HBC was involved in exploration, surveying, cartographic and observational sciences, astronomy, meteorology, natural history, and ethnology. Binnema’s introduction promises a case study in the history of knowledge networks in the British Empire, but this ambition is limited by a narrow def-

inition of “science.” Several thematic chapters on the period after 1821 are more successful in reconstructing the networks to which the HBC contributed during the heyday of natural history.

Binnema’s central argument is that after a century of secrecy, the HBC became a “generous patron of science” (p. 7) as the result of networks linking HBC directors and officers in the field, metropolitan savants and institutions, and aboriginal trading partners. These networks were held together by rewards and recognition. The main motive for the HBC’s support of scientific endeavors was to burnish its reputation. Binnema catalogs every printed acknowledgment of HBC assistance as a public “tribute,” and claims that these expressions of thanks redefined the HBC “brand” as enlightened, disinterested, and benevolent (pp. 11, 13). Tributes countered criticism of its commercial monopoly or its treatment of aboriginal peoples. Many HBC officers had time on their hands in the field and natural history provided intangible benefits such as male companionship, self-improvement, or a sense of meaning.

The emphasis on lay science in action in the hinterland is refreshing, but the book is hindered by defining “science” as knowledge pursued for non-commercial purposes and shared through publication. The introduction remarks that definitions of science, natural history, and natural philosophy changed over time, but the next few chapters do not adopt this perspective, instead offering distinctly old-fashioned views of the Royal Society and Baconian science as ideal types. Binnema seems to agree with E. E. Rich who wrote in the 1940s that “‘it is odd to note how many of the early adventurers were Fellows of that [Royal] Society’” (p. 52). According to Binnema, the first reports about Hudson’s Bay in the papers of Robert Boyle “contained no information of scientific interest. It must have been of purely business interest to Boyle” (p. 54). This creates a dichotomy where it did not exist at the time. “[F]inding some Trade for Furrs Mineralls and other considerable Commodities” (p. 52), as stipulated in the company’s charter, created knowledge networks as much as expedition reports on the Northwest Passage or shipments of natural history specimens.

The Transit of Venus in 1769 marked a turning point in the use of precision instruments in Hudson’s Bay. Binnema examines HBC surveying efforts from the late eighteenth century onward, with detailed maps and short biographical sketches of many explorers and naturalists, including Samuel Hearne, Peter Fidler, David Douglas, John Rae, John McLoughlin, and Robert Kennicott. Yet this biographical approach and limited definition of “science” leave the impression of a missed opportunity to examine how natural knowledge was constructed in a chartered monopoly. A survey made by Peter Fidler—whose interests ranged from astronomy and meteorology to natural history—receives this summary: “since there is no evidence that any of these documents were conveyed to learned people, and since the focus of the present study is on knowledge that was shared, the content of those documents are of little rel-



evance here" (p. 118). Since Binnema promises a longer study of Fidler, perhaps this should be taken as a promissory note.

Later chapters provide a very stimulating synthesis of research by Binnema and other scholars on the HBC's role in search of the Northwest Passage, geomagnetic surveys in the 1830s and 1840s, and collaboration with learned societies and museums in Edinburgh, Toronto, Montreal, and Washington, D.C. Binnema convincingly suggests that the kindness shown by the HBC to American and Canadian travelers promoted settlement and later annexation of Oregon by the United States and of other HBC territories by Canada.

Despite a prejudice among HBC officers against ethnology as the "science of amateurs" (p. 283), Binnema attends to the HBC's ambivalent contributions. The role of aboriginal informants is described as undoubtedly significant but poorly documented. In the 1830s, Richard King served in the HBC before founding the Aborigines Protection Society and Ethnological Society. Some HBC employees raided native graveyards for skulls and generally treated First Nations peoples with contempt, while others adopted their methods of travel and compiled dictionaries of native languages. Indeed, although Binnema does not state the matter this way, a reader could draw the conclusion that the company's reputation for enlightened zeal in natural history was often defined in contrast to native peoples (pp. 151, 283).

The book is well illustrated with excellent maps and plates, including the painting on the cover by Paul Kane, *Scene in the Northwest: Portrait of John Henry Lefroy*, in which Lefroy, an army officer who searched for the magnetic North Pole in the mid-1840s, stands on snowshoes in front of a dogsled wearing a Métis capote, leggings, garter and moccasins, as wisps of smoke rise out of a tipi in the background. For all the recognition paid to the men of the HBC in print, the small place reserved for two native informants and collaborators, who stand beside or look out from inside the tipi, paints a muted tribute to the wide networks that co-produced natural knowledge.

PETER H. HANSEN  
Worcester Polytechnic Institute

ROBERT KUMAMOTO. *The Historical Origins of Terrorism in America, 1644–1880*. New York: Routledge, 2014. Pp. 298. Cloth \$135.00, paper \$39.95.

This book argues cogently and earnestly for something it is not. Robert Kumamoto puts a number of violence-infused episodes—the North Carolina Regulators, the Green Mountain Boys, various post-revolution outbreaks, the White Indians of Maine, the Ku Klux Klan, the Mollie Maguires—under a microscope to establish a pattern of violence he defines as "terrorism" in American history from 1644 to 1880. The thesis is a simple one: that terrorism is part and parcel of our past. To carry this a bit further, Kumamoto argues that despite our past of domestic terrorism, Americans today mis-

takenly believe that terrorism is an imported phenomenon and therefore must be dealt with as such. On the contrary, this study points to the need for a reconsideration of the origins of terrorism and a different strategy to combat terrorism in today's world.

Given the rise of global terrorism today, this study is exceptionally relevant. Though, at times, Kumamoto struggles to fit the episodes he describes into a neat definition of "terrorism" that somehow will offer insight into the rise of terrorism in the contemporary world. Kumamoto does argue that definitions of terrorism have changed over time and that the early American episodes he identifies were unusually lacking in fatalities. This point leads to the proposition that acts of terror need not be violent but instead may be driven by political or psychological manipulation.

Although Kumamoto provides a very competent narrative of specific moments of violence in American history, his study is less about domestic terrorism and more a history of violent outbreaks, eruptions of social/political clashes, and challenges to government. Contrary to what he suggests, all of the events about which he writes are fairly well known, rather than "dark and fairly obscure" (p. 288), and none would surprise any early American or nineteenth-century scholar. Each case study is very well done, based on fine primary and secondary sources. (I do note that the book lacks a bibliography of secondary sources, a puzzling and troubling omission.) Each account offers a detailed narrative, in somewhat textbook fashion, with analysis that molds most of the events into moments of terror, whether they were violent, political, or psychological. Take the challenge of the Sons of Liberty to the Stamp Act and Townshend Duties as an example. To call the Sons of Liberty terrorists does not make them so. Kumamoto makes frequent references to "mobish behavior," to the Sons' ability to "stir the mobs into acts of destructive violence" (p. 118), and to "pulling strings from behind the curtain" (p. 131). Curiously, much of the original source material for this chapter is based on the observations of those being challenged, like the Hiller Zobel interpretation of the Boston Massacre, based on the correspondence of frustrated British governors who were unable to attribute any agency to colonial crowds. Kumamoto could also note that often the lack of violence could be simply explained by the fact that the British had no loyal police force in colonial towns.

Curiously, Kumamoto includes in this study Shays' Rebellion which he says, "never relied on the tactics of terror" (p. 143) and the Whiskey Rebellion where rebels used terrorism "[o]nly secondarily" (p. 153). The inclusion of these outbreaks strengthens the argument that this study is more about violence and less about terror. Kumamoto appears to be on firmer ground when discussing the Ku Klux Klan, which within any contemporary definition of terrorism, is a true domestic terror organization. This chapter is riveting and given that the Klan still exists in some form, an understanding of its nineteenth-century legacy is important.

There are a number of commendable features of this study. In a single volume Kumamoto advances some very credible accounts of striking moments of resistance and violence in American history in a clear and readable fashion. In some respects his work is an extremely capable literature review, and this appears to have been one of the author's goals. For example, chapter 6 is based largely on the work of Alan Taylor whom he says "provided not only the first major historical investigation of the White Indians but most likely the last as well" (p. 169). Perhaps this study will supplant the classic comprehensive work of Richard Maxwell Brown and others as a fine and useful reader for students of violence in American history. But as a tool to inform us on terrorism in the contemporary world, Kumamoto falls short. Consider that most (but not all) of the events Kumamoto writes about were purposeful, some personal, and had very specific immediate goals of cause and effect. In light of 9/11, it might be difficult to square the author's argument that a history of domestic terrorism ought to inform us on ways to challenge terrorism today.

DONNA J. SPINDEL,  
Emerita  
Marshall University

DORON S. BEN-ATAR and RICHARD D. BROWN. *Taming Lust: Crimes against Nature in the Early Republic*. (Early American Studies.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. Pp. 209. \$34.95.

KELLY A. RYAN. *Regulating Passion: Sexuality and Patriarchal Rule in Massachusetts, 1700–1830*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. xi, 264. \$55.00.

The American Revolution ushered in an era of experimentation in individualism, reason, and independence, but it simultaneously generated a counterrevolution that favored the continuing authority of local elites and the disciplining of the "free" citizenry. Both the Doren S. Ben-Atar and Richard D. Brown volume and Kelly A. Ryan's book examine elite efforts in the early republic to create and sustain an orderly society by taming Americans' lusts and passions. It seemed to many local leaders that the joys of liberty joined to sexual impropriety created a toxic mixture. They thought it necessary to resist people's libertarian urges in order to save traditional patriarchy and especially the traditional patriarchal family, the ostensible bedrock of a civilized nation. The books' authors make the same overall point but do so in very different ways.

Ben-Atar and Brown ingeniously focus their study on two octogenarians in 1790s New England. These elderly men, in separate states, were indicted, prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to death for the crime of bestiality, which fell under the rubric of sodomy but more specifically referred to sexual relations with animals (such as canines and mares). Nearly everything about the two men and their cases was atypical. Few men lived into their eighties. The new state and local governments

gave increasingly low priority to prosecuting and executing individuals for most sexual infractions after the revolution. And the few souls that governments did police for sexual misdeeds tended to be youths rather than old men. The authors set out to discern why officials revived their ancestors' harsh Mosaic code and employed more modern (and draconian) British common law punishments to police sex at that particular post-revolution moment.

The authors give two answers. First, local elites, especially rural leaders, suffered from religious, political, and cultural anxieties spawned by the struggle for independence and by the tumults of the first decades of individual liberty. They feared an oncoming decline of Christianity as well as an upcoming rise in atheism, apostasy, free thinking, Freemasonry, male passions, female debauchery, religious and sexual toleration, family disintegration, Jeffersonianism, political radicalism, adverse demographic and economic forces, and alleged conspiracies. The authors suggest that a blend of these factors ultimately resulted in a "nostalgic spasm" (p. 145) in the 1790s. Elites sought to reproduce an imagined, more virtuous past when local churches and individual families taught future citizens to control their passions and become responsible patriarchs and good wives. Looking back also allowed elites to divert their gaze from the Lockean liberalism that was making its appearance and establishing its dominance. Ultimately, the two old men were the victims of end-of-the-century nostalgia.

Second, Ben-Atar and Brown use the stories of the two men, their alleged bestiality, and their journey through local criminal justice systems as a means to introduce a grander tale about post-revolution elites and their dread at the demise of their Puritan heritage and the arrival of cosmopolitanism, liberalism, and modernity. Local leaders portrayed themselves as the "final guardians" (p. 87) of Christian orthodoxy, old-time morality, and neighborly civility. For them, the revolution should have meant a change of patriarchs, not an end to patriarchy. Unfortunately, new-won liberty and independence seemed to invite Americans to indulge their passions, live out their lusts, and experiment with non-marital sex. Elites' desire and ability to perpetuate patriarchal society proved to be remarkably resilient. Still, their willingness to enforce the patriarchal norms of manhood was somewhat elastic. Neither octogenarian was executed. One was pardoned and the other died in prison prior to his execution date. Henceforth, harsh penalties for sex crimes such as fornication, adultery, and sodomy became anachronistic.

Ryan widens the historical lens from two individuals to nearly every American inhabitant in every conceivable category. The author breaks down the American people by gender, race, class, religion, age, and more. White men and white women, Indians, African Americans, the rich and the poor, and young males are some of the main players in this multi-faceted narrative about how traditional patriarchal controls underwent sweeping challenges and changes during the revolutionary ep-



och. White men's sexual regulation of American society came under attack and state and local governments began to exercise less and less power over (some categories of) individuals who were accused of committing sexual transgressions. Elites experimented with new models of hierarchy, wherein patriarchal expectations continued but were mostly enforced informally, by local churches, community networks of social reputation, and an ethic of reciprocity. Meanwhile, leaders redoubled their efforts to celebrate patriarchal families and patriarchal norms. They encouraged individual sexual virtues and charitable guardianship schemes that promised to educate as well as discipline various subordinate individuals and groups. Nonetheless, elites still relied on state and local government coercion to restrict and punish interracial marriages, prostitution, disorderly houses, and lewd conduct. Their main targets tended to be poor men, African Americans, and unmarried women.

Some subordinate Americans devised ways to fight back against resilient patriarchy. For example, white women no longer accepted their narrow public role as society's moral guardians. Now they laid claim to "a new sexual self" (p. 175), a share of Enlightenment reason and education, a degree of individual independence, avenues of social action, control of social service agencies, and even inroads into citizenship. Meanwhile, many prostitutes did not accept their reputation and treatment as seductive, lustful, and deceitful women. They sometimes portrayed themselves (and were portrayed by social activists) as the victims of duplicitous, degenerate men. Ryan concludes that elite patriarchal control of most Americans gradually declined. Still, segregation, sexual reputation, and "the patriarchal gaze" (p. 176) conspired to maintain white, male-dominated hierarchy and invidious distinctions between sexes, races, classes, ages, and religious outlooks.

Despite their different approaches, both books' authors share several perspectives. They agree that a robust patriarchalism survived the revolution. They might disagree about how much patriarchalism persisted, how long it lasted, and how it was institutionalized, but what they do not dispute is the ongoing dominance of wealthy white fathers and father figures or patriarchs' own sexual freedom in the early republic. Wealthy white men generally treated their own illicit sexual acts with impunity and rarely suffered serious consequences, if any, for their sexual misdeeds. I believe the authors underestimate the extent of elite efforts to claim sexual liberty for themselves and to scale back sexual liberty for virtually all other Americans. Patriarchal regulation of people's passions became an ongoing aspect of modern liberal society.

I am a bit disappointed that neither book addresses the question of why patriarchalism survived the revolution and what was at stake in its longevity. Nor do the authors consider how patriarchal norms and structures made peace with Lockean liberalism to persist for several more centuries. Neither volume scrutinizes the priorities, the beliefs, or the interests behind the patriar-

chal struggles of early elites to ensure that the revolution benefited them and maintained their place at the apex of the social order. Nor do the authors provide much insight into the nature, extent, and effectiveness of those who resisted ongoing white, male domination. Fortunately, the creative scholarship of Ben-Atar, Brown, and Ryan complements the many other studies that address related issues.

MARK E. KANN,  
Emeritus  
University of Southern California

NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO. *Against the Profit Motive: The Salary Revolution in American Government, 1780–1940*. (Yale Law Library Series in Legal History and Reference.) New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2013. Pp. xi, 568. \$55.00.

The aim of Nicholas R. Parrillo's book is to describe the historical shift in the mode of remuneration of government personnel, from one based on "facilitative payments" and "bounties" (p. 2) to the salary-based regime that became the norm in twentieth-century America. In the former model, officeholders charged for the services they provided (e.g., approving licenses) or were rewarded on the basis of their productivity in a specific field of government intervention (e.g., pursuing outstanding tax payments). In the latter regime, officials receive a preset salary funded from the public purse, and other forms of payment come to be closely associated with bribery and corruption. Parrillo understands this historical process in terms of the gradual eradication of the profit motive from the operation of government institutions. A long introduction presents the general argument. Part I is concerned with the demise of the facilitative payment and part II with the decline of the bounty, with each chapter focusing on a different policy or issue.

The conceptual approach of the book is set out with reference to Max Weber's work, which has been the foundation of much of the historical research done. Weber viewed the emergence of a salaried public officialdom as an important dimension of the growth of bureaucratic rationality in the practices of government, a process itself part of the wider rationalization of modern social life. Parrillo tends to endorse this general perspective but argues that the process was more complex than Weber realized: "there were two distinct though simultaneous transitions, each with its own inner meaning, that ended up in the same place: one rejecting the facilitative payment, which drew officials too close to the layperson, and the other rejecting the bounty, which alienated them too far from the layperson" (p. 5).

This argument is the main conceptual underpinning of the book and of course it hardly amounts to a critique or even revision of Weber's thesis but should be seen primarily as an adjustment or elaboration. Indeed, it is a rather thin conceptual reed on which to hang such a massively detailed book. If at the start of the book Par-

rillo claims that “[t]he salary embodied a new state-society relationship” (p. 4), the rest of the book unearths one historical episode after another without ever returning explicitly to that argument. This is hardly a justifiable limitation: if the distinctive character of modern governance consists in the fact that it is neither overwhelmed by social interests nor imposes itself on them in a predatory fashion, the material in this book would seem to provide ample resources to address this question in a new and fruitful way. The literature on American political development, which has been centrally and productively concerned with the question of state capacity, is briefly cited and discussed in a footnote (pp. 378–379, n. 22), but the author simply aligns himself with the notion that the American state should not be seen as a “weak” state and leaves things at that. To be sure, the book offers an epilogue on “The Salary Revolution and American State-Building,” but this is only four pages long and adds little to what has already been said in the introduction.

The absence of reflection on wider analytical implications and the lack of engagement with significant scholarly debates represent major missed opportunities. This is the case all the more because the historical material presented in the book offers such rich opportunities. The scale of the project and the meticulous documentation of sources are impressive (to give an indication, there are 170 pages of notes for 362 pages of text; and chapter 4 has a grand total of 426 notes), as is the author’s general mastery of his subject. There can be little doubt that this is the definitive historical treatment of the salary revolution for the timeframe it examines. If writing that kind of book was Parrillo’s objective, he has certainly succeeded. But this reviewer could not help but feel that an important story was drowned out by the sheer detail of historical description. Indeed, the book offers only cursory recognition of the fact that the salary revolution hardly created a historical *fait accompli* (as during recent decades a range of governmental functions such as incarceration have again become imbricated with the profit-driven motivations of private providers), and no serious analysis of its significance for how we should read the history of the salary.

Overall, this is a good old-fashioned history book, offering engaging narratives that are richly detailed and exhaustively referenced.

MARTIJN KONINGS  
University of Sydney

RACHEL HOPE CLEVES. *Charity and Sylvia: A Same-Sex Marriage in Early America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. xix, 267. \$29.95.

Charity Bryant put it simply, “‘On the 3rd of July 1807’ . . . Sylvia Drake ‘consented to be my *help-meet* and came to be my companion’” (p. 101). Thus, the two women initiated their lifelong union in western Vermont. They built a home and a tailoring business together, shared their finances and their bed, and over

time earned the admiration of their fellow congregants and the town’s ministers. They were widely recognized as a couple and when they died they were buried together under a shared headstone. Rachel Hope Cleves’s deeply researched and compelling biography tells the story of their marriage and reveals how their community, family, and friends made sense of this same-sex union in early-nineteenth-century America.

*Charity and Sylvia: A Same-Sex Marriage in Early America* is a love story. Cleves boldly, and convincingly, asserts that the two were lovers who bound themselves to one another in the most fundamental ways that marriage was understood at the time: as a spiritual and sexual union in which two became one. Diverging from earlier historical studies of women’s intimacy in same-sex romantic friendships, Cleves argues that sexual attraction and physical sexual intimacy were unquestionably part of their relationship. A central goal of the book is to understand how those around them reconciled acknowledgement of Charity and Sylvia’s union with a general societal condemnation of same-sex sexual practices. Cleves’s answer is that Charity and Sylvia gained tolerance by being modest, productive members of their community and enmeshing themselves in public and religious service. By being otherwise exemplary reputable women, Charity and Sylvia encouraged their community to remain silent about their sexuality and treat it as an open secret. Cleves evokes the concept of the open closet wherein the denizens of Weybridge, Vermont strategically chose to remain ignorant of the couple’s sexual intimacy in order to avoid the necessity of condemnation.

Cleves’s twinned biography of Charity and Sylvia relies, in part, on embedding their story in the social constructions of female same-sex intimacy documented by previous scholarship. Specialists will be familiar with the varied cultural constructs circulating in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century America: the tribades of *Aristotle’s Masterpiece*, literary allusion in lesbian landscape poetry, the female husband in fact and fiction, bosom sex, and sisters in Christ. But Cleves’s work advances our understanding by illustrating how a social history, which reconstructs and analyzes social relationships over the course of a lifetime, can move beyond tropes and character types to reveal self-definitions and lived experience.

The result is a rich history full of ambiguity and complexity. The marriage Charity and Sylvia created was both like and unlike conventional early national marriages. If neighbors attributed the role of husband to Charity and wife to Sylvia, the couple themselves rejected the patriarchal authority generally vested in husbands, choosing instead an equal partnership. Charity took the lead in business matters and Sylvia took charge of household domestic duties, but they were both committed to female economic independence, a status denied legally married women under marital coverture. Each woman’s identity combined aspects of a gendered spousal role (husband or wife) with that of the female gendered independent spinster who exemplified many



aspects of ideal womanhood: piety, modesty, sincerity, and civic mindedness. Charity cultivated female masculinity and independence, Sylvia religiosity and self-improvement.

Both Charity's and Sylvia's families understood theirs as a love match from the beginning. Cleves uses evidence of wide-ranging familial reactions—from acceptance to profound discomfort—to illustrate that those closest to them understood their union to mirror marriage in its authorization of a sexual union. Charity's sister Anna immediately embraced the union and encouraged her sister to return Sylvia's love with fidelity. Meanwhile, Sylvia's mother resisted recognizing, and thus legitimating, their union by refusing to visit and stay in their home for the first eight years of the marriage. In time the enduring nature of the couple's commitment to one another eased Mrs. Drake's disapproval. Had she not imagined her daughter as Charity's lover she could have entered the women's home with ease.

One of the most important contributions is Cleves's exploration of Christianity, sex, and sin for women who loved women in this era. Charity and Sylvia were lifelong believers. Each intensified her spiritualism during the second Great Awakening when first Sylvia, and then Charity experienced spiritual rebirth. Sylvia taught Sunday school and Charity chaired the church's Female Benevolent Society. Their shared Christianity enhanced the value they placed on their love for one another, and yet both were troubled by their belief that the physical expression of their love was a sin.

The tangle of piety and sexual sin was with them from the start. Charity used the inducement of building a pious life together to encourage Sylvia to live with her, and assuaged any misgivings about sins of the flesh by assuring Sylvia of God's forgiveness of those who repent of their sins. To struggle with sexual temptation was at the core of human experience, and such struggle endeared one to God's favor. Despite decades of living in a loving monogamous union, both women persisted in believing the sexual expression of their love was a sin of the first order. Sylvia, at age 54, inscribed in her diary: "31 years since I left my mother's house and commenc'd serving in company with Dear Miss B. Sin mars all earthly bliss, and no common sinner have I been" (p. 129).

One might wish that Cleves was willing to explore the extent to which marriage, which Charity and Sylvia believed they had forged, might have conferred some legitimacy to the physical expression of the love they shared. Or, alternatively, how the couple may have embraced chastity during their stretches of heightened religiosity. But Cleves's careful reading of the archival remnants of this couple's life suggests a powerful new narrative in the history of Christianity and homosexuality: Charity and Sylvia, a couple who lived openly in a pious same-sex marriage in antebellum America, were

recognized by their community as exemplars of Christian faith.

CLARE A. LYONS  
University of Maryland

MARK E. BRANDON. *States of Union: Family and Change in the American Constitutional Order*. (Constitutional Thinking.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2013. Pp. xi, 335. \$37.50.

Over the past several decades, many historians of marriage, childhood, and family life in the United States have challenged the political trend of romanticizing the unchanging, "traditional" American family. In doing so, they have demonstrated that the family has evolved significantly—and not always for the worse, as some critics have suggested—throughout U.S. history. In this ambitious work, Mark E. Brandon adds an important new layer to the existing historiography. Intent on countering the arguments of "family values" advocates from a legal perspective, Brandon explores how and why the American family became constitutionally significant, as well as what this development has meant for families, the law, and the complex relationship between the two.

Brandon builds his case carefully, opening the book with a theoretical discussion of various conceptual frames that he believes are essential for understanding "the constitutional status of family" (p. 17) before delving into an examination of family law in eighteenth-century England. One purpose of this latter discussion is to demonstrate how circumstances in the North American colonies led to a substantive deviation from the "common law" of Great Britain. Brandon argues that some colonists, including wives and children, had greater opportunities to leave their families and many came to reject older notions of patronage. These principles, in turn, clearly influenced, and were influenced by, the American Revolution.

Given this close connection, it is perhaps initially surprising that the family was largely absent from the Constitution. Brandon makes the case that multiple visions of the family, from agrarian to capitalist and individualistic, informed the founders, but that only the slaveholding family received the "blessing of the Constitution" (p. 80). This statement is provocative and Brandon's legal analysis on the development and purposes of the racial family, even after slavery, is persuasive. Somewhat less so is his examination of the inner workings of slave families. While Brandon clearly states that he does not intend his work to serve as a comprehensive history of family life in the United States, his decision to rely heavily on Kenneth M. Stampp's *The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South* (1956) and Eugene D. Genovese's *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made* (1974) for this discussion ignores decades of further research, especially works that play closer attention to gender analysis, about this very topic. This omission does not necessarily detract from his larger argument, but it is evidence of the real

challenge of balancing breadth, as well as depth, in this type of scholarship.

The heart of Brandon's book is the four chapters that consider the fates of the diversity of family forms in the United States from the late eighteenth century until the end of the nineteenth. Brandon presents evidence of a wide range of familial behavior and seeks to explain why, by the later years, the monogamous nuclear family was in the process of attaining constitutional status. He argues that while the frontier family's job "was to maintain (and extend) political domination" (p. 109), these families were far from static, witnessing a loosening of gender roles and a number of same-sex households that operated as families. Some "uncommon" families, notably the communal experiments of groups like the Shakers and the Oneida community enjoyed a degree of legal and social acceptance at the time. But countervailing forces were also at work. Breaking down the communal nature of Native American families was an essential element in westward expansion. The Mormon experiment in polygamy, in particular, led to a national reckoning about the fundamental character and legal status of American family life.

Brandon argues that even as the family gained a stronger hold in constitutional thinking in the early decades of the twentieth century, "[t]he institutional and ethical DNA of this institution was complex and even conflictual" (p. 220). In legal familial matters, support for tradition and regulation coexisted uneasily with a belief in liberty and equality that defied close supervision of private lives. Both kinds of reasoning influenced judicial decisions throughout the twentieth century, leading some commentators to maintain that the Supreme Court was responsible for the rapid changes in family life that seemed to occur after the 1960s. Brandon firmly disputes this interpretation. He makes the case that the family, and law, had been changing well before mid-century and that the Supreme Court's decisions just as often reflected, rather than shaped, the changing landscape. Given the extraordinarily detailed descriptions that Brandon offers of the social and legal histories of nineteenth-century families, his relatively brief take on the twentieth century reads as somewhat impressionistic. Brandon corrects this oversight, however, with a nuanced discussion of the changing legal fate of same-sex marriage in the United States.

While occasionally quite dense, Brandon's case is forcefully and persuasively argued. He successfully underscores the knotty relationship between the American family and the Constitution and ultimately provides a better understanding of both.

KRISTIN CELELLO

*Queens College, City University of New York*

KATHERINE C. MOONEY. *Race Horse Men: How Slavery and Freedom Were Made at the Racetrack*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014. Pp. 321. \$35.00.

*Race Horse Men: How Slavery and Freedom Were Made at the Racetrack* is a fascinating, surprising work that

uses short analytical narratives to tell the story—or more precisely, the stories—of African Americans in the world of horse racing from the early 1800s to the early twentieth century. Concentrating on a few well-known jockeys and countless unheralded skilled workers, the book moves through individual settings and people, races, tracks, publications, and moments. Chapter by chapter, Katherine C. Mooney analyzes the specifics of horse racing in the context of major issues in the relationship between freedom and race: the meanings of the American Revolution; Whiggish arguments about progress through organized group efforts; proslavery arguments about paternalism and stability; the possible meanings of emancipation; opportunities for class advancement and respectability; and the limits new forms of racial segregation placed on African Americans in the racing world.

Readers who want a quick conclusion or narrow thesis statement will likely find the volume frustrating. As Mooney writes in the introduction, "The story is, in truth, a patchwork of many stories. It is less an attempt to answer a set of analytical questions about historical cause and effect than a portrait that seeks to reveal some complex and difficult realities in the lives of people in the past" (p. 3). If one were to attempt a quick thesis statement, a beginning might be that African American men contributed their skills and dedication to a popular sport but had to negotiate extraordinary and ever-changing challenges. A second argument is that white horse owners, journalists, and fans of the sport often used stories and images of African American horse men to display or prove various visions of a solid, happy racial order, while the African Americans themselves used the sport to pursue freedom, opportunity, dignity, and respectability. A third argument might simply emphasize that horse racing—its people, gambling, and spectacles—has played an important role in America's most compelling issues.

The uniqueness of the volume lies first in the stories of individuals few historians know about, and second in the numerous analytical ways Mooney connects their stories to broad themes. She tells the story of Cornelius, an antebellum trainer and slave in Charleston, South Carolina; of Charles Stewart, a groom and jockey; of famous jockeys Abe (later Abe Hawkins) and Isaac Murphy; and of a number of successful jockeys who faced new limits on their potential in the age of segregation. Most chapters include a story of a race or two, reminding us that the histories of sports only make sense when we understand the win-or-lose drama of sporting events themselves. Mooney connects those stories to themes of power in a range of ways without making broad, general points about horse racing. She writes early in the book, "Racing, long acknowledged as a symbolic display of power, flourished as an institution precisely because it was far more than symbolic. It was a school, a showcase, and a testing ground—a political arena in the most literal sense. It gave concrete, compelling form to abstractions about the rightful workings of power" (p. 27). The concrete ways she discusses the



meaning of horse racing in different periods of American history ultimately makes *Race Horse Men* a compelling work.

TED OWNBY  
University of Mississippi

SANDRA REBOK. *Humboldt and Jefferson: A Transatlantic Friendship of the Enlightenment*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014. Pp. ix, 220. \$30.00.

Studies by Americans of the life and work of Thomas Jefferson are plentiful, some admiring, others not so much. However, as Sandra Nichols pointed out in 2006, American scholars have not paid much attention to Alexander von Humboldt ("Why Was Humboldt Forgotten in the United States?," *Geographical Review* 96, no. 3 [2006]: 399–415). Since then, several new studies by Americans have appeared, and this slim volume is a gem of a book. Taking advantage of the current interest in how progressive ideas were profoundly fertilized and transmitted in a transatlantic environment, Sandra Rebok focuses on two of the iconic figures of the Enlightenment era, Jefferson and Humboldt. Like J. G. A. Pocock and Jonathan Israel, Rebok understands that there were multiple versions of the Enlightenment, so like these earlier scholars, she often uses the plural form of "enlightenment" to describe the intersection of ideas, mainly but not exclusively scientific, that emerged in the encounter of these two men.

Jefferson and Humboldt met briefly in Washington, D.C. in 1804. For the previous five years, Humboldt, who was 26 years younger than the president, had been undertaking a scientific exploration of the Spanish colonial territories in the Americas. His initial aim had been to return to Europe with his specimens and findings, but the American consul in Havana, Vincent Gray, encouraged him to travel to Washington because he knew that Humboldt had discovered new information about Spanish concerns regarding New Spain and the independence movement. The U.S. government was vitally interested in learning about this region in light of the Napoleonic Wars raging in Europe. As it turned out, Humboldt wanted to visit the new American nation to see how its new democratic republic distinguished it from the rest of Europe.

Rebok has made a career of studying and comparing Humboldt and Jefferson's scientific, political, and social opinions. This book represents the culmination of that inquiry. She is obviously comfortable in several languages, including English, French, German, and Spanish, and she has made excellent use of sources in all four. The book's appendix contains all of the letters between the Prussian scientist and the American president. Humboldt and Jefferson did not meet again, but they corresponded throughout the rest of Jefferson's life: the last letter Humboldt wrote to Jefferson was in 1825, a year before the former president's death. The letters show that their discussions ranged over a wide array of topics. Humboldt, an emerging scientist, and Jefferson, an established one, carried on discussions

touching on political and social issues as well as scientific matters.

Rebok begins by citing Immanuel Kant's famous 1784 question: "What is Enlightenment?" She quotes his own response, namely it is a human being's emergence from his own immaturity, but she could have gone further to orient the reader to her thematic approach to this most fruitful, long-term friendship. Kant's even more celebrated statement, "*Sapere aude!*" or "Dare to know," derived from the Roman poet, Horace (first century B.C.), was his challenge to awaken people to inquire through their rational faculty into every mystery of the universe to uncover the laws of nature and the principles of human nature for the improvement of mankind. Humboldt and Jefferson dared to know and while their conclusions were often similar, they sometimes differed.

Rebok divides her book into eight short chapters, many of which are based on earlier essays Rebok prepared for various journals. Chapter 1 explores the biographical backgrounds of both men, while chapter 2 focuses on Humboldt's visit to the United States. Chapter 3 surveys the international experiences of both men: Jefferson as the American minister in Paris in the 1780s and Humboldt's world travels throughout his adult life. Chapter 4 is central to Rebok's methodology in that it investigates the transatlantic network of ideas. Here, Rebok discusses Humboldt's trip to Washington from the perspective of both men: Jefferson in attempting to gain information about Spain's strategy in dealing with its North American colonies, and Humboldt in probing Jefferson's mind ranging over several topics, such as the future of self-government in nations that only experienced monarchy, the nature of human progress, the future of the United States in relation to the rest of the world, and, of course, scientific and technological developments, such as canals, geography, and flora and fauna.

Rebok astutely notes that any real discussion of slavery is missing. She focuses on Jefferson's ambivalence about slavery, how even he agreed that it was an immoral institution, but one that had to be preserved for the southern economy to flourish (he was a Virginia planter, after all). She does not quote, but could have, Jefferson's famous statement about slavery in a letter to John Holmes in 1820 that "we have the wolf by the ear, and we can neither hold him, nor safely let him go. Justice is in one scale, and self-preservation in the other."

The latter chapters focus on the two men's views of climate change, geography, the plight of North American Indians, national identity, and the Haitian Revolution. The issue of whether America in the New World had created a model appropriate for the Old World was not a new one for Jefferson, Humboldt, or many other Americans. Rebok does not make this clear. Even so, she does note that while Jefferson initially told Humboldt that the United States created a model that Old World nations could emulate, he soon changed his mind when he realized that Europe lacked a history of liberal democracy.

Chapter 8 details the similarities and differences in Humboldt and Jefferson's Enlightenment thinking surrounding three themes: how and whether the seventeenth-century geographical ideas of Bernard Varenius influenced either of the men; how they differently applied their shared values of liberty, religion, and progress; and the differences between European and American approaches to Enlightenment ideas, such as the centrality of constitutional monarchies (Europe) as opposed to a representative republic (America). Rebok's work deserves a wide audience. As an important contribution to Jefferson studies, it introduces readers to the increasing importance of Alexander von Humboldt as not only an Enlightenment thinker and writer but also a scientist whose work spanned the first half of the nineteenth century as well.

JACK FRUCHTMAN  
Towson University

MARY BABSON FUHRER. *A Crisis of Community: The Trials and Transformation of a New England Town, 1815–1848*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014. Pp. xii, 354. \$39.95.

Mary Babson Fuhrer has written a thoughtful, humane book on how dramatic changes spurred by the American Revolution and the market revolution reshaped ordinary lives in Boylston, Massachusetts. Her narrative focuses on Mary White, a diligent diarist, and her family as they went through four tumultuous decades.

Fuhrer argues that over those decades, "Mary and her neighbors asserted an unprecedented degree of personal autonomy and individual liberty. Their actions—associating, reforming, converting, instituting, innovating—remade community by radically transforming the way individuals related to each other on a face-to-face, day-to-day basis" (pp. 5–6). Through White's and others' experiences, "we see a people's gradual embrace of individualism, pluralism, and ambition" that transformed "[a] community of necessity and custom" into "a community—or communities—of choice and interest" (p. 9).

Fuhrer draws on Richard D. Brown's work on modernization. She examines how a communal social order gave way to one made up of individuals. She also, like Thomas Bender in *Community and Social Change in America* (1978), argues that community is historical and takes different forms.

Fuhrer's narrative is the opposite of a declension story: it celebrates change. The book starts by painting a picture of a traditional corporate community isolated from the world. The focus of life was on community and intergenerational obligations. This was out of necessity: to ensure the town could feed itself and take care of its residents. It meant that "[l]ife was experienced in and through relation to others" (p. 15). All institutions sought to reinforce a shared communal order.

That all changed. First, liberal and orthodox divisions in religion led to the fracturing of the community's churches and made religion an individual choice. Con-

version became personal and private. Then, the market revolution altered relationships as increasing numbers of young people left the farm to work in towns and cities, and as more farmers sought to feed not only themselves and each other but also distant markets. People began to interact with those beyond their borders and relied on cash instead of neighbors to survive. These forces led to new ideals of self-making as a new generation "declared independence from time-honored bonds to family, neighbors, and townsmen" to get involved with "distant and diverse partners, parties, and sects" (p. 103).

These processes fragmented the old order, but the heart of the book is the sixth chapter, "Re-Forming Community," which explores how Boylston's residents learned how to come together in new ways. Boylston did not become libertarian; instead Boylston's people sought community but had to do so in a very different context than the world that Mary White had once known.

The new communities were "voluntary" (p. 153), while the older community idealized uniformity. Now, people could choose the groups that they wished to join, and in joining voluntary associations, they forged ties with those both within and beyond Boylston's borders. Even as people joined new communities, however, they spurred new conflicts and divisions.

In discussing the town's temperance society in 1830, Fuhrer discounts Alexis de Tocqueville's claim, in *Democracy in America* (1835, 1840), that associations "bonded individuals to collective society." Instead, she argues, membership in temperance societies set joiners apart from the larger community, and urged them "to resist the norms of their immediate corporate community" while uniting them "in fraternity" (p. 157).

This may be true, but it also should raise some questions. As Robert D. Putnam posited in *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (2000), there are two forms of social capital: bridging and bonding. Bridging capital brings people together across boundaries, whereas bonding social capital isolates people from each other. Tocqueville understood this. He considered associations to serve both purposes, bringing people together and enabling them to resist the pressures of public opinion and of political leaders.

This is important because Tocqueville's great concern in a democracy was that people would be set loose from society, atomized. Fuhrer's work helps us understand why that did not happen, why ordinary people continued to find ways to connect. But implicit in her study is the premise that "[l]iberty was vested in the power to choose where and how one would belong" (p. 9). If all communities are those of choice, how can a town, a state, or a nation, a church, or a political party, expect obligations? What about duty?

These questions remain to be answered. Fuhrer believes in choice, but Tocqueville recognized the importance of boundedness as well. At a time when our own civic institutions are fraying, perhaps we too need to



remember that we all must belong, and in belonging we must give up some choice for a larger common good.

JOHANN N. NEEM

Western Washington University

BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN. *A Warring Nation: Honor, Race, and Humiliation in America and Abroad*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014. Pp. viii, 247. \$29.95.

Published posthumously, Bertram Wyatt-Brown's *A Warring Nation: Honor, Race, and Humiliation in America and Abroad* is a history of the role the ethics of honor have played in American conflicts from the Barbary Wars of the early nineteenth century to our current misadventures (as he saw it) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Given the sheer breadth of the topic, Wyatt-Brown rightly saw *A Warring Nation* not as a definitive treatment but a speculative foray. "I hope this work will be only the first of many to explore the interrelationships of honor, race, and humiliation" in a military context, Wyatt-Brown concludes. There is "much still to be explored by others" (p. 193). The work of *A Warring Nation*, then, is to build a case for the importance of such an exploration, and in that it is convincing and successful.

Wyatt-Brown is synonymous with the ethic of honor, having pioneered its study in an American context in *Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South* (1982). He begins *A Warring Nation* by extending that analysis to the study of military honor among the American enslaved population, focusing on warrior traditions they may have brought with them from Africa and on the role honor played in insurrections that finally helped topple the Slave Power. Like Carole Emberton, Wyatt-Brown sees this tradition of martial manhood as an unsteady, if necessary, base on which wider claims were later made to citizenship and rights for all African Americans. *A Warring Nation*'s next two chapters on traditions of honor, humiliation, and military service among southern whites—traditions that helped form the political matrix for secession—are less original but necessary to the chapters that follow on the role honor played in Reconstruction, World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. Wyatt-Brown grants that honor played a declining role in the wider context of American life in these later periods and that gradually preoccupations with "honor" gave way to niche concerns for "rep," "cred," and "face" in hyper-male enclaves like the Mafia or street gangs. But ironically, says Wyatt-Brown, the fact that our honor traditions faded (while generally a good thing and a sign of loosening patriarchal strictures) has too often made us blind to the honor traditions that shape the cultures with which we increasingly interact on a world stage. Had policy-makers better understood, for instance, how de-Baathification would not merely weaken a political sector in Iraq but also emasculate, humiliate, and enrage the heads of many households, the United States might have made better policy choices.

Moreover, Wyatt-Brown believed that while honor traditions have weakened in the United States—we no longer do much dueling, obviously—we kid ourselves if we think that national honor, or its opposite, the fear of national humiliation, played no role in our foreign policy and foreign wars. Indeed, *A Warring Nation* postulates that we tend to go to war not against our greatest threats (heart disease and handguns, for instance) but against our greatest fears (ISIS and Ebola being the fears du jour). Such implications make *A Warring Nation* Wyatt-Brown's most political book, but it is also one of his most suggestive. Because while it is true that Wyatt-Brown made an entire career of studying honor, the less appreciated leitmotif running through all of his work was his insistence that historians take seriously the irrational forces—from faith to depression to rage—that often drive American politics and culture. In a nineteenth-century historiography now dominated by investigations of the influence of "interests" (e.g., the "plantation-industrial complex" and "slavery's capitalism"), *A Warring Nation* sounds a welcome note of contrarian caution. The reason we have generally cooled to our wars so quickly, Wyatt-Brown claims, is because we tend to go in so hot, driven by nightmare visions of mushroom clouds or falling dominoes that were conjured for our amygdalae and not our frontal lobes. In reviewing Wyatt-Brown's seminal *Southern Honor* in 1982, famed Harvard sociologist Orlando Patterson noted that "[a] good part of [the book's] intellectual excitement comes from the fact that it takes many chances, both methodologically and interpretively. Timidity is not one of Professor Wyatt-Brown's failings." Indeed, it was not.

STEPHEN BERRY

University of Georgia

LINDA M. CLEMMONS. *Conflicted Mission: Faith, Disputes, and Deception on the Dakota Frontier*. St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2014. Pp. 274. Paper \$22.95, e-book \$15.99.

Many U.S. historians are familiar with missionary travel accounts, often with titles such as "By the Wall." And while larger studies of missionary societies who sent workers into western Native American communities have been published, there are few case studies of specific mission stations. Linda M. Clemmons has provided just such a study, focusing on a handful of Presbyterian missionaries who entered Minnesota in 1835 with the intent of "saving" the Dakota (or Eastern Sioux) people. Her thesis is clear from the start: these missionaries, attached to the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), faced continued conflict as they debated among themselves various strategies, found federal Indian policies to be mostly detrimental, and had only minor success in converting Natives who had their own religious practices and beliefs.

Discord existed from the start as missionaries argued over just what to do first: save the Indian or lead him/

her into a “civilized” lifestyle? The two leading missionaries in the group, Thomas S. Williamson and Stephen Return Riggs, generally opted for the former, although the issue was never completely settled. Constant trouble erupted over how to prevent gift-giving (the missionaries were generally viewed by Indians as stingy as a result), polygamy, dancing, and especially Indian warfare. Less important were conflicts over the standard Presbyterian rule of honoring the Sabbath. When it came to government policies, missionaries found themselves writing countless critical letters that they cautioned their readers not to make public. Quite simply, their stations were on Indian lands at the discretion of government officials, many of whom were corrupt and incompetent.

While dogmatic in nature, the study suffers from a very narrow source base. Fortunately—or perhaps unfortunately—these missionaries wrote letters virtually every day, and it is a daunting task to read through them. The largest collection is in the ABCFM archives, although Riggs, Williamson, and others kept private collections that are also significant. Clemmons has mined these letters thoroughly. Nevertheless, the author has ignored government documents, such as the papers of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and other very important sources from the time period such as the Lawrence Taliaferro Papers or the Henry Hastings Sibley Papers. While the study is admittedly about missionaries, the subjects of their efforts—the Dakota people—are barely visible. Gift-giving is mentioned, but the nature of tribal reciprocity and its importance in tribal societies is completely ignored by the author.

For anyone interested in the trials, hardships, goals, and testimonials of western missionaries, this book has much to offer. The thesis of conflict is carried through to the end. Clemmons also incorporates some interesting gender history, as missionaries were discouraged—even forbidden—from going west without a wife. As the author suggests, female missionaries played a key role in preventing their men from succumbing to the solicitations of Native women (pp. 26–27). Overall, this well-written monograph will be of interest almost exclusively to scholars who study religion and missionary work, and to a lesser degree those readers interested in the early history of Minnesota.

GARY CLAYTON ANDERSON  
*University of Oklahoma*

TRISHA FRANZEN. *Anna Howard Shaw: The Work of Woman Suffrage*. (Women in American History.) Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2014. Pp. x, 263. Cloth \$97.00, paper \$30.00.

Biographers have intentions and none so forthright as when studying the lives of neglected, mistakenly characterized women worthies. In the case of Trisha Franzen’s biography of Anna Howard Shaw, the suffrage advocate and president of the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), the purpose is threefold. As Franzen writes in her lengthy introduction:

“With so rich a life Anna Howard Shaw deserves a major place in U.S. and women’s history. Yet in one of the many contradictions involving Shaw, this exceptional leader has been generally ignored, denigrated, or marginalized during the resurgence of women’s history” (p. 2). Thus the organizing questions driving this biography are first, why this “energetic, charismatic ‘odd woman out’” has been “transformed into a conservative ineffectual curmudgeon” (p. 5), second, how important Shaw was to the suffrage movement, and third, in a related historiographical concern, why the demotions of Shaw continued even after the resurgence of women’s history in the 1970s.

Granted that suffrage history has never taken its rightful place as a civil rights movement in American history, within that generic demotion Shaw has been neglected in comparison to the biographical attention that suffrage leaders such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, Lucy Stone, and Alice Paul have garnered. Even as an unavoidable presence in the suffrage movement, when she appears in the history books, Shaw is characterized as an ineffective leader. In the popular *Through Women’s Eyes: An American History with Documents* (2005) by Ellen Carol DuBois and Lynn Dumenil, Shaw is mentioned only once for her suffrage work and, as is often the case, critically, for her inability to shift from the endless state campaigns to the national one that eventually triumphed in the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment.

Franzen’s exceptionally well-researched biography will do much to revive interest in Shaw, even if it is not dispositive on the matter of Shaw’s contributions especially during her second presidency of the NAWSA. This meticulous study begins with Shaw’s early years. Franzen first discusses Shaw’s experiences on an impoverished Michigan farm and then her extraordinary efforts to educate herself as a minister and a physician. It continues chronologically through her suffrage years when Shaw described herself as nothing if not a suffrage worker. One of the strengths of Franzen’s biography is her emphasis on Shaw as a working woman, an example of the new autonomous woman of the late nineteenth century who unlike many in the elite ranks of the suffrage movement needed a salary. The necessity of earning a salary forced suffrage leaders to transform their association from one of volunteers to an organization of professionals; it also forced Shaw to rely on the largesse of M. Carey Thomas and Mary Garrett. An additional theme, along with Franzen’s emphasis on the often neglected theme of racism in the movement, is Shaw’s powerful oratory, which provided an enduring means of financial support as well as an important source of suffrage propaganda.

Franzen is fair-minded in her treatment of Shaw’s crucial presidencies of the NAWSA, providing evidence both to rebut and to support the familiar charge that Shaw did little during a period generally characterized as the doldrums of the suffrage movement. The author agrees that Carrie Chapman Catt, who once called her competitor for the presidency “a little,



humped, yellow faced, sour-looking woman,” was a better organizer than Shaw (p. 242, n. 4). As others in the suffrage movement moved toward lobbying the U.S. Congress, Shaw still supported the Shafroth Amendment, which would have provided a distracting and time-consuming system of state referendums on suffrage. Indeed throughout, the author provides countervailing evidence of Shaw’s proficiency as president, especially during her first presidency from 1904–1908. Furthermore, Franzen agrees that Shaw was not skilled as a peacemaker. But like her subject, Franzen does not give much credence to Alice Paul’s more radical approach or the powerful criticisms the members of the National Women’s Party made of what they considered Shaw’s feckless conservatism.

*Anna Howard Shaw: The Work of Woman Suffrage* is a specialist’s book, requiring some background in women’s history, if, for example, the material on Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s *The Woman’s Bible* (1895, 1898) or language like “gender-variant,” “heteropatriarchy,” “hegemonic,” or “romantic dyad,” the latter referring to Shaw’s long relationship with Lucy Anthony, are to be understood. The writing, though straightforward, is hardly supple; for example, we learn that “1893 proceeded into 1894 and 1895” (p. 81) and “women gave it their all” (p. 71). And only suffrage historians will appreciate the careful but numbing convention-by-convention description of the NAWSA meetings in the latter chapters of the book.

Overall this is a thoughtful addition to our understanding of an important figure in the suffrage movement. It will do what its author intends: force all students of women’s history to reevaluate Anna Howard Shaw as well as the clichéd doldrums of the movement.

JEAN H. BAKER  
Goucher College

NIKKI M. TAYLOR. *America’s First Black Socialist: The Radical Life of Peter H. Clark*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2013. Pp. 308. \$40.00.

Most biographers have to contend with the challenge of managing an overabundance of archival and secondary material to reconstruct the lives of their noteworthy subjects. In other cases, biographers have to work from a shortage of both. This is what Nikki M. Taylor faced in providing the first book-length biography of Peter H. Clark, but the result is a thorough portrait of a complex man.

But who was Peter H. Clark? Before he became the first black American member of the Workingmen’s Party of the United States, or the Socialist Labor Party, Clark (1829–1925) was a Cincinnati-born educator, orator, political activist, writer, and editor who was an active participant in the most significant black political movements (antislavery, civil rights, emigration, and public education) and debates (black nationalism vs. integration, militancy vs. persuasion, industrial vs. liberal arts education, and entrepreneurial vs. cooperative business ventures) of the mid- to late nineteenth cen-

tury. If there was a platform or podium in Ohio or elsewhere where matters concerning blacks were being discussed in that era, Peter H. Clark was certainly among the contributors.

So why, then, have the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries been so unkind to the memory of such a highly respected and solicited figure of the nineteenth century? Taylor suggests that Frederick Douglass was, in part, the reason: he was even more active politically than Clark and he was born a slave, an experience that, to some, made his life a more “authentically” black one than that of a third-generation free black man such as Clark. But there is another reason besides Douglass: Clark was a political maverick who called on blacks to vote for individual, local candidates, not the straight Republican Party ticket. Even before Clark became a member of the Workingmen’s Party, he was a fierce critic of the party of Abraham Lincoln for taking the black vote for granted without enacting civil rights legislation or awarding blacks political appointments. “We do not demand,” Clark declared in his 1873 Emancipation Day speech, “any offices on the ground of color; but we do demand that color not be a bar to office; that the political rights of the colored man shall not be exhausted when he has cast his ballot” (p. 125). So incensed was he by the Republican Party’s slighting of blacks generally and himself personally, that he counseled blacks to be open to voting for even Democratic candidates, an unthinkable proposition for most given the party’s history in both the slave and post-emancipation South. Clark would eventually do the unthinkable and follow his own advice.

However, before Clark took that unorthodox step, he had taken an even more unorthodox one when he became a member of the Workingmen’s Party in 1876. Yet, as Taylor suggests, that decision was not surprising in light of Clark’s background. Hiram S. Gilmore, the founder of the high school that Clark attended, was a benefactor of socialist causes, including a “utopian” community of which Clark’s aunt and uncle were members. Many of these “communitarians” and “spiritualists” were also members of the Unitarian church whose services Clark began to attend in the 1850s. And finally, after the aborted revolutions of 1848 in Central and Western Europe, Cincinnati became the place of exile for thousands of German leftists and liberals fleeing conservative backlash. Of the different branches of socialism, Taylor maintains that Clark was a Lassalleian in that he advocated the use of the ballot to achieve, among other goals, the nationalization of the most indispensable resources, industries, and banks.

Yet, despite his passionate condemnation of capital and his defense of wage earners generally following the Panic of 1873, Clark was officially a socialist for only three years, and during that period he did not completely sever ties with the Republican Party. Moreover, after failing to secure the appointments that he sought from the Garfield administration, he not only bolted the party and became a Democrat, but he also at one time conspired with Cincinnati police and Democratic Party

officials to suppress the black Republican vote. These facts raise some important questions about Clark: Is it appropriate to consider him “America’s first black socialist” as Taylor and others before her have labeled him, when his adherence to socialism was so short-lived? And does it matter that he went from identifying as a socialist to a Democrat, despite that party’s opposition to black advancement, within three years?

However, these are minor questions when set against Taylor’s thoughtful and fascinating biography, which has the additional merit of being a useful introduction to American political history of the latter half of the nineteenth century.

CHRISTOPHER A. MCAULEY

*University of California, Santa Barbara*

ANNETTE G. AUBERT. *The German Roots of Nineteenth-Century American Theology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. xii, 402. \$74.00.

In *The German Roots of Nineteenth-Century American Theology*, Annette G. Aubert argues that American Reformed theology underwent significant transformations in the nineteenth century. While scholars have acknowledged the influence of Scottish Common Sense Realism and Baconian science, Aubert contends that the influence of German theology has been neglected. She addresses this gap by examining the ways in which Charles Hodge of Princeton Theological Seminary and Emanuel Vogel Gerhart of Mercersburg Theological Seminary selectively appropriated nineteenth-century German theological ideas in their writings. In particular, she focuses on the ways in which German ideas affected their theological method and their conceptions of the atonement.

Aubert begins by exploring the ideas of Friedrich Schleiermacher and the diverse group of German mediating theologians he influenced, such as Carl Christian Ullmann, Friedrich August Gottreu Tholuck, Karl Rudolf Hagenbach, and Isaak August Dorner. Responding to contemporary challenges to the validity of theology, such as historicism, biblical criticism, romanticism, and skepticism, they sought to modify theology in order to make it viable in the modern world. To that end, they asserted that the basis of theology was religious experience. The truth of theology was not found in abstract propositional truth claims but in the Christian life. Furthermore, theology was not a set of unchanging dogmatic truths. Rather, it advanced, progressed, and developed along with fields such as philosophy and the natural sciences. They also revised the traditional notion of the atonement. The redeeming act of Christ was not to be found in his death and resurrection but in his incarnation. In the incarnation, humanity achieves a union with the divine, or *theosis*. Christ provides satisfaction as the perfect man.

Gerhart remains an obscure and understudied figure. However, he was the first to write a systematic theology and definitive summary of “Mercersburg theology” in his *Institutes of Christian Religion* (1894). Aubert should

be commended for shedding light on this neglected but important figure. She clearly demonstrates that Gerhart was deeply influenced by the mediating theologians. For example, “Gerhart insisted that each new age of the church must change ‘the universal truth in a mould of its own’” (p. 101). Advocating a subjective approach, adapted to the modern world, Gerhart believed that dogma has authority to the extent that it authenticates itself to the Christian consciousness. Christ, rather than the Bible, is the primary source of revelation. Gerhart also adopted mediating theology’s understanding of the atonement. Through the incarnation, Christ not only provides forgiveness for sin but the Christian enters into a closer union with God than he had before the fall. Gerhart’s atonement theology thus includes aspects of deification.

Hodge, in contrast, the stalwart defender of Reformed conservative thought, was predictably far less amenable to and receptive of the ideas of Schleiermacher and the mediating theologians. He condemned mediating theology as “Christian only in name” (p. 159). He was, however, interested in the ideas of the conservative German theologian Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg, who was decidedly not a mediating theologian.

In Hengstenberg, Hodge found an erudite German theologian who reaffirmed what Hodge already believed. “Hengstenberg was ‘orthodox’ in a manner very similar to Hodge,” and they both aimed to “vindicate orthodox theology” and the “inerrancy of Scripture.” They were not “originator[s] of new ideas, but . . . skillful advocate[s] of old ones” (p. 162). Both believed that the source of theological truth is Scripture, not the life of Christ or the experience of the Christian. Hengstenberg summed up his position clearly: “‘To us the scriptures are the word of God, which we do not judge, but by which we are judged, whence we derive our knowledge’” (p. 163). Hodge is well known for his stress on the centrality of Scripture and defense of Reformed theology. Aubert argues that his position was reinforced by his critical analysis of mediating theology and the influence of Hengstenberg, who was trying to defend traditional orthodoxy. Mediating theology, skeptics, and rationalists compelled Hodge to stress the proper foundation of theology.

Hodge was not merely restating sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Calvinist theology. He also argued that theology followed the same methodology as science, thus giving credibility, certainty, and objectivity to theological truths. He used the ideas of Francis Bacon and Arnold Guyot, but he also selectively used the ideas of the mediating theologian Tholuck, who advocated a scientific and inductive approach to theology. Hodge believed that theology, like the natural sciences, merely arranged and presented evidence. However, Hodge’s understanding of the close relationship between science and theology is radically different from that of Gerhart and Ullman. They believed that theology needed to progress and evolve, and it needed to be in agreement with modern philosophical views. Hodge,



however, used science to advocate for an unchanging notion of theology that was independent from philosophical speculations that were alien to the Scriptures.

Aubert demonstrates that Gerhart and Hodge were keenly attentive to German theological developments. Yet, while the influence of the mediating theologians on Gerhart is both profound and undeniable, the case of Hodge is not so clear. This is not to say that there was no effect. But Hodge was committed to maintaining the basic theological principles of John Calvin and Francis Turretin. For example, in the case of the influence of Hengstenberg, Aubert writes that "Hodge's existing views and doctrines . . . were reinforced and strengthened" (p. 162). Hodge selectively appropriated from the Germans tools to strengthen conclusions he was already committed to preserving. One could ask if Hodge had never encountered the Germans, would his theology be terribly different. I am also left wanting more historical context. How were these German-inflected ideas received by Gerhart and Hodge's respective institutions and denominations, or by Christians in America? Now that we know that Gerhart and Hodge were influenced by German ideas, does that alter the way we understand the history of Christianity in America? This book does not tell us.

These last criticisms aside, *The German Roots of Nineteenth-Century American Theology* is an excellent book and well worth reading. The research is meticulous, and like her subjects, Aubert is clearly well-versed in both the American and German sources. Her work enriches our understanding of the transatlantic nature of theology in America.

MICHAEL J. LEE  
Eastern University

PETER ADAMS. *Politics, Faith, and the Making of American Judaism*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014. Pp. x, 207. Cloth \$70.00, paper \$29.95, e-book \$29.95.

In *Politics, Faith, and the Making of American Judaism*, Peter Adams ventures onto very familiar terrain for students of the history of the American Jewish experience. He seeks to show how, from the Civil War era through the end of the nineteenth century, the leaders of American Judaism, both Reform and Orthodox, began to fret over rising antisemitism. That anxiety over the manifestation of Jew hatred in the United States, as Adams depicts it, began with Ulysses S. Grant's General Order No. 11, which sought to expel the small number of Jews who lived in Kentucky, an area recently brought under the administration of the United States Army. Although relatively few Jews lived there and President Abraham Lincoln swiftly rescinded the order, it served as a dreaded harbinger of bad times yet to come for Jews of the United States.

In their fear that antisemitism would rear its head in the U.S., Jewish communal leaders—mainly rabbis in this book—adopted two strategies, although Adams does not do a particularly effective job in linking them.

On the one hand, Adams claims that this act, which in fact had absolutely no consequences in and of itself, brought about the birth of Jewish politics in the United States. The Jewish communal elite hoped to secure the place of the Jews in America, and therefore recognized that they could not be aloof from the hurly-burly of partisan politics. They considered it crucial to forge a Jewish vote. In that same vein they embarked on a series of endeavors to create nationally based, centralized, and unified communal bodies that could coordinate not just political action but also the fight against antisemitism.

On the other hand, Adams claims that efforts toward the reform of Judaism, both in terms of the creation of a movement or denomination known as Reform, as well as the smaller or larger reforms that crept into nearly every synagogue then in existence in America, emerged out of fear of antisemitism. Jews, Adams insists, looked for ways to shade their differences from the white, Protestant majority whose goodwill they needed in order to plant themselves comfortably in their new American homes.

Adams posits that the struggle over antisemitism launched by the Grant affair propelled into existence a new cadre of Jewish leaders: men—and sadly only men—who had imbibed American values and understood what America demanded of them. They hoped to unite the scattered, disorganized, and contentious Jewish populations that had formed in nearly every state of the Union by the time of the Civil War. They worked ceaselessly to erase any vestiges of Jewish difference and any markers of the Jews' non-native origins, since in fact the vast majority hailed from the streams of immigrants coming from Central and Eastern Europe.

The book's narrative goes into the last years of the nineteenth century as the immigration question became particularly salient for Americans, American Jews, and the Jews of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires who joined the mass European migration to the United States. Adams however does not justify ending where he did and could easily have moved into the first decades of the twentieth century to chart the creation of the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League, and the American Jewish Congress, the "big three" of the Jewish defense infrastructure.

This book covers a well-known era and focuses on developments so thoroughly written about in the literature that it remains unclear as to whether the author has added anything new. Adams not only trods a familiar path, but he also shows very little immersion in the primary sources. Nor does he show much cognizance of any recent analytic innovations. He uses no sources other than those in English, which limits his access to the words of the men he is studying, many of whom wrote in German. Furthermore, no women populate this book. The National Council of Jewish Women founded in 1893 could offer him a lens through which to consider the subjects at hand. Likewise, he makes blanket statements that flatten and generalize the subject's complexity, one which scholars previously have

sought to show. Terms that Adams uses uncritically, such as “assimilation,” “Americanization,” the “German Jews,” and the “Russian Jews,” have been found to be analytically wanting, while much of the best scholarship since the 1960s has discounted the role of the pogroms in stimulating the migration from Eastern Europe, a phenomenon that Adams accepts as accurate. Additionally, the book lacks a conclusion, which may reflect its overly ambitious scope at the same time that it reveals how the book in actuality offers no new interventions into the many subjects it claims to cover.

HASIA R. DINER  
New York University

KATHLEEN M. HILLIARD. *Masters, Slaves, and Exchange: Power's Purchase in the Old South*. (Cambridge Studies on the American South.) New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Pp. xiii, 217. \$27.99.

Eugene Genovese's central thesis, that paternalism best describes the social relations in the pre-capitalist slave South, receives renewed support and elaboration in this timely book. While there are numerous recent scholars emphasizing the capitalist nature of slavery, Kathleen M. Hilliard's work suggests that the debate is far from decided. Her work does a wonderful job of showing how the accommodation and resistance that Genovese posits was at the heart of the master/slave relationship took place in the context of a burgeoning informal/underground/illicit economy in consumer goods that masters and slaves increasingly used to construct their social relations and power. By mixing the field of consumption studies with the history of enslavement in the southeastern antebellum South, Hilliard makes an important contribution to the field.

The chapters are thematically organized, dealing with different elements of consumption in plantation economies. Chapter 1, “Money and Moralism,” outlines planter views of slave consumption, and generally argues that masters felt it was their paternalist duty to guide their slaves toward prudent and moral consumption, although achieving this was a never-ending and frustrating task for them. Chapter 2, “Slaves and Spending,” is perhaps Hilliard's best, as it details how enslaved people learned consumer skills such as numeracy, market pricing, and credit negotiations, all in order not simply to provide a means of survival, but to mark themselves off as distinct within the slave community. Chapter 3, “Servants Served,” extends this analysis by outlining the role of small-town stores in the slaves' economy. With money earned from their productive nighttime work, many chose to buy ready-made clothing and other consumer goods. Hilliard's use of store records to reveal slaves' consumer activities and consciousness, as well as their struggles with the master class, is a significant contribution. Chapter 4 explores black markets in stolen goods, which created a form of illicit consumption in the slave quarters. This chapter clearly shows the limits of the planter paternalist designs, as planters were constantly devising new ways to

try to curb theft and illicit sales. The paternalist theme is perhaps most convincingly shown in chapter 5, “Gilt Chains,” which illustrates how planters' Christmas gift-giving further fueled the circulation of money and goods on plantations while also binding master and slave in mutual obligation. The final chapter, “The Choice,” demonstrates how consumption could include self-purchase; but even here masters were most likely to manumit slaves with whom paternalistic bonds were strong.

The book is deeply researched, creatively argued, and will make a significant impact, especially in its use of consumption as a way to analyze the master/slave relationship. But the weaknesses here are notable, too. First, perhaps because of the fragmentary source base, the book is written in a way that is abstracted from the social geography of the region under study, so readers get little sense of how the arguments here intersected with plantation crop regimes, urban/rural economies, gender roles in the slave community, or changes in the broader economy. Hilliard utilizes many wonderful sources, but the big-picture contextual elements that can help sustain a narrative are sometimes missing. Second, while much of Hilliard's adaptation of Genovese's framework works well, particularly in regard to the accommodation/resistance dialectic that infused the master/slave relationship, I remained unconvinced that paternalism was the more important theme than capitalism, or modernization as Hilliard would have it. Hilliard does not dispute the notion that the South was modernizing, only quarrelling with “[r]anks of modernizationist scholars” who have “pitt[ed] their interpretations at paternalism's antagonistic pole” (p. 13). Much of the book, however, is about how money-minded black and white southerners were becoming, how consumer-oriented they were becoming, and how that led to a range of tensions (see chap. 4) between masters and slaves. Clearly the market could corrode paternalism, and while Hilliard's argument is convincing in the instances regarding how market behavior could bind master and slave, her decision to fold market values into paternalism seemed strained.

These comments suggest a great quality of this book: it is controversial. While the historiography of capitalism has focused a lot on slavery of late, and provides many counterexamples to the ones illustrated in this book, Hilliard's vigorous analysis of the economy of paternalism will make it a much discussed text among historians. It is a significant achievement.

THOMAS C. BUCHANAN  
University of Adelaide

JOHN F. KVACH. *De Bow's Review: The Antebellum Vision of a New South*. (New Directions in Southern History.) Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2013. Pp. 270. \$50.00.

John F. Kvach's biography of James Dunwoody Brownson (J. D. B.) De Bow, perhaps the best-known antebellum booster of southern industrialization, is a timely



contribution to the growing literature on the modernity of the pre-Civil War South. Although historians frequently use De Bow's writings as sources for exploring the proslavery path to a modern economy, more than 50 years have passed since the last publication of a De Bow biography. Since then historians have called into question a long-held interpretation of the slave South as an economically backward, tradition-bound region out of step with the modernizing trends of the nineteenth century. Building on this work, Kvach provides a much-needed account of De Bow's role in propounding the compatibility of slavery with the growth of cities and industry.

The book persuasively shows that De Bow, who began writing in the 1840s, promoted a vision of industrial progress and economic diversification for his region that anticipated many of the themes advocated by late-nineteenth-century boosters of a "New South." Kvach's work also stands out for its detailed analysis of the readership of *De Bow's Review*, the subject's most successful publishing venture. An impressive appendix on the readers of the review shows that they were among the wealthiest in southern society, invested in slaves, plantations, and industry, and they tended to be much more urban than the general population.

This readership data informs Kvach's argument that De Bow aimed his journal at proslavery entrepreneurs; that is, white southerners on the lookout for new investment opportunities, who were more cosmopolitan than the average southern white person and, simultaneously, deeply invested in slaveholding as an economic pursuit. Through a synergy between writer and reader, De Bow crafted an outlook that combined support for southern industrialization with the defense of slavery.

Politically De Bow started out as a supporter of John C. Calhoun. Both men shared a nominal attachment to the Democratic Party balanced by an interest in Whig economic policies that promoted infrastructural development. Like Calhoun, De Bow became increasingly skeptical of northern goodwill toward slavery. By the mid-1850s, when conflict over slavery's status in Kansas gave rise to the free-soil Republican Party in the North, De Bow identified with the militant fire-eater defense of slavery and advocated southern independence while denigrating abolitionists at every turn.

De Bow managed to make this political pivot compatible with southern industrialization by arguing for the importance of economic diversification as a spur to his section's self-sufficiency. In this outlook he joined other contemporaries like George Fitzhugh, Leonidas W. Spratt, and the boosters of the southern commercial conventions in which De Bow played a prominent role. Ironically, this emphasis on independence led De Bow to boost cotton, which produced enormous profits and gave the South leverage in international trade, at the expense of a more diversified regional agriculture.

The Civil War disrupted publication of the *Review*, which had been published in New Orleans until the city fell to Union forces in 1862. In 1864, De Bow managed to produce an issue of the *Review* wherein he reiterated

the rightness of the Confederate cause and southern economic independence. Between the end of the war and his death in 1867, De Bow acknowledged the error of secession and recanted his earlier optimism that cotton would drive economic growth.

Although Kvach says a lot about De Bow's support for slavery, he could do more to flesh out the details of De Bow's views on master-slave relations and industrial slavery. Readers learn plenty about De Bow's case for bringing railroads and factories to the South, but comparatively little about his specific advice on how to incorporate slave labor into those enterprises, or how practices like slave leasing and state-run policing of slaves might have helped the institution adapt to an urban future.

These gaps notwithstanding, Kvach's account of De Bow's life and writings has tremendous merit. Historians will especially appreciate Kvach's spadework in finding out about the *Review's* readers and connecting the content of the periodical to the concerns of its audience. This study should be read by anyone interested in understanding how slaveholders thought about their world and its future.

FRANK TOWERS  
University of Calgary

STEVE LONGENECKER. *Gettysburg Religion: Refinement, Diversity, and Race in the Antebellum and Civil War Border North*. (The North's Civil War.) New York: Fordham University Press, 2014. Pp. xiv, 246. \$45.00.

This volume posits that the religious life of the small town of Gettysburg in southern Pennsylvania exemplified national trends in microcosm. In particular, Steve Longenecker believes that the antebellum impulse toward refinement; denominational, ethnic, and racial diversity; and the experience of war illustrate larger truths about American religion in the nineteenth century. Although he promises that "[r]eligion among the memories of the Civil War in this famous but small place teaches big lessons about American life" (p. 6), much of the interpretation that follows is either well-known or strained.

There was a general trend toward respectability among many of Gettysburg's religious congregations in the antebellum period, and the town had some religious and racial diversity. Longenecker charts a change both in the furnishings of their meeting places and in the conduct of their worship services. While church architecture and furnishings became more ornate and genteel to reflect Victorian middle-class values, church services moved away from the emotionalism associated with camp meeting revivals. Gas lighting, cushioned pews, and the rural cemetery movement were all signs that a search for refinement was "pervasive in the spiritual life of this small town" (p. 69). There were individual variations, of course, on this trajectory, but the general movement seems well-established. It does not follow, however, as Longenecker concludes, that "when people went to church, they usually got refined rather

than reformed" (p. 38). Gettysburg's Dunker congregation self-consciously rejected sophistication, preferring a simpler life and simpler worship. The town's small African Methodist Episcopal Zion (AMEZ) congregation could not afford the trappings of gentility, even if they wanted them.

Longenecker's discussion of diversity strains to demonstrate the representativeness of Gettysburg, both of the border North and of the nation that America became. German-Americans and German immigrants gave Gettysburg ethnic variety, and the divisions among the Presbyterians, Lutherans, Reformed, and German pietistic sects like the Dunkers demonstrated the denominational heterogeneity of the antebellum North. The presence of a small Catholic parish and an AMEZ congregation further extended religious and racial variation.

Longenecker's conclusions from this diversity are perplexing. He points out that "[a]nti-Catholicism was rampant in Gettysburg" (p. 92). He also documents the success of the anti-immigrant, anti-Catholic American Party in the 1850s in southern Pennsylvania and notes that the Catholics were never considered for inclusion in the rural cemetery movement that resulted in the Evergreen Cemetery over which both sides fought in July 1863. Longenecker rightly points out that life was neither easy nor secure for African Americans on the very border of slavery: "Kidnappers, slave catchers, and racial violence afflicted Gettysburg" (p. 32). Despite these characterizations, Longenecker concludes optimistically and anachronistically that Gettysburg "foretold of a nation that would be ethnically and doctrinally complex and as a rule, with some big exceptions, tolerant" (p. 98). His conclusion about African American religion rings closer to the truth: "Black religion, independent but barely, was especially characteristic of the Border North and would soon be the national pattern for a long time" (p. 127).

Longenecker makes his best contribution in assessing the impact of the Battle of Gettysburg in July 1863 and the war in general on the town's religious life. The battle completely interrupted the churches of Gettysburg for a few days, and because most churches served as hospitals, "it would be several months before Gettysburg could have a 'Sunday'" in its normal sense (p. 154). By 1864, routine patterns had returned, and "the impact of the battle on local religion was barely discernible" (p. 157). Even here, however, Gettysburg does not seem representative. Host for a few days to an intense battle, Gettysburg experienced the war in very different ways than areas that never witnessed hostilities, areas that were occupied through much of the war, and areas that faced repeated, intensive fighting. Religious life in these areas was affected in a myriad of ways that do not resonate with Gettysburg's experiences.

In contrast, "four years of war had more lasting influence on broader religious patterns, most noticeably in the relationship between church and state" (p. 159). The religious life of Gettysburg became more identified with a nationalistic form of civil religion that celebrated

the triumph over slavery as a purging of evil. The jeremiad form of sermon provided a rationale for the slaughter and unified church and state in ways not familiar in the antebellum period, a pattern that does find resonance in other areas of the North and the South.

In concluding that "[r]efinement, diversity, and war in mid-nineteenth-century Gettysburg religion reveal existing national patterns and the future of America" (p. 175), and that "Gettysburg provides a foretaste of modernity" (p. 178), Longenecker's study overstates the town's representativeness and reads the past through the future of American religious life. However, it does succeed as a study of how a group of local religious communities experienced and responded to both an intensive battle and an extensive civil war.

DANIEL W. STOWELL

*Papers of Abraham Lincoln*

IAN BINNINGTON. *Confederate Visions: Nationalism, Symbolism, and the Imagined South in the Civil War*. (A Nation Divided: Studies in the Civil War Era.) Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013. Pp. ix, 198. \$39.50.

A quarter century has passed since Drew Gilpin Faust's *The Creation of Confederate Nationalism: Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South* (1988) presented the white South's campaign for nationhood as a cultural and ideological project no less than a military and political one. Faust's insight spurred a cluster of works that now includes Ian Binnington's book. To borrow the author's own formulation, his variation on this theme conveys "case-studies of certain important elements of the symbolic text of the ideology of the Confederate nation" (p. 15).

Binnington's exploration of symbol-making includes an opening chapter on the 1861 Confederate Constitution, two chapters on select works of southern literature (novels that anticipated a new southern republic before 1861 and then the *belles lettres* that celebrated the nation during war), and a closing chapter on the symbolism of martial heroes, especially as featured in front-cover woodcut engravings for the *Southern Illustrated News*. Familiar material is given a new slant in these four chapters, each of which conveys intriguing findings derived from broad research across Confederate print culture. The connecting thread is the notion of "Confederate Americanism" and its key tropes of the "Worthy Southron," the "Demon Yankee," and the "Silent Slave" (p. 3). A suggestive conclusion carries the story beyond Confederate defeat, with the "Silent Slave" giving way to a competing image of the "Feared African" (p. 147).

The book's most novel material appears in its central third chapter, which focuses on the iconography of Confederate Treasury issues. Here, Binnington brings the specialized field of Confederate numismatics into conversation with the conceptual framework provided by Eric Helleiner's *The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspective* (2003).



Among the real strengths of this chapter is the considerable visual material included (in contrast to the chapter on military portraiture, which unfortunately is not supported by any illustrations at all). In reproducing ten distinct Treasury Bills, Binnington combines a close reading of complex imagery with a consideration of parallel non-visual expressions of Confederate self-understanding. The idyllic scene depicted in the Confederate Treasury's first \$50 note is set beside Jefferson Davis's inaugural address, while a later \$2 note's "Personification of the South Striking down Union" is considered in light of nationalist mixed messages of early 1862. The close readings are imaginative, though not altogether persuasive. This is especially the case when Binnington takes up the important question of how African American slaves were depicted on the new nation's most important circulating medium.

Binnington takes issue with two recent online exhibitions that affirm slavery's central importance in Confederate financial iconography. "Beyond Face Value: Depictions of Slavery in Confederate Currency" was mounted a decade and a half ago by the United States Civil War Center at Louisiana State University; its attention to plantation labor scenes on paper money was echoed by "Confederate Currency: The Color of Money—Depictions of Slavery in Confederate and Southern States Currency," curated just a short time later by the College of Charleston's Avery Research Center for African American History and Culture. Binnington contends that the recurrence of African American figures in these widely publicized projects results from their inclusion on state and local paper money (what he terms "Confederate-era currency" [p. 74]). By narrowing his own consideration to those 51 illustrated instruments issued by the Confederate Treasury Department *per se*, Binnington reaches a different conclusion, and on this basis suggests a more complicated relationship between slavery and the self-understanding and self-presentation of those administering the wartime South's central government.

Binnington's knack for close readings and careful qualifications give way to assertions that, in the case of money, neglect the wider picture and move beyond the evidence he presents. He notes the disappearance after April 1862 of slave figures from Confederate government currency while not addressing whether there was also a drop in "Confederate-era" designs after this date. He takes the sharp shift in this more narrow category as "a manifestation of the emerging fear among leading Southern politicians that slavery was a double-edged sword," which resulted from "[a] very real class schism" that would be exacerbated by "the infamous Twenty Negro Law" (p. 85). While plausible, this reading is not supported by a consideration of who was in charge of Confederate currency design or whether their choices were informed by slavery-related class conflict. Across the best parts of this book, Binnington takes some pains to establish how nationalist imagery was the work of specific nationalist image-makers. In the case of money,

designers, and any other period commentators on monetary imagery, are as silent as the slaves they depict.

ROBERT E. BONNER  
Dartmouth College

WILLIAM A. BLAIR. *With Malice toward Some: Treason and Loyalty in the Civil War Era*. (The Littlefield History of the Civil War Era.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014. Pp. 419. \$40.00.

Vice President Andrew Johnson loved to talk about the hanging of rebel traitors. It was his "favorite theme" of conversation, according to Union General Carl Christian Schurz. Johnson's disdain for large slaveholders was well-known, and his belief that secession was treasonous led Schurz to fear that "if this man ever came into power, the face of the country would soon bristle with gibbets, and foreign lands swarm with fugitives from the avenging sword of the Republic." (Schurz, *The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz* [1907], p. 96) A Forty-Eighter, Schurz had every reason to be apprehensive. The failed revolutions in Europe from which he fled resulted in the imprisonment or execution of thousands. Yet Johnson's leniency surprised and disappointed Schurz who, despite exile from his native Germany, nonetheless lamented that rebel southerners had gotten off too easily and feared the consequences of Johnson's generous amnesty policy.

William A. Blair takes up the question of why the United States did not follow the punitive path of other nations who faced similar civil upheavals in the mid-nineteenth century. Although Blair believes that secession fit squarely within the Constitution's definition of treason, *With Malice toward Some: Treason and Loyalty in the Civil War Era* seeks to understand Americans' changing conceptions of disloyalty and their implications for how the Civil War was waged as well as how the peace was established afterward. Blair's focus moves from the halls of Congress and the White House to the streets and homes of ordinary Americans as they wrestled with the everyday, lived realities of war in a democratic nation. Unlike those European powers whose revolutions preceded the American Civil War, the United States' historical and legal commitments to free speech and assembly made the policing of individual loyalty a tricky endeavor. Blair has managed to capture both the drama and difficulty of this enterprise in new and important ways.

The book is organized thematically. Chapters on the ideological and constitutional meanings of treason before the war are followed by an investigation into the transatlantic roots of American ideas of treason, the creation of the Provost Marshal (PM) General's Bureau, the policing of disloyalty in Union-occupied areas of the South as well as the North, and the debates over the terms of surrender and Reconstruction. Of these, the chapter on the confusing and contradictory role of the PM is perhaps the most noteworthy in the way it illustrates Blair's central argument: "[p]opular understandings of treason, not legal definitions in civil courts,

guided actions by Union functionaries, both high and low, throughout the Union and Confederacy" (p. 12). Although its existence is often cited, particularly when discussing the enforcement of the draft, historians of the Civil War have neglected to explain the formation and structure of this institution, and Blair's painstaking unraveling of the PM's overlapping jurisdiction and personnel reveals the likely reason why. Blair explains that there was not one but rather three different types of PM agents at work in any given location during the Civil War. There were army PMs, effectively military police, who oversaw infractions within the ranks, such as drinking and desertion. They traveled with the army and had no fixed jurisdiction. Then there were local or civil PMs who oversaw a fixed geographical location such as a town or city. These agents were often civilians appointed by military commanders and were responsible for policing disloyalty among the civilian population. The third type of PM existed at the departmental level of the Army and ostensibly oversaw the other two units. Blair cautions that while the distinction between these three levels may seem clear on paper, in actuality their duties and jurisdictions overlapped, resulting in considerable confusion in the day-to-day policing of loyalty. Thus, while previous historians have understood the PM as an example of the increasing power of the centralized state, Blair argues, "state and local power remained in play and mitigated the reach of national agents in certain communities" (pp. 100–101).

The importance of local people and politics in the construction of national policy is the signal contribution of this book. Blair persuasively argues that historians' narrow focus on Abraham Lincoln's prosecution of dissidents like Ohio congressman Clement Vallandigham has neglected the ways that local agents, such as those civilian PMs, shaped Washington's views of what constituted treason. Civilian arrests and prosecutions often preceded and sometimes flew in the face of official directives, resulting in the formation of a piecemeal, flying-by-the-seat-of-their-pants approach to disloyalty that belies the conventional narrative of an over-reaching, potentially despotic executive office hell bent on subverting the Constitution.

Despite this significant contribution, Blair's answer to the original question posed by Schurz's observation about European repression in the wake of civil unrest leaves this reader unsatisfied. In the end, the familiar explanation of a lack of political will coupled with a rush toward reconciliation accounts for the lack of gibbets in the postwar United States. That conclusion seems somehow disconnected from the rest of Blair's analysis about confusion and conflict; for while most people seemed to agree that secession was treasonous, few believed it should be punished with extensive prison sentences or death. That such consensus emerged so quickly from such divisive politics is astounding and deserves further consideration. Which is to say, *With Malice toward Some*, nonetheless, succeeds in laying the

foundation for future studies of treason and disloyalty in the Civil War era and beyond.

CAROLE EMBERTON

*State University of New York at Buffalo*

MICHAEL C. C. ADAMS. *Living Hell: The Dark Side of the Civil War*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. Pp. xi, 292. \$29.95.

*Living Hell: The Dark Side of the Civil War* presents the U.S. Civil War as a chronicle of misery. For those readers who continue to labor under the delusion that the Civil War was a gentleman's conflict or a restrained brother's war, this book serves as a sharp rebuke. But few such readers exist at this point and those that do are unlikely to pick up a university press book featuring a grim photograph of a dead soldier on its cover. Most academic readers will likely sympathize with Michael C. C. Adams's broad purpose in *Living Hell*: to capture the dirty, bloody, and traumatic nature of the Civil War. Few scholars today have any truck with those who romanticize slavery or secession, though most celebrate the outcomes of the Civil War, even with the limits that accompanied emancipation and reunion. But Adams rejects even the moral accomplishments of the war. His ultimate purpose is to disabuse Americans of their faith in war itself, and what better way than by taking aim at that most important of national turning points? Many readers (including this one) may see this is a worthy goal, but such a tendentious purpose makes poor history.

In cogent, clearly written chapters, Adams covers the process of soldiering, from enlistment to camp to battles, as well the experience of southern civilians exposed to Union invasion and occupation. For sources, he draws upon the published diaries and letters of participants along with a handful of secondary sources (the latter serve as resources for material; he does not engage with historiographical arguments in a systematic way). The story he tells is well constructed but already well-known. Adams describes camp life, marching, and battles, focusing exclusively on the deprivations, illnesses, and horror that awaited the young men carried into war. These sections are vivid and graphically characterized with well-chosen quotes. But rather than analyze such material or place it in a context that might help account for soldiers' perseverance (to say nothing of the enthusiasm some displayed), Adams lets the sources stand on their own. In some cases, he ignores countervailing evidence of charity, restraint, and humanity that surprisingly but persistently asserted itself throughout the conflict. The cumulative result of the narrative suggests the madness of war. Without any context—intellectual, religious, or political—the reader is left confronting historical behavior that appears irrational. But as we know from our own lives, rationality is flexible and dynamic. The true tragedy of history lies in those actions people make with deliberate intentions without being able to foresee the often terrible consequences.



One of Adams's major critiques of Civil War historians is their refusal to assess the psychological impact of battle on soldiers and their families. He is correct that this represents a lacunae in the field, though not one as deep as he asserts. James Marten, David Silkenat, Diane Miller Sommerville, and other scholars have begun probing the various ways that nineteenth-century Americans responded to the traumas of the war. Importantly, their research uses contemporary terms and frameworks to explain both the successes and failures. Adams, in contrast, seems intent only on condemning the prevailing frameworks of manhood, honor, and courage that structured most responses to the obvious psychological damage wrought by battle. Adams's approach leaves readers with no alternative but to pity those people who did not understand what was happening to them. Clearly, modern psychological theory and modern research regarding war's victims can benefit historians seeking to explain the past, but our first obligation is to explain how historical actors understood the world in their own terms. There are a number of scholars now thinking seriously about how the war's participants regarded the violence and death in which they were immersed. Those studies will hopefully explain rather than merely chronicle the bloodshed and destruction Americans created. As a society all too frequently at war, we would do well to heed Adams's warning about romanticizing military conflict. But demonizing it misleads people as well. A more useful account of the terror and chaos the Civil War engendered must root itself in particular times and places to show how even loving and peaceful people could bring themselves to commit such horrible acts.

AARON SHEEHAN-DEAN  
Louisiana State University

WENDY HAMAND VENET. *A Changing Wind: Commerce and Conflict in Civil War Atlanta*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2014. Pp. x, 280. \$30.00.

With her new history of Civil War Atlanta, Wendy Hamand Venet gives readers the most fully realized portrait of the fledgling city to date. This is, perhaps, unusually important for a city which, Venet notes, retains so few physical vestiges of its Confederate past. But the true measure of her accomplishment is that she has produced a brisk, spirited account that simultaneously manages to be comprehensive. It is difficult to say exactly how she does this, but surely two keys are her lucid prose and extensive archival research.

Civil War Atlanta is an especially apt topic for a historian interested in the breadth of experience, due to the sheer density of rare or exceptional historic processes and events taking place in so compact a space and time. While not limiting her scope, Venet concentrates her efforts on four of these. First is the development of Atlanta as a regional center, which it remains today. The second is the emergence of a class of New South-type business leaders who profited from the war and an increasingly centralized and intrusive Confed-

erate government at whose interference they bristled. She examines the impact of Atlanta's becoming a "city of women" (p. 4) as virtually all able-bodied white men were mobilized to the war front. The ways in which urban slaves used wartime conditions to win new rights and privileges for themselves, thereby testing the limits of slavery, constitutes the last of Venet's central themes.

To focus on central themes, though, may be to soft-pedal the wealth of detail the author packs into this not-quite-slender volume. From the importance of the wagon trade to antebellum Atlanta to cavalryman John Hunt Morgan's status as a beau ideal for white Atlanta women to the widespread looting visited on local businesses by retreating Confederate soldiers, *A Changing Wind: Commerce and Conflict in Civil War Atlanta* overflows with telling details that make the wartime city feel real. The source of this detail is the author's use of archival collections throughout the South. Despite using contemporaries' words to tell her story in almost every paragraph, Venet resists any impulse to use long block quotes, which helps the narrative flow. Adding to the tactility of the city, at the book's center are ten pages of pictures and photographs of the people and places of Civil War Atlanta.

Beyond bringing the city to life, Venet explores important questions posed by wartime southern cities like Atlanta and Richmond, in which the tension between slavery and modernity was heightened, depending on one's view of the question, nearly or all the way to a breaking point. Although urbanization and war precipitated no servile insurrection in the usual sense, it was clear that many slaves took advantage of their new circumstances by effectively creating a new liminal status for themselves that, while not completely free, was not wholly enslaved either. This was seen in bondsmen operating independent businesses and increasing incidences of "insolence" and "disorderly conduct" (p. 100). And of course, other slaves took advantage of the chaos occasioned by urbanization and a rapidly approaching war front to slip the chains of bondage altogether. Wartime privation also had the effect of unleashing the kind of open class fissures that were rare in the antebellum South. These fissures expressed themselves most notably in "bread riots" (in reality, few of the incidents characterized thusly warranted the label) across the urban South. Atlanta was not immune to this type of flare-up as, in the spring of 1863, a gang of impoverished women attempted to force a butcher to change his bacon price at gunpoint.

As vivid and compelling as Venet's Atlanta is on the page, one may wish for a marginally less descriptive, more thesis-driven account as the book nears its conclusion. The book's final chapters capably recount, respectively, the city's recovery in the immediate postwar years and how Atlanta chose to remember (and not to remember) its Confederate past. And yet there is not much attempt to explain how and why the city emerged from the wartime devastation, almost immediately, as a New South dynamo. This is admittedly criticizing the

author for not writing a different book and, as such, patently unfair. But given how good *A Changing Wind* is, one may be forgiven the feeling that an opportunity has been missed. In her prologue, Venet alludes to the “‘Atlanta spirit,’” which she defines as “the desire of its people to move forward, to compete, to endure, and to rebuild” (p. 3). Certainly given the city’s lack of natural advantages, wartime ruin, and recent rise to prominence—it was a town of scarcely 2,000 people as late as 1850—it was not the most logical candidate to emerge as the region’s premier economic engine, and more may have been made regarding how the war shaped the Atlanta spirit that was to carry the city forward.

CHAD MORGAN

*North Carolina Central University*

DAVID WILLIAMS. *I Freed Myself: African American Self-Emancipation in the Civil War Era*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Pp. x, 266. \$27.99.

In a well-researched and cogently argued study of emancipation, David Williams reconsiders the question that James M. McPherson and Ira Berlin debated almost 20 years ago: “Who Freed the Slaves?” Focusing on the African American struggle for freedom in the Civil War era, he draws on a wide range of primary sources, including Works Progress Administration interviews with former slaves, slave narratives and biographies, nineteenth-century newspapers and pamphlets, antislavery reports, political and military correspondence, speeches, government records, and private letters, as well as a wealth of secondary literature on African American and Civil War history. Stressing black agency, Williams challenges views portraying Abraham Lincoln as the “Great Emancipator” and asserts “that the true authorship of African American freedom” came not from the “top of American society” but from enslaved blacks, who, as W. E. B. Du Bois claimed, invoked a “‘general strike’” that undermined the Confederacy (p. 20).

Williams juxtaposes African Americans’ “unrelenting resistance to slavery” (p. 16) against Lincoln’s support of the proposed Corwin Amendment that would have guaranteed slaveholders’ rights to their human property, the Crittenden-Johnson Resolution that defined the North’s war aim as the preservation of the Union, compensation to slaveholders for emancipating slaves, colonization of free blacks, and the minimal readmission requirements for seceded states in the 16th president’s Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction. Documenting a veritable groundswell of black resistance from 1850 onward, notably increased slave flight to the northern states, Canada, and Mexico, higher incidence of such slave crimes as arson, theft, murder, and vandalism of planter property, and numerous slave rebellions, Williams argues enslaved blacks “seized what liberties they could,” and drew the entire nation into their freedom struggle (p. 17). He describes blacks’ strategic resistance at key times, notably during the 1860 election campaign and immediately after the

preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, and discusses how such resistance ignited fear among southern slaveholders and many racist northern whites.

Williams contrasts blacks’ striving for freedom with what he regards as Lincoln’s catering to conservative whites, which he contends often distanced the Republican president from northern blacks on slavery and civil rights issues. He emphasizes that Lincoln promised to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law, reversed field commanders’ orders regarding the confiscation and freeing of rebels’ human property, delayed recruiting black soldiers, and seemed ready to backtrack on the Emancipation Proclamation when Democrats experienced political gains. According to Williams, only Union losses, particularly the horror at Shiloh and the disastrous Seven Days battles in the early summer of 1862, pushed Lincoln toward emancipation and accepting blacks in the military. In addition to the need for recruits, Williams suggests Lincoln’s “new departure” (p. 97) responded to racist northern whites’ hopes that emancipation would halt the flow of fugitive slaves to the North. “[R]acial containment,” contends Williams, represented a Republican priority and emancipation, along with colonization, became a means of ensuring that the North remained white (p. 200). Noting blacks’ disillusionment with Lincoln’s stance and his administration’s efforts “to keep black refugees from penetrating into the free states,” Williams reveals how African Americans set their own agenda (p. 192). Black freedom became “*a holy cause*” for which they were willing to die (p. 51 [emphasis added]).

Williams’s most significant contribution to the literature lies in his documentation of the increasing militancy of blacks’ individual and collective resistance to slavery and race prejudice. He shows how African Americans exercised agency, tailored their quest for freedom to rapidly changing political and economic circumstances, sealed alliances with radical white abolitionists and women’s rights activists, and responded innovatively on a landscape imbued with strident white racism fueled especially by workers’ fears of job competition from emancipated blacks. He ably describes how black militants reshaped their struggle in response to changes in the political landscape and American sentiments precipitated by the Kansas-Nebraska crisis, the Dred Scott decision, John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry, two waves of southern secession, Union military setbacks, the Emancipation Proclamation, hotly contested election campaigns, and the emergence of differing visions of Reconstruction. Williams’s discussion of black soldiers’ contributions to the Union war effort builds on existing literature.

Most controversial and less convincing are Williams’s questioning of Lincoln’s antislavery commitment and his frequent portrayal of Lincoln as racist. As a political leader, Lincoln too was forced to react to changing circumstances in order to maintain office in the face of unprecedented political challenges; he had to respond to a divided electorate that he knew comprised a large constituency of white racists. The 1862 and 1864 elec-



tions remind us that he had to walk a very fine line. As commander in chief, Lincoln had to mobilize resources, including troops made up of prejudiced whites. Simply put, assessment of Lincoln must be informed by the context in which he carried out his responsibilities. At Gettysburg he reminded Americans of his belief that all men were created equal and shared his vision concerning “a new birth of freedom,” which he believed would ensure “that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”

GORDON S. BARKER  
Bishop's University

JONATHAN W. WHITE. *Emancipation, the Union Army, and the Reelection of Abraham Lincoln*. (Conflicting Worlds: New Dimensions of the American Civil War.) Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014. Pp. xv, 275. \$39.95.

Conducting elections in the midst of a war is a delicate matter even in the best of circumstances. And if the war is internally divisive, while also being fought, in part, on the principle that election results must be respected, then it is even harder. If you believe that free elections are the hallmark of liberty, yet you also believe that if one side wins liberty would die, how far can you go to ensure the right outcome?

Historians of the Civil War have been slow to recognize this paradox, and the censorship, corruption, hypocrisy, violence, and outright fraud that it engendered. Instead, wartime politics in the North have generally been presented as a fairly straightforward business in which, Copperheads notwithstanding, more and more people recognized the virtue and the logic of Abraham Lincoln's war and emancipation policy. In the Civil War North, soldiers manned some polling places and in border states loyalty oaths demanding fealty to the government were a precondition for voting. Yet even this seemingly un-American partial militarization of the electoral process has excited relatively little scholarly interest. Historians have disagreed over whether the Democrats were mostly the irredeemable Copperheads of Republican propaganda or not. But they have rarely examined how wartime strictures affected how—and how freely—people expressed political views. In this book, Jonathan W. White tackles all of these questions as they applied to the group most susceptible to intimidation and corruption: Union soldiers.

Contemporary engraved images of soldiers voting in camp in the 1864 presidential election, published in *Harper's Weekly* and sold by Currier & Ives, show orderly lines of uniformed men lining up to cast ballots overseen by their officers. The artists' intention was to celebrate citizen soldiers exercising their right to vote. The incontrovertible implication was that the men were voting—of course—for Lincoln. An alternative interpretation, voiced at the time by Democratic critics, was that the evident discipline and formality—such a contrast from the raucous, jostling elections of peacetime—stifled the people's voice. White's fascinating

book takes us behind the façade of those familiar images into the murky reality of politics conducted under very strained conditions.

White's writing has a self-consciously iconoclastic tone. And justifiably so, because within the fortified ramparts of Civil War scholarship faith in soldiers' support for Lincoln in the 1864 election is iconic and White tackles it head on. To be fair, he does not challenge the numbers: he accepts that Lincoln won a big majority of soldiers' votes. But White does question how we should interpret this result. He points out that one in five soldiers did not vote at all (though that is broadly in line with the non-voting population on the home front), and that many of those who voted for Lincoln did so not out of gratitude for “Father Abraham” but because they mistrusted the peace wing of the Democrats even more. Many voted for Lincoln in spite of emancipation not because of it. What is more, while it is hard to quantify exactly, White makes a convincing case that the political composition of the army changed after the Emancipation Proclamation as many Democrats resigned, deserted, or failed to re-enlist. It was not so much that hundreds of thousands of men were converts to Republicanism, as has often been assumed, but that the army, by November 1864, simply had more Republicans in it. And at the same time, White provides fascinating material from the underused courts-martial records showing how vocal Democrats were silenced in the ranks. And also how some were disfranchised after the war was over.

White's is the subtlest and most precise analysis I have read of how and why voters, in this case soldiers, made their choices in wartime. For example, lifelong Democrats could vote for Union party candidates like John Brough in Ohio in 1863, seeing Brough not as a surrogate for Lincoln but as an old Jacksonian supporter of the war.

This book is part of a reassessment of the Civil War by a new generation of scholars who stress irony and paradox as opposed to what they see as the straight lines and uplifting meta-narrative of what might be termed the “McPherson settlement.” And indeed James M. McPherson himself is the target of a series of well-aimed sniper bullets from White even on details where others would defer, such as the proportion of Union soldiers who re-enlisted at the expiration of their three-year terms (many fewer, White shows, than McPherson claimed).

Such details are telling because they help to build the case for what I see as White's main contribution, which is to show that, in the face of revolutionary change, fewer northerners than we have traditionally thought embraced new ideas. The Civil War North seems a more complicated and more interesting place in White's telling, and quite right, too.

ADAM I. P. SMITH  
University College London

JOHN MCKEE BARR. *Loathing Lincoln: An American Tradition from the Civil War to the Present*. (Conflicting

Worlds: New Dimensions of the American Civil War.) Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014. Pp. xiii, 471. \$35.95.

In poll after poll, Abraham Lincoln is rated as our nation's best and most respected president. In contrast, John McKee Barr's new book, *Loathing Lincoln: An American Tradition from the Civil War to the Present*, explores those who have, since 1858, loathed Abraham Lincoln. While others have talked about incidents of anti-Lincolnism in America, this is the first full-length examination of that phenomenon. Barr argues that Lincoln loathers are "a minority tradition to be sure but never a marginal one, because [they have] been a significant part of an important and long-standing argument about what type of nation the United States ought to be" (p. 5). "Lincoln's enemies," Barr contends, "have always used their opposition to the sixteenth president to advance a distinct political agenda . . . more often than not, this agenda has been illiberal, even counter-revolutionary, in its aim to roll back or limit the liberty-expanding achievements of Lincoln and the antislavery movement during the Civil War and Reconstruction" (p. 3).

Initial loathing was for the Republican Party, but soon fixated on Lincoln as he rose to prominence in 1858, and "denunciations never veered far from matters of slavery, race, and associated issues of freedom and equality" (p. 20). Ironically, Lincoln loathers in this period particularly disliked the two speeches for which Lincoln is most often praised—the Gettysburg Address and his Second Inaugural Address—and their statements on equality. In the quarter century after the war Barr argues that hating Lincoln became a critical part of the Lost Cause (p. 60). Simultaneously, Barr observes that "after 1865 denigration for Lincoln in the northern states was relatively rare and loosely organized" (p. 61) in contradiction to the war era when northern Democrats were virulent in their loathing.

In the imperial era (1890–1918) loathing intensified and became institutionalized, largely as part of "racially based opposition to American expansion overseas" (p. 104). Those who did not want "others" from Hawai'i, Puerto Rico, or Guam becoming part of the United States blamed Lincoln and his supposed centrist and imperialist tendencies for creating a nation that was expanding both geographically and ethnically. Much of the backlash in this era came because Lincoln loathers feared a positive image of the sixteenth president was taking hold. Thus Confederate heritage organizations sought to ensure that pro-Lincoln textbooks were banned from schools, and they even led charges to fire faculty members who used neutral or "pro-northern" texts. Simultaneously, as African American's increasingly saw their status fall—highlighted by the 1908 race riots in Lincoln's hometown—many began to wonder what Lincoln had really done for them, leading some to loathe him.

Lincoln's reputation was at its peak during the interwar period, but it was also during that time that crit-

icism moved from regional back to national, and gained an academic arm with the agrarians critiquing Lincoln as the personification of modernity. Barr notes a "direct connection between criticism of Lincoln and a defense of Christianity" (p. 167). "In the 1920s and 1930s," Barr maintains, "the evidence suggests, if someone was a Christian, it did not mean they hated Lincoln, but if they hated Lincoln, then the chances were pretty good that person was either a conservative Christian or at the very least fundamentally at odds with modernity" (p. 162).

In the postwar era the loathing continued along many of the same-lines, except that within the conservative community the question of whether to embrace or loathe Lincoln took on added urgency. Simultaneously, in the midst of the civil rights movement, a reappraisal of Lincoln saw some authors categorize Lincoln as a racist. Lerone Bennett Jr., like many African American intellectuals before him, "saw an excessive veneration of the sixteenth president as a not-so-subtle form of intellectual subservience to whites" (p. 251). Hammered on one side for espousing equality and on the other for being a racist, such was the dichotomy of the Lincoln loathers between 1945 and 1989. Over the last quarter century, Barr contends, Lincoln loathers have sought to "repeal the twentieth century" (p. 261) and return to a weaker nation-state, an old argument among Lincoln loathers. In summation, Barr notes three things that Lincoln opponents loathe: his supposed lack of religion, his stance on equality, and his strengthening of the federal government.

The author is refreshingly bold in his assessments of the motivations of the Lincoln loathers, and he turns some beautiful and humorous descriptive phrases. At times, however, it is less clear what impact these loathers had upon the broader discourse. Barr indicates in his subtitle that he is focusing on Lincoln loathing in America only, but it would be fascinating to see future works that discuss Lincoln loathing at the global level and the motivations and functions of that stance. This is a well-written and original book that helps round out any discussion of the legacy of Abraham Lincoln.

JARED PEATMAN

*Lincoln Leadership Institute at Gettysburg*

JAMES C. RENTFROW. *Home Squadron: The U.S. Navy on the North Atlantic Station*. (New Perspectives on Maritime History and Nautical Archaeology.) Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014. Pp. xi, 218. \$54.95.

James C. Rentfrow's *Home Squadron: The U.S. Navy on the North Atlantic Station* drives one more nail into the coffin of conventional wisdom that the era between the Civil War and the Spanish American War represented the "dark ages" of U.S. naval history. The author masterfully demonstrates how the post-Civil War navy, then focused on single-ship combat and cruiser warfare in defense of overseas trade, evolved into the powerful fleet that utterly devastated the Spanish navy in 1898.

Rentfrow is a U.S. naval officer, faculty member in the U.S. Naval Academy's History Department, and



2007 recipient of the Naval History and Heritage Command's distinguished Samuel Eliot Morison Scholarship. He skillfully exploits navy records held in the National Archives, Library of Congress, the Naval Academy's Nimitz Library, and the Naval War College's Naval Historical Collection to buttress his analysis. Rentfrow's historiographical survey reflects a keen understanding of period scholarship.

Rentfrow focuses on the North Atlantic Squadron, familiarly known as the "Home Squadron," during the years 1874 to 1897. The squadron is a logical choice to investigate new approaches to naval warfare, since it operated in defense of America's most vital North Atlantic, East Coast, and Caribbean interests. Unlike the Asiatic Squadron and the other far-flung units, the Home Squadron—the first among equals—benefited from proximity to national leaders and their control of budgets in Washington and the visionary strategic thinkers at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. The author does not spend much time discussing why Americans wanted a more modern, powerful navy during the second half of nineteenth century but he argues convincingly that the work done by the Home Squadron to bring that about predated the advocacy of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, and other "navalists." Rentfrow posits that "[y]ears before Mahan popularized the theory of seapower, the operational patterns of the North Atlantic Squadron were laying the foundations for the development of a national battle fleet" (p. 63). Rentfrow sheds light on key individuals—Foxhall A. Parker Jr., John Grimes Walker, Bancroft Gherardi, and Stephen B. Luce—who as commanders at sea and theorists ashore spurred the transition to multi-ship warfare.

Rentfrow relates how the navy developed the doctrine, tactics, organization, and command and control processes that eventually enabled multiple ships to operate as one concentrated and synchronized battle fleet so familiar to later twentieth-century naval warfare. He looks at the squadron's day-to-day operations and training exercises that facilitated the incorporation into the fleet of new technologies—rifled guns, signaling devices, torpedoes, steel hulls—and helped prepare a commander to fight and win a major sea battle.

Success in that effort came neither easily nor quickly. The author treats the subject chronologically, with individual chapters focusing on key developments in the long-term "process of developing a multiship fighting ability" (p. 3). Chapter 1 discusses how Commodore Foxhall Parker (author of *Fleet Tactics under Steam* [1870]) used the 1873 concentration of naval forces at Key West, Florida, in a confrontation with Spain, as an opportunity to practice fleet maneuvers. Spain's seizure of the *Virginius* crewed by American adventurers and caught delivering arms to insurrectionists in Cuba prompted the fleet deployment. Washington and Madrid eventually settled their differences, but Parker exploited the months-long negotiation to practice operating his ships in battle formation. The experience revealed numerous problems with signaling and com-

mand and control of the battle line, but it represented a first step. Chapter 2 relates how the squadron continued to practice multi-ship maneuvers in the 1880s. The reluctance of "old-school" officers to embrace the new approach to warfare, "show the flag" responsibilities, and the need to respond to crises in the Caribbean, however, frequently disrupted fleet exercises. Chapters 3 and 4 relate how during the early 1890s two dynamic naval leaders, rear admirals John G. Walker and Bancroft Gherardi, worked with their respective formations, the experimental Squadron of Evolution and the Home Squadron, to adapt the navy's warships, including the four unarmored cruisers of the "New Steel Navy" to the new approach in naval warfare. Chapter 5 concludes that by 1895–1897, the North Atlantic Squadron had become especially skillful at multi-ship fighting maneuvers and had brought to fruition the battle concepts of one-time commanding officer of the squadron and founder of the Naval War College, Stephen B. Luce. An epilogue relates how the persistent efforts of key leaders during the latter half of the nineteenth century produced the well-armed, well-led battle fleet that emerged victorious in the Battle of Santiago de Cuba in 1898.

A larger type size, a few maps, and a few appropriately placed photographs might have enhanced the text but these are mere quibbles. Rentfrow's well-written, well-organized, and well-argued book should become a standard work on the period and should grace every serious scholar's bookshelf.

EDWARD J. MAROLDA  
Naval Historical Foundation

ELIZABETH GRITTER. *River of Hope: Black Politics and the Memphis Freedom Movement, 1865–1954*. (Civil Rights and the Struggle for Black Equality in the Twentieth Century.) Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2014. Pp. 355. \$40.00.

Elizabeth Gritter's *River of Hope: Black Politics and the Memphis Freedom Movement, 1865–1954* is an outstanding contribution to the fields of African American, civil rights, and American political history. As part of Steven F. Lawson and Cynthia Fleming's series with the University Press of Kentucky, *Civil Rights and the Struggle for Black Equality in the Twentieth Century*, Gritter's work highlights the ways that African Americans continued to mobilize formal political structures during the height of Jim Crow oppression in the United States. More than in most regions of the South, black residents of Memphis continued to vote in substantial numbers as violence and legislative efforts to disfranchise them succeeded in horrifying fashion elsewhere. To make her case, Gritter delves deeply into the history of the Church family, whose patriarch, Robert R. Church Sr., emerged as a major force in black business and politics following the Civil War. Known as the "Boss of Beale Street," Church Sr. "became the first black millionaire in the South" (p. 17). His daughter, Mary Church Terrell, became the leader of the Na-

tional Association of Colored Women's clubs, and his son, Robert Church Jr., half-brother of Mary, inherited the family's economic and political power in Memphis. While the Church family achieved a level of privilege that was extraordinary for most people, black or white, Gritter does a masterful job of showing the ways that Church Sr. and Jr. fought to build and maintain their economic and political power in the face of vigorous and often violent white opposition. Over the course of their respective lifetimes, in fact, both men witnessed the decline of their political and economic power. Ultimately, Robert Church Jr. would be exiled from Memphis, with much of his property seized by the city and sold at auction. Gritter does not, however, make the tragedy that befell the Church family the point of her work. She is far more interested in, and successful at, showing how black Memphians imagined and found ways to make their voices heard through formal political channels—through the Republican and Democratic parties, as well as at the ballot box—all set against the backdrop of a repressive political and economic system, one dominated for decades in Memphis by Edward “Boss” Hull Crump Jr.’s notorious Democratic Party political machine.

When I was asked to review this book, I admit I wondered what more could be written about the black freedom movement in Memphis, which has been wonderfully chronicled in Michael K. Honey’s *Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing Memphis Workers* (1993) and *Going Down Jericho Road: The Memphis Strike, Martin Luther King’s Last Campaign* (2007), as well as in Laurie B. Green’s excellent monograph, *Battling the Plantation Mentality: Memphis and the Black Freedom Struggle* (2007). But Gritter’s work proved a worthy contribution. What she shows is that black Memphians, like other African Americans in the Jim Crow era, used whatever institutions available to them to press for change and demand freedom, from the Republican Party to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to labor unions to myriad civic organizations to the Democratic Party, and even the ballot box. And when existing institutions proved insufficient, black Memphians created new ones. The cover photo for Gritter’s book is remarkable, and really embodies the crux of her argument which is most fully realized in the second chapter. The year was 1916. The NAACP’s James Weldon Johnson was canvassing the South, trying to encourage black southerners to engage in organizing efforts. In Memphis, under the leadership of Church Jr., African Americans formed the Lincoln League in an effort to force the Republican Party to be more responsive to black concerns. The action explicitly harked back to Reconstruction and drew on decades of black political activism. That fall, the league organized voter education schools, led voter registration efforts, and ultimately ran 12 black Republicans to challenge the lily-white slate in the November elections. The book’s cover image could have been taken during Reconstruction, or during a meeting of South Carolina’s Progressive Dem-

ocratic Party in 1944, or at a gathering of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party in 1964. In it, black men and women, sought to enact an inclusive vision of democracy that would be, and still can be, elusive. Nevertheless, Gritter shows, black people continued to fight on and creatively refashion institutions to meet their needs and aspirations. Gritter struggles in the end to assess just what this remarkable period of unheralded activism meant for black people in terms of a qualitative impact on their lives. Certainly it helped set the stage for the mass movement of the 1960s and it, no doubt, provided hope for a better tomorrow in the context of soul-crushing circumstances. But I am not sure that assessing the specific impact is even possible. Rather, it is more accurate to conclude that the results of the Jim Crow era movement she illuminates have yet to be determined. What I keep wondering in our era of civil rights rollback, mass incarceration, and events like those in Ferguson, Missouri, is: what kind of democracy would exist in the United States without the fortitude and creativity of African Americans who refused to accept terrifying circumstances seldom, if ever, of their own choosing?

PETER F. LAU  
*Independent Scholar*

SUSANNA MICHELE LEE, *Claiming the Union: Citizenship in the Post-Civil War South*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Pp. xv, 252. \$95.00.

For those of us who study Unionism in the Civil War South, the records of the Southern Claims Commission (SCC) are indispensable sources. Established by Congress in 1871, the SCC was a federal agency charged with providing financial compensation for property loss or damage inflicted by Union forces to those southerners who could demonstrate their loyalty to the Union during the war. Nearly 17,000 such claims were submitted during the commission’s decade-long existence; each consisted of a deposition, or questionnaire, that described the form one’s Unionist sympathies had taken. A three-man panel appointed by President Ulysses Grant determined whether such claimants met the standard of loyalty that warranted payment for wartime losses of “stores and supplies.” (Fewer than half of claims submitted were ultimately approved.) The vast majority of those “interrogatories,” as they were called, along with supporting evidence gathered by local commissioners and roving investigators, have been preserved in the National Archives, and they have long provided historians with a wealth of material with which to chronicle Unionist activity and attitudes within the Confederacy in far more depth and breadth than would otherwise be possible.

Susanna Michele Lee has detected in this vast array of testimonials a very different set of historical realities. In *Claiming the Union: Citizenship in the Post-Civil War South*, she argues that they have as much to tell us about the changing conceptions of citizenship in the 1870s as they do about wartime loyalties. Originally envisioning



loyal citizens as white male property owners, commissioners were caught off guard by the profusion of women, former slaves, free blacks, and even Indians who filed claims with the SCC, which forced it not only to revise the questions asked and refine the standards for assessing loyalty, but also to reconsider the nature of citizenship in more expansive terms.

For southern white males who could vote, serve in the military, and own property, such demonstrations of “active citizenship” (p. 6) were obvious and fairly straightforward. For all others, claims were complicated by antebellum assumptions of “mastery” that lingered into the 1870s. As dependents of white masters, both white women and former slaves found it more difficult to provide tangible evidence of independent thought or deed on behalf of the Union. As such, those claimants, along with the commissioners themselves, applied other stratagems and rationales to legitimize not only their claims, but also their right to submit them. This meant that the claims of most white women (usually widows) were assessed through the demonstrated loyalties of deceased husbands or other male relatives, with their property appraised on the basis of common law traditions of coverture.

Former slaves proved more anomalous as claimants, given their wartime status as owned property with only tenuous claims as property owners (a crucial piece of the formula on which Lee touches only fleetingly). Many slaves simply fell back on the basic logic that the Union meant freedom, and the Confederacy stood for slavery, which of course made them Unionists. Free blacks often stretched that logic to argue that their own status in a racist southern society led them to oppose the southern cause. One Savannah woman stated the case made by many: “[Y]ou must know that all of my color sympathised with the Union Cause, because we were oppressed and who don’t want to get from under oppression” (p. 117).

Lee is sensitive to and adeptly balances the many intricacies and varied scenarios at play over the course of the SCC’s existence; she employs well-chosen vignettes of a wide range of individual claimants to provide human faces to the issues and ideologies so integral to the process. However, much of the bigger quantitative picture is lacking. Although several tables offer numerical data on claims and claimants overall, Lee provides no breakdown on more revealing and relevant data, such as the number of women, slaves, or free blacks within the claimant pool, or how many of their claims (compared with each other and with white males) were allowed or disallowed.

For Lee, the SCC records serve as a unique gauge of what had changed and what had not in terms of social, legal, and civic status of formerly marginalized groups in the eyes of federal officials eager to reunite the nation. At the same time, the process itself served as a forum through which post-Civil War America confronted even more profound questions of what the nation owed its citizens and what those citizens owed the nation. If the answers provided by the commission and

its claimants remained tentative and ambivalent, they tell us much about the tentative and ambivalent nature of the reconciliation process itself, as Lee’s insightful study so aptly demonstrates.

JOHN C. INSCOE  
University of Georgia

ELAINE LEWINNEK. *The Working Man’s Reward: Chicago’s Early Suburbs and the Roots of American Sprawl*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. ix, 239. \$45.00.

The notion that cities grow up and then out, forming metropolitan areas that stretch from central downtowns through residential neighborhoods and industrial zones to the suburbs beyond is a truism of American urban history. More than 50 years ago, in *Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870–1900* (1962), Sam Bass Warner Jr. explained how in the late nineteenth century Boston’s streetcar lines enabled greater mobility for commuters and led to the development of an outer ring of suburbs. In *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (1985), Kenneth T. Jackson offered what is now the standard account of American suburban history. Paying particular attention to the twentieth century, Jackson showed how with larger property lots, tax benefits, better services, and less racial diversity, the suburbs became a destination for white middle- and upper-class families eager to escape the ills of urban life.

*The Working Man’s Reward: Chicago’s Early Suburbs and the Roots of American Sprawl* adds to the growing number of studies that are complicating the view of suburbia as “bland, white, [and] middle class” (p. 9). Through its emphasis on working-class ownership, minority populations, and industrial landscapes, the new suburban history has shown that American “suburbs were also places of refuge for people on the margins of power, both before and after 1945” (p. 10). Elaine Lewinnek’s contribution to this history focuses on Chicago, in many ways the paradigmatic example of American metropolitan development. The visual marker of Chicago’s rapid growth in the late nineteenth century was its skyline: the steel-girded towers that made the Loop a showcase for modern architecture. Of course, the city expanded horizontally as well, and during the early twentieth century, as the metropolis sprawled out into the adjoining region, Chicago became “Chicago-land.”

Throughout, Lewinnek stresses the leading role that blue-collar workers—that is to say, immigrants and the children of immigrants—played in the emergence of Chicago’s suburbs. Noting that in 1900 the ethnic working-class population was more likely to own homes than the affluent native-born residents, who preferred to rent, she tracks the development of this trend from the 1871 fire to the 1919 race riots. Suburban homeownership among the laboring classes was the result of several factors. In the aftermath of the Great Fire, the Chicago Relief and Aid Society, overseen by the city’s

native-born leadership, constructed more than 8,000 suburban cottages outside the city limits and encouraged homeless workers to move there, while simultaneously arguing for fire ordinances that limited the building of affordable wooden structures in the central neighborhoods. Seen in these terms, “suburban-style housing” (p. 51) was a form of social control that promoted middle-class values, discouraged the problems associated with group or tenement living—sexual promiscuity, health problems, and so forth—and allowed elites to segregate the urban landscape by class. Workers protested zoning restrictions, insisting on their right to rebuild as they liked. Initially, they succeeded in blocking the changes, but by the mid-1870s, the ordinances had been extended northward and workers were buying property beyond the city limits where lots were less expensive and wooden houses were permitted.

Increasingly, blue-collar Chicagoans purchased homes in the suburbs to be closer to their places of work. So the advertisement that Samuel Eberly Gross distributed in 1891 for the houses he built near Forty-Seventh Street and Ashland Avenue—in the erstwhile suburb of the Town of Lake—featured images of well-manicured lawns but also highlighted the advantages of living within walking distance of the Union Stock Yards. In 1889, Chicago annexed the Town of Lake, but the community’s suburban origins joined it to Cicero, Calumet City, and other factory suburbs that Lewinnek describes in her book. These places were not bedroom communities, and the fact that they included industrial centers or vice districts defies the classic image of the American suburb. Just as importantly, she argues that the pattern of suburban development was at odds with the map of urban growth that sociologist Ernest W. Burgess created at the University of Chicago in the 1920s. Chicagoland did not expand “like a bull’s eye of circles or the segments of sector theory, but like a gridded starfish, complex and contested” (p. 148). Lewinnek underscores the volatility of urban growth in the final chapter, arguing that the 1919 race riots can be best understood as working class-resistance to housing pressures represented by Chicago’s growing black population. Rather than give way to African Americans and move to the suburbs, white homeowners—tied to “mortgages of whiteness” (p. 172)—fought to stay in their neighborhoods.

*The Working Man’s Reward* is a welcome contribution to the history of Chicago and an insightful reminder that the difference between urban and suburban culture can be surprisingly fluid. That said, the study would benefit from a clearer articulation of what distinguished urban Chicago from its suburban extensions, and of how the city’s working-class suburbs differed from more affluent suburbs like Oak Park and Winnetka.

TIMOTHY B. SPEARS  
Middlebury College

CHRISTOPHER F. JONES. *Routes of Power: Energy and Modern America*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014. Pp. 312. \$39.95.

America’s interest in energy issues such as global warming, renewable and non-renewable fuels, and the construction of transmission systems such as the Keystone XL pipeline are acute. Mineral-based supplies of coal and oil are finite, and studies note that such resources pollute the atmosphere, alter the ecosystem, and despoil the landscape. Yet Americans resist change. They want to turn on their lights, gas up their cars, and heat and air condition their homes at their convenience. A world without a constant supply of energy or even a reduction in energy output would be unimaginable and would disrupt their lives. Yet, how much energy do people need? What do they do with what they have? Do people understand the human and environmental costs to those who produce the energy and to those who live along the pipelines and other transmission systems? There is a cost, but who bares it? Christopher F. Jones examines the energy shifts that occurred between 1820 and 1930 and suggests that there are lessons that can be gleaned from an examination of that transition, including an understanding of the impact imposed by the various transmission systems.

*Routes of Power: Energy and Modern America* examines not only the production of coal, oil, and electricity, but also, importantly, how that energy was transmitted to the consumer and the price of that transmission. Coal was one of the earliest mineral fuels to be exploited, specifically anthracite coal. Initially it was easily accessible. Found in Pennsylvania, this coal was extracted by unskilled laborers, but its use presented problems. It was expensive to ship, difficult to ignite, and lacked a ready market. Transportation also posed a problem. Shipping costs were high; overland roads proved inadequate and drivers were costly and unreliable. Nature offered the easiest solution: water transport. Rivers and canals reduced costs. Railroads followed and the Pennsylvania coal country was open for business. Demand, however, took time to build. Suppliers targeted the large seaport and inland cities. To heat their homes, people burned wood; now they had to be convinced that coal, not wood, was less expensive, easy to use, clean, and reliable. Not only that, coal also required investments in new coal burning stoves, another expense. Over time, demand increased and other outlets were found. Industries, such as paper manufacturing, that relied upon a heat source often switched to the new energy source. It fostered the development of the iron industry that required large amounts of energy. No longer did man have to rely upon the use of wood or charcoal for energy; coal proved easier and cheaper to use and it was readily available. And the mid-Atlantic region was the beneficiary of this change. It now challenged New England’s industrial leadership.

Oil followed. According to the author, drilling presented fewer problems than did the transport and distribution of this liquid. Pennsylvania oil was refined and used primarily for lubricating machinery and importantly for illumination. It allowed people to set their own time and not be controlled by the rising and setting of the sun. Initially the oil industry built upon the in-



infrastructure created by coal. It soon added narrow pipelines to help move the oil faster and at a lower cost. All along the way, John D. Rockefeller was there. He dominated the movement of oil by railroad and then by pipeline. Unlike the railroads that could transport goods both into and out of a region, pipelines moved oil in one direction. Uneven distribution produced inequality not only within the country and the region, but also within a given state.

The last source examined is electricity. Transmission of electricity proved more problematic than its production. Electricity often had to travel long distances to an appropriate market. Wired transmission was the solution, yet companies had to obtain the right of way for their lines. Then there were the problems of uneven use, down times versus peak use, and distribution of electricity to rural and lightly populated areas. These issues also had solutions. By 1930 Jones concludes, "Mineral energy sources were not a luxury for Americans . . . they were a necessity" (p. 226).

The author has addressed an important issue, the transmission of energy and its effects on the United States. Energy influenced how and where people lived, how they earned their living, and it exacerbated the gap between those within the chosen market locations and those that produced the energy, who resided in remote areas and/or could not meet the distribution costs. This book is a step in the right direction in identifying many of the problems associated with energy transmission, but these issues beg further research.

BARBARA M. TUCKER

*Eastern Connecticut State University*

ANDREAS BERNARD. *Lifted: A Cultural History of the Elevator*. Translated by DAVID DOLLENMAYER. English ed. New York: New York University Press, 2014. Pp. 309. \$35.00.

Andreas Bernard ambitiously explores the relationship between an important technological innovation and its effect upon the imaginative capacities of the residents of European and American cities. Bernard claims the elevator created a marginal but paradigmatic site for interpreting the dramatic influence of modernity upon urban culture at the turn of the twentieth century. His narrative examines its subject from multiple perspectives offering insight into the technical, architectural, legal, and literary significance of the elevator on modern culture.

Bernard begins with a critical assessment of the claim that Elisha Graves Otis invented the modern elevator and demonstrated its effectiveness to astonished New Yorkers in 1854. He shows this foundational myth was a fiction generated 57 years after the fact by the Otis Elevator Company, the largest manufacturer of elevators. Otis Elevator engaged in a remarkably effective publicity campaign to retroactively gain credit for an invention by the firm's founder. Bernard shows that the elevator was in fact the product of many anonymous mechanics whose creative efforts were inspired by the

development of the iron-wire cable in 1834. By the 1870s, their collective successes provided an impetus for the construction of tall commercial and residential buildings, especially in major American cities like New York and Chicago. The initial installations of elevators raised serious concerns regarding safety, which were not completely overcome until the introduction of sliding doors at mid-century. Bernard's principal concern, however, is not technological innovation narrowly defined. He does not examine the significant role of Otis Elevator in manufacturing, promoting, selling, installing, and maintaining their product. We learn nothing of the cost of the different types of elevators installed in buildings. Instead, the book focuses on the relationship between the introduction of the elevator, architectural design, and modern fiction. Bernard claims that at the end of the nineteenth century modern elevators eliminated the need for central staircases in tall buildings. In American cities, the innovation transformed stairways into nothing more than a necessary escape route. Unfortunately, Bernard does not provide analysis of floor plans of tall buildings to show more effectively the extent and nature of the transformation. Tall buildings were more varied than he suggests.

Nevertheless, Bernard effectively demonstrates that the introduction of elevators with push-button controls allowed for a new "architecture of linearity," transforming the multiple-story building from a series of connected floors ascended by stairways into a series of separate and seemingly unrelated platforms accessed by pushing a button and being transported almost magically to one's destination, without the need for assistance by skilled elevator operators. Bernard regards the effect of push-button technology as transformative, especially when combined with similar innovations in the use of modern devices such as the Kodak camera. Increasingly, users became removed from technical processes as designers concealed the working parts of common machines. The experience of linearity produced a mindset that altered literary imaginations and ultimately led to creative constructions like the often used trope that nuclear war could result simply from the mistaken push of a button.

The imaginative consequences inspired by architectural changes also produced a new social psychology since elevators freed the upper stories of buildings from the stigma associated with inaccessibility. Bernard draws upon literary sources to show that attics previously were the stuffy, poorly lit, and cluttered spaces inhabited by servants, poets, young couples, and persons seeking concealment for illegitimate relationships. As sites, they inspired a literature associated with the complexities of social conditions in places like grand hotels and garret rooms. With the introduction of the modern elevator in American cities, the upper stories of buildings radically transformed into sites of conspicuous consumption. With the creation of penthouses, executive suites, and roof gardens, the ability to inhabit the upper stories provided a source of inspiration, one that allowed the privileged to contemplate from a spec-

ulative loft the vastness of urban landscapes. For the middle class, the social concerns generated by the need for elevators were equally powerful. In Paris, multiple-family residences were common, leading to a culture where citizens traditionally regarded stairwells as spaces more public than private. Americans shared with the British a preference for single-family housing. Consequently, when the construction of multiple-family housing increased in cities like New York, residents sought to more strictly regulate access to the halls and corridors of apartment buildings. Privacy was an important issue. Once again, Bernard fails to provide analysis of floor plans. He is more concerned with employing literary analysis to evoke the imaginative consequences associated with architectural innovation.

Bernard's most insightful chapter identifies the elevator as the important trigger for producing fears of claustrophobia and of social mixing. He shows how modern films and novels frequently employed the elevator as a critical space for organizing narratives of city life. It was the standard vehicle for conveying the discomfort associated with social mixing in so confined an urban space. Repeatedly, the stalled elevator unmasked the contingencies of urban life in a space that served modern authors as an equivalent of the Roman Catholic confessional. Readers will recognize the effectiveness of the argument by the renewed self-consciousness they experience riding elevators after reading the book.

JOSEPH C. BIGOTT  
Purdue University Calumet

CLARE VIRGINIA EBY. *Until Choice Do Us Part: Marriage Reform in the Progressive Era*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014. Pp. xxiii, 237. \$27.50.

*Until Choice Do Us Part* is a persuasive and bracingly written account of marriage reform during the Progressive Era. Focusing on a group of novelists, academics, and other public intellectuals, Clare Virginia Eby argues that these reformers constituted a vital and overlooked variety of Progressive reform, targeting not public institutions, but rather relationships between people. They believed that marriage could be transformed for the betterment not just of individual couples (wives, especially), but also society as a whole. Though the group met with mixed results in their own marriages, Eby demonstrates that their widely disseminated ideas set the stage for many of the marital patterns and ideals that we have inherited.

Eby's reformers were not so radical as to oppose marriage altogether. Rather, they wanted to preserve marriage by transforming it from within. They believed, first, that women should work so they would not be economically dependent upon their husbands. Second, they argued that couples should only remain together because of mutual and lasting affection; for this reason, divorce should be easily accessible. While reformers differed on whether monogamy was desirable or achievable, those who favored it believed that only voluntary monogamy based on mutual desire—not compulsory

monogamy grounded in outdated marriage laws—could sustain a marriage. In keeping with this belief, they also affirmed the importance of female sexuality within a marriage: only when the wife's pleasure was valued as much as the husband's could a marriage be successful.

The book is composed of five substantive chapters. In the first Eby reviews both changes to marriage law and cultural ideals for married couples from the colonial era through the early twentieth century. She also explains why marriage was so controversial at the turn of the century: increased women's emancipation, rising divorce rates, sexual liberalism. In chapter 2, Eby surveys the varied public figures who targeted marriage reform as a Progressive project: Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Olive Schreiner, Elsie Clews Parsons, George Elliott Howard, Havelock and Edith Ellis, and Ellen Key, among others. While these reformers did not agree on all the particulars, collectively they endorsed a vision of marriage that aligned with the tenets above. Of course some of them also dabbled in eugenics, gender essentialism, and desperately illogical reasoning. Eby is clear throughout that some of their ideas were not politically progressive, by our definition, even as they were indicative of a particular Progressive moment.

The real meat of the book is to be found in chapters 3 through 5, case studies of the writings and marriages of Meta Fuller Sinclair and Upton Sinclair, Sara White Dreiser and Theodore Dreiser, and Neith Boyce and Hutchins Hapgood, respectively. Readers will note that five of the principals here were writers of fiction (among other genres); Sara Dreiser is the exception. Eby is a literary critic and one of her primary contentions is that these reformers self-consciously used novels as a tool for marital reform. To varying degrees they saw their own marriages, which they documented in semi/autobiographical ways, as laboratories for the ideal marriage or as vehicles to criticize outdated marital standards. Upton Sinclair, for instance, documented his marriage “to set the right kind of example to the world” (p. 71). And Eby argues that Boyce and Hapgood saw their marriage as the generative force for their own creativity and “envisioned marriage literally as text, at times co-written, but more often produced by independent yet intertwined artistic visions” (p. 164). They all drew on their own marriages in order that others might question the purpose of marriage itself.

The case studies are based on published works, but also make compelling use of archived papers: letters, especially, and drafts of novels (in the case of Meta Sinclair, who never published hers, and Theodore Dreiser, who produced a substantially different first draft of *The Genius* than the one he published in 1915). Some readers may find the focus on the novels overly detailed and, in a word, literary. There are also moments when the case studies feel disconnected from the legal history that preceded them, largely because these figures were more focused on reforming marital relations than marriage law. That said, Eby consistently draws fascinating



links between the fiction, the historical circumstances that inform it, and the marital politics that infuse it.

The book's subject is not, of course, uncharted territory. Nancy F. Cott, Glenda L. Riley, Christina Simmons, Christine Stansell, and Kevin White, among others have explored this era in marriage reform and a number of these figures particularly. But Progressive-era historians should take note of Eby's contention that marital reform was characteristic of the era's ideals just as much as other reforms generally seen as more paradigmatic. And historians of social movements and of marriage will benefit from Eby's fresh emphasis on the novel as a profoundly social tool of reform. Written in a witty, straightforward voice, *Until Choice Do Us Part* is both compelling and enjoyable.

NICHOLAS L. SYRETT

*University of Northern Colorado*

CATHERINE COCKS. *Tropical Whites: The Rise of the Tourist South in the Americas*. (Nature and Culture in America.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. Pp. 255. \$59.95.

In this book, historian Catherine Cocks traces the rise of white tourism and the emergence of a tourism industry in what she labels "the Southland"—Florida, Southern California, Mexico, and the Caribbean—in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 1880, Cocks notes, white North Americans and Europeans referred to the tropics as the "white man's grave" (p. 2.) Yet by 1940, these places had become popular vacation destinations and winter resorts for privileged and, increasingly, middle-class whites. That transformation, she argues, reflected broader changes in the way whites understood the relationship between climate and disease, race and environment. It also underscored the ability of a burgeoning tourism industry to cultivate demand for pleasure travel and commodify cultural difference. The industry's growth during these decades, Cocks contends, did not constitute simply another chapter in the history of racism and imperialism in these parts of the world. Subtly but undeniably, pleasure travel led people "to question one of the founding assumptions of white supremacy: that it represented the best and most moral way of life" (p. 13).

In chapter 1, Cocks shows how the rise of commercial agriculture provided new incentives for travel and exploration into the Southland. Growing demand for tropical fruits in North American markets fueled the rise of U.S.-based companies such as United Fruit, Standard Fruit, and Cuyamel. Through advertising, these companies helped to create a warm image of the tropics as a place of health and beauty, a stark contrast to its past associations with death and disease. Like the repressive, highly exploitative labor regimes and agricultural systems they established, fruit companies furthered the idea of the tropics as a "regulated paradise" (p. 40), a place where whites could extract resources and partake in native cultures without fear of contamination or loss of racial integrity. Cocks develops this

theme further in chapter 2 by looking at the growth of the Caribbean cruise industry. These floating hotels provided a degree of distance between tourists and native peoples, and allowed tourists to experience local cultures while enjoying all of the luxuries of home. "In its sheltered embrace," Cocks writes, "white travelers in the Caribbean could indulge themselves in the region's famed sensual pleasures without selling their souls" (p. 55). They could view different cultures and customs from afar, "in small doses" (p. 72), while socializing among fellow white North Americans and Europeans.

Chapter 3 focuses on how tourism promoters worked to turn the tropics' liabilities (in particular, its weather) into assets. Claims about the health benefits of warmth and humidity were aided by medical advances in the diagnosis and treatment of disease, and by feats of modern engineering such as the Panama Canal, which reinforced an image of the tropics as a place where the health and social dominance of white, Western cultures could be fortified and accentuated, rather than undermined. As travel and tourism became more popular in the early twentieth century, white Americans embraced more informal dress and prized tanned skin as a sign of status and privilege. Tourism, and tourism promotion, Cocks argues, also instigated and contributed to the greater liberalization of pleasure and sexuality, even as it reinforced racist beliefs in the sexual propensities of "darker races."

Much of the book looks at the Southland through the lens of white travelers and tourism industry executives and promoters. Cocks relies heavily on brochures, advertisements, and ephemera produced and distributed by the industry, and on travel writings. Only in the book's final chapters do we see how government officials and entrepreneurs in Mexico and the Caribbean sought to capitalize on travel and tourism and turn it into an engine of economic growth and development. Chapter 6 looks at how culture became, as one Mexican bank executive put it, "spontaneous capital." Folk art, customs, and the natural environment became forms of capital that could be cultivated, packaged, and sold. As a result, Cocks argues, tourism played an important role in fostering nationalism. "The process of officially identifying national heritage," she states, "turned some vernacular customs and arts into important markers of a national culture" (p. 153). This process of turning culture into capital was predicated on identifying and accentuating difference and distinctiveness. Latin American and Caribbean countries hoped these cultural industries would not only grow local economies but also breed respect and understanding among white visitors.

Whether whites' journeys into the Southland served in the long term to undermine or reinforce notions of white supremacy remains unclear, in part because Cocks chose not to fully address this topic. This is indicative of one of the book's major shortcomings. Cocks supplies readers with tantalizing evidence and numerous anecdotes throughout the book, but hesitates to provide definitive conclusions. All too often Cocks says that her evidence "suggests" or "hints at" a larger his-

torical change or development, but she holds back from offering any powerful, compelling arguments about the role travel and tourism played in the production of culture and in changes in social, political, and economic relations between the U.S. and the Southland. Nevertheless, *Tropical Whites: The Rise of the Tourist South in the Americas* should be of great interest to scholars interested in travel, tourism, and the global South in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

ANDREW W. KAHRL  
University of Virginia

PIPPA HOLLOWAY. *Living in Infamy: Felon Disfranchisement and the History of American Citizenship*. (Studies in Crime and Public Policy.) New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. xv, 236. \$34.95.

Pippa Holloway's *Living in Infamy: Felon Disfranchisement and the History of American Citizenship* is a meaningful, original, and significant work of history. Based on exhaustive research in local, state, and federal sources, *Living in Infamy* investigates the complex history of felon disfranchisement and race in the United States over the course of nearly two centuries. Holloway argues that the concept of "infamy" marked felons and, eventually, African Americans, as degraded individuals unworthy of the privilege of the franchise. Her assiduous examination of the history of infamy, alongside a careful interpretation of the origins of the criminal disfranchisement language contained in Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, illuminates the origins of America's peculiar, often selective, practice of stigmatizing felons by excluding them from voting. Her study suggests a new understanding of why American politicians have a long history of narrowing the electorate through disfranchisement, and why the promise of full citizenship and voting protection for African Americans was so readily upended.

Many supporters of felon disfranchisement purported to support the purity of democracy, and Holloway shows how both felons and African Americans were stigmatized at different times by the legal concept of infamy. According to Holloway, "infamy" originated in English common law where it was used to label individuals who had suffered degrading punishments, such as whipping, or who were considered so delinquent or immoral in their behavior that they could be disqualified from jury service, giving testimony, or suffrage (p. 4). In America, slaves were inherently "infamous" because they had suffered the indignity of whipping and bondage. After freedom, the infamy of this group was compounded by the disproportionate number of black criminal convictions. Both bondage and imprisonment were evidence of a "degraded social status," which led to a "degraded civil and legal status of infamy," which justified racial disfranchisement (p. 151).

Holloway's exceedingly thorough introduction places felony disfranchisement in the United States Constitution within the historical context of Reconstruction. Crucially, Holloway explains the origins of Section Two

in the Fourteenth Amendment that allowed for disfranchisement for crime, a provision surprisingly supported by both Republicans and Democrats after the Civil War. As Holloway explains, the majority in Congress agreed, as part of long-standing practice, that allowing convicted men to vote, even after they had served a sentence, degraded suffrage. A consensus on continuing the antebellum practice of disfranchising convicted felons existed. But as Holloway also elaborates, political concerns shaped Congress's intentions. Republicans on the committee desired to exclude former Confederates, guilty of treason, from voting. Fears that the clause would allow state statutes to discriminate against newly emancipated black voters were set aside. And so, Republicans and Democrats supported the clause in the Constitution that enabled states to enact felon disfranchisement laws, which were soon used against African American voters.

Holloway argues that infamy and felon disfranchisement explains the early momentum behind black disfranchisement in the South. Obviously, infamy remained a fluid term with a moral resonance that fit with other types of suffrage restrictions practiced in various states, northern and southern. The middle section of the book is a richly researched account of the evolution of disfranchisement based on infamy and race, and examines the evolution of the wording and intent of the state disfranchisement statutes. The legislative backlash against black voting began well before the rewriting of the Mississippi Constitution in 1890. Holloway argues that right after the war, the impact of felon disfranchisement fell disproportionately upon black shoulders.

Eventually, throughout the United States, "infamy" was simply conflated with anyone who had been convicted of a felony (p. 101). Yet not all felons were treated equally upon their release. Holloway explores how white convicts often escaped the ignominy of disfranchisement through pardons, or what she calls the system's "safety valve" (p. 130). Individuals could appeal for the restoration of their rights, and some states reinstated the right of citizenship to groups of felons, such as veterans. Only rarely, however, could African Americans erase the degradation of their conviction and vote again. More than any other group, black felons were treated as outcasts.

Holloway's research is nothing short of astounding. Most studies of convicts tend to rely heavily on the documents of a single state, but Holloway draws upon the published legal sources, court records, and legislative debates of an astonishing 33 states. Holloway's deep research and range across complex secondary literatures involving the politics of Reconstruction, crime, race, and the law allow her to assess the shifting sands of state, regional, and national perspectives. Her judicious use of such complex evidence establishes a nuanced yet persuasive argument on the saliency of felon disfranchisement for understanding the immediate attack on African American citizenship and voting after emancipation. *Living in Infamy* is an outstanding achieve-



ment that deserves a wide scholarly and popular audience.

MARY ELLEN CURTIN  
*American University*

EMILY E. STRAUS. *Death of a Suburban Dream: Race and Schools in Compton, California*. (Politics and Culture in Modern America.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. Pp. 313. \$55.00.

Emily E. Straus's *Death of a Suburban Dream: Race and Schools in Compton, California* is both a deep look at one community's past and a much broader cautionary tale about the future of education and equity in America. As an inner-ring, blue-collar suburb, Compton, California, never fit neatly within the history of mid-century suburban privilege. Once noteworthy as an outlier to dominant patterns, contemporary Compton serves as a critical bellwether of several recent national trends: increasing levels of suburban poverty, the challenge of forging black-Latino coalitions in impoverished majority-minority communities, and the growing demand for school choice in an age of high-stakes testing. It was in Compton, for example, that parents first used a "parent trigger" law that promised alternatives to a troubled public school (p. 1). While Straus focuses her analysis on Compton's schools, the story here is a richly layered one. Indeed, she insists that "Compton's educational crisis is not at heart a crisis of schooling," but rather a complex struggle involving race, ethnicity, politics, economics, and "the relationship between schools and place" (p. 4).

The book's first two chapters trace the deep roots of Compton's failed suburban dream. Originating in the late nineteenth century as a white farming community, Compton evolved into a suburb of modest homes for Los Angeles's white industrial workers. Then the earthquake of 1933 struck, and the city's weak industrial base coupled with its low property values hampered rebuilding efforts. Having long privileged local control of its schools, residents increasingly required state and federal funds for improvements. Whites, however, compounded their fiscal woes by rejecting outside assistance that threatened residential or school segregation.

In the postwar period, white efforts at racial exclusion collapsed when the United States Supreme Court outlawed restrictive covenants and black veterans sought out Compton's promise of the American dream. By the late 1960s, Compton had a majority-black population. That demographic shift translated into black political power but not economic and educational progress. As Straus puts it, "Compton exemplified the limitations of political power without economic development" (p. 120). Deindustrialization added to increasing unemployment, paving the way for Compton's infamous levels of violence and gang activity. Mid-century descriptions of the local schools read like reports from the Jim Crow South at its nadir. In 1964 parents protested against middle-grade classrooms with 150 and 175 students each. Three decades later, when Straus

taught in a Compton middle school, her classroom had "dilapidated furniture" and a "gaping hole" in the ceiling (p. 3). Student test scores routinely came in near the bottom of state rankings. By that time, Compton had experienced another population shift, this time to majority Latino, but blacks resisted power sharing with their new neighbors, especially when it came to educational administration, a rare source of professional jobs. In the growing literature on black-Latino relations, Straus tells a story of failed opportunity. "[A]s the power holders, blacks had more to lose from an alliance with Latinos than they stood to gain," she writes (p. 161).

Straus concludes with a dismal assessment of recent reform efforts and offers some broad prescriptions for the future. Beginning in 1993, an eight-year state takeover of Compton's schools yielded disappointing results due to its focus on test scores and other limited measures of success and its near total disregard for the city's underlying struggles with violence and unemployment. State and federal accountability initiatives, with their emphasis on competition and school choice, have done little to offer Compton's children meaningful alternatives.

In several important respects, Straus adds to a growing understanding of the "long civil rights movement" outside the South. While some of this story will be familiar, Straus thoughtfully complicates the standard narrative. She reminds us, for example, that white flight did not always traverse a city-to-suburb path. Compton's whites first moved within their inner-ring suburb and then moved to outer-ring suburbs. Moreover, the flight was not always white, as more prosperous blacks also fled. In a compelling discussion of Proposition 13, the 1978 state constitutional amendment that supposedly represented California's suburban "tax revolt" against the urban poor, Straus points out that the suburban residents of Compton voted "overwhelmingly" against the measure (p. 149).

One of Straus's most important contributions is her recovery of an organizing tradition in a city that by the 1980s was becoming synonymous with disorder and despair. For more than a century, Compton has seen a continuum of educational activism led by teachers, parents, and students. While outsiders commonly associate Compton with the searing rap lyrics of NWA, whose 1988 album *Straight Outta Compton* spotlighted the city's gang violence, Straus shows that those same years gave rise to peaceful protests, such as the 1984 mass withdrawal of students from a school that lacked heat or the 1990 demonstrations led by Save Our Children, a grassroots parent organization.

Policymakers and historians alike will find valuable context here for contemporary educational debates. In what could have been a top-down, policy-heavy narrative, Straus does a beautiful job of humanizing Compton's troubled past with the use of oral history interviews and accounts from the black press that never appeared in the *Los Angeles Times*. For anyone invested in the future of public education, Straus's elegant ren-

dering of these stories will serve as a haunting call to action.

SARAH C. THUESEN  
Guilford College

JOHN A. HEITMANN and REBECCA H. MORALES. *Stealing Cars: Technology and Society from the Model T to the Gran Torino*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. Pp. ix, 216. \$29.95.

According to 2013 insurance statistics, thieves steal a car every 33 seconds in the United States. As John A. Heitmann and Rebecca H. Morales write, although car theft has existed “at the margins of American life,” it is and was, nevertheless, “far from inconsequential” (p. 1). They prove this broad claim by surveying the reasons and methods for stealing cars and the technological, social, and institutional responses to the crime. A long history of stealing cars has resulted in myriad anti-theft technologies, powerful federal laws to ameliorate the criminal activity that thrived by crossing state and international borders, and a trend toward more sophisticated, professional criminals who in the twentieth century set up global networks to trade in stolen vehicles.

Historians have mostly overlooked theft as an important part of Americans’ relationship with the automobile. But as Heitmann and Morales rightly argue, we can learn much about technology, law enforcement, and the role of insurance companies, by examining the changing contours of auto theft. Their work is part of a growing body of scholarship that examines how users changed the design and meanings of the automobile from the bottom up. However, here, users applied their ingenuity to illegal activities, from the fairly harmless act of joyriding, or stealing cars for pleasure, to more serious offenses. The authors ask: “Who steals cars, and why?” (p. 1). How did government and industry respond to the crime in an escalating battle to thwart a growing network of criminal activity? Heitmann and Morales mine their source material, which ranges from statistics and patent records to interviews and a range of popular literature, film, and digital games to understand the complex back-and-forth between criminals, technology, authority, and the wider culture. Their most significant claim is that automobility changed and increased the scale of unlawful activity beginning with the mass production and adoption of the car. The automobile became a prime target for thieves and conveniently provided its own means of escape. Although, some saw the opportunity to enjoy a free ride or make money stripping parts or selling stolen cars, thus robbing car owners not only of an expensive durable good but also their own automobility, Heitmann and Morales conclude that American culture, as seen through films, songs, novels, and video games, has often glorified car thieves rather than condemning them.

The authors survey the landscape of auto theft in six chronological chapters, a brief conclusion, and a useful collection of historical statistics. Taken together the

chapters chart the trajectory of criminal activity from the 1910s to the present. The book is organized into periods, beginning with the 1910s to the 1940s; continuing into the postwar period to about 1980, when auto theft rose so rapidly that there was an unprecedented response; and ending with the 1990s to the present. Chapter 5 examines the history of cross-border activity between Mexico and the U.S. providing an in-depth case study of the globalization of automobile theft that should give historians much to consider.

Throughout the book we learn that average people and often skilled users participated in the process of stealing, stripping, masking, and trading in stolen cars. Chauffeurs, mechanics, assembly-line workers, small business owners, and a couple of generations of male teenagers all took part in stealing cars. Notably, car owners, through the 1960s, were often culpable as well; some reported their cars as stolen to get the insurance money, many more simply left the keys in the ignition or under the floor mat. Whatever the cause, we learn that this crime shaped the institutions and the larger landscape that governed the use and value of cars, including the insurance industry. Insurance companies led the way in developing new communications systems and technologies to protect and recover their investments. Additionally, law enforcement, especially at the federal level, grew. Because the stolen goods crossed state and international borders, auto theft became a federal crime and the authors trace the legislation and developments in policing from the Dyer Act (1919) to the growth of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). They also explore efforts to outwit ingenious criminals through an array of devices from early ignition locks to General Motors OnStar surveillance system.

In the last chapters, Heitmann and Morales suggest that there has been a definable shift in the nature of the car theft, from youth-centered impulsiveness to an organized and global crime. Although global trade in stolen cars existed as early as the interwar period, the scale increased dramatically in the late twentieth century. The chapter on Mexico and the U.S. provides a more careful look at this phenomenon and suggests that borderlands foster crime. Beginning with the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920), she provides an intriguing case study of how automotive theft became entangled in a more complex web of illegal activities including drug trafficking. As the authors conclude, “Crossing borders was, and remains, the car thief’s best strategy” (p. 158).

The authors’ attention to the variety of people and technologies involved in stealing cars and the evolution of the practice into a global business make their study worth reading. Some small criticisms: The latter half of the book felt somewhat disjointed. The later chapters would have benefited from more historical context, especially with regard to the political and economic landscape of the 1970s and 1980s. How did the energy crisis figure into criminal activity or its representation in film? But overall, Heitmann and Morales have added to a better and broader understanding of both crime and the



automobile in American life and have pointed to other fruitful avenues for exploration.

KATHLEEN FRANZ  
*American University*

ROMAIN D. HURET. *American Tax Resisters*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014. Pp. 370. \$29.95.

Elsie de Wolfe, by many accounts the founder of the profession of interior design, became rich through her efforts in the early twentieth century. When her wealth brought her into the crosshairs of the new income tax law of 1913, she bristled: how could women be taxed when they did not have the right to vote? How could this be anything other than taxation without representation? The story of how the women's suffrage movement became entangled with the tax resistance movement is only one of the surprises of the history of American tax resistance, brought to light in Romain D. Huret's *American Tax Resisters* as well as other recent scholarship that has appeared on this topic. De Wolfe lost her case, but the men and women who have resisted the encroachment of income tax form an interesting cast of characters, a set of history's losers who suddenly at the end of the twentieth century began to win.

Their cause was not an easy one. In one prominent episode of tax resistance in the 1950s, the governor of Utah refused to pay his full tax bill "in order to instigate a court test of the constitutional right of the U.S. government to appropriate taxpayers' funds for foreign aid" (p. 193). The press made fun of him, local hooligans painted graffiti on the governor's mansion demanding that the governor pay his taxes, the court would not hear his case, and the Internal Revenue Service simply took from his bank account the money the governor owed. Even the Republican Party was not interested in the cause of tax resistance. Barry Goldwater's campaign distanced itself from the tax resisters.

Things started to change in the 1970s. Huret gives us the familiar stories of Arthur Laffer, Jack Kemp, and Howard Jarvis, and then Ronald Reagan lumbers into view, proclaiming a rebellion from the White House: "'the tax system has earned a rebellion—and it is time we rebelled'" (p. 241). But even Reagan met limits that he could not break through. When his administration tried to extend tax exemptions to schools that discriminated racially, the uproar caused Reagan to backtrack within days.

Huret has scoured dozens of manuscript collections and produced a thoroughly researched book. But although he documents the story of American tax resistance, he is not of much help in trying to understand or explain it. The book reads as if the author is dumping on us all of the exciting discoveries he has made in the archives without having thought much about how to incorporate them into a larger picture. For example, he does not have much to say about what seems to be the central question: why did this group of losers suddenly begin to gain influence at the end of the twentieth cen-

tury? Nor does he provide any framework with which to understand the episodes he meticulously documents.

Huret, a French academic, says he is curious to understand "why Americans had such a complex relationship with their federal government," by which he specifically means "American antistatism" (p. 356). But a reader of this book is no wiser as to why that is. Moreover, what Huret does not mention is that one reason Americans resisted the progressive income tax is that they *had* a successful progressive income tax to resist. By comparison, enforcement of France's income tax was so weak in the early twentieth century, partly because of French resistance to the encroachments of the growing state, that France was forced into implementing regressive sales taxes. Ironically, these proved to be much more successful at financing a large state.

Just as scholars who protest that their work includes no theory are often working with unexamined theoretical assumptions fully in place, authors who set out to tell the story of only one country often have an unstated comparative picture in mind. Huret's is of an anti-statist America compared to statist Europe. But over the last two decades historical scholarship has cast increasing doubt on the faithfulness of that picture to the reality of American history. A scholar can reasonably dissent from the emerging consensus of an American state that has been stronger than we thought, but it seems irresponsible to ignore it. Alongside the long history of American tax resistance has been the equally long history of an America that took pride in its progressive tradition of taxation, even as European states adopted regressive sales taxes. Keeping the focus on that—the comparatively unusual strength of progressive taxation in American history, and why it went awry in the late twentieth century—would cast American tax resistance in a different light and maybe even help to explain "why Americans had such a complex relationship with their federal government," but the book that accomplishes that remains to be written.

MONICA PRASAD  
*Northwestern University*

SAMI MOUBAYED. *Syria and the USA: Washington's Relations with Damascus from Wilson to Eisenhower*. Paperback ed. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2013. Pp. xv, 207. \$19.95.

Sami Moubayed has written a fascinating history of the United States-Syrian relationship during the first half of the twentieth century. The role of the U.S. in the Levant during the 1910s–1950s has received relatively little scholarly attention, a neglect that is not entirely surprising. For most of that period the U.S. exhibited little interest in Syria or the broader Levant. American leaders, including President Woodrow Wilson, grudgingly acceded to British and French claims in greater Syria, Iraq, and Palestine. It was only in the aftermath of World War II, toward the closing years of Moubayed's narrative, that the U.S. hesitantly took on a great power role in the Arab east, endorsing indepen-

dence for Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, and taking its first tentative steps in support of the newly established state of Israel. Seen from the vantage point of Washington, Damascus was a minor capital, largely insignificant, its presence registering only when regional conflicts or global crises brought it briefly into the limelight. It was not until August 1952, six years after the country became independent, that the U.S. appointed an ambassador to Syria.

As Moubayed's thoroughly researched account makes clear, however, the perspective from Damascus was quite different. From the Syrian vantage point, Washington loomed large, its presidents and representatives were objects of fascination, its policies endlessly parsed and debated. Washington's influence and intentions were invariably seen as consequential, if not existential, for Syria, whether for good or, as Syrians increasingly came to believe as the Cold War unfolded, for ill. Moubayed highlights in particular the many turning points at which the Syrian-American relationship, now deeply fixed in mutual mistrust and enmity, might have developed in more positive ways. He notes the expectations President Wilson created among Syrian nationalists with his Fourteen Points; the hope that Syrians placed in the recommendations of the King-Crane Commission of 1919–1920 favoring Syrian independence; and the sympathy shown by American diplomats during the interwar period for Syrian nationalist aspirations.

Time and again, however, Syrian hopes and expectations were disappointed. The advantages that Moubayed believes would have accompanied a closer relationship between Washington and Damascus never materialized. Instead, Syrian perceptions of America's pro-Israel bias, Washington's preference for the conservative, anti-communist monarchies in Jordan and Iraq, and its meddling in Syria's tumultuous domestic politics pushed U.S.-Syrian relations toward the antagonism and mutual hostility that have defined the relationship for the past 50 years.

In recounting this narrative of opportunities lost, and the costs that Moubayed believes both the U.S. and Syria have paid as a result, he both summons up an imagined counterfactual history in which the two states enjoyed the benefits of a close and collaborative partnership—a history in which the U.S. and a democratic Syria find common ground in resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict while advancing the security and economic development of the entire region—and suggests that it may not be too late to make up for lost time. In this, *Syria and the USA: Washington's Relations with Damascus from Wilson to Eisenhower* strikes a familiar tone. It is one in a long line of “if only” tales about the needless price that America has paid, and the price it has imposed on Syrians and other Arabs, for its flawed policies in the Middle East. To his credit, Moubayed does not overlook Syrian complicity in shaping the U.S.-Syrian relationship. He conveys effectively the instrumentalism and self-serving ambition of the Syrian leaders who had their own agendas in seeking to draw

the U.S. more deeply into Syrian affairs. Yet Moubayed's frustration is directed principally toward the American officials who failed to recognize Syria's potential and treated its leaders with cavalier disdain. Ultimately, however, the counterfactual history that Moubayed's narrative suggests is too elusive to be compelling. By the 1950s, the conflicting strategic interests that drove Syria and the U.S. to become adversaries were too powerful, U.S. influence in the region too limited, and the advocates of a closer relationship too weak, to imagine that these conditions could have been overcome if only the U.S. had taken a different course.

Published as Syria spiraled into a brutal civil war that has torn the country apart, the diplomatic maneuvering and political jockeying that Moubayed captures so successfully have been overshadowed by the violence and massive destruction of a conflict that has produced the worst humanitarian disaster since World War II. With Syria's survival as a state in doubt, and with the crushing burdens of post-conflict reconstruction still ahead, Moubayed's account might be seen as no longer relevant, but this would be a mistake. How the U.S. responds to the Syrian conflict will be pivotal in shaping U.S.-Syrian relations in the twenty-first century. To date, the legacies of antagonism and mistrust, whose origins Moubayed documents, have carried the day in defining the U.S. response to Syria's violent collapse, leaving future historians to consider whether this era, too, will be remembered as a missed opportunity.

STEVEN HEYDEMANN  
U.S. Institute of Peace

CHARLES H. HARRIS III and LOUIS R. SADLER. *The Plan de San Diego: Tejano Rebellion, Mexican Intrigue*. (The Mexican Experience.) Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013. Pp. xvi, 338. \$45.00.

Charles H. Harris III and Louis R. Sadler have authored numerous books on international aspects of the Mexican Revolution, from the multinational intelligence war along the United States-Mexico border to the role of the Texas Rangers. In *The Plan de San Diego: Tejano Rebellion, Mexican Intrigue* the authors explore one of the least understood elements of the revolution: the possible role of President Venustiano Carranza's government in promoting a revolution in Texas involving not only the Tejano population, but also African Americans to create first an independent Hispanic nation in the southwestern portion of the U.S. and then a buffer state for African Americans between the new Hispanic state and what would remain of the United States.

Harris and Sadler's work takes full advantage of newly available information, the papers of Agustín de la Garza Solís, acquired by the Museum of South Texas History located in Edinburg, Texas. Garza was the leader of the Plan de San Diego and his correspondence provides ample proof that the plan's followers were supported by, and cynically used by, the Carranza gov-



ernment. The would-be revolutionaries would eventually be abandoned by Carranza as soon as they had fulfilled their roles as a means to pressure the U.S. politically and militarily. The result was a series of border raids from northern Mexico into Texas, which often were led by Carranza's officers and included Mexican troops as well as Mexican and Tejano revolutionaries. Even when Mexican troops were not directly involved they supplied the revolutionaries with arms and ammunition. Mexican newspapers in cities controlled by Carranza reported fanciful tales of military victories followed by the flight of thousands of Anglo refugees northward. In reality, the attacks were not militarily significant. Most raids were small hit-and-runs. The plan's leaders were amateur military commanders, "and their rebellion reflected this unpalatable fact" (p. 83). Although, the most dramatic raid, north of Brownsville, Texas, involved 60 raiders who derailed a passenger train, destroyed a nearby railway bridge, and killed several Americans.

What did Carranza hope to obtain by supporting the plan? In 1915 he wanted the Wilson administration to recognize Carranza's Constitutionalist regime as the legitimate government of Mexico. The plan's raids across the border into Texas would, he hoped, create enough chaos along the border that the U.S. would finally choose a side in the ongoing Mexican internal war and force an end to the disorder. As the recognized legitimate government of Mexico, the Carranza administration could legally buy arms from the U.S., while their rivals, particularly the forces under General Pancho Villa, could not. It worked; "Carranza played Woodrow Wilson like a violin" (p. 84) and the U.S. extended official recognition to Carranza on October 19, 1915. The cross-border raids promptly ceased as the Mexican government abandoned the revolutionaries. Carranza, however, used the revolutionaries a second time in 1916 when Pancho Villa's attack on Columbus, New Mexico, led to General John J. Pershing's "Punitive Expedition." The resulting crisis led to a war scare, and the Mexican government again turned to the Plan de San Diego's would-be revolutionaries. Once more amateurs aided by Mexican troops led raids across the border. This time, the authors argue, Carranza miscalculated. Wilson asked Congress to allow him to send troops to occupy and pacify the northern tier of Mexican states, and over 100,000 National Guard troops were deployed. Faced with a larger fight than he was prepared to undertake, Carranza backed down and, for a second and final time, abandoned the Plan de San Diego revolutionaries (p. 262).

Historians have argued over the plan, despite being hindered by a lack of information. Was it real or fake? Was it a fabrication by the Texas Rangers to justify violence, or was it a plot by the supporters of ousted Mexican dictator Victoriano Huerta? Was it invented by Germans trying to entangle the United States in a war with Mexico? Was Carranza involved? Was it a genuine revolution by Tejanos? There is no consensus among scholars, and their explanations tend to fit each author's

preconceptions about the Mexican Revolution. The biggest problem is a lack of real, concrete information. Using the Garza papers, however, Harris and Sadler provide enough evidence to demonstrate that Carranza knew of the plan and that he was controlling it. There are, however, remaining questions, especially regarding the role of the Japanese, who appeared at opportune times to aid the revolutionaries. But the matter should now be settled.

*The Plan de San Diego* meets the high standards that its authors set with their earlier works. The research is impressive, the writing is clear, and the tone is entertaining. The index is fine, although not especially detailed. Moreover, the bibliography is a bit shorter than I would have liked, but covers the relevant works. The illustrations are good and include many of the more obscure figures, especially Augustine Garza, one of the Plan's leaders. And the volume could have used some maps, especially for readers not as intimately acquainted with the Texas-Mexican border as the authors. The book would be useful for graduate classes and should be read by anyone interested in the United States' involvement in the Mexican Revolution. *The Plan de San Diego* is one of the most valuable and original additions to the literature of the Mexican Revolution to be released in recent years.

MARK E. BENBOW  
Marymount University

ANGELA TARANGO. *Choosing the Jesus Way: American Indian Pentecostals and the Fight for the Indigenous Principle*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014. Pp. xii, 219. \$32.95.

As Angela Tarango notes in her introduction to this important new work, scholars of American Indian history are increasingly interested in understanding how Native people have indigenized Christianity, making its theological conventions and institutional structures meaningful in new contexts. Inverting old models that posit conversion as just another form of colonial conquest, Tarango echoes James Treat, Michael D. McNally, Harvey Markowitz, Andrea Smith, and others when she writes that Native Christians, and especially Native Pentecostals, do not have to be explained away as cultural aberrations. Instead, they should be taken seriously as one example of "how Native peoples live out their own religious identities, and how they take an outside religious idea . . . and mold it into a practice that reflects their own reality" (p. 7).

Tarango's focus is on the small but devoted number of Indian people who belong to the Assemblies of God (AG), founded in 1914. Comprising only 1.5 percent of all AG members, and thus an even tinier percentage of all Native Christians, Tarango examines the twentieth-century Native Pentecostalism that AG converts regard as essential to, and compatible with, their identities as Natives. "[D]ivine experiences and healing powers, essential features of Pentecostalism," writes Tarango, "likely made it an attractive form of Christianity for

American Indians, because it absorbed already familiar forms of religious practice and allowed them to form their own new practices as Pentecostals" (pp. 14–15).

The willingness of Native people to embrace Pentecostalism revolves most intensely around the "indigenous principle" inspired by the Apostle Paul's scriptural admonitions in the Book of Acts, which asserts that missionaries and churches should be located in and dedicated to the communities they wished to convert and serve. This idea was not unique to the AG; many main-line denominations have historically embraced it with varying results all across the Americas. But as was the case in the overwhelming majority of such programs, "indigenous" referred to the location of missions and churches, not to the nature of their leadership or to their interpretation of scripture. It was an institutional descriptor, not a cultural one, and this ultimately became problematic by the 1950s when Native missionaries and their congregants began to demand a greater sense of autonomy. In time, they pushed for an indigenous principle that articulated a meaningful measure of local control based on Native needs and championed by Native leaders. In their hands, "indigenous" came to have a particular resonance that reflected more than mere locale; it became, writes Tarango, "the tool they used to try to carve out their own version of indigenous Pentecostal Christianity, a colonizing theology that was turned against the colonizer to argue for Native autonomy" (p. 169). In an irony that many church leaders often failed to perceive, Native Pentecostals were asking their white counterparts to make the indigenous principle truly indigenous.

At the heart of the matter was the fact that many AG missionaries and pastors had a provincial world view when it came to Native Pentecostals. Unconvinced that Indians could or should actually direct their own affairs, staff their own missions, and lead their own churches, white missionaries saw the indigenous principle through a narrow lens. Tarango argues that at best, whites often embraced a sort of halfway indigenous principle but only when it served their ends. Leaders of the church only reluctantly supported the call in the 1950s for an all-Indian Bible school, for example, and it was not until 1977 that the church finally appointed a national Indian representative. Even then, the position was "ill-defined, had little power or influence, and remained part-time and underfunded" (p. 168). Moreover, it took a full century for a Native to be called to join the church's Executive Presbytery. This halting progress notwithstanding, Tarango argues that Native leaders have over time managed to change the AG's interpretation of the indigenous principle so that it now reflects a more nuanced and culturally sensitive philosophy. "For Native Pentecostals," she writes, "the indigenous principle became more than just a theology of missions—through their struggle for it, they turned a theology into a practice—a distinctly Native Pentecostal practice. They *lived* the indigenous principle" (pp. 172–173).

Yet the deeper cultural contours of that change re-

main somewhat oblique in this book. Because this study tracks institutional and personal narratives, we learn little of the cultural and community values, ideals, and practices that also shaped the changes to the indigenous principle and gave it new meaning in Native hands. As a result, the book misses the opportunity to more fully explore how Native Pentecostals actually live the indigenous principle in ways that reflect their own cultural and religious worlds. Tarango writes that a discussion of how Christian ideals are translated into Native forms is "beyond the scope of this book" (p. 92), but without that cross-cultural ethnographic piece in place, the story remains somewhat underdeveloped and will leave some readers wishing to know more about how and with what consequences belief and cultural identity are articulated in these churches. That caveat aside, this is a truly important and insightful contribution to the literature that deserves a wide readership.

CLYDE ELLIS  
Elon University

ROSS F. COLLINS. *Children, War and Propaganda*. (Mediating American History, no. 6.) New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2011. Pp. xvii, 296. \$91.95.

Historians of U.S. children in wartime generally pick one war. Ross F. Collins fruitfully combines two in his study of propaganda and children on the U.S. home front in World Wars I and II. Saying that the term "propaganda" was initially less exclusively pejorative than it became after World War I's excesses, Collins discusses discourse concerning the wars that ranged from informational and mildly persuasive to blatantly jingoistic. Much of it addressed children directly; some advised adults on how to manage children and adolescents in wartime. Collins summarizes and quotes pronouncements by officials in government, school administration, and youth work; by educators and psychologists; and by writers in children's magazines. Though sometimes strident, these were the voices of responsible adult authority. The magazines he uses—*American Boy*, *American Girl*, *Boys' Life*, *St. Nicholas*, *Jack and Jill*—breathed respectability. Collins mostly avoids popular culture as "not generally under direct control of authorities" (p. xvi), but discusses some war toys such as World War I machine guns that promised to stream wooden pellets.

As Collins repeatedly observes, evidence concerning children's responses to adults' patriotic admonitions is sparse and the youngsters' reactions are hard to discern. Citing William Tuttle's findings that American adults generally recalled their World War II childhoods with fond nostalgia, Collins warns of possible "[h]indsight bias" (p. 264). Quoting patriotic stories and doggerel written by wartime children, he cautions that adult editors chose which to publish. It is a "challenge . . . finding out what the children themselves thought about militarization of their daily lives" (p. 253).

Recurrent references to the "militarization" of American childhood (p. xv) beg, however, a question



about which Collins's evidence, and sometimes his comments, suggest considerable ambivalence. In these "total" wars (p. xiii), adults enlisted children's active support. But just how thoroughly militarized *were* home-front childhoods? Children faced more strident and guilt-inducing calls to patriotism and duty during World War I than during World War II, a finding that matches Christopher Capozzola's description of coercive voluntarism in the First World War. In both wars, however, beyond some parading, children were called mostly to mundane duties—growing food (more in World War I), gathering scrap (more in World War II), selling bonds, and sending knit goods and treats to soldiers. Collins emphasizes, perhaps unnecessarily, that these efforts did not contribute materially to U.S. victory. A 1943 survey found that Boy Scouts liked building model planes, foraging for rubber and metal, and selling war bonds but thought gardening, collecting waste paper, and distributing leaflets pointless. Collins records publicists' impressive aggregate statistics but tempers these by trying to ascertain children's persistence and participation rates. New York State's after-school military drills during World War I met massive adolescent resistance. Especially during World War II, much advice primarily urged adolescents to keep fit and stay in school.

Age and gender differences mattered. Preteens and early teens seemed more amenable to chores than older adolescents. With a few exceptions, such as enthusiasm for aviation that encouraged girls to dream of flying during World War II, propaganda supported conventional gender roles. Collins finds greater continuity than difference between the wars but credits 1940s authorities with greater solicitude for children's fears and less celebratory depictions of warfare. Calls to service became more matter-of-fact.

Collins laments that propagandists did not discuss death "in any honest way" (p. 259) or portray the horrors of actual combat. One exception, the graphically antiwar "War Issue" of *Boys' Life* published in November 1914, infuriated Theodore Roosevelt, the Boy Scouts' Chief Scout Citizen, and the magazine fell silent on the war until 1917. Realistically, Collins concedes, editors had to please their public. He emphasizes that U.S. children's home-front experiences were "in no direct way comparable" to those of child soldiers in recent wars (p. 274); yet he sees a common moral thread in adult actions that might encourage children to favor war, at one point condemning war toys by noting that recruiters for Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers mounted toy automatic weapons on seesaws. In conclusion Collins affirms the standard narrative that postwar tensions explain U.S. recourse to military power after World War II. "We can hardly hand credit for this decision to the propagandized children of world war . . . We may be able to say this: by infusing world war into their children's daily lives, America raised a generation to accept the principle that war works" (p. 278).

The book would have benefited from fact-checking, copy-editing, and proofreading. Although not vital to

Collins's main conclusions, there are errors concerning child labor law, Boy Scout officials, percentages, and dates. Awkward writing and misprints abound. And generalizations such as the claim that in April 1917 "hardly anybody" thought the U.S. "incorrect" in declaring war (p. 4) invite debate. The publisher's shortcomings notwithstanding, however, *Children, War and Propaganda* examines troubling and important issues.

DAVID I. MACLEOD  
Central Michigan University

DONALD L. FIXICO. *Indian Resilience and Rebuilding: Indigenous Nations in the Modern American West*. (The Modern American West.) Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2013. Pp. xi, 284. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$30.00.

Last summer, I pulled into the gas station on northern California's Round Valley Indian Reservation. Barely a year old at the time, the facility sits on the reservation's northern boundary and shares space with a convenience store and the Hidden Oaks Casino. As I jockeyed for position with reservation residents, ranchers, and people who participate in northern California's marijuana industry at one of the station's four pumps, I contemplated how much this small parcel of land had changed since the small casino opened in 2007. For a long time, the land on which the gas station sat was a flat, gravel turnout where people pulled up their cars to chat with one another. The site possessed the potential for economic development but needed the spark provided by gaming. In his new book, historian Donald L. Fixico suggests that the changes I witnessed on the reservation are not exceptional; rather, they are examples of events that occurred across the American West in the 1900s. Fixico argues that during the first half of the twentieth century, American Indians demonstrated resilience in the face of federal assimilation policies and subsequently rebuilt their nations in the last half of the twentieth and first part of the twenty-first centuries. Fixico employs three methodologies in his book: ethnohistory, political economy theory and an "indigenous paradigm" (p. 5). In doing so he argues that constant rebuilding is part of the American Indian Circle of Life, in which Native people have been continually forced to adapt and reinterpret themselves.

Fixico divides the book into two parts. In the book's first section, titled "Resilience," he traces American Indian efforts to maintain culture and identity in the face of assimilation policy. Focusing on reservations, education, the Indian New Deal, and urban relocation, Fixico unearths the manner in which Native peoples adapted to the various machinations of federal Indian policy. Boarding schools, for instance, produced American Indian leaders, who, in the twentieth century, recreated tribal economies and participated in the ongoing reinvention of indigenous people. "The mainstream tool of education, like the horse," Fixico concludes, "became a part of Native people as they realized its

importance in dealing with the rest of the country at all levels" (p. 69).

In the book's second section, "Rebuilding," Fixico identifies how Native nations reconstructed their economies during the second half of the twentieth century. Fixico analyzes the American Indian civil rights movement, natural resource development, gaming, and the return of sacred lands. Helpfully, he explores the tensions produced by economic development, especially in terms of casinos and natural resources. Since the 1980s, Fixico points out, Native nations have found themselves in a bind. While the federal government has repeatedly slashed funding for American Indian governments, tribal leaders have often had to turn to the development of natural resources to offset such losses. Moreover, the "energy tribes" face pressure from the United States to quench the U.S.'s thirst for coal, petroleum, and natural gas. Yet, traditional Indian leaders question the damage done to the environment. Fixico concludes that only Indian people will solve these disagreements: "Indians must make the changes; change cannot be carried out by non-Indians on behalf of Indians" (p. 169).

*Indian Resilience and Rebuilding: Indigenous Nations in the Modern American West* is a welcome update to the works of James Olson, Raymond Wilson, James J. Rawls, and Peter Iverson, who have previously written synthetic works on American Indians in the twentieth century. In particular, Fixico utilizes indigenous methodologies and, what Lumbee scholar Malinda Maynor Lowery calls, "autoethnography" to reinterpret twentieth-century American Indian history. At times, Fixico could have bridged the indigenous paradigm and political economy more clearly. Yet, the topical nature of this book will make it an essential read for those interested in American Indians in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

WILLIAM BAUER  
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

ELIZABETH MCKILLEN. *Making the World Safe for Workers: Labor, the Left, and Wilsonian Internationalism*. (The Working Class in American History.) Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2013. Pp. xii, 299. \$55.00.

Why were the international organizations founded in the wake of World War I so weak? In this fine new book, Elizabeth McKillen tells what happened when the effort to found one key institution, the International Labor Organization (ILO), met political reality. It is a work of both diplomatic and labor history, a wide-ranging contribution to understanding the political and intellectual reasons for the failures of ambitious postwar plans.

Samuel Gompers, head of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), advanced President Woodrow Wilson's vision of new national, regional, and global institutions that would promote peace and prosperity while protecting U.S. interests. The Wilson administration valued labor's role so much, particularly in countering

radicalism, that it subsidized AFL international initiatives, institutionalizing a relationship between mainstream labor and the U.S. foreign policy apparatus that has lasted to this day. Over the objections of U.S., Latin American, and European radicals and Socialists, Gompers spearheaded first the creation of a Pan American Federation of Labor and then the ILO. Wilson and Gompers worked together to create a "corporatist partnership" (p. 8) of labor and government at home and abroad, a vision best expressed in the founding of the ILO with its representation for government, business, and labor. The institution failed to live up to its promise, but not, McKillen demonstrates, for the reasons scholars have usually given.

In tracing the political history leading to the formation of the ILO, McKillen rediscovers a lost history of left-wing opposition to Wilson's initiatives. The "persistence of oppositional labor forces," she finds, was almost as important as the isolationist right-wing reservations to the Versailles Treaty in obstructing U.S. involvement in the new international order (p. 8).

The Left of the labor movement has been largely written out of histories of American diplomacy and foreign policymaking. Yet McKillen's goal is to show that a vibrant, at times militant, grouping from the Socialist Party to the United Mine Workers to the Industrial Workers of the World, articulated an alternative path for the United States and actually made a difference in how the U.S. behaved. The radicals argued for a foreign policy that was not only anti-imperial but also anti-capitalist. In turn, government officials feared their influence and unleashed a wave of repression, imprisoning radical leaders from Eugene V. Debs on down, shutting down their press, and hounding their organizations.

For the Left, the Wilsonian, or perhaps more accurately "Gomperian," proposals put forward at several international conferences did not go far enough in protecting workers. Radicals feared that the ILO would serve the interests of government and business. Others, like Andrew Furuseth of the International Seamen's Union, an effective advocate of international regulation and hardly a radical, feared the preponderance of business and government representatives would lower labor standards at home and abroad. This labor "opposition helped to stimulate, to shape, and ultimately to undermine Wilson's efforts to create a permanent role for labor in international governance" (p. 1). The net result of the Left's opposition was not only the destruction of their movement, but also the creation of an ILO without U.S. participation. Worse, even when the U.S. finally joined 15 years later, it failed to ratify most of the ILO conventions governing a range of labor relations.

This work ambitiously expands McKillen's earlier book, *Chicago Labor and the Quest for a Democratic Diplomacy, 1914–1924* (1995), which focused on left-wing Chicago trade unionists' attempts to influence international affairs. The broader Left McKillen discusses here had decisive—if negative influence—on U.S. foreign relations and the creation of new international institutions. It was this Left, for instance, that convinced



Senator Robert M. La Follette Sr., one of the key labor allies in Congress, to oppose the labor provisions of the Versailles Treaty.

McKillen uses careful readings of conference proceedings, letters, and articles in the Socialist and labor press from around the world to construct a nuanced portrait of a vibrant and complicated debate about the international order among unions, Socialists, women's groups, and African American organizations. At times, however, it is hard to get a sense of how important the issues actually were to anyone beyond a small group of activists. For instance, McKillen is able to point to quite a few articles about Versailles and the various labor conferences. Yet she does not tell us what proportion of the papers were devoted to this topic, information that might help demonstrate its importance.

Such small caveats aside, the book is an intelligent reading of the complicated politics of labor involvement in the making of U.S. foreign relations in the Wilson era. It makes an important contribution by adding to our understanding of the bitter divisions that split labor in the U.S. and around the world. The story detailed here, however, matters beyond the small but vibrant field of international labor studies. Despite the fears of the Left, McKillen concludes that the ILO "conventions . . . signaled a paradigm shift in international governing circles" because they revealed an "assumption that peace between nations was inextricably linked to industrial peace" (p. 229). Sadly, for reasons detailed in this book, that assumption never got a chance to be demonstrated.

VICTOR SILVERMAN  
Pomona College

LIBBY GARLAND. *After They Closed the Gates: Jewish Illegal Immigration to the United States, 1921–1965*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014. Pp. x, 288. \$45.00.

At a time when American anxieties, fears, and hostilities toward undocumented ("illegal") immigrants from Mexico and other Spanish-speaking countries is at an all-time high, Libby Garland offers a study of a period nearly 100 years ago when Eastern European Jews were seen as the chief violators of American immigration laws. She charts how Jews in Europe and the United States evaded the U.S.'s restrictive immigration quotas of the 1920s by entering the U.S. through various illegal means, including document forgery and human smuggling by foot and by boat across the Canadian and Mexican borders and from Cuba. Garland also examines Jewish legal and political activism against the quotas in the interwar years and after the Second World War.

*After They Closed the Gates: Jewish Illegal Immigration to the United States, 1921–1965* begins by explaining the origins and passage of the national origins quota laws in the aftermath of World War I, and then in chapter 2, analyzes how Jewish organizations dealt with the problems and ambiguities that emerged after the laws' passage as the federal government worked to imple-

ment them. In particular, Garland looks at Jewish illegal crossings of the Mexico-Texas border, and the plight of Jews who had been granted visas between 1921 and 1923 that were then declared void by the 1924 "national origins" law. In chapters 3 and 4 Garland examines Jewish and non-Jewish smuggling rings and their relationship to Prohibition-era bootlegging, organized crime, and document forgery. The final two chapters use the example of Jewish political activism against an alien registration law passed in Michigan in 1931, and Jews' continued efforts against restrictive quotas in the wake of World War II, the Holocaust, and the postwar European refugee crisis of the late 1940s to argue that Jews ceased to be associated with illegal immigration by becoming "white."

Garland poses two questions in the book: First, what was the social history of the quota laws and what impact did they have on people's lives? And second, how did Jewish immigrants come to be associated with, and then disassociated with illegal immigration and alien status? She asserts that the meanings of the quota laws were created through the actions of lawmakers, government officials, advocacy groups, smugglers, and immigrants themselves. Garland also argues that the "de-illegalizing" (p. 3) of Jews between the 1930s and 1950s was the result of "vigorous political efforts on the part of American Jewish citizens," who sought to distance Jewish immigrants from other immigrant groups, particularly Mexicans.

*After They Closed the Gates* is most interesting and most persuasive in addressing Garland's first question. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are populated with Jewish migrants creatively avoiding the quotas; Jewish legal, political, and social welfare organizations struggling to help their co-religionists while appearing to be law-abiding and loyal Americans; confused and overwhelmed bureaucrats, gangsters, bootleggers, and smugglers of various ethnic backgrounds exploiting a new market created by the quotas.

Garland's argument that Jews ceased to be seen as illegal aliens when they became "white" Americans is less convincing. While it is clear that Jews were associated with illegal immigration more than other Eastern and Southern European groups before the 1920s, and it is well established that Jews "became white" in the 1920s–1950s, the argument that these two phenomena were connected is not persuasive.

The weak link in Garland's story is chapter 5, which covers the fight against Michigan's 1931 alien registration law, a law that would have required all non-citizens to register with the state government. Garland repeatedly discusses Mexican and Chinese immigrants as "racial others" who were seen by white Americans and the federal immigration bureaucracy as "illegal immigrants," but Mexican and Chinese immigrants had very different immigration experiences under American law. Garland never acknowledges that Mexicans were legally white under the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and thus their failure to become white the way Jews (and Italians, Greeks, and Slavs) did is significant.

Rather than assuming that Mexicans had no opportunity to claim whiteness, Garland could have theorized why one group (Eastern European Jews) came to be seen as white while another group (Mexicans) did not.

Although *After They Closed the Gates* is supposed to cover 1921–1965, most of the book focuses on the 1920s and early 1930s. There is hardly any discussion of German Jews' efforts to escape Nazi persecution, and the discussion of the postwar Displaced Persons crisis of 1945–1947 is cursory and is crammed into the final chapter, which discusses Jewish activism against the 1952 Immigration Act and on behalf of the 1965 Immigration Act.

*After They Closed the Gates* rightly highlights the fact that the quota laws did not effectively end immigration but rather diverted some immigration streams into illegal channels. Yet the momentum of the story falters when Garland becomes diverted by theories of “whiteness,” “alienness,” and “illegal immigration.”

CHRISTINA A. ZIEGLER-MCPHERSON  
University of Bremen

FIONA I. B. NGÔ. *Imperial Blues: Geographies of Race and Sex in Jazz Age New York*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2014. Pp. x, 267. Cloth \$84.95, paper \$23.95.

*Imperial Blues: Geographies of Race and Sex in Jazz Age New York* is a welcome addition to a host of recent books on comparative racialization in the United States, such as Crystal Parikh's *An Ethics of Betrayal: The Politics of Otherness in Emergent U.S. Literatures and Culture* (2009), Julia H. Lee's *Interracial Encounters: Reciprocal Representations in African and Asian American Literatures, 1896–1937* (2011), Grace Kyungwon Hong's and Roderick A. Ferguson's edited collection *Strange Affinities: The Gender and Sexual Politics of Comparative Racialization* (2011), and Helen Heran Jun's *Race for Citizenship: Black Orientalism and Asian Uplift from Pre-Emancipation to Neoliberal America* (2011). Like Jun and Lee's work in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century racial formations, Fiona I. B. Ngô casts this history in the early twentieth century, in the particular locale of Jazz Age New York City. Part urban studies, part cultural history, part literary and cultural analysis, Ngô's work here pushes against reading the intersection of Asian American, Middle Eastern, and African American studies as only a flow of recognizably raced, or erased, bodies. Instead, it insists on what Ngô calls the “imperial logic” (p. 2) at work in the racialization of space, one that imbues music, dance halls, Harlem Renaissance writing, and art with a keen sense of the possibilities of invoking a broad specter of empire. Ngô locates aesthetic and material influence from diverse African, Asian, Middle Eastern, Latin American, and Caribbean sources, real or imagined, within the space of Harlem. At once dangerous and liberating, regulated and diffuse, imperial logic, for Ngô, offers a nuanced view of Harlem and Harlem Renaissance history. This subsection of New York City, contends Ngô,

was constructed by both outsiders and its own citizens through its relationship with empire, with such metaphors and allusions helping to locate Harlem both on “the razor's edge of illegality and degeneracy” (p. 162) and “as a spot of pleasure and importance” (p. 164). *Imperial Blues* then refuses the separation of transnational and domestic racialization processes. In this way, it contributes significantly to the field of American ethnic studies by arguing that the “transnational turn” in the field need not only mean studying American influence abroad, but how American, and in particular African American, spaces and subjectivities have been historically constructed through empire.

This book is ambitious in the scope of both its argument and its archive. In its attempt to do “more” than offer readings of representations of imperial objects and bodies—a commendable turn away from mimetic representation as the only recognizable object of ethnic studies—*Imperial Blues* organizes itself around, for instance, a news story and clippings about a white chorus-girl's murder, a popular musical number, and a satiric novel written and set in jazz age New York City, as well as night club history, and transcripts of police raids for impropriety replete with racialized, gendered, and sexualized types driven by the pseudo-science and sexology of the day. Ngô attempts to truly stage a scene of imperial logic, offering us a broad glimpse of Harlem's and jazz music's racial and sexual stakes and how they dovetail with imperial discourse in chapter 1, and a complication of this scene via a reading of black queer appropriations and approximations of this logic in chapter 2. Chapters 3 and 4 provide a background to orientalist imaginaries that fuel the city's various cultural activities—from ballrooms to the vibrant arts scene—and make a compelling case for the way these imperial logics undergird the search for American personhood in this era, in both appropriative as well as resistant ways. The reader may wish for a clearer argumentative thru-line for each complex iteration of imperial logic in individual chapters, but the payoff is chapters that offer a nuanced, variable slice of analysis that round out a cultural history of New York City that cannot be encapsulated in, say, a single chapter on jazz, on the regulation of dance halls and cabarets, or on writers Richard Bruce Nugent and Wallace Thurman, or, for that matter, on white women, black queer men, and black women's reuses of the signs of imperial logic as separate processes. Instead, Ngô's attention to varying aesthetic strategies in each chapter offers a way into the question of imperial presence in the artistic and cultural history of New York for truly interdisciplinary audiences across African American studies, modernist studies, urban history, American studies, and Asian American studies.

The book is particularly a way to open up African American studies to investigating the presence of empire at home, a reverse of Paul Gilroy's *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double-Consciousness* (1993), if you will, though Ngô could perhaps engage more deeply with an existing canon of African American and Asian



American scholarship on this era. Ngô is clearly inspired by the many genres and fluid aesthetic practices of Nugent, who she continuously foregrounds as an artist who self-consciously juxtaposes the exotic and the urban, the “orientalist”/“primitive” and the black/queer, in an effort to strike out of imposed limits on black subjectivity, including gender and sexual desire. In Nugent, Ngô finds a muse who does not, and in her readings, *cannot* merely appropriate the imperial for liberatory uses. Instead, she finds in his work the resignification of imperial logics for various Queer of Color Critiques, to rest on a construct from Roderick A. Ferguson that Ngô finds useful throughout the book, “mobilizing the modernist symbols of primitivism and orientalism as means of conveying the non-normativity of queer sexualities” (p. 79) and subjectivities. In locating Nugent as such, *Imperial Blues* recenters black queer aesthetic practices not just in the geography of Harlem, but also in the field of early-twentieth-century transnational American studies.

SAMANTHA PINTO  
Georgetown University

ANDREW T. DARIEN. *Becoming New York's Finest: Race, Gender, and the Integration of the NYPD, 1935–1980*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Pp. xx, 279. \$85.00.

A generation ago—in the wake of nationwide urban unrest nearly always rooted in animosity between police and minority neighborhoods—historians sought to answer larger questions about American society by looking at its police departments. But historians rarely loitered at the precinct level and, with a few notable exceptions, soon left twentieth-century police studies to criminologists, journalists, and legal scholars. Recently, mass incarceration—a state enterprise whose costs and consequences rival those of the New Deal—has propelled historians back to the station house. This return trip has begun with a slate of new studies focusing on big cities such as San Francisco (Christopher Lowen Agee's *The Streets of San Francisco: Policing and the Creation of a Cosmopolitan Liberal Politics, 1950–1972* [2014]) and New York (my own *The Last Neighborhood Cops: The Rise and Fall of Community Policing in New York Public Housing* [2011]). Among the new studies, Andrew T. Darien's *Becoming New York's Finest: Race, Gender, and the Integration of the NYPD, 1935–1980* seeks to understand how demographic shifts, civil rights, feminism, and identity politics converged to remake the New York Police Department. Darien weaves together stories familiar to those conversant with NYPD lore with newly unearthed evidence that will surprise even specialists, and he largely succeeds in locating the department's experience from the 1930s to the 1970s within the larger story of American social history. Less clear, however, is whether this deeper knowledge of the NYPD revises our understandings of the rights revolution, urban history, or race relations.

The experiences of African Americans, Latinos, and

women working to break into the NYPD's nearly all white male redoubt echoes those of outsiders attempting to enter many other exclusive workplaces at the time. The very arguments for increased diversity in the ranks that had been grounded in particular—and generally stereotyped—characteristics (women's presumed greater sensitivity; African Americans' presumed greater credibility in minority neighborhoods) often justified the new arrivals' ghettoization once inside. Likewise, just as the most powerful opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment often came from women who saw losses and not gains for themselves in a shifting of the gender order, efforts to expand the number of female beat cops faced significant organized resistance from the *wives* of current officers. The Policemen's Wives Association mobilized notions of domesticity to challenge progressive change and staged a two-hour protest march from police headquarters to City Hall in a failed bid to deny women spots on patrol duty. Darien provides other variations, specific to policing, on the era's established freedom-struggles narrative. Social science revealed both that little about the daily routine of patrol required physical prowess (and so simultaneously delegitimized male officers' sense of self and arguments against female officers) and documented that fear of police violence made law enforcement harder not easier (and so discredited arguments warning curtailing aggressive tactics would endanger law and order while at the same time also bolstering calls for minority recruitment). More sobering is the account of the ways in which increasing the ranks of black and Latino officers in New York ended up forestalling more progressive and comprehensive reform of racially biased policing. Darien also offers a useful corrective to existing civil rights accounts by arguing for the importance of black law enforcement officers in New York and elsewhere in such struggles. But he misses an opportunity—as evidenced by the absence of a conclusion to his otherwise compelling book—to rethink larger themes in postwar historiography through the rich lens of the NYPD.

FRITZ UMBACH  
John Jay College of Criminal Justice

JOSEPH F. SPILLANE. *Coxsackie: The Life and Death of Prison Reform*. (Reconfiguring American Political History.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. Pp. x, 296. Cloth \$44.95, e-book \$44.95.

Joseph F. Spillane's study of Coxsackie, a correctional facility located in upstate New York, presents a tragic portrait of twentieth-century prison reform that should be required reading for historians of juvenile and criminal corrections. Opened in 1935 as a reformatory for youthful offenders, Coxsackie became a testing ground for the ideas of a generation of reformers who believed prisons should provide rehabilitation and education rather than merely confinement and punishment. However, the reform experiment ran aground on the shoals of inadequate resources, indifferent elected officials,

hostile old-line prison administrators, and, most importantly for Spillane, the inability of the institution's leadership to adapt to changing social realities, particularly those stemming from racial and ethnic inequality. By the 1970s, under attack from the political Left and Right, and facing rebellions from inmates and prison guard unions, Cocksackie was converted to a medium-security prison, marking the transition to the era of mass incarceration.

Spillane, following the work of David J. Rothman, argues that the failure of prison reform was the inevitable result of a flawed attempt to make change within the confines of a "total institution" (p. 8). The enterprise began with great promise in the 1910s and 1920s. Led by correctional education advocates Thomas Mott Osborne and Austin H. MacCormick, reformers articulated an inclusive vision of prisoners as potential citizens who should receive educational opportunities, evoking John Dewey's notion of "learning by doing" (p. 22). Done properly, they contended, correctional education could prepare prisoners for "social citizenship" in a democratic society (p. 17). After Osborne's death in 1926, MacCormick became the leading figure in this movement, surveying hundreds of facilities around the nation and advising state governments on correctional reforms. In 1929, a series of prison riots in New York prompted Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt and his successors to authorize the construction of three reformatories that would offer educational programming, ostensibly in a less prison-like environment. The last of these reformatories, Cocksackie, was built without walls and was aimed at a distinct category of youthful offender between the ages of 16 and 21 years old. A reception center provided intake services for these offenders, placing them in a program of vocational and academic education that aspired to transform them into productive citizens upon their release. Cocksackie thus embodied the highest aspirations of liberal prison reform, which made its failure all the more painful.

Despite some successes, reform dreams became nightmarish realities in the daily operations at Cocksackie. Spillane deftly exploits a rich set of source materials, including inmate case files spanning several decades between the 1930s and 1960s. Separate chapters bring inmate experiences alive, detailing their backgrounds, daily routines, work, education, and parole experiences. No strangers to trauma and conflict by the time they reached Cocksackie, most youthful offenders were nevertheless ill-prepared for the brutality and racism that permeated the institution. Pronounced racial segregation and a racial caste system that advantaged whites over African Americans and Puerto Ricans structured daily life in Cocksackie. As a result, nonwhite inmates found themselves generally excluded from the educational programming envisioned by reformers. Guards hired from older state prisons brought the same brutal practices with them, beating and generally abusing inmates in a variety of ways. This racial divide worsened during the post-World War II era, with the arrival of more gang-involved offenders and heroin addicts.

Cocksackie administrators responded by transferring challenging youth to other institutions, resulting in a disproportionate "whitening" of the inmate population at a time when the overall inmate population was fast becoming majority minority. Despite its flaws, in its demography and mission, Cocksackie stood as an island in an increasingly punitive state prison system during the 1950s and 1960s.

Spillane usefully complicates the prevailing chronology of the emergence of mass incarceration. Cocksackie inmates began organizing protests of their treatment as early as the 1950s, roughly 20 years before the pivotal and better-known riots at nearby Attica State Prison. Habituated to the imperative for security and order, progressive-minded administrators responded with brutal suppression and defenses of abusive practices under the guise of rehabilitation. By the 1960s, liberal and conservative critics alike questioned the effectiveness of educational programming, citing a lack of research data on recidivism. A particularly fascinating (and tragic) figure was Robert Martinson, a left-leaning activist and criminologist who unwittingly provided ammunition for "law and order" conservatives in his strident denunciations of treatment-oriented corrections. Spillane's concluding chapters capture the painful irony of the Cocksackie experiment, which became indistinguishable from the mass-custody prison it had sought to replace, and provided cover for "get tough" opponents of rehabilitative corrections. *Cocksackie: The Life and Death of Prison Reform* thus presents a compelling cautionary tale that contemporary would-be reformers ignore at their peril, while offering important new insights for scholars.

WILLIAM S. BUSH

Texas A&M University-San Antonio

LINDSEY R. SWINDALL. *The Path to the Greater, Freer, Truer World: Southern Civil Rights and Anticolonialism, 1937-1955*. (New Perspectives on the History of the South.) Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2014. Pp. xii, 238. \$69.95.

The Southern Negro Youth Congress (SNYC) and Council on African Affairs (CAA) were two pivotal black-led organizations whose members worked to create global pathways for black liberation. In *The Path to the Greater, Freer, Truer World: Southern Civil Rights and Anticolonialism, 1937-1955*, Lindsey R. Swindall examines how these groups emerged out of the historical circumstances of the 1930s, continued to develop global antiracist ideas during the Second World War, and thereafter fell victim to postwar anti-communism. More specifically, Swindall seeks to explore how these activists and intellectuals conceived of the American South as part of the global struggle against the intertwined forces of fascism and imperialism.

The first two chapters outline the mobilization of the SNYC and CAA in the late 1930s and on the home front during World War II. These chapters delineate how both organizations navigated activist and government



networks to make President Franklin D. Roosevelt's rhetoric, especially his "Four Freedoms" speech, into a democratic reality. Swindall introduces the reader to some of the young and dynamic activists in the SNYC and then charts how they "conceptualize[d] . . . the American South as part of the African diaspora" (p. 64). Meanwhile, the CAA, from its "northern metropolis" (p. 51) base in New York City, sought to provide "accurate, up-to-date news from Africa" and to influence "public opinion about issues and events on the continent" (p. 49). Despite conservative opposition and the ideological rupture of the Hitler-Stalin non-aggression pact among the Popular Front leftists, both groups, according to Swindall, subsequently "mobilized energetically during the war years" (p. 103).

The next two chapters explain how each group fell apart amidst Cold War pressures that narrowed the range of permissible politics at home and abroad. The book's introduction argues that "[t]he year 1946 held promise" (p. 1) for these activists, but its later chapters indicate that as early as 1945 the "antifascist coalition" between the United States and Soviet Union "was beginning to unravel" (p. 105). Despite this descent, both groups seemed to generate some of their most significant moments of mobilization after the war. While the CAA survived longer than the SNYC, it too fell apart by the mid-1950s, and Swindall points out the paradox represented by the timing of the CAA's demise at a "promising moment for anticolonial movements on a world stage" (p. 154).

This book adds much-needed texture to the growing historiography on African American protest politics and the global understandings of racism during the 1930s and 1940s, but its use of sources, its conceptualization, and its conclusion limit its overall impact. First, while Swindall states that both organizations have "rich archives that deserve to be fleshed out more completely by scholars" (p. 6), her own work shows an overreliance on secondary sources, and as a result, she only superficially explores the grassroots organizing activities of SNYC that could be illuminated by the archival material she found. As Charles Payne and other scholars of the black freedom struggle have argued, mobilizing and organizing emerged from very different traditions. Excluding the latter limits Swindall to a top-down view of leaders' speeches and moments of assembly at the expense of highlighting grassroots activism. That said, Swindall's analysis of leaders' pronouncements (at conferences and through journalism) is more appropriate for the CAA, given that group's limited membership and educational focus on African politics.

Instead of examining the local activism of the SNYC across the South, Swindall juxtaposes it with the CAA. But by placing so much conceptual weight on this comparison, she circumscribes her book's explanatory potential. As Swindall admits, the two groups had some intergenerational contact and shared some ideas, but they diverged widely in terms of design, reach, and objectives. Her specific choice of the CAA is puzzling. If

one of the book's main points in examining these groups in tandem is that both prioritized the "global South," why include the New York City-based CAA (p. 7)? Swindall might have made conceptual use out of these geographical and organizational distinctions by comparing and contrasting their strategies in order to expose their parallels and divergences. Absent such analysis, the narratives of the two groups largely proceed on separate tracks.

Last, despite an introduction that argues the contrary, the book rests its claims for this earlier generation's significance by framing it as a prelude to the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Early on, Swindall approvingly quotes the historian Thomas Sugrue, who argued that the 1930s–1940s period of antiracist activism cannot be seen as simply a foreshadowing of "what was to come later" because the "emergence of interracial coalitions, an emphasis on the intersection of race and class, and the explosion of organized and unorganized protests give this era importance in its own right" (p. 8). But by interspersing anecdotal references to the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee throughout the book and by framing the Cold War as inevitable, Swindall falls back on teleological conclusions that these activists "prepared the way," "made important headway," and represented an "early instigator of future change," and laments that "[t]here were few tangible signs of change" until the 1960s (pp. 127, 128). Certainly these intergenerational connections matter and could have been explored in the epilogue, but not in place of sustained attention to how these activists interpreted their own experience and crafted their own vision in their own time. Given the recent work of Ira Katznelson and other scholars who have shown the potential for the deepening and spreading of international fascism in the U.S. South during this era, we might need to change our notions of what constituted success. Of course the CAA and SNYC thought they would accomplish more, and neither group anticipated the Cold War's destructive impact, but what if they and the rest of the Popular Front activist networks had not existed at all? We will never know, but perhaps battling southern fascism on what W. E. B. Du Bois called the international "firing line" (p. 4) of the U.S. South and emerging with some wins abroad and a draw at home was a greater victory than we have yet acknowledged.

ERIK S. GELLMAN  
Roosevelt University

AMY HELENE FORSS. *Black Print with a White Carnation: Mildred Brown and the Omaha Star Newspaper, 1938–1989*. (Women in the West.) Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013. Pp. xii, 241. \$30.00.

*Black Print with a White Carnation: Mildred Brown and the Omaha Star Newspaper, 1938–1989* explores the life of Mildred Dee Brown, the publisher and owner of Nebraska's longest running black weekly, the *Omaha Star*. In it, Amy Helene Forss depicts Brown as a heroine and a "fearless female gladiator" (p. 169).

Forss's first two chapters trace Brown's early life and career. Part of the Great Migration, Brown, a school teacher, and her husband, Shirley Edward Gilbert, left Alabama and settled in the Midwest. By 1938 they had founded the *Omaha Star*. The *Omaha Star* differed from the other black newspaper in town, the *Omaha Guide*. It published more local features about the African American community of North Omaha in addition to syndicated national news. This strategy ultimately allowed the *Star* to outlast the *Guide* and all other black weeklies in the state.

Chapters 3 and 4 consider Brown in her roles as editor, publisher, and businesswoman. As the sole owner of the *Star* after her divorce from Gilbert, Brown's importance as a role model grew. It was during this period that Brown sharpened her ideas and editorial policies. To combat the negative portrayal of African Americans in the mainstream press, the *Star* published only positive news about the African American community. While this approach opened the paper and Brown to criticism, Brown's method successfully created a record of African American club, church, professional, and business life in North Omaha.

While considerable segments of Forss's work recount the national civil rights movement, the most original writing in the volume appears in chapter 5, which focuses on the local movement. Forss provides a window into early civil rights protests in Omaha and the *Star*'s role as the movement's communication hub. Brown used her power as publisher to support the anti-segregationist Saint Martin De Porres Club. She embraced the interracial club and put her newspaper at the service of the campaign to desegregate Omaha, starting with publicly pressuring companies that denied employment to African Americans. The *Star* ran stories on African Americans' right to equal treatment under the law and featured news of De Porres Club demonstrations against local businesses. Brown also hosted club meetings at her place of business and hired De Porres Club members to work for her paper. The editor/publisher used the *Star* to promote demonstrations and to celebrate desegregation victories.

One aspect of Brown's legacy that warrants further research is her role as mentor of the many community youth whom she hired to deliver papers over the years. To young people, including founder and owner of Radio One, Cathy Hughes, Brown represented a professional black person who competed with the state's leading paper and who challenged the status quo and thrived.

Brown is presented here as the "black matriarch" and "protector of the black community" (pp. 2, 17). Forss situates Daniel Moynihan's discredited report *The Negro Family* as the subtext for her work. In her introduction the author argues against Moynihan's description of black matriarchs as debilitating to black men and the black community. However, Forss returns to Moynihan in her conclusion, reasserting the notion that strong black men and women cannot co-exist. The author describes Brown's disconnect with the black power

movement as caused by the "masculine deployment of power, punishment, and violence" (p. 147). But Forss's position that sexism forced Brown from the movement overlooks other African American women leaders in the Midwest during the 1950s and 1960s, including Leola Bullock of the Lincoln, Nebraska, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; Rowena Moore, initially a labor activist in Omaha—whose family owned the Malcolm X birth site—and who remained an activist for the remainder of her life; local human rights activist Alice Station; Dorothy Eure and Bertha Calloway, who participated in the De Porres Club protests and whose activism continued into the 1960s and beyond; and Andre Weatherby and Charlotte O'Neal, powerful women in the Black Panther Party in Kansas City, Missouri, to which the Omaha Black Panther Party and its affiliates were subordinates.

The 150 interviews conducted by Forss provide the basis for this narrative, but the author's interpretations are sometimes at variance with the conclusions voiced by Brown's contemporaries. Brown's increasingly conservative politics during the late 1960s and her middling posture between the white power structure, on whom she relied for advertisements, and the black community, on whom she relied for subscriptions, surfaces but is not investigated. Brown's elitism and separation from the black power movement are described as rooted in the male domination of the movement rather than attributed to fundamental ideological differences over the concept of self-determination. The author notes but ultimately disagrees with interviewees who suggested that Brown's activism ended because she feared the loss of white advertising dollars in the 1960s. Their firsthand perspective may warrant further study. Forss also includes very private information about Brown's family life in this work, which her subject, a woman very concerned about emphasizing positive news and African American professionalism, would likely abhor. These and other choices create a considerable gap between the narrative voice and Brown's voice, which appears in jingo and slogans but otherwise is relatively silent in this text. By printing positive news about the African American community of North Omaha, Brown combated the racialized and often criminalized imagery that the *Omaha World-Herald*, the state's most widely read mainstream newspaper, circulated. The sections on Brown's activism, the De Porres Club, and the early civil rights moment in Omaha, Nebraska, make this volume important for collections. This first biography on Brown, though, is not likely to be the definitive work on this worthwhile subject.

TEKLA ALI JOHNSON  
Southern Preservation Center

PAUL ALKEBULAN. *The African American Press in World War II: Toward Victory at Home and Abroad*. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2014. Pp. ix, 165. Cloth \$80.00, e-book \$79.99.



This engaging book adds to a growing body of scholarship on the black press and extends recent output on the genre of African American foreign correspondence. While Paul Alkebulan covers ground already examined in recent years, he provides a very good overview of the political, economic, and social conditions of blacks in the lead-up to World War II and the role of the black press during the conflict. Such context is important to understanding media, black, American, and international history.

The first two chapters look at how the black press championed the cause of equality in all segments of American and African American life. Coverage in *The Crisis* magazine, the official organ of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, as well as five premier black publications—the *Atlanta Daily World*, *Baltimore Afro-American*, *Chicago Defender*, *Norfolk Journal and Guide*, and the *Pittsburgh Courier*—are the lens through which Alkebulan makes his examination. The *Afro-American*, the *Defender*, and the *Courier* are well known for their coverage of the war, and the latter two are known especially for the Double V campaign that called for the United States to grant black rights at home as black troops fought for democracy abroad. The book also includes the *Atlanta Daily World*, whose war reporting has received less attention. These publications were very influential in the black community and were paid less attention by mainstream newspapers and the greater public.

Alkebulan illustrates how and why the black press addressed systemic structural racism simultaneously at home and abroad. Black newspapers pushed for blacks to serve in the military, challenged racism and segregated training camps when blacks were accepted for service, and then chronicled the discrimination many experienced while they were serving. At the same time, Alkebulan maintains that on the home front, black journalists, as advocates and reporters, were the “loyal opposition” who protested an unjust legal system, made the case for equal educational opportunity and pay for African American teachers, and urged political participation—particularly in the South—among other issues (p. 37).

One chapter in particular hones in on how the black press reported on and kept in the public sphere the heroic action of black seaman Doris “Dorie” Miller during the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. The goal was not only to challenge myths and stereotypes about blacks’ inability to serve in all areas of the military, but also to argue that black loyalty and bravery were representative of a people whose patriotism should be rewarded with equal rights and protection. Publicizing the training of the Tuskegee Airmen and reporting on their performance during combat also illustrated black preparation for military and civilian life.

Alkebulan notes that he did not focus on government-press relations, or on the experiences of black sailors and soldiers, but instead sought “to extend historical knowledge of the press by including coverage of the anticolonial movement in Africa, Asia, and the Ca-

ribbean” (p. 3). In the chapter titled “An End to Colonialism,” readers will gain perspective on how the black press focused on the shared identity of African Americans and non-white others to link the black quest for freedom at home with United States foreign policy and western imperialism. According to Alkebulan, the black press equated domestic civil rights struggles with anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, calling for change at home and abroad.

This examination of the African American press is as much about the home front as it is about overseas reporting. It shows the struggles blacks endured prior to and during the war through the lens of black journalists who brought the news to readers, chronicled discrimination and black achievement, sought to correct ills in American society, raised expectations for change following the conflict, and ultimately helped launch a civil rights movement.

This book would be ideal for history courses because it provides additional perspectives on a major period in American and world history. At the same time, it would be an ideal text for media history courses because it further elaborates on the pivotal role of a genre that is just gaining a place in the scholarship of the press.

JINX COLEMAN BROUSSARD  
Louisiana State University

J. E. SMYTH. *Fred Zinnemann and the Cinema of Resistance*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2014. Pp. xi, 317. \$60.00.

Do not expect this important book by film scholar J. E. Smyth to be the definitive biography of the Austrian-American filmmaker Fred Zinnemann. Comprehensive, this book is not. In the first two chapters, Smyth quickly recounts the prewar life of Zinnemann. The director migrated to the United States in 1929 and struggled for almost 15 years in the Hollywood studio system before directing a major film, *The Seventh Cross*, starring Spencer Tracy, in 1944. These years were an interesting time in the director’s life: Zinnemann collaborated with Robert Flaherty, Berthold Viertel, and Paul Strand; met Sergei Eisenstein and Vsevolod Pudovkin while in Berlin in 1930; shot several short films at MGM; and lost several family members to the Nazi camps. But this book does not mean to be a biography. Instead, *Fred Zinnemann and the Cinema of Resistance* is a most impressive interpretive essay on this filmmaker, based on thorough research in the Fred Zinnemann Papers at the Margaret Herrick Library of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences in Beverly Hills.

The new archival evidence allows Smyth to revise the critical appreciation of Zinnemann’s work. Despite earning four Oscars and multiple nominations in several film genres, the director was never the darling of cutting-edge critics. The influential Andrew Sarris saw him as a dutiful and skillful employee of the studio system rather than an auteur with individual style and thematic obsessions like his fellow Central Europeans,

Billy Wilder and Fritz Lang. For feminist Molly Haskell, Zinnemann's films also conformed to the rule of Hollywood's male chauvinism. Revising this storyline, Smyth indicates that while the director was a skillful negotiator and practitioner of big-budget cinema, he also possessed idiosyncratic political and aesthetic concerns. In particular, Zinnemann's cinema reveals his creative obsession with the theme of resistance against fascism and authoritarianism, his commitment to realism, and his deeply felt interest in the historical role of ordinary people and of women.

The book focuses mainly on eight films: *The Seventh Cross* (1944), *The Search* (1948), *High Noon* (1952), *From Here to Eternity* (1953), *The Nun's Story* (1959), *Behold a Pale Horse* (1964), *The Day of the Jackal* (1973), and *Julia* (1977). These films deal with a variety of topics, times, and nations, including Nazi Germany, occupied Belgium, colonial Congo, the American West, the American military, and France and Spain in the 1960s. According to Smyth there is a thread that links them all: Zinnemann had a capacious notion of anti-fascist resistance that linked the anti-Nazism of George Heisler (Spencer Tracy) in *The Seventh Cross*, with the solitary resistance of Will Kane (Gary Cooper) against what Smyth calls—somewhat imprecisely—“American fascism” (p. 120). Smyth's sophisticated historical and textual analyses reveal Zinnemann's style as subtle, complex, and often obliquely referential. In some of these films the direct confrontation with fascism and authoritarianism is hidden under metaphors (the hoodlums of *High Noon*, the Catholic Church of *The Nun's Story*) and the heat of war is displaced in the past (the Spanish Civil War of *Behold a Pale Horse*). But the moral necessity of standing against fascism dominates these works.

Zinnemann's cinema was also about reconnecting the history of antifascist resistance with its least-known victims and least-celebrated protagonists. *The Search* deals with the plight of postwar displaced and orphaned children and Zinnemann employed many of them as extras. Many women fought Nazism in Europe but Hollywood largely ignored them until Zinnemann and Audrey Hepburn gave screen presence to Marie Louise Habets in *The Nun's Story*. In one of the book's most provocative revisions, Smyth convincingly argues that, with the exception of *The Seventh Cross*, Zinnemann's cinema of resistance often cast women at its center. This leads her to reinterpret classic films and characters like Amy Kane (Grace Kelly) and Helen Ramírez (Katy Jurado) in *High Noon*, whom she sees as “two ‘active’ and even transgressive agents who pursue their own forms of independent judgment” (p. 112).

Smyth does not do much with the existing literature on Central European refugees in the United States. Without substantially altering her argument, engagement with this body of work would have allowed her to draw parallels between Zinnemann's cinema and the works of other refugees. The director's preoccupation in the early 1950s with American authoritarianism, in fact, echoes similar concerns voiced by Theodor W.

Adorno and Thomas Mann, or cast in film by Wilder and Lang, among others.

Smyth's book is aided by the fact that Zinnemann kept most of his records and that his papers offer “the most complete archival picture of a filmmaker's mind” (p. 235). But library riches are null without a talented interpreter. Smyth does not summarize archival discoveries; she uses these documents to interpret the films and illuminate their historical circumstances. The author has written a potent book that casts Zinnemann's cinema in the context of recent American and European intellectual and political history and reminds us that films and filmmakers are very relevant elements of both.

SAVERIO GIOVACCHINI  
University of Maryland

ERIN ROYSTON BATTAT. *Ain't Got No Home: America's Great Migrations and the Making of an Interracial Left*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014. Pp. xv, 233. \$32.95.

The largest internal migration in U.S. history occurred not during the widely studied African American migration or Great Depression, but during the 1940s, when more than 25 million white and non-white citizens—20 percent of the population—traveled to another country or state for military service or employment. Erin Royston Battat builds from this and other counterintuitive facts a provocative oppositional reading of American literature. In *Ain't Got No Home: America's Great Migrations and the Making of an Interracial Left*, Battat argues that the migration narrative, literally stories of people in motion, became a popular mode for leftist artists and writers advocating interracial working-class unity near mid-century. Mutually displaced and dispossessed by Jim Crow, the demise of sharecropping, the Depression, war, and economic trauma, black and white workers on the move became inspirational case studies in fiction, painting, and photography of how a failing capitalist system divided workers by race, and how interracial unity was their best weapon with which to fight back.

Battat's compelling book is undergirded by two recent trends in scholarship. The first is renewed attention to the Communist Party's Popular Front period in U.S. history as a high point for interracial organizing. The Popular Front's “Black and White Unite and Fight” slogan, Battat shows, helped attract black, Latino, and Asian proletarians fighting for a place in the U.S. labor market. It also galvanized a multiracial antifascist Left to participate in a movement for what it called “people's culture.” Artists, from white singer-songwriter Woody Guthrie to African American painter Charles Wilbert White, were compelled to the aesthetic and political orbit of the party. Battat in fact draws her title from Guthrie's musical lament for displaced sharecroppers: “‘Rich man took my home and he drove me from my door/And I ain't got no home in his world anymore’” (p. 5). Guthrie's theme of root-



lessness found echo in white, Midwest proletarian writer Jack Conroy and African American writer Arnaud "Arna" Wendell Bontemps's Works Progress Administration-supported joint-authored study of African American migration *They Seek a City* (1945). Conroy and Bontemps turned the national story of African American migration into a symbolic parable of Depression-era dispossession.

Battat's theme of integrated solidarity is also an appeal to literary critics to desegregate their work. Her study invites scholars to read African American migration stories as "proletarian," and classic migration narratives, like John Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath* (1939), against a wide backdrop of interracial labor organizing. For example, Battat offers as artistic hyperlinks to Steinbeck's portrait of white Okies the communist writer Sanora Babb's *Whose Names Are Unknown: A Novel* (2004), which features Oklahoma migrants to California who join the interracial labor struggle; Carlos Bulosan's autobiographical *America in the Heart: A Personal Story* (1943), dramatizing California labor battles led by Filipino and Mexican workers; and Farm Security Administration (FSA) photographs by Dorothea Lange of Japanese American agricultural workers in California during the 1930s. Lange's example is particularly instructive of Battat's thesis: her iconic 1936 photograph of a white California pea-picker, sometimes known as "Migrant Mother," for years occluded attention to her photographs of interned California Japanese, or FSA photographer Russell Lee's contemporary pictures of Native American mothers and daughters. Battat also shows how Steinbeck's symbolic use of the *pieta* motif at the end of *Grapes of Wrath*—Rose of Sharon breastfeeding a dying worker—was refashioned by radical women artists like Elizabeth Catlett, whose 1944 lithograph "Mother and Child" offered a stark portrait of a black mother protecting her son from lynching.

Battat also innovatively argues that the Scottsboro Boys case, through which nine African American youth were falsely accused in 1931 of raping two white women on an Alabama train, generated contested versions of the "hobo" during the Depression. She argues persuasively, for example, that William Attaway's neglected novel *Let Me Breathe Thunder* (1939) revises Steinbeck's *Of Mice and Men* (1937) and rewrites the lynching story of the Scottsboro case and offers the train car as a site of radical interracial unity. Here, "forced" migration and racism collude, as they did in the Communist Party's publicity in defense of the Scottsboro Boys, to raise the specter of interracial solidarity as a stay against capitalist "lynching" of workers.

Battat at times simplifies the history of U.S. communism, failing to note for example how the Popular Front's "no strike" pledges in support of the U.S. war effort alienated class militants. This helped generate migration narratives of failed interracial unity like Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man* (1952). Her study could also benefit from deepened analysis of labor movements and debate in leftist cultural journals like *New*

*Masses* about what constituted an effective workers' culture. Still, Battat has reminded us how central the communist Left was to African American literary production in the early twentieth century, and how integrated leftist culture truly was. The author also reminds us that a central task still facing scholars is to push past anti-communist paradigms for studying U.S. literature in order to let its own history breathe thunder.

BILL V. MULLEN  
Purdue University

JONATHAN SCOTT HOLLOWAY. *Jim Crow Wisdom: Memory and Identity in Black America since 1940*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013. Pp. xiv, 273. \$39.95.

Jonathan Scott Holloway's remarkable book, *Jim Crow Wisdom: Memory and Identity in Black America since 1940*, explores the specific ways in which African Americans in the mid- to late twentieth century forged social, economic, and intellectual identities in the face of a violent system intent on denying black humanity and erasing black historical memory. In doing so, Holloway unpacks the faulty intersection between "truth" and "memory," and analyzes how this uneasy coexistence has informed African American constructions of public and private identity. As he argues, "the literal truth is less important to me than the act of remembrance itself. This is the act that shapes a consciousness and an identity, and this is the act that I find most compelling in telling stories about the black past" (p. 9).

In each chapter, Holloway intertwines deeply personal reflections about his family history with the traditional historian's methodology of rigorous primary and secondary source research, an unusual technique, but quite effective in the context of this work. His conversations with relatives, his rereading of family letters, and his analysis of old photos leads to an interrogation of the "truth" of his own childhood memories (about subjects as varied as a trip to Colonial Williamsburg, or a neighborhood in Alabama where he lived as a child). This exploration then serves as a trigger point for Holloway's examination of issues such as the emergence of popular black periodicals like *Ebony*, the representation of African American history in museums, and the controversy surrounding the establishment of ethnic and African studies departments in universities.

Holloway argues that one way African Americans tried to forge a stable identity was to attempt to erase or silence memories that appeared less than positive or uplifting. For instance, Holloway documents the struggle of prominent African American authors, such as Richard Wright and James Baldwin, to publish material that members of the black middle class deemed to be more appropriate to "forget." By editing and erasing these discussions, middle- and upper-class African Americans believed they could "preserve their respectability in black America during an era of profound social, economic, and political change" (p. 15). This editing of difficult history and traumatic memory could be

both conscious and unspoken, a method of preservation of self and family that affected what Holloway's own parents told their children about race and family history.

Public historians will be particularly interested in Holloway's chapter on the ethical issues that arise when sites of difficult history are promoted as part of the local tourist economy. Holloway visited several African American museums that have been built upon what many African Americans consider to be "sacred ground," such as the Lorraine Motel in Memphis (now the National Civil Rights Museum) and the site of the first Woolworth's lunch counter sit-in, now the International Civil Rights Center and Museum in Greensboro, North Carolina. Holloway is critical of African American museums that must, inevitably, edit and, perhaps, self-censor their approach. He does, however, acknowledge the difficult ground that these sites must tread. As he states, "Sites of true horror—places where physical violence, cultural depravity, or moral failure made themselves known—are difficult to market, especially when visitors to these sites may view themselves as inheritors of the horror itself" (p. 200). Analysis of the work of the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience, which supports exhibits, conferences, archives, and projects across the globe related to difficult history, would extend Holloway's analysis of collective black memory into global memory/reconciliation.

There are several moments of humor throughout Holloway's writing, where the author's trenchant wit simultaneously unsettles and engages the reader. One example of this occurs in the epilogue, when Holloway is traveling to Ghana to visit Elmina Castle and the Cape Coast, the last places that slaves were held and tortured before their forced journeys. He recalls, "I still have to admit feeling a thrill the first time I looked at my in-flight monitor and discovered that my comfortable British Airways flight—bumped up to Premier Economy, thank goodness; it was almost a seven-hour flight, after all—was now in African airspace" (p. 215). While initially amusing, we pause over these words, and Holloway's unspoken reference to the far longer, anguished, deadly transatlantic journey that had taken place centuries before. Holloway's work represents a significant, and personal, contribution to the burgeoning field of memory studies, and black historical memory in particular, which scholars such as David Blight, James Oliver Horton, and Geneviève Fabre have established.

ANDREA A. BURNS  
*Appalachian State University*

HAL BRANDS. *What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2014. Pp. xiii, 273. \$29.95.

Hal Brands has written a good book on a timely, important subject: grand strategy. At a time when some policymakers and security studies scholars are questioning whether grand strategy is an illusion in the com-

plex world of international politics, Brands makes a compelling case for its necessity and utility.

As Brands says at the outset, grand strategy is a "notoriously slippery concept" (p. 1). In a masterful synthesis of existing literature—both by historians and security studies scholars—Brands fashions as good a working definition of grand strategy as we are likely to get. Grand strategy functions as an analytic framework that guides policymakers in employing the instruments of statecraft to promote core national interests. Grand strategy enables policymakers to set priorities among threats, and among competing interests and objectives. It is also an indispensable tool for matching ends and means, which is crucial because for all great powers, even one as dominant as the United States has been for most of the post-1945 era, resources are always scarce.

The four case studies that form the book's core are well researched and clearly presented. The chapter on the Truman administration—"often thought of as the golden age of American grand strategy"—presents a conventional view of U.S. policy during the 1945–1952 period (p. 17). Although George Kennan's "Long Telegram" and "X" article in *Foreign Affairs* set the U.S. on the path to containment, Harry Truman was challenged to give substantive content to that concept. Notwithstanding some missteps—especially over Korea—Brands renders a positive judgment of the Truman administration. Through the Marshall Plan and NATO the U.S. rebuilt Western Europe economically and guaranteed its security. The U.S. also transformed (West) Germany and Japan into allies.

The chapter on Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger is nuanced. Nixon and Kissinger assumed the foreign policy helm during the nadir of America's post-1945 geopolitical fortunes. While the U.S. was bogged down in Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union significantly enhanced its military capabilities and its influence in the Third World. Consequently, the "correlation of forces" was perceived to have shifted adversely to the U.S. (p. 119). Brands gives due credit to the intellectual boldness of the Nixon-Kissinger strategic vision: using the opening to China as leverage against the Soviet Union, and a "linkage" strategy to ameliorate Cold War tensions with Moscow (p. 69). Brands's verdict on the Nixon-Kissinger strategy is equivocal. Their style of conducting U.S. foreign policy was at odds with the democratic norms of American government. As a result, they could not command domestic support for détente. And while they extricated the U.S. from Vietnam, they were unable to secure domestic support for providing South Vietnam with the assistance that, in Brands's view, might have enabled it to survive after withdrawal of American forces in 1973.

In his chapter on the Reagan administration, Brands argues that although Ronald Reagan was not a conceptual thinker he did have an intuitive sense of how the U.S. could use its military and economic power to compel Moscow to adopt a more accommodating foreign policy, and ultimately to reduce Soviet power. The debates on Reagan's role, on whether the U.S. won the



Cold War or the Soviet Union lost it, are far from settled. But as Brands says, “Reagan *presided* over a truly astounding improvement in America’s geopolitical fortunes, a turnabout that most observers would have thought highly unlikely when he took office in 1981” (p. 103 [emphasis added]). According to Brands, Reagan’s contribution to this was to recognize that America’s hard (military, economic, technological) and soft (ideational) power were tools that could be used to force the Soviet Union—suffering accelerating economic decline—to moderate its behavior and reach diplomatic accommodations with the U.S. largely on Washington’s terms.

The case study on the George W. Bush administration deserves a book-length treatment. As Brands points out, when the administration took office there was every reason to believe that its primary focus would be on domestic policy. Similarly, there was no reason to believe the administration would pursue the kind of nation-building policies into which it stumbled in Afghanistan and Iraq. 9/11 changed that (or, for the “Vulcans” who held key national security positions in the administration, offered a pretext for changing that and, at the same time, pursuing their hegemonic ambitions [p. 149]). As Brands points out, Bush’s post-9/11 policy in the Middle East was fueled by the “grand ambition” of nation-building in Afghanistan and regime change and democratization in Iraq as a springboard for wider regional political transformation. These policies failed. As Brands correctly observes, although the Bush administration articulated extraordinarily expansive objectives, it failed utterly to devise policies to fulfill them. Its strategy could neither match ends and means, nor reconcile conflicting objectives. The Bush administration’s Middle East policy was fundamentally flawed because it was based on outsized aspirations: its “basic problem was not an absence of big ideas . . . the problem, rather, was that the ideas were simply too big from the start” (p. 189).

As is true of all good books, *What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* has weaknesses. A major one is the manner in which Brands depicts each of the four administrations studied as having a discrete grand strategy. This misses a key point: since World War II the United States has had a single grand strategy of primacy; that is, of exercising hegemonic power in the international system. And the tools of U.S. grand strategy have remained constant. To be sure, individual administrations have followed different policy approaches at times, but each has been committed to preserving “American leadership.” As Brands admits, even the Nixon-Kissinger retrenchment had the goal of restoring the U.S. to its central role in international politics. Although Brands does raise the issue of the economic costs of the policies pursued by Truman, Reagan, and George W. Bush, he does not give this issue the weight it deserves.

A second weakness is that Brands fails to consider whether there were grand strategic alternatives to pri-

macy that might have better served U.S. interests. He does not question the fundamental assumptions that have guided U.S. grand strategy since 1945. Consequently, in evaluating the record of the four administrations he studies, he does not come to grips with alternative approaches that might have yielded better outcomes. The so-called Truman Golden Age can be viewed as something quite different. A strong case can be made—and has, notably by Melvyn P. Leffler—that the Truman policies were a form of offensive realism. As such they heightened Moscow’s security dilemma and transformed the Cold War from a traditional great power rivalry into a virulent ideological competition.

Three other quick points. Reagan may have set the stage for a U.S. victory in the Cold War, but it could easily have turned out otherwise. His hardline policies, especially the Euro-missile deployments, nearly ruptured the transatlantic relationship, and U.S.-West German relations in particular. Had Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987–1988 offered German reunification on the basis of German neutrality, the Cold War might have ended quite differently than it did. Although Brands is critical of the George W. Bush administration, he is not critical enough. The invasion of Iraq—which destroyed the Iraq/Iran balance of power in the Gulf, and the domestic Shia/Sunni balance in Iraq—rivals Vietnam as the greatest grand strategic blunder in U.S. history. Contrary to what Brands says, the 2007 Bush/Petraeus “surge” was not a success because it failed to attain its stated goal of Shia/Sunni political reconciliation in Iraq. The surge’s failure set the table for the rise of the Islamic State. Consequently, instead of completing its military withdrawal from Iraq, the U.S. now is re-engaging.

This list is not exhaustive. Nevertheless, these weaknesses should not detract from the fact that *What Good Is Grand Strategy?* is an impressive and important book. It deserves a wide readership not only by scholars, but also by non-specialists interested in U.S. foreign policy.

CHRISTOPHER LAYNE  
Texas A&M University

MARTIN HALLIWELL. *Therapeutic Revolutions: Medicine, Psychiatry, and American Culture, 1945–1970*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2013. Pp. xiv, 382. \$62.50.

*Therapeutic Revolutions: Medicine, Psychiatry, and American Culture, 1945–1970* offers a sweeping account of the diverse ways postwar American culture represented developments in psychiatry. It relies on sources that extend from Hollywood film, popular journalism, and poetry to novels, sociological studies, and public policy statements. It moves from capsule histories of the ways that U.S. presidents from Harry Truman to Richard Nixon addressed issues relating to healthcare to discussions of motion pictures—like *Pride of the Marines* (1945), *Shock Corridor* (1963), and *Bob & Carol & Ted & Alice* (1969)—whose plots pivot around all manner of medical conditions with psychiatric implications

(from paralysis to paranoid schizophrenia) and therapeutic techniques (from electroshock to encounter group). The result is an expansive compendium that includes quite a few of the major milestones in postwar American culture.

In three sections, *Therapeutic Revolutions* seeks to offer a fresh periodization of the postwar era. The first section, "Fragmentation: 1945–1953," opens with a chapter that examines the "therapeutic function" of immediate postwar Hollywood films about the travails of wounded soldiers as they struggled to reconnect with the daily routines of civilian life (p. 43). A second chapter explores the phenomenon of film noirs that incorporated medical themes. A third chapter looks at Cold War science-fiction movies (like *The Day the Earth Stood Still* from 1951), and it interprets these films as mirrors of national anxiety at the prospects of nuclear annihilation. The book's middle section, "Organization: 1953–1961," focuses on the psychological stresses believed to bedevil the white-collar professional. This section additionally looks at how pharmaceuticals started being used with increasing frequency as a means to dull the psychic aches and emotional pains of suburban existence (and especially of suburban housewives). It also considers novels (like Richard Yates's *Revolutionary Road* [1961]) that drew exceptionally bleak portraits of (white) middle-class existence in the late 1950s. Further, it discusses the extensive cultural and medical chatter about a supposed epidemic in adolescent delinquency, and includes analyses of several iconic 1950s artifacts like Nicholas Ray's *Rebel without a Cause* (1955) and Allen Ginsberg's *Howl* (1956).

The third section of *Therapeutic Revolutions*, "Reorganization: 1961–1970," states that its intention is to provide "a balanced account of public health in the 1960s" (p. 204). It opens with a chapter that looks at cultural representations of the mental hospital, including classics like Erving Goffman's *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates* (1961) and Ken Kesey's *One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest* (1962). This section continues with an examination of how community health programs in the 1960s became "part of a concerted attempt to return the human face to medicine as a caring profession" (p. 235). Halliwell outlines how semi-autobiographical novels like Sylvia Plath's *The Bell Jar* (1963) and Joanne Greenberg's *I Never Promised You a Rose Garden* (1964) represented the treatment of women and girls for mental illnesses in the 1950s and 1960s. And he concludes the book with a chapter on the counterculture and its contradictory views on how best to do therapy; while psychologist Timothy Leary called for everyone to drop LSD as the means to heal social ills, many in the human potential movement sought self-fulfillment in holistic, drug-free practices.

There are evocative moments throughout *Therapeutic Revolutions*. It is good to be reminded of President Harry Truman's efforts in the late 1940s to reform (or socialize, as his detractors declared) the national healthcare system (p. 19). It is horrifying to hear how

"flash burn experiments" in the 1940s and 1950s exposed "poor black college students, hospitalized patients, and prisoners" to radiation in the alleged interests of medical science (p. 80). And it is timely to be reminded that total legal restrictions on abortion during the Cold War hardly prevented (as Alfred Kinsey estimated) approximately a quarter of women of child-bearing age from having "had at least one induced abortion" (p. 163). Also important are many of the summaries of cultural texts, like the Broadway play *Tea and Sympathy* (1953) with its strong hints of homoerotic desire. And it is darkly amusing to learn that already in the Eisenhower years, rumors circulated that Vice President Richard Nixon might have suffered from "a borderline personality disorder" (p. 166).

*Therapeutic Revolutions* is a capacious book, even as its conclusions are not clearly declared. It opens with the view that "[t]he cultural history of mental illness in the United States since World War II is marked by both progress and stasis" (p. ix). It ends with an assertion "that the longer history of healthcare in the United States is shot through with moments of optimism and instances of deep pessimism, in which it is often hard to separate out progressive from realistic perspectives and where the politics of therapy are always open to debate" (p. 299). As it is, though, *Therapeutic Revolutions* remains a useful and frequently entertaining synthesis.

MICHAEL E. STAUB

Baruch College, City University of New York

MATTHEW W. DUNNE. *A Cold War State of Mind: Brainwashing and Postwar American Society*. (Culture, Politics, and the Cold War.) Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013. Pp. xii, 281. \$27.95.

Contemporary cultural observers might be forgiven for assuming that a study of brain warfare belongs to the expanding corpus of works on the zombie apocalypse now appearing in twenty-first-century American literature, television, and film. Thanks to Rick Grimes and company in Robert Kirkman's graphic novels and in the accompanying AMC television series *The Walking Dead* (2010–), Americans have been schooled with a new knowledge of brain warfare, whereby the only way to stop zombies for eternity entails kill shots to the brain, whether by guns, knives, machetes, swords, or hardcore boot stomping. Although gruesome in their own way, the forms of brain warfare actually discussed in Matthew W. Dunne's *A Cold War State of Mind: Brainwashing and Postwar American Society* appear somewhat mild by comparison. His ruling concept is brainwashing, and he initially focuses on communist efforts to turn American prisoners of war (POWs) during the conflict in Korea through such methods as indoctrination, reeducation, psychological torture, isolation, and sleep deprivation. One metaphor employed in the 1950s to describe an American POW in the Korean War, though, especially if he refused repatriation to the United States, was "zombie" (p. 91).



While mercifully lacking the visceral grotesqueness of zombie brain killing, Dunne's account of brainwashing does convincingly demonstrate the nefarious and insidious elements of brain warfare, and the dehumanizing uses to which it was put by the forces of both communism and democracy in the early years of the Cold War. According to Dunne, the concept of brainwashing evolved throughout the 1950s and early 1960s into a cultural force mirroring multiform American anxieties and informing Cold War military, cultural, and political discourses. Its trajectory likewise morphed in American perceptions, from its origins in the Korean War as a foreign weapon of mental coercion deployed against American POWs to its discursive invasion of the domestic spaces of the United States, where it assumed mind-controlling democratic-capitalist forms. Dunne organizes his treatment of brainwashing around this transformation. The first part of his analysis focuses on brainwashing as an external communist threat that nonetheless forced a reevaluation of the American character, and the second part hones in on the myriad American incarnations of mind control and the consequent threat to American individuality and autonomy. Because this latter section feeds off and from an existing critical scholarly recognition of American conformity and consensus in the 1950s—when suburban homogeneity, advertising's "hidden persuaders" (employing subliminal suggestions), and mass media manipulation produced robotic, other-directed organization men outfitted in gray flannel suits—it is the previous exploration of Korean War POWs that especially propels the power and intrigue of brainwashing in this study (p. 5).

Dunne, in essence, dissects some of the real-life incidents and ideas that informed Richard Condon's 1959 novel and the 1962 film *The Manchurian Candidate*, albeit without the film's satirical flourishes. As the conflict in Korea neared its negotiated end and prisoner exchanges between combatant nations began, 23 American POWs sent shock waves through the American military and American society by refusing repatriation to the United States. While two of these POWs ultimately returned, the other 21, along with POWs earlier in the war who had written or recorded pro-communist statements, including two captured Air Force pilots who had radio transmitted confessions of American war crimes, not only provoked a national conversation about communist mind control weapons like brainwashing, but also sparked a generalized military and cultural suspiciousness about the mental and physical strength—and patriotism—of all the POWs (and by extension, all American soldiers in Korea). Brainwashing, once condemned as a cruel North Korean and Chinese technique of psychological torture, became a means by which to condemn POWs for their softness and willingness to collaborate with the enemy. Blame for this susceptibility to brainwashing spread through many facets of American life, including mothers who coddled their sons, a military system lacking preparedness for such a psychological battlefield, and a generation of sol-

diers suffering from a crisis of masculinity and lacking the physical and mental fitness necessary for war.

The excessive negativity attached to Korean War-era POWs and soldiers offers a fascinating opportunity to investigate how that war revealed the relatively unsavory fashion by which Americans tried to adjust to the new realities of a frustrating Cold War. Perhaps aligning themselves with the previously dismissed from service General Douglas MacArthur (never discussed by the author), who famously and recklessly believed there was no substitute for victory, even in the nuclear age, Americans appeared to have molded prisoners and soldiers into scapegoats for the stalemate in Korea. Dunne's analysis foregrounds the discourse on brainwashing to serve as an effective medium for assessing such American concerns about the Cold War security of the American mind and body, despite Dunne's underlying worry throughout his text about the legitimacy and respectability of brainwashing as a viable psychological or historical tool.

Dunne notes how some scholars have dismissed brainwashing as a "cultural fantasy" (p. 49), and he acknowledges how science has discredited overt mind control to the point where it has been "relegated . . . to tinfoil hat territory and the margins of mainstream political discourse" (p. 234). Nonetheless, the author has certainly demonstrated the discursive and metaphoric persuasiveness of brainwashing in the early Cold War, and his argument for its continued relevance in the contemporary era of the War on Terror likewise has merit. Dunne does not situate brain warfare in the current cultural renaissance of zombies, but other events after this study's publication have conspired to highlight in a disturbing manner the continued employment of brainwashing techniques from the Korean War. The December 2014 Senate report on the Central Intelligence Agency's use of torture after 9/11 exposed how that agency applied so-called enhanced interrogation techniques that derived from the very Chinese and North Korean methods that had elicited confessions from American POWs during the Korean War.

MARGOT A. HENRIKSEN

*University of Hawai'i at Mānoa*

ROBERTA GOLD. *When Tenants Claimed the City: The Struggle for Citizenship in New York City Housing*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2014. Pp. xi, 330. \$55.00.

AMY L. HOWARD. *More Than Shelter: Activism and Community in San Francisco Public Housing*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014. Pp. xix, 308. Cloth \$82.50, paper \$27.50.

Amy L. Howard and Roberta Gold share a common goal of evaluating the efficacy of citizen activism in postwar urban social policy. Both authors consciously build on studies by scholars such as Rhonda Y. Williams and Lisa Levenstein, who have foregrounded the politicization of many city dwellers, particularly women,

as a result of engaging in “bread and butter” issues such as housing and welfare.

Howard’s *More Than Shelter: Activism and Community in San Francisco Public Housing* begins with a long-term administrative overview of the trials and tribulations of the San Francisco Housing Authority, one of many mismanaged American big city housing authorities. After setting the context of dysfunction at the top, she devotes most of her readable, well-researched book to three detailed chapter-length case studies of public housing projects in San Francisco from their inception to the present. The individual projects chosen as representatives possess, at least for public housing, distinct design strategies, demography, neighborhood contexts, and management issues. Howard’s focus in all of the case studies is on the relative ability of residents to overcome underlying social and administrative problems in order to create quality neighborhood life.

The comparatively creative architecture of San Francisco’s public housing, and relative ethnic diversity (compared to most American big cities), will come as a surprise to many. Latinos and Asian Americans, for instance, shared San Francisco’s public housing system with African Americans. Yet the better design, siting, and comparative ethnic diversity did not prevent the development of various and serious social and management issues, most of which had to do with dysfunctional city-wide management, broader social problems, and punitive federal housing policies. Howard’s findings are instructive for those who believe that “grassroots” can always positively influence social policy. Despite a range of activism over many decades, residents in two of her three case studies (in the otherwise gentrified Mission District and North Beach) failed to maintain control or secure funding for adequate maintenance. The one housing project that survived, located in Chinatown, benefited from powerful external support, and Asian solidarity, that aided in maintenance and extra funding.

San Francisco’s public housing administrators (since the 1990s) systematically emptied out the Mission District and North Beach projects and then made various deals with remaining residents to get them to leave. Administrators then knocked down and redeveloped the sites, creating “mixed-income” communities that included many new public housing apartments; for various reasons, however, comparatively few of the original, long-term residents moved back in (at one project there was only a 36 percent return rate). For housing-policy specialists, the book’s cursory treatment of the complexity and conflict over redevelopment will be frustrating. Howard seems reluctant to acknowledge the mixed social and economic results, now widely documented, of public housing redevelopment.

Roberta Gold, in a much longer, more detailed, but equally engaging study, takes as her subject the history of tenant activism in New York City as a whole; as a result, individual places receive far less detailed treatment than those in San Francisco. Gold’s focus is on describing the strategies, laws, and organizations of

mostly leftist, female housing activists from the 1940s to the 1970s (primarily). Gold has a good feel for the racial, ethnic, and political complexity of New York City that comes through in the text; the level of detail including personalities and organizational acronyms may, however, be somewhat tedious for non-New Yorkers and undergrads. Yet Gold deftly weaves together activist stories, housing and community-planning history, changing social conditions, and the existing literature from many fields—including women’s studies, urban policy, sociology, African American history, and labor studies—to create a compelling narrative.

Many political historians will be impressed by the degree to which some New York communist organizers survived the Red Scare of the 1950s by funneling their energies and organizational abilities into the field of housing activism. Gold finds that, despite losing many battles, leftist New York activists sustained a pro-renter city at a time when most Americans celebrated homeownership as the dominant ideal. Among the accomplishments was early resistance to the most destructive and segregationist urban renewal strategies; maintenance of rent control longer than most cities; additional housing enforcement for slum landlords; and, in the long term, some tenant-activist inspired or organized housing projects. The book as a whole demonstrates that these New Yorkers, even in the height of the post-war suburban consensus, created an alternative sense of place and political economy.

Gold acknowledges that the most radical approaches—squatting, rigorous building enforcement, and some constructive building projects—did not enjoy the same success as battles for rent regulation or a few clear, high-profile victories over urban renewal plans. Even the best organizers had to face the entrenched power of private property and politicians beholden to wealthy owners. Nor did many of the battles against urban renewal necessarily translate into benefits for the initially displaced poor and minorities. In the long term, she also acknowledges that activists since the 1970s have lost significant ground in terms of affordability; after all, social policy, including the ebbing of rent regulation, now favors neoliberal interests and policies to encourage gentrification.

Gold’s research illustrates the perils of a confrontational approach. Rejection and/or exclusion from mainstream power structures deprived activists of the resources and the significant political power enjoyed by property owners and allied political figures. As a result, activists were usually reactive to serious problems, and frequently too weak or too late to make a real difference in major issues such as urban renewal/redevelopment, city-wide housing abandonment, housing supply generally, and building maintenance. They also frequently ceded “constructive” social policy, the creation of new government subsidized housing, to those with more traditional views of family, decorum, and social organization (such as religiously affiliated community development corporations) that has given the post-1970s housing network a more socially conservative,



middle-class affect. In New York today, for instance, very poor and homeless families are on the margins of housing policy and provision because of their lack of income and their tremendous and very expensive social needs. Because of the lack of a broad social democratic or socialist movement in the United States, even in most liberal American cities, it is hard to imagine an alternative path that, as in Europe, would have given leftist activists the powers and resources to create a closer version of their all-inclusive social utopia.

NICHOLAS DAGEN BLOOM  
*New York Institute of Technology*

PETER BACON HALES. *Outside the Gates of Eden: The Dream of America from Hiroshima to Now*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014. Pp. 471. \$40.00.

In this new work, Peter Bacon Hales mines a terrain well dug before, in part by himself in his earlier *Atomic Spaces: Living on the Manhattan Project* (1997). To premise a book on the importance of the bomb and the suburb to postwar American culture risks consignment to the flames of obviousness, redundancy, and critical dismissal. Although she is never cited (and once or twice really should have been) in the text proper, Elaine Tyler May broke a lot of this ground in 1988 with *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*, and studies detailing the relationship between the postwar atomic and suburban—as Hales phrases them, the “American nightmare and the American dream” (p. 1)—have only, well, mushroomed since then.

What an author on this subject must do, therefore, is locate and arrange in innovative, necessary ways historical artifacts attesting to the importance of these formative postwar phenomena. Overall, *Outside the Gates of Eden: The Dream of America from Hiroshima to Now* does a striking job of locating, arranging, and interpreting said artifacts, and thereby increasing our understanding of those founding phenomena. Even in the introduction, the bomb-suburb trajectory gets crossed (and crisscrossed) with the related trajectories of technology (as the bomb was a major breakthrough in twentieth-century technology) and spatial arrangement (as the suburb revolutionized twentieth-century social configuration). For those desirous of a fifth ball in the air, Hales informs us that “stages” will be a recurring theme—both stages of development from 1945 to the present day and stages upon which Americans have pictured themselves in this same span—in media from magazines like *Life* and *Time* to video games such as *Fallout* and *The Sims*. Although this is more implicit than explicit at any point, staging has therefore both a temporal and a spatial aspect, and both the temporal stages of cultural development and the spatial stages on which to view the national self are importantly built upon ever more sophisticated (though not necessarily more revealing or flattering) media-mirror technologies, from black-and-white photography to television productions (both documentary and fictional), from transistor radios to video games. Though he also prom-

ises to include overarching analyses of white and black, male and female, and older and younger American experiences in this period, these are maybe too many balls to keep aloft; the first two contests are treated perfunctorily—with a short chapter on African American Levittowners and an assuredly remarkable discussion of *I Love Lucy* (1951–1957) sufficing for each. In fact, Hales seems mainly interested in the way new generations grew up, grew old, and got supplanted by yet-newer ones, perhaps because of the dovetailing here with his abiding interest in evolving technology: older folks (and younger kids) watched network television while teenagers plugged in to transistor radios; then the Internet hit (or maybe it was just the loss of the Al Gore presidency) and those generation-defining media and the content they once provided gave way to myriad atomistic entertainments that remarkably both young and old (the author himself serving as Exhibit A) addicted themselves to and bonded together over.

The book’s 17-chapter structure is unique in this genre and might have been effectively traded for four or five large sections (e.g., bombing the “Wild West” from Japan to Western Long Island; TV in the home and the home on TV; technologies in space from “still” photography to Telstar, etc.) that did more to organize and synthesize what is now a thematic roller-coaster ride. These 17 chapters vary widely in length and scope and connect to the text’s main themes sometimes only in the final paragraphs and often idiosyncratically. I felt farthest down the garden path during the over-long discussions of popular music, specifically chapters on Bob Dylan and Jimi Hendrix, but with plenty said about Carole King and Gerry Goffin, Little Eva, the Beach Boys, and many others. While it is entirely likely that the “guitar effects, notably swirls of feedback . . . Appalachian modalities . . . Eastern scales and hints of the raga forms that had very recently infiltrated English pop music” influencing Hendrix’s style (p. 302) bear tremendously on the book’s overarching questions, the connections are never quite clear. Hales’s deep affinity for popular music is a hindrance here, as the note-by-note read-through of various lyrics and arrangements was, to this non-reader of *Rolling Stone*, well-nigh unreadable. Bumps in the road such as those aside, Hales brings remarkable incisiveness to his subject matter: the suburban dream in the oddly urban *Miracle on 34th Street* (1947) (a contest restaged on the small screen in *I Love Lucy*), the damage done to American faith in atomic preparedness (not to mention those poor mock-up houses and beleaguered mannequins on the Yucca Flats) when a propaganda documentary dissolved into traumatizing snapshots of utter destruction, the transistor radio that defined a generation by moving it out of the living room and into “the streets,” fought over by this ever-radicalizing youth counterculture and a repressive state apparatus to a bloody culmination at Kent State University. Though many of the landmarks visited here are regular stops in postwar studies texts

like *Outside the Gates of Eden*, the connections made and the nuances illuminated are worth the trip.

JACQUELINE FOERTSCH  
University of North Texas

W. HENRY LAMBRIGHT. *Why Mars: NASA and the Politics of Space Exploration*. (New Series in NASA History.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. Pp. x, 320. \$49.95.

During a session on space history at the 2015 American Historical Association Annual Meeting, an audience member asked the panelists whether they felt marginalized among the broader historical community, or if their panel's presence at the conference indicated a growing acceptance of space history as a valuable field of historical inquiry. It was a revealing question. While space histories routinely enjoy enviable popular audiences, few have had much influence on academic historians who do not write directly on the subject.

Such historians may wonder: why Mars? Not why *explore* Mars, but why *study* its exploration? It is, after all, literally a world removed from more pressing historical concerns, concerns of humanity, which are earthly in nature. W. Henry Lambright takes for granted that Mars exploration is a worthwhile endeavor. His goal in *Why Mars: NASA and the Politics of Space Exploration* is to show how advocates since the late 1950s have encouraged the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to elevate Mars exploration over other priorities such as human space flight, space telescopes, outer-planet probes, and satellites for studying climate change on Earth. The result is "a political history of the Mars program" that is decidedly earth-bound, focused less on Mars than on the decision-making and political battles that have led to its robotic exploration (p. ix).

By examining the long history of Mars exploration, Lambright reveals not only its ups and downs, but also the factors behind each major decision and the consequences of NASA's various successes and failures. There is broad (albeit fairly shallow) public interest in Mars, and although it is hardly a pressing concern to most Americans, advocates have been able to use this general curiosity to push NASA, Congress, and the White House to finance robotic missions, especially those that search for signs of life, which has been the most publically compelling reason for exploration and the most effective argument for additional funding over the years.

At moments of high public interest in Mars, advocates have greater sway over NASA's priorities, and NASA can more successfully appeal for increased budgets. Such was the case in the 1990s—when scientists reported signs of fossilized life on a Martian meteorite and millions upon millions of people used the Internet to follow the progress of the first Mars rover, Sojourner—and again in the 2000s when the Spirit and Opportunity rovers beamed back valuable scientific findings along with astonishing images of the Martian surface.

But it was not an easy path to our current "golden era of Mars exploration" (p. 4). The program fell on hard times in the post-Apollo 1970s, especially after Mariner probes in the 1960s seemed to reveal a dead world little different from the Moon. After the one major success of the decade—the 1976 Viking landers—failed to find unambiguous signs of life, Mars exploration faded as NASA focused on the shuttle program that debuted in the 1980s. But Mars advocates persisted, and eventually pressured NASA and Washington to fund a steady run of orbital and terrestrial missions that, although not without setbacks, revived public excitement and in turn facilitated continuing attention from NASA.

Lambright's greatest achievement here is revealing the different coalitions of Mars advocates over the decades—hodgepodes of NASA officials, scientists, technicians, and often-sparring field centers, all influenced by external scientists, hardware suppliers, advocacy groups like the Planetary Society, and media-friendly figures like Carl Sagan and Bill Nye the Science Guy—and tracing their long, evolving struggles to ensure Mars remained a major focus of NASA in the face of shifting political environments, budgetary fluctuations, and advocacy for competing exploration programs. He also uses Mars exploration to shed fresh light on a central issue in federal "big science" policymaking: "how to maintain a long-term, large-scale, high-risk, and expensive federal research and development (R&D) program in the face of competing scientific, bureaucratic, and public priorities and ever-changing political winds" (p. 4).

However, Lambright falls short in relating this story to the larger history of the past half-century—alas, a characteristic of much space history, and one reason the field has had little impact on the historiography of recent U.S. history. The politics explored here are narrow, and primarily concerned with federal space policy and priority battles within NASA, such that the bigger political picture too seldom comes into focus. For example, rather than analyzing national developments in the 1970s that might help explain why Jimmy Carter, a Mars "buff," nonetheless declined to support its exploration in his budgets, Lambright is content to simply declare Carter an "enigma" before returning once again to internal NASA priority jockeying (p. 78). Delving more deeply into broader political (and even social) issues and relating them to Mars exploration might have resulted in a work with more appeal to non-space historians.

In other words, *Why Mars* will not likely sway those unsure of space history's relevance to more general U.S. history. But such is not Lambright's ambition, and he has written a thorough historical examination of Mars exploration that readers interested in space history, the politics of NASA, and "big science" public policy will find most valuable.

MATTHEW D. TRIBBE  
University of Connecticut



SOOJIN PATE. *From Orphan to Adoptee: U.S. Empire and Genealogies of Korean Adoption*. (Difference Incorporated.) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014. Pp. 210. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$25.00.

Until recently, the adoption of children from non-Western countries by Western parents was not on the research agenda within the academy at large, and those few scholars who even bothered to mention and look at this somewhat peculiar mass movement of children between continents also symptomatically named it the quiet migration. Researchers did not even know how to understand this practice: for psychologists, medical doctors, and social workers it was a child welfare intervention and solely a reproductive technique, while for others it was a forced child migration or even a lingering colonial-style trafficking in human beings. Although the placement of children for adoption between races, cultures, countries, and empires is hardly a new phenomenon, the scale and the institutionalization that was initiated in the postwar period and that peaked in the 2000s with 30,000–40,000 adoptions annually, according to the demographer Peter Selman, must be said to be unprecedented in human history.

Even if the birth of transnational or international adoption can be traced back to the colonial period and to the two world wars when children were transported back and forth over vast distances as part of imperial settler programs and philanthropic rescue operations, the modern form of transnational adoption is intimately linked to the aftermath of the Korean War, as well as to subsequent postcolonial conflicts in the Third World during the Cold War. The Republic of Korea, henceforth South Korea, was not only the birthplace of transnational adoption in its current version, but it is also the country that has adopted out the highest number of its children—upward of 200,000 to around 15 different Western countries—and its adoption program has also functioned uninterrupted since the 1950s.

In spite of its history, it took many years before any historical theses and monographs took on the subject of transnational adoption in general and Korean adoption in particular. Soojin Pate's *From Orphan to Adoptee: U.S. Empire and Genealogies of Korean Adoption* is therefore a welcome contribution to the history of Korean transnational adoption, which is based on archival sources and makes use of theoretical perspectives such as critical race theory and postcolonial feminist studies. This work joins those by scholars such as Christina Klein, Arissa Oh, Catherine Ceniza Choy, Karen Balcom, Susie Woo, and Eleana Kim who all have touched upon and studied various historical aspects of Korean adoption.

In her study, Pate focuses on the crucial and initial years of transnational adoption from Korea in the 1950s and 1960s, which primarily were a Korean-U.S. affair, and that at least in the beginning mainly concerned mixed-race children. Pate's empirical material and primary sources derive from archives such as the Social Welfare History Archives in Minneapolis, congressio-

nal and military documents as well as news reels from the Department of Defense, newspapers and magazines, and adoption agency material. Pate's interest is not however to map out and narrate the full history of transnational adoption from Korea as it developed in the aftermath of the Korean War and as a result of the continuous presence of the U.S. Army within the country. Instead, Pate's point of departure is to write a genealogical study of the first decades of Korean transnational adoption in a Foucauldian sense, within the framework of U.S. militarism and empire-building and "Cold War Orientalism," a term that Christina Klein has coined to describe the colonial-like U.S.-Asian relationship during this time period.

By using concepts such as a "militarized humanitarianism" and a "militaristic gaze," Pate is able to show how Korean children in postwar Korea became desirable, marketable, and adoptable for U.S. and Western adoptive parents, as they were understood within the context of racialized ideas of docile Asian bodies who were in need of protection and care as well as being assimilable in contrast to, for example, African American children. Pate also emphasizes the gendered characteristics ascribed to Korean boys and girls: While Korean boys tended to become mascots for soldiers and oftentimes were even dressed up as small child soldiers, Korean girls could be turned into dolls, as they were sometimes dressed up as small entertainment women and photographed and filmed while singing and dancing. This portrayal of Korean girls illustrated Americans' Orientalizing sexual fantasies.

The book is divided into five chapters. The last chapter differs from the previous ones as it consists of a critical reading of Jane Jeong Trenka's acclaimed *The Language of Blood: A Memoir* (2003). In this concluding chapter, Pate is able to convincingly link her analysis of the historical material from the 1950s with the contemporary story of a Korean adoptee who grew up in Minnesota and who experienced to the very same Orientalizing desires and fantasies that constituted the very beginning of transnational adoption from Korea.

Soojin Pate's *From Orphan to Adoptee* problematizes the category and the position of the "social orphan" and complicates how Third World children are turned into adoptable and desirable children within the framework of the U.S. militarized imperialism of the Cold War. The book is a valuable contribution to the study of the birth of transnational adoption in Korea. However, the full history of transnational adoption from Korea and elsewhere is yet to come, as it requires access to archival material that is not always easily accessible and that is written in several different languages. Because transnational adoption as a global practice is dramatically waning in numbers currently, it is my hope that a historian will at least try to take on this endeavor in the future and write the history of transnational adoption from the 1950s to the present.

TOBIAS HÜBINETTE  
Multicultural Centre, Sweden

E. WAYNE CARP. *Jean Paton and the Struggle to Reform American Adoption*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014. Pp. xvii, 403. Cloth \$60.00, e-book \$50.00.

Shortly before her death in 2002, Jean Paton, adoption reform advocate for almost a half century, offered historian E. Wayne Carp full access to her papers. It was, Carp notes, “a biographer’s Eldorado” (p. xii). In addition to almost 50 boxes of letters, there were memos of phone conversations, letters from members of the adoption triad, and newsletters from across the country. The result is a detailed, sometimes overwhelming, account of the woman many have referred to as the “mother of adoption reform.”

Paton’s unmarried mother gave Paton up for adoption in 1909. When Paton’s adoptive father died she was placed in foster care for seven months and then adopted again. In her forties she sought for, and found, her birth mother. While Paton’s ideas of how to deal with the problems created by adoption changed over time, she always maintained that separation from one’s birth family created trauma that could only be healed by searching for one’s birth family, that the stigma of illegitimacy was central to the difficulties inherent in adoption, and that social workers created more problems than they solved. Adoptees, she repeatedly insisted, had to search and speak for themselves.

Paton’s adoption occurred when the practice of adoption was undergoing a major transformation. While the first American adoption law was passed in 1851, major legal and legislative reform began in the twentieth century. In what Ellen Herman describes as “kinship by design,” policymakers strove to regulate “the process that turned strangers into kin” (Herman, *Kinship By Design: A History of Adoption in the Modern United States* [2008], p. 2). Their efforts, Herman notes, “were premised on the belief that the distance between adoptive and natural families—the factor that made adoption different—was both dangerous and, fortunately, subject to systematic management” (Herman, p. 4). It was that systematic management, devoid of empathy, according to Paton, that Paton objected to.

Paton worked for several years as a social worker and then, in 1953, left her job and dedicated her life “to advancing the interests of adult adoptees and birth mothers” (p. 1). She was fearless, creative, and widely read. Quoting Paul Tillich, Simone Weil, Aristotle, and others she proposed that birth certificates be replaced with identity cards; that single women deliver at a crèche assisted by alumni who could advise them; and that there be an adoption memorial akin to the Vietnam War Memorial. She designed a button, “Bastards are Beautiful” (p. 237), and, at almost 80, draped herself in chains to show what being adopted felt like.

She was a complicated and difficult person who was “temperamentally incapable of compromising with people who disagreed with her fundamental principles” (p. 126). Paton often rejected those she had originally embraced. As outspoken as she was, her poetic articulations were often hard to understand. Nevertheless

she was notable for her unfailing effort to empower adoptees and birth mothers by creating the space for them to take responsibility for themselves. She described her Life History Study Center founded in 1953 as “an experiment in communication. It is not an agency. It is a sort of agglutination of aliveness among people who are restive within adoption” (p. 35). The center pioneered the first voluntary mutual consent adoption registry. Her self-published books, *The Adopted Break Silence* (1954) and *Orphan Voyage* (1968), were based on extensive interviews with adoptees. Her membership organization, Orphan Voyage, facilitated support groups across the country and established the first adoptee search organization. “The reason I use the term Orphan Voyage” she explained, “is that adopted people lose their parents, although not by death, but by a social decision that they had no part of. We are a different kind of orphan” (p. 114). Her newsletter, *The LOG of Orphan Voyage*, kept her members informed of the latest research and media reports on adoption. As Carp summarizes, her “most notable achievement was to provide adult adoptees with a self-definition, instill pride, create a self-conscious community, and eventually generate political action” (p. 5).

Paton was not the only adoption activist but in her role as communicator she interacted with, supported, and critiqued almost every adoption-related reform project of the twentieth century. For example, she spoke at the first New York Foundling Society reunion, encouraged birth mothers to form the Concerned United Birthparents, and inspired Bastard Nation. The book thus offers a blizzard of organizations and acronyms, all of which can be traced through an excellent index. In addition, “Sealed Adoption Records” and “The American Adoption Congress” have their own chapters. While Carp explains Paton’s actions and words well, he sometimes provides too many unnecessary details. Instead of writing about Paton’s health, he might have more fully developed the voices of those who corresponded with Paton. One single mother, for example, kept Paton informed as she struggled to protect her son from discrimination and lost her job on account of his “illegitimacy” (p. 103). “Each time an adoption is finalized and the birth records sealed,” another wrote, “a mother is symbolically buried . . . Our grief is the grief of ghosts” (p. 182). Giving more voice to those for whom Paton fought so valiantly and creatively for would underline the importance of her work.

*Jean Paton and the Struggle to Reform American Adoption* is fascinating to read on many levels, as a study of a movement, of grassroots organizing, and of adoption. Paton, as flawed as she was, said exactly what she thought and dared to think in large terms.

MAZIE HOUGH  
University of Maine

JOHN W. MALSBERGER. *The General and the Politician: Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, and American Politics*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014. Pp. xvi, 265. Cloth \$40.00, e-book \$39.99.



In 1953 when Richard Nixon became vice president, the office had generally languished in irrelevance for more than a century. Except for occasions when the president died in office, the vice president counted for nothing. This situation changed when Dwight Eisenhower made Nixon a major figure in his administration and gave new importance to the office and the relationship between the chief executive and the vice president.

The Eisenhower-Nixon association is a controversial subject that historians have debated for more than half a century. It is difficult to decipher because both men were extraordinarily complex and because so many historians patronized Eisenhower, detested Nixon, and adored their political opponents: Harry Truman, Adlai Stevenson, and John Kennedy. An additional problem is the massive manuscript collections left behind by Nixon, which few historians have mastered. More than 60 years after they first took office, there is no definitive biography of either Eisenhower or Nixon and little understanding of how the two men worked together.

John W. Malsberger is the latest historian to attempt to solve the Eisenhower-Nixon riddle. His book is organized into six chapters, with an introduction and a conclusion. It starts with a description of the Nixon fund crisis of 1952. The next four chapters cover the administration in two-year increments. The final chapter deals with the period from 1961 to Eisenhower's death in 1969. And the short conclusion summarizes the author's interpretation of the relationship.

The most important contribution of this book is its debunking of the standard view that Eisenhower and Nixon did not get along. Its central theme is that the two men formed an effective working partnership that deepened as they became better acquainted. This maturation was especially notable after 1956, as Eisenhower expanded Nixon's responsibilities and began to groom him as his potential successor. According to Malsberger, by 1958 Nixon was more of a protégé than a subordinate. In 1960, the president enthusiastically supported Nixon and deeply regretted Nixon's narrow defeat. After 1960, the two men drew even closer. Malsberger focuses on what he considers their successful effort to reshape the Republican Party. He pays only passing attention to the great policy issues the administration confronted.

Despite his positive assessment, the author emphasizes the tensions between Eisenhower and Nixon that appeared during the fund crisis of 1952, the controversy over Nixon's campaign in the 1954 midterm elections, and the flap over whether Nixon would be the vice-presidential nominee in 1956, among other incidents. These conflicts developed because the two men operated from different premises. According to Malsberger, Richard Nixon was a conventional politician who proceeded solely on the basis of political calculations. Dwight Eisenhower, in contrast, was guided by the principles of duty, honor, and country. Malsberger maintains Eisenhower was not motivated by ill will toward his vice president. Instead, he simply acted on the principles instilled in him by his military service. These principles,

though, led to actions that were open to misinterpretation by both the vice president and others.

Malsberger is unable to break away from the idea that Eisenhower distrusted Nixon. One of the sub-themes of the book is the doubts Eisenhower regularly experienced about Nixon. These began with the fund crisis, when the author contends that Ike wanted Nixon to offer to resign from the ticket. He states that the episode increased Eisenhower's doubts about the younger man's maturity and judgment. In 1954, Malsberger sees the president's misgivings reawakening. Later, even as Eisenhower expanded Nixon's responsibilities, Nixon's behavior "occasionally rekindled the president's doubts about his maturity" (p. 116).

The alleged Eisenhower-Nixon antagonism has been the approved interpretation for more than 50 years and infects almost all historical accounts, even those relatively sympathetic to the Republican duo. This conflict is much exaggerated. There is no evidence that Eisenhower wanted Nixon off the ticket in 1952. As for Ike's criticism of Nixon as "too partisan," it is well to remember that Eisenhower disdained Truman, despised Stevenson, and had no respect for the Kennedy clan. It is more accurate to view Eisenhower as cheering on Nixon's attacks rather than criticizing Nixon for making them.

There were differences between Eisenhower and Nixon, as between any president and vice president. They developed naturally out of the generational difference (the president was more than 20 years Nixon's senior) and Eisenhower's military rank. Eisenhower organized his administration as he had his military headquarters in World War II. To Ike, the cabinet officers, the vice president, and all other administration officials were comparable to the officers he had commanded in the war. They were subordinates to be utilized as best suited their abilities. With few exceptions, Eisenhower was not close to his generals. During his presidency, Ike chose his personal circle of friends almost entirely from outside government. His treatment of Nixon was, therefore, perfectly consistent with his treatment of everyone else.

Malsberger misconstrues the Eisenhower-Nixon relationship. In addition, there is a problem with his thesis, that Eisenhower and Nixon formed a political partnership. Partnership presumes some degree of equality. After 1945, Ike did not have any partners (except perhaps his wife). He had subordinates and Nixon was one of them. He never looked at Nixon as a partner and it is doubtful that Nixon did either.

John Malsberger has made a start at unraveling the Eisenhower-Nixon riddle, but it is just a start and much more remains to be done to delineate the complex association of these two men.

EDMUND F. KALLINA JR.

*University of Central Florida*

HELEN BURY. *Eisenhower and the Cold War Arms Race: "Open Skies" and the Military-Industrial Complex*. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2014. Pp. xiv, 285. \$90.00.

Helen Bury has written an interesting book about President Dwight D. Eisenhower's military strategy during his eight years in office. Before Ike assumed the presidency, defense spending had increased as a result of the Korean War and the dictates of NSC-68, his predecessor's guiding document for countering the USSR. Eisenhower feared the economic harm of a large federal budget, and he consequently sought to restrain federal appropriations, including funds allocated to the military. Once in the White House, he took a "New Look" at U.S. foreign and defense policy.

Eisenhower made nuclear armaments more central to U.S. military plans. By ensuring that the United States would promptly respond with atomic weapons to almost any type of Soviet aggression (in a spasmodic act of "massive retaliation"), the need and attendant expense of a large standing army and navy was seemingly obviated. Amidst this reorientation of policy, Ike gave a speech at a 1955 summit of the big powers in which he proposed that the Soviet Union and United States each permit the other to conduct aerial reconnaissance flights over important military facilities and factories. These missions, combined with the sharing of other details about warfighting capabilities, offered the prospect of tempering Cold War tensions. Although "Open Skies" (as the plan was dubbed) was rejected by the Soviets, Bury supports the view that it could have lessened mutual suspicions of the opposing blocs and undercut calls for a continuing military buildup at a crucial period in the superpower contest.

Bury argues that Open Skies was a central component of the New Look. From her perspective, the proposal was an essential element of Eisenhower's effort to prevent the U.S. from becoming what Harold Lasswell had termed a "Garrison State." Bury portrays the president arrayed against the interlocking group of individuals and institutions who putatively comprised the "military-industrial complex." This includes "specialists in violence" (p. 12), and others she variously calls "hard-line" (p. 9), "fierce" (p. 34), and "staunch" (p. 79) anti-communists who all had vested personal, professional, or financial incentives to advocate for more expensive and elaborate military programs. This interpretation is complemented by a nice explication of the roles that Nelson Rockefeller, Walt Whitman Rostow, and various think-tank denizens and university scholars had in several internal and external study groups that begat the Open Skies proposal and later critiqued the New Look.

Indeed, it is entirely possible to not be in the thrall of the military services, defense contractors, or others who might have benefited from a different strategy and still suggest that massive retaliation and other aspects of Eisenhower's defense policy were faulty. Bury does not fully engage the perspective of those many "who believed the Soviet Union posed a serious threat to American security" (p. 79) and thought inapt the prescriptions of the New Look. Further, Bury too readily discounts Ike's concern about the prospect of a surprise Soviet attack on the United States, which is especially

curious because in early 1954, the president led the National Security Council in discussions on the topic. While never believing a strike was imminent, Eisenhower considered the possibility was sufficiently realistic to be personally involved in improving North American defenses and expanding civil defense efforts and elaborate mechanisms to ensure the federal government would continue to function after an attack. In these and other ways, Bury seems to not have considered several significant and relevant works of the last 20 years, including books by Valerie L. Adams, Campbell Craig, Benjamin P. Greene, David F. Krugler, and David Snead.

*Eisenhower and the Cold War Arms Race: "Open Skies" and the Military-Industrial Complex* has other flaws. Some prose is awkward or infelicitous. There may also be too many clichés. Bury's verbiage includes "to start the ball of negotiation rolling" (pp. 8, 78), "putting all of America's eggs in one basket" (p. 19), "the door to negotiations could have been left open" (p. 41), "this matter opened up a big can of worms" (p. 113), and "it did not take long for the so-called missile gap to start raising its ugly head" (p. 143).

Copy editors also missed several mistakes. There is a discussion of U.S. Air Force B-36 bombers being under the authority of the Science Advisory Committee rather than another SAC, the Strategic Air Command (p. 92). The name of the Ramo-Wooldridge company, a prominent defense contractor of the era, is rendered incorrectly (p. 203) and the endnotes and bibliography list several incorrect or misspelled author names.

CHRISTOPHER J. BRIGHT  
*Independent Scholar*

GEOFFREY KABASERVICE, *Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican Party, from Eisenhower to the Tea Party*. (Studies in Post-war American Political Development.) Paperback ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. xx, 492. \$21.95.

Geoffrey Kabaservice's meticulously researched volume persuasively argues that moderate Republicanism is "a distinctive political philosophy, different from both Democratic liberalism and Republican conservatism" (p. 398). Sadly for those who might adhere to its tenets—principles such as advocacy of civil rights and liberties, internationalism, devolution of power, reliance upon market incentives, transparency, and good government practices—even moderate Republicans have often failed to recognize their distinctive contributions to American politics and to effectively mobilize what could be a sizeable moderate constituency.

Meanwhile, conservative activists since the 1960s have effectively organized their own constituencies, privileged ideology over party, and in some cases actively attacked GOP moderates. Conservative organizational triumphs have combined with a host of demographic, governmental, and political forces to undermine moderate Republicanism, hitherto an im-



portant force in the GOP. As a consequence, “[t]he first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed the final decline and virtual extinction of moderates’ power and representation in the Republican Party” (p. xix). In a new afterword written for the paperback edition of *Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican Party, from Eisenhower to the Tea Party*, Kabaservice indicates he sees this as a serious problem for the future of American democracy.

Kabaservice uses an impressive array of archival sources and interviews to craft his eminently readable story of moderate Republican decline. Starting with the 1960 presidential election, he carefully chronicles GOP moderates’ many legislative and state-level contributions. Republicans, for example, were instrumental in crafting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and both House and Senate Republicans voted in larger proportional numbers to pass this landmark legislation. Kabaservice’s extensive coverage of the Ripon Society illustrates the prolific policy creativity resident in the progressive wing of the GOP throughout the 1960s and well into the 1970s. Moderate and progressive Republican governors innovatively addressed state needs and attempted to promote cooperation through the Republican Governors Association.

Republican moderates’ promise, however, was stymied at the presidential level by their failures to unite behind a moderate-to-liberal candidate. Perhaps the moderates’ last, best hope came in 1968 with the candidacy of Michigan governor George Romney. Alas, his unfortunate “brainwashing” comment in late August 1967 torpedoed his chances. Moderates’ initial pleasure at many Richard Nixon policies turned sour in 1970. When Nixon’s April 30 announcement of the Cambodian invasion prompted widespread unrest, GOP moderates sought efforts toward national reconciliation, and Nixon decided to side with “hardhat” counter-protesters. Nixon’s decision sounded the death knell of his “eighteen-month flirtation with the moderate movement” (p. 305).

By the end of 1970, the Nixon administration had alienated moderates, ceded the center to Democrats, and “[t]he moderate movement essentially was finished. There would be no more wide-scale efforts to reach those constituencies that moderates sought to draw into the party” (p. 323). While “moderates would remain an important part of the Republican coalition for some time to come” (p. 324), they would lack sufficient organizational infrastructure to mount any coordinated challenge to conservative dominance. Increasingly influential social issues, such as abortion, created new alliances, animated new activism, and divided old constituencies. Kabaservice continues the story of moderate decline through 2012, but the fulcrum of transformation came years earlier.

While Kabaservice’s book is important reading for anyone interested in gaining a better understanding of the ideological polarization of the major parties since 1960, political historians seeking fresh ideas would be especially well advised to take a look. *Rule and Ruin*

generates a laundry list of potential dissertation or book topics, not because of any shortcomings in Kabaservice’s work but because his narrative highlights a significantly under-studied component of this era and its politics. While several young scholars are undertaking important work in this field, significant opportunity remains.

The volume’s readability makes it a useful possibility for assignment to upper-level undergraduate or graduate courses, perhaps in tandem with Daniel K. Williams’s *God’s Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right* (2010), which complements Kabaservice’s party-political focus with important attention to the growth of the Religious Right. Kabaservice only briefly touches upon the growing influence of this vital constituency, though this is a reasonable omission given the focus of his work.

As mentioned earlier, Kabaservice indicates that moderate Republicans offer tools that are sorely needed in contemporary politics. The very pragmatism that makes it difficult for moderates to generate electoral passion akin to their erstwhile conservative colleagues grants them important advantages when it comes time to actually govern. Successful policy development requires pragmatism, and successful politics requires intra- as well as inter-party debate to avoid the pitfalls of ideological rigidity. Among Kabaservice’s concluding remarks is a reference to Judge Learned Hand’s observation that “the spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure it is right” (p. 402). After reading his excellent book, it is difficult to disagree.

LAURA JANE GIFFORD  
George Fox University

BRYAN HARDIN THRIFT. *Conservative Bias: How Jesse Helms Pioneered the Rise of Right-Wing Media and Realigned the Republican Party*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2014. Pp. xii, 262. \$69.95.

Jesse Helms, five-time senator from North Carolina died on July 4, 2008, a timely departure from life that probably reaffirmed the belief of his most devoted followers that he was chosen by God. For more than a half century as a journalist, behind-the-scenes political adviser, spokesman for North Carolina bankers, right-wing radio and television announcer, and finally as the state’s longest-serving senator, Helms proudly claimed the title of “Senator No.” Early in his career as a right-wing broadcaster, he proposed the abolition of public schools and repeatedly attacked higher education. (He described the University of North Carolina [UNC] as the “University of Negroes and Communists,” a typical example of his lifelong racism and red-baiting.) Once elected to the Senate he fought the Supreme Court’s ban on school prayer; in 1982 he introduced a bill that would ban federal funding for most abortions, which he compared to the Holocaust; he loathed gays and lesbians; and he opposed the creation of a national holiday honoring Martin Luther King Jr. To be sure, there were some things he tenaciously supported: red-baiting, seg-

regation, apartheid (he was an unstinting supporter of the South African and Rhodesian white governments), unregulated capitalism, tax cuts for his wealthy supporters, and his state's tobacco industry.

But we already know much of this story from William A. Link's thorough 2008 biography, *Righteous Warrior: Jesse Helms and the Rise of Modern Conservatism*. Link may have leavened his biography with references to Helms's courtliness, his generosity to staff and friends, and his outstanding constituency service while in office, but the dark side was there to see.

So what more can be said about the senator from North Carolina? A good deal, as we learn in Bryan Hardin Thrift's study, which focuses on the early years of Helms's career, particularly his time as director (and principal spokesman) for the North Carolina Bankers Association and, after 1960, as vice president of the state's most influential television station, WRAL, "The Voice of Free Enterprise" (p. 49).

In Thrift's analysis, we see the way in which Helms's role as spokesman for North Carolina's most right-wing bankers reinforced his white, middle-class, small-town southern attitudes and made the defense of the "free enterprise system" against any government interference central to his political career. During the 1950s, Helms became convinced that there was little difference between liberalism, socialism, and communism, a conviction that would underlie much of his career.

But it is Thrift's discussion of Helms's years as a broadcaster that are the most revealing. In 1960 Helms launched a series that would ultimately make him the voice of conservatism in North Carolina. His twice-a-day television editorials (*Viewpoint*) from Raleigh's WRAL-TV reached a large audience in central North Carolina and were amplified by free distribution to 25 radio stations and print versions in dozens of mostly small-town newspapers. Thrift has examined the nearly 3,000 Helms editorials broadcast between 1960 and 1972, showing just how prescient Helms was in combining traditional right-wing economics with racism and a defensive social conservatism that would underlie much of the new conservatism in southern and American politics. Well before Kevin Phillips advised Richard Nixon to work for a southern political system divided between a white Republican majority and a permanent black Democratic minority, Helms sought to accomplish the same goal in North Carolina.

Perhaps his most long-lasting impact lay in transforming the news department of WRAL into an arm of his right-wing political opinions. "News" coverage became little more than amplifications of Helms's editorials. Conservative and far-right politicians and spokesmen were given a regular platform in the station's news programs while news coverage persistently attacked "liberals." As Thrift meticulously documents, Helms had no interest in whether or not attacks were factual or truthful. In one (of many) instances Helms accused a young UNC English graduate teaching assistant of assigning an essay to students with the topic: "If you were a girl (boy), how would you go about seducing a boy

(girl)?" (p. 131). Helms's attack reflected both his obsession with "fornication" and his hatred of the university (p. 133). Helms's accusation was totally unfounded, but it was soon apparent that he cared little about the factuality of this or other false accusations so long as they advanced his war against liberalism.

Thrift is somewhat less successful in making his argument that Helms transformed the Republican Party. He did help to shape ideas and influence the realignment of southern politics. And his willingness to erase the lines between opinion and traditional "news neutrality" may well have laid the foundations for today's Fox News network. But he was not a major figure outside North Carolina politics. And the reality is that individual political leaders like Helms, George Wallace, and Strom Thurmond may have been able to shape and give voice to the rise of conservative politics in the region. But often they were simply successful surfers on the waves of white resentment and anger that came from the depths below them.

This modest criticism does not undermine the overall strength of Thrift's significant contribution to our understanding of the rise of the new conservatism in the South.

DAN CARTER,  
Emeritus  
University of South Carolina

JEFFREY BLOODWORTH. *Losing the Center: The Decline of American Liberalism, 1968–1992*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2013. Pp. 345. \$50.00.

In *Losing the Center: The Decline of American Liberalism, 1968–1992*, historian Jeffrey Bloodworth attempts to explain the collapse and transformation of American liberalism in the last decades of the twentieth century. Focusing on the Democratic Party's embrace of "New Politics" in the 1970s, Bloodworth argues that American liberals abandoned the "vital center" that had underwritten and sustained the New Deal Order. The collapse of the Democratic Party and the exodus of white working-class voters, Bloodworth claims, can be traced to egregious missteps by Democratic leaders who refused to take up the social issues important to many voters. Democrats' "New Politics stances on defense and social issues" led to landslide defeats in the presidential elections of 1972, 1980, 1984, and 1988 and cost the party critical support in the South and the West (p. 6). Between Hubert Humphrey's defeat in 1968 and Bill Clinton's narrow victory in 1992, "liberalism suffered a slow death by a thousand cuts" (p. 10). What is worse, most of these cuts were self-inflicted.

Comprising 13 chapters, including an introduction and a conclusion, *Losing the Center* uses 11 individual biographical sketches to reveal "the multiplicity of policy failures" that contributed to the decline of American liberalism (p. 10). Some of these chapters deal with well-known public figures, including President Jimmy Carter, Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson, and Representative Bella Abzug; others feature lesser-known



“politicians, activists, and policy intellectuals” (p. 10), including Donald Peterson, Dave McCurdy, and Lindy Boggs. While admitting that “biography, as a tool of historical inquiry, is positively unfashionable” and “outmoded in the eyes of the academy,” Bloodworth hopes that the approach allows him to tell “a complicated story in a concise manner for a wide audience” (p. 13).

Bloodworth’s history does provide some useful insights. Chapter 4, for example, highlights the unintended consequences of a 1982 law that allowed for the creation of majority-minority voting districts. Although the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1982 increased significantly the number of African Americans elected to office, it did so at the cost of further political polarization. While Bloodworth overstates the potential to build a “biracial Democratic Party” in the South that existed before the 1982 VRA, he is nonetheless correct in calling attention to how institutions can change political outcomes (p. 11). Likewise, chapter 10’s analysis of gender politics and the 1984 presidential race, introduces the compelling story of Lindy Boggs, a longtime political spouse and the “most powerful woman in Congress” (p. 201).

These strengths, however, are overwhelmed by the text’s flaws. Bloodworth’s prose is lucid and quite readable, but he too often adopts a tone that is at best dismissive and at worst condescending toward his subjects. This is particularly evident in his discussions of women and people of color. For example, while Bloodworth decries the “chauvinist contempt” directed at Barbara Honneger when she published a “scathing critique” of how the Reagan White House handled women’s issues (p. 210), he nevertheless describes that same critique as a “public tantrum” not three paragraphs later (p. 211)! Bloodworth likewise seems all too comfortable repeating, without unpacking, casually sexist descriptions of New York Democrat Bella Abzug’s “demanding,” “[g]arrulous,” and “abrasive” style (p. 163) or in favorably comparing Boggs who “cajoled and suggested” to her “sister feminists” who “pushed and shoved” (pp. 207–208).

The text is curiously old-fashioned in other ways as well. Not only is his embrace of American exceptionalism “unfashionable” (p. 246), but Bloodworth also all but ignores an entire generation of scholarship on the origins and nature of the fall of the New Deal Order. For more than three decades scholars including Arnold Hirsch, Thomas Sugrue, Robert Self, and Matthew Lassiter have convincingly demonstrated that vital center liberalism was neither particularly vital nor particularly liberal. Indeed, while white working-class voters may have supported liberal candidates for office, it is clear that many of these voters never bought into liberalism’s commitment to racial justice. The electoral success of the postwar Democratic Party too often came at the cost of accommodating segregation and white supremacy. Ignoring this longer history, Bloodworth is able to dismiss white working-class racism as incidental to, rather than constitutive of, the so-called social issues that helped drive post-1960s domestic policy. However,

it is hard to argue that the late-twentieth-century social issues like welfare, “[r]ising crime rates, busing, urban riots, drug use, out-of-wedlock pregnancies, and the youth rebellion” did not stem at least in part from white anxiety about racial change (p. 8).

With extensive archival source material, Bloodworth’s text is well researched and passionately written. It uncovers stories and characters that many readers—even professional historians—may not know. His larger historical project to grant agency to liberals in the Democratic Party’s own decline is a good one, and other scholars should take up the call to more thoroughly interrogate the liberalism on the 1970s as distinct from its New Deal or Great Society forebears. Unfortunately, *Losing the Center* obscures more than it reveals about the contours of late-twentieth-century American politics.

MOLLY C. MICHELMORE  
Washington and Lee University

JACQUELINE E. WHITT. *Bringing God to Men: American Military Chaplains and the Vietnam War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014. Pp. xii, 298. \$34.95.

Jacqueline E. Whitt has written an engaging and fascinating book on American military chaplains who served during the Vietnam War. Based on an exhaustive range of published and unpublished primary sources, as well as a wide collection of secondary works, Whitt acknowledges that most of her sources come from Army records. This is not because she is biased or negligent, it is because unlike the Army, neither the Navy nor the Air Force maintained extensive records relating to the chaplaincy. And furthermore, out of 28 chaplains’ memoirs discovered by the author, 24 were written by Army chaplains and only four by men serving in the Navy. Whitt does, however, assume that her findings are similar for all branches of the armed forces.

One of the major theses in *Bringing God to Men: American Military Chaplains and the Vietnam War* is that chaplains are “people in the middle” (p. 1). Whether Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish, liberal or conservative, male or female, African American or white, they stand in the middle between God and country. Whitt maintains that these chaplains also stood “in the middle” of things sacred and secular, officers and enlisted personnel, civilian and military people, the home front and the battlefield, communities with starkly conflicting views about the war, and between Americans and foreign nationals. Put another way, these chaplains always lived in tension between two worlds. They did so by choice (they were volunteers) and by military institutional design. And in the final analysis they performed well.

What Whitt gives us is an impressive revisionist interpretation of the work of sociologists and social historians who have claimed that role conflicts so prevalent in the 1960s and early 1970s caused chaplains to surrender their sacred and religious duties to militarism in a war that was difficult to defend as “just” in com-

parison to World War II. Whitt persuasively argues that this interpretation is wrong. On the contrary, chaplains kept their focus on serving as ministers and priests to people in uniform and generally eschewed being prophets or politicians. To the point, chaplains were busy ministering to soldiers who simultaneously were being assaulted by a tough enemy in Vietnam and antiwar combatants at home. Therefore, chaplains mainly channeled their energy into soul care rather than taking sides in church and state culture wars. Indeed, for Vietnam-era chaplains, ministry trumped debate.

Whitt argues that if chaplains refused to make pronouncements or get involved with moral issues such as civilian deaths during battles, it was not because they were amoral and calloused. They were so busy caring for the wounded of body and soul that there was no time to comment on these complex issues. But in chapter 6, "Reflection and Reconciliation," an insightful and balanced picture is presented of chaplains who were in many respects similar to the men they served inasmuch as they had to come home from the war, face the antiwar culture and a deeply divided nation, and personally begin to sort out the grave moral issues they found so little time to ponder in the fog of war.

*Bringing God to Men* presents chaplains as more than "people in the middle"; it shows complexities of both the war and the people who served. Whitt refreshingly challenges three prevalent yet mutually exclusive caricatures of chaplains foisted upon us by scholars, television, and Hollywood. The public, depending upon their view of clergy, like to imagine chaplains as saintly men who make St. Francis of Assisi look worldly; or gun-slinging, gung-ho fighters who make Marines and Army Rangers seem timid in the face of the enemy; or comical, unholy M\*A\*S\*H-type military chaplains who could never care for a soul. But Whitt, who is always careful with her observations and generalizations, acknowledges that although there were chaplains who approximated these caricatures, most chaplains were complex people. Indeed, these popular stereotypes do not survive careful scholarly examination. In the final analysis, Whitt found most chaplains were self-sacrificing pastors who put the needs of the troops above their own interests.

Whitt has written an important book. She revises inaccurate views of military chaplains in the Vietnam era while providing original contributions to our understanding of that conflict. But I have a word of caution. The author insists that we need to be wary of chaplains' own memories about the war. She says, "What chaplains wrote about their experiences in Vietnam is, almost certainly, riddled with factual error, exaggeration, and hyperbole. Their accounts require the historian to move beyond simple narrative and factual claims and enter the mental world of others" (p. 14). Certainly sources must be evaluated, but we historians can learn from syndicated journalist and World War II combat veteran Andy Rooney who attended a 1994 history convention where several historians presented papers on World War II: "They had read and studied all about the

war for years and had a great grasp of the overall picture. There was only one advantage I had over all of them. I was there when it happened. On several occasions I've actually ended up convinced that my memory serves history better than the historians" (Rooney, *My War* [1995], p. xiii).

LYLE W. DORSETT  
Samford University

CHARLES E. COBB JR. *This Nonviolent Stuff'll Get You Killed: How Guns Made the Civil Rights Movement Possible*. New York: Basic Books, 2014. Pp. xiii, 294. \$27.99.

Charles E. Cobb Jr.'s *This Nonviolent Stuff'll Get You Killed: How Guns Made the Civil Rights Movement Possible* is the most recent addition to a strand of civil rights historiography that emerged after the publication of Timothy B. Tyson's pathbreaking *Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power* (1999). Over the course of the last 15 years, a deluge of monographs and journal articles has confirmed and elaborated on Tyson's findings about the significance of black armed resistance in the southern civil rights struggle.

Cobb, who was a field secretary for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in the 1960s, echoes this historiography's conclusions. He argues that armed self-defense took on a "complementary" role that "ensured the survival not only of countless brave men and women but also of the freedom struggle itself" (p. 1). He asserts that this phenomenon cannot be fully understood without taking into account a long tradition of black self-defense against white supremacist terrorism, an argument that Nicholas Johnson has made most forcefully in *Negroes and the Gun: The Black Tradition of Arms* (2014). And he contends that local black southerners and civil rights activists tended to regard nonviolence primarily as a tactic, not as a way of life.

Given the familiarity of these arguments, it is surprising that Cobb laments the neglect of black armed resistance in "the conventional narrative of southern civil rights struggle" (p. 6) without mentioning that this omission has been addressed in great detail by Tyson and other historians. Frequently citing their work, Cobb focuses on the freedom movement in Mississippi in the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s but also provides examples from other states and the pre-World War II era. The book's stories of black resistance are as familiar to students of civil rights activism as is his overarching argument. Cobb discusses slave rebels and black militias during Reconstruction as well as the protective efforts of veterans of color after World War I and World War II. The chapters on the southern civil rights struggle after World War II introduce readers to well-known activists such as Medgar Evers, Amzie Moore, and T. R. M. Howard as well as to the various self-defense efforts these men and their allies engaged in in Mississippi. Similarly well-trodden terrain is covered in sections on Robert F. Williams and armed resistance in North Carolina, the defense organization



that black activists founded in 1964 in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and the Deacons for Defense and Justice in Louisiana.

Nevertheless, the book is a worthwhile read because its narrative is interspersed with the author's personal recollections of black self-defense efforts in the Mississippi movement as well as with quotes from numerous interviews that Cobb conducted with former members of SNCC and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). These oral histories shed additional light on the ways in which self-defense and nonviolence frequently worked hand in hand in many local campaigns, but also on how armed resistance created tensions within civil rights organizations that claimed to be committed to nonviolence.

Yet there are also a number of aspects that one would have liked to learn more about. Although Cobb stresses the importance of nonviolence in his narrative, for instance, his discussion of this crucial aspect of civil rights activism remains surprisingly cursory. Readers learn much about SNCC activists' nonviolent pragmatism, but the book fails to fully probe the intricacies of nonviolence in other civil rights organizations. To argue, for example, that "[n]onviolence was more deeply embedded in CORE than in SNCC" (p. 189) oversimplifies CORE's history and ignores the fact that many of its members adopted an approach toward nonviolence that mirrored developments within SNCC. Cobb also rarely addresses the Southern Christian Leadership Conference's (SCLC) changing approaches toward nonviolent protest and the reasons why it worked in some contexts but not in others. In addition, one would have expected a more thorough discussion of Akinyele Omowale Umoja's *We Will Shoot Back: Armed Resistance in the Mississippi Freedom Movement* (2013). While Cobb argues that "the need for organized self-defense seemed to decrease after the early 1960s" (pp. 16–17), Umoja asserts the opposite to be true for the Magnolia State, a finding that Cobb does not mention. Finally, it is unfortunate that Cobb ends his narrative in 1966, justifying this chronological limitation with the argument that the second half of the 1960s was characterized by "a different dynamic of black struggle" (p. 13). Given the author's unique personal insights into SNCC's radicalization, one would have wished to learn more about the similarities and differences between the role of armed resistance before and after 1966.

This book is unlikely to spark discussions among scholars of black self-defense in the civil rights movement, but it is a good general introduction to the topic. Especially nonacademic audiences will appreciate Cobb's accessible style and the book's thrilling stories of African American resistance in the southern freedom struggle.

SIMON WENDT  
*University of Frankfurt, Germany*

We are overdue for a full, scholarly biography of Stokely Carmichael, so it is a decidedly welcome event to have Peniel E. Joseph deliver this excellent new work. Written with both broad accessibility and scholarly insight in mind, Joseph's book provides a window into a world of people, ideas, and events that reminds us again of the remarkable years of 1960–1968, the era in which Carmichael was a central and meaningful actor. This biography in many ways is both of a person as well as a time, a sort of "America in the Stokely Years."

Weaving the events of the era with the details of Carmichael's life, the biography renders plain the extent to which the life of this activist helped to define the era. In Joseph's view, Carmichael belongs in a trilogy of transformative leaders from the period, alongside Malcolm X and Martin Luther King Jr. In this, Joseph is persuasive. We see Carmichael in the heady mix of Howard University, interacting with some of the great minds of the day as well as the young activists of the time. We find him marching in Selma, working to register voters in the Mississippi Delta, helping the Black Panthers of Lowndes County gain traction before eventually going on to be part of Oakland's Black Panther Party for Self-Defense. We trace his steps on the march started by James Meredith, and his bringing to the fore the slogan of "Black Power" for America and the world to engage.

The Meredith March turned Carmichael "into an icon" and introduced a new generation of leaders to the civil rights landscape (p. 102). For Joseph, the march was the bridge from the last great demonstration of the "heroic period" of the civil rights era to the first national recognition of the black power movement, and Carmichael, in short, was that bridge personified (p. 102). Joseph does a masterful job of telling the story of that time and Carmichael's life in these pages. As Carmichael became a more well-known figure—in 1966 he was head of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)—Joseph sees an activist and organizer who also embraced the role of celebrity and symbol.

Joseph uses poll numbers to indicate that Carmichael's approval rating among black Americans was not near that of Martin Luther King, 18 percent versus 64 percent, but as Joseph argues, numbers themselves fail to account for Carmichael's rise as "a radical activist whose growing fame and genuine appeal in the black community transcended statistical surveys" (p. 170). This, of course, mirrors the ongoing tension that black power and its supporters faced: pushing people, and America, to do more to address the fundamental inequities in American life.

That struggle ultimately would take Carmichael to Africa, and to Pan-Africanism. His travels in Africa—ultimately his home and final resting place—turned him from a radical political activist into a revolutionary Pan-Africanist. This part of his journey began in 1967, and would manifest itself more fully in the months and years to follow, politically as well as romantically. Carmichael became involved with and then married Miriam Makeba. While personal details of this relationship are

PENIEL E. JOSEPH. *Stokely: A Life*. New York: Basic Civitas, 2014. Pp. xiv, 399. \$29.99.

there, in general Joseph's is a biography that focuses on the political and social dimensions more than the intimate.

Joseph argues that Carmichael's encounter with Kwame Nkrumah, overthrown as leader of Ghana in 1966 and in exile in Guinea, helped push Carmichael down the path of building a Pan-African political party in the United States. The fruits of this initial 1967 meeting emerged more fully in the following years, and that development is very much part of Joseph's story. At the same time, Joseph's choice to focus on the eight years from 1960 to 1968 influences the extent to which we see how that plays out. The first 30 years of Carmichael's life span the first 300 pages, while the last 25 years—during which he changed his name to Kwame Ture as a way to honor Nkrumah and Sékou Touré—are condensed into roughly 25 more episodic pages. One of the book's great strengths is the depth devoted to the 1960–1968 years, even as it also becomes one of its few weaknesses.

This leaves the door open for those seeking more about Carmichael/Ture's relationship with Africa and Pan-Africanism, a terrain needing further interrogation. That said, those familiar with the era that Joseph covers will find themselves enriched by the details he brings, while those less familiar will find a sure-handed guide through the era and the remarkable life of Stokely Carmichael.

JAMES H. MERIWETHER

*California State University, Channel Islands*

STEVEN P. MILLER. *The Age of Evangelicalism: America's Born-Again Years*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. viii, 221. \$24.95.

Steven P. Miller's *The Age of Evangelicalism: America's Born-Again Years* joins Daniel K. Williams's *God's Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right* (2010) as the best recent cultural-political surveys on their subject. The book's cultural side focuses on the many avenues through which over the last half century formerly sectarian fundamentalist or Pentecostal white Protestants have entered the American mainstream: through effective spokesmen like James Dobson, who gained wide popularity by providing advice on parenting and child-rearing; through the unprecedented success of Hal Lindsey's apocalyptic *The Late Great Planet Earth* (1970), the best-selling book of any kind for the 1970s; through publicists like Marabel Morgan, who piously promoted the joy of sex for religious conservatives; through NGOs like Habitat for Humanity and World Vision that have won positive recognition for humanitarian service; through attention from Hollywood in the wake of evangelical enthusiasm for Mel Gibson's *The Passion of the Christ* (2004); through ecclesiastical re-thinking that produced a plethora of mostly suburban megachurches with weekly attendance climbing well into the thousands; through spectacular media successes like the *Left Behind* series (1995–2007) of apocalyptic novels by Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins; and

through strategic alliances with other ethical conservatives, especially Roman Catholics, to make common cause as culture warriors. Appealing to such phenomena, Miller suggests that “[a]s evangelicals embraced the therapeutic turn, other Americans proved responsive to the therapeutic side of born-again Christianity” (p. 22).

Hinge figures like the apologist Francis Schaeffer (d. 1984), who turned from Christian evangelism aimed at alienated youth to public consciousness-raising for the pro-life cause, and Rick Warren, pastor of the very large Saddleback Church south of Los Angeles and host of well-publicized forums for presidential candidates, link the cultural narrative to the political story. A highlight is Miller's expert tracking of evangelical political salience in the national media. First came the explosion, as if from nowhere, of evangelical political activism in the era of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, followed by media panic among non-evangelicals, but then cooling to reduced attention in the Bill Clinton years. George W. Bush's message of “compassionate conservatism” galvanized a new surge of white evangelical political activity, but also badly frightened a raft of commentators who wrote as if fearing some kind of theocratic coup. Miller labels the spate of distraught hand-wringing that greeted President Bush's reelection in 2004 “the second evangelical scare” (p. 135), even as he shows why that fright receded rapidly in the era of Barack Obama. For the Bush years, Miller helpfully differentiates between “faith-based policies,” which had at least some chance of building coalitions among otherwise antagonistic parts of the electorate, and “faith-based politics” (p. 125), which Republican operatives exploited for partisan advantage. Miller is equally helpful in depicting President Obama as able, for both political and personal reasons, to talk some of the evangelical talk without necessarily walking the evangelical walk. He also points out that the Obama electoral victories helped resuscitate a small cohort of left-leaning evangelicals. As Miller shows early in the book, such social liberals had pioneered modern evangelical political engagement in the 1960s, only then to be overwhelmed by the surging New Christian Right as soon as evangelical voters turned on Jimmy Carter.

Miller makes excellent use of a rapidly growing roster of increasingly sophisticated monographs, including books by Randall Balmer, Amy DeRogatis, Darren Dochuk, Axel Schäfer, Matthew Avery Sutton, David R. Swartz, John G. Turner, Grant Wacker, and Molly Worthen. He also draws insights from sociologists Robert Wuthnow (on the postwar reconfiguration of American religious allegiance), James Davison Hunter (on the dimensions of a national culture war), and D. Michael Lindsay (on the emergence of nationally recognized evangelicals in politics and business). The result is attractive, informed, and accessible contemporary history ideally suited for assignment in surveys of postwar America, especially if read alongside David Hollinger's *After Cloven Tongues of Fire: Protestant Liberalism in Modern American History* (2013), which argues



that the values of mainline Protestants have triumphed even if evangelical numbers far outstrip the shrinking mainline.

Doubts concern only the extent of what Miller has documented. While evangelicals have certainly advanced far outside the beleaguered margins that still feature large in some evangelical self-descriptions, it is not clear that they should be positioned in the national story as Miller contends. His own account of the small contingent of evangelicals active in research universities offers an accurate portrait, but a portrait underscoring their relative irrelevance in that world. Similarly, although an evangelical presence is not entirely lacking in the nation's largest industries, in the marketing of college and professional athletics, in the courts, and in the elite print media, it stretches a point considerably to view evangelicals "at the very center" of these important facets of national life (p. 7). Questions about this aspect of his argument notwithstanding, Miller has combined wide reading with skillful writing to narrate well a convincingly complex story.

MARK A. NOLL

*University of Notre Dame*

NICOLAS RASMUSSEN. *Gene Jockeys: Life Science and the Rise of Biotech Enterprise*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. Pp. viii, 249. \$35.00.

In 1978, the "biotech industry" was a couple of start-up companies with a handful of employees working largely out of academic labs. By 1990, it was a multi-billion-dollar industry employing tens of thousands of people that had generated enormous hype, launched the largest initial public offering in history, brought several medical innovations to market, and become a new model for both university-industry collaboration and science-based business.

Nicolas Rasmussen explores this transformative period from the birth of biotechnology into what might be called its adolescence: the period after its first generation of products had reached the market; and after the early start-ups had either failed, merged with larger drug companies, or expanded so much as to little resemble the academic-industrial hybrids they once were. He tells this story by following the development of five of the first ten rDNA drugs to be approved in the United States: human insulin, human growth hormone, alpha interferon, erythropoietin (Epo), and tissue plasminogen activator (tPA).

After a synthetic chapter tracing the unfolding of molecular biology from the mid-twentieth century through the invention of recombinant DNA technology in the early 1970s, the rest of the substantive chapters each follow a strand of the biotech story through the development of one of these five products. As Rasmussen notes, this requires some chronological overlap across chapters, and bits of the story introduced in one part of the book occasionally pop up again in others. In general, though, this organizational device works very well, as Rasmussen never loses sight of the fact that these

individual narratives are in service of a larger one about the birth of a new, important, and unusual industry.

In his choice of sources, Rasmussen makes a virtue of necessity. Without industry archives to draw upon, he turns to a rich and unconventional range of documents. Trained as a biologist, he relies heavily on the scientific literature; he extensively uses oral histories conducted by himself and others (notably the valuable biotech collection at the University of California, Berkeley Bancroft Library's Regional Oral History Office); and, most innovatively, Rasmussen draws on the large volume of legal documents—including many internal company papers that would otherwise be inaccessible—generated by the lawsuits that accompanied nearly every commercial advance made in biotech's first decade.

Each chapter of the book not only follows the creation of a particular biotech product, but also highlights one aspect of the dramatic changes in the life sciences that were concomitantly taking place. These range from the fierce early competitions between commercial and academic labs (in the human insulin story), to researchers' creative efforts to convert scientific capital into financial capital and vice versa (Epo), to how the need to conduct clinical trials and market products pushed the early biotechs to become more like big drug companies (tPA). Rasmussen's account of how the aggressive patent battles over Epo and tPA shaped the future of the industry by setting a low bar for the issuance of biotech patents is particularly valuable, and made possible by his deep engagement with highly technical (in both the scientific and the legal sense) material.

In keeping with that engagement, *Gene Jockeys: Life Science and the Rise of Biotech Enterprise* is heavy throughout on the development of the science itself, which is an important contribution but does slow the narrative for the less technically inclined reader. Rasmussen's explicit intent is to avoid an internalist account of science, and certainly much of the book is focused on the interests—both financial and academic—that shape the environment in which science is done. Still, the book could have drawn more explicit connections between the dramatic changes taking place in the organization of science and the progress of the science itself. The science story is always placed in its human context. But the counterfactual remains unaddressed: how might the science have unfolded differently if the life sciences had not, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, been the hothouse of academic and commercial interests that they were?

This is particularly relevant in light of Rasmussen's normative position on the restructuring of the academic life sciences during the early biotech era. While the book is not polemical in tone, Rasmussen argues strongly that biotech was a "Faustian bargain" (p. 5). The commercialization of academia may have accelerated the process through which these drugs were brought to market, but the new biotech firms were reaping the low-hanging fruits of decades of public investment. In doing so, though, they changed the way life

science research was funded and conducted in ways that have made it less productive in the long run.

In general, Rasmussen achieves admirably what he sets out to accomplish. His book complements recent work like Sally Smith Hughes's *Genentech: The Beginnings of Biotech* (2011), Eric James Vettel's *Biotech: The Countercultural Origins of an Industry* (2006), and Doogab Yi's *The Recombinant University: Genetic Engineering and the Emergence of Stanford Biotechnology* (2015), but covers different ground from all of them. *Gene Jockeys* will be the go-to source on the history of the biotech industry in the 1980s for some time to come, and particularly regarding the scientific and legal developments on which that industry's growth rested.

ELIZABETH POPP BERMAN  
University at Albany, SUNY

### CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA

DAVID SARTORIUS. *Ever Faithful: Race, Loyalty, and the Ends of Empire in Spanish Cuba*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2013. Pp. xix, 312. Cloth \$89.95, paper \$24.95.

David Sartorius has identified a vital and little-understood topic in Cuban, Spanish, and colonial Latin American historiography: the politics of loyalty of Cuba's free population of color in the nineteenth century. Why is this subject so urgent?

Cuba was the largest slave society in Spanish American history, peaking in the mid-nineteenth century. It was also one of Spain's last two American colonies after the Spanish American revolutions of the 1810s and 1820s (Puerto Rico was the other). Exploring the connections, and disjunctures, between late-colonial rule and slavery has produced many years of fruitful research. Over the past three decades, since the publication of Rebecca Scott's *Slave Emancipation in Cuba: The Transition to Free Labor, 1860–1899* (1985), the richest vein has been the exploration of how the struggles for independence between 1868 and 1898 converged with slave emancipation (slavery was abolished in 1886). Several historians, including Aline Helg, Ada Ferrer, and Alejandro de la Fuente, have given nuanced accounts of how this convergence led to the crystallization of an antiracist nationalist political project in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

One of the striking features of Cuban slave society was the large free population of color, the principal protagonist of Sartorius's study. Slaves never accounted for a majority of the colonial population as they did in other large-scale Caribbean slave societies such as Saint-Domingue in the eighteenth century. Matt D. Childs, Jane Landers, Michele Reid-Vazquez, and other scholars have thus turned new attention to this segment of the Cuban population, trying to understand its roles and interests during the long rise and fall of slavery and colonialism. The works of Childs and Reid-Vazquez, squarely focused on the period of rapid growth of the slave trade and the sugar plantation, em-

phasize how the colonial regime targeted free people as potential enemies of the political and social order and sought to cut down on their historical freedoms, thus alienating them from Spanish rule.

Sartorius takes a different tack in his work, which is what makes his scholarly endeavor so original. Rather than looking ahead to the Cuban wars of independence, he questions nationalist teleology and asks how free people of color and the colonial state negotiated loyalty over the course of the nineteenth century. In doing so, he challenges the narrative of national conciliation and redemption that figures in the work of even the most sophisticated and accomplished historians of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Cuba. The reader will find echoes of influential works, such as Frederick Cooper's *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (2005), that have sought to undo the binaries between empire and nation and between subject and citizen in various colonial situations, an approach rarely undertaken in the treatment of nineteenth-century Cuba.

The author explores several aspects of loyalty and negotiations over it. These include military service, a deeply rooted feature of Spanish colonial societies, associational life, especially rich in Cuba in the late nineteenth century, political parties, the struggle to abolish slavery, and the complexity of loyalty during periods of anti-colonial revolution. The book's conclusion considers the trajectories of loyalism after the defeat of Spain and the rise of U.S. influence in the new republic.

The section that most stood out for this reader was chapter 3, "The Will to Freedom," which explores the politics of loyalty and freedom during the first phase of the Cuban independence movement, the Ten Years' War (1868–1878). This chapter will be of interest not only to historians of Cuba but also to scholars of Spain working on other colonial situations. The chapter's core concerns how the Spanish military sought to recruit black troops to combat the insurgency. Though Spanish colonial officials had relied on black service for centuries, in mid-nineteenth-century Cuba the policy was more delicate because recently the regime had sought to disarm black troops in the aftermath of an island-wide conspiracy against slavery and colonial rule, in which many free people were implicated and severely punished (the topic of Reid-Vazquez's *The Year of the Lash: Free People of Color in Cuba and the Nineteenth-Century Atlantic World* [2011]). Nonetheless, the military found black support indispensable. One of the most eager recruiters would go on to have an infamous career in Cuba: Valeriano Weyler. As a young officer, Weyler commanded irregular units, the *Cazadores de Valmaseda*, that mimicked the tactics of insurgent guerrillas. He enlisted black and white troops alike, seeking out those accustomed to hardship and who were perhaps used to living outside the law, not unlike the "scum of the earth" that generals Francisco Franco and José Millán Astray would incorporate into the Spanish Tercio in the Rif Rebellion in the 1920s.

The chapter also contains a rich archival find that the



author perhaps could have discussed at greater length: the interrogations of enslaved troops who were to be freed for their service to the Spanish cause. These cases were a product of Spain's first emancipation law, the Moret Law of 1870, a highly gradualist measure. Among its provisions was Article 3, which would liberate those whose service could be demonstrated. Sartorius compiled more than 300 such interrogations (p. 111) but devotes only a few pages to their analysis. Such sources indicate the richness of the author's research, and the wealth of material still to be mined by those interested in the politics of loyalty, a topic that Sartorius has successfully brought to the fore.

CHRISTOPHER SCHMIDT-NOWARA  
Tufts University

STEVEN E. TURLEY. *Franciscan Spirituality and Mission in New Spain, 1524–1599: Conflict beneath the Sycamore Tree (Luke 19: 1–10)*. (Catholic Christendom, 1300–1700.) Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2014. Pp. x, 202. \$119.95.

It is not uncommon to think of the early Franciscans sent to evangelize New Spain as a homogenous single body, or to focus purely on the works of that body instead of the spirituality of the individuals. Yet Steven E. Turley examines the individual within the whole to expose the changing spirituality of the sixteenth-century Franciscans and the internal conflicts they faced in their missionary efforts while in New Spain. While others have described the Franciscans as the order best suited to undertake the evangelization of the New World, Turley's work exposes the conflict many early friars felt in their attempts both to strictly observe the rule of their order while also prioritizing the importance of bringing souls to Christ. In the end, Turley calls upon the various writings and biographies of the early friars themselves to provide a new angle from which to view this important stage of Christianity's expansion.

Chapter 1 gives important background on the Franciscans and their eventual mission in New Spain. Recent additions to the historiography have highlighted the diversity within the Franciscan order itself. To this body of scholarship Turley makes an important contribution by examining the medieval conflicts between the Conventual and Observant branches of the Franciscans. The chapter illustrates the reform efforts of the Catholic monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabella, along with fray Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros in "unifying" the order under the Observants while, importantly, recognizing that "the 'united' Franciscan order [had] . . . many different kinds of friars" (p. 28).

Chapter 2 explains the results of such reform in a religious order that increasingly emphasized an eremitic spirituality focused on ascetic rigor and contemplative prayer. This type of spirituality, largely encouraged by fray Francisco de los Angeles Quiñones, would present a contradiction to the friars sent to New Spain. Quiñones instructed the missionary friars to maintain strictly their spiritual discipline while simultaneously

ordering them to not allow such traditions to affect their evangelization endeavors. Put simply, for the friars "to practice this eremitic spirituality in the mission field was extremely difficult" (p. 55). The resulting tension friars felt in fulfilling a task that paradoxically promoted personal observance and the spiritual welfare of the masses over the individual informs much of the remaining study.

Chapter 3 explores this tension by illustrating the differences in the lives and routines friars experienced previously in Spain and those they now faced in New Spain. The duties of the Franciscans in central Mexico prohibited, in large part, any direct continuity with their experiences in Spain. Moreover, the demands placed upon the outnumbered friars prevented their New World convents from being places of soothing contemplation and prayer. As a result, Turley demonstrates the various reactions of the early friars to such challenges: some isolated themselves, others became immersed in the work of evangelization, and still others simply quit.

The colonial turmoil that threatened the eremitic spirituality of the friars is further examined in the proceeding chapters. Chapter 4 explores the challenges of a growing Franciscan order that faced internal and external threats, particularly from the new archbishop Alonso de Montúfar. Montúfar encouraged secularization while accusing the Franciscans both of favoring their eremitic spirituality over missionary work, and, ironically, neglecting their spirituality in an overzealous effort to monopolize the evangelization project. Chapter 5 discusses the recruiting crisis mid-sixteenth-century friars faced. The Protestant Reformation, the popularity of the Jesuits, financial problems, and even resistance from peninsular Franciscan authorities all stunted recruitment efforts in Spain. As a result, the number of creole friars grew, yet these New Spain friars did not benefit from the same tradition and training available in Spain. The chapter also illustrates how Juan Focher's 1574 *Itinerarium Catholicum Profescentium ad Infideles Convertendos* encouraged a pragmatic spirituality that saw the evangelization of the natives as the greater good, one that did not necessarily conflict with the lesser good of contemplative spirituality although the latter should never triumph over the former. In short, Franciscan spirituality was being shaped to fit the demands of New Spain.

Chapter 6 employs the Patronazgo of 1574 to illustrate "the extent to which the eremitic spirituality of the first missionaries had splintered into a broad range of competing spiritualities" (p. 139). Some Franciscans opposed the secularizing effects of the Patronazgo on the grounds that it would damage their ministerial efforts thus far, or out of fear of having to return to the austere life of the monasteries. Others embraced the Patronazgo in hopes of regaining such rigorous enclosure. The chapter also calls attention to the concern among the late-sixteenth-century friars over the spiritual "laxity" of the order and the impact of the arrival of the *descalzos* (a branch of Franciscans highly devoted to eremitic spirituality) in New Spain. Their arrival and re-



fusal to engage in broader evangelization efforts exacerbated existing tensions with some friars seeing the *descalzos* as a hindrance to maintaining a dominant position in the church of New Spain, and others welcoming a revival of the traditional spiritual life.

Chapter 7 brings the conflict full circle to illustrate how the missionary endeavor in the New World affected the Franciscan spirituality in the Old. Self-interest toward their own provinces encouraged peninsular provincials to refuse or, at the very least, to drag their feet in sending requested friars to New Spain. Moreover, returned missionaries and their experiences, both good and bad, had mixed effects on peninsular spirituality, and the peninsular *descalzos* used their engagement of the missionary effort to boost their favor with the Spanish monarch, Philip II.

Overall, Turley provides a well-written account that demonstrates the impact missionary work had on the spiritual life of the Franciscans. Employing well-known sources and events in new ways to expose diversity and conflict, Turley's work encourages readers to consider the impacts of evangelization beyond the natives to include the Franciscans charged with their conversion.

MARK CHRISTENSEN  
Assumption College

JAIME E. RODRÍGUEZ O. *"We Are Now the True Spaniards": Sovereignty, Revolution, Independence, and the Emergence of the Federal Republic of Mexico, 1808–1824*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2012. Pp. xx, 497. Cloth \$70.00, e-book \$70.00.

Jaime E. Rodríguez O. has been studying and writing about Mexican independence since 1968, and he has now produced a painstakingly researched and trenchantly argued monograph that brings much of his work together in one place. Rodríguez has long argued for the importance of understanding the Mexican independence process in the context of the larger movements taking place in the Spanish world. In *"We are Now the True Spaniards": Sovereignty, Revolution, Independence, and the Emergence of the Federal Republic of Mexico, 1808–1824*, he tells a story that is familiar to Latin Americanists in significant part because of his own long career. Napoleon Bonaparte's invasion of Spain in 1807 accelerated the movement toward representative government, and as Spain's population entered the political stage they argued that in the absence of the monarch, "sovereignty reverted to the people," a concept readily available in the Spanish legal lexicon (p. 38). When Spaniards convened an elected representative body in order to draft a new constitution in the people's name, the colonial elite reached for another available concept to argue that the colonies were not colonies at all, but autonomous "kingdoms" with their own separate relationships to the sovereign, and that sovereignty over Spanish America thus reverted specifically to Spanish Americans. There were, then, two related "revolutions" occurring, one for representative government in the Spanish world, and one for autonomy in America.

What did *not* happen, Rodríguez insists, was a radical anticolonial revolution in Mexico. He argues that when Mexicans called for "independence" they nearly always meant "autonomy," and that is what they fought over. Insurrection stemmed not from opposition to Spain but from fear of the ascendancy of the reputedly despotic French. Until the very end, many if not most in Mexico believed that this autonomy could be realized within the Spanish monarchy.

The notion that Mexicans did not wage an anticolonial war is not new. It has often been used to make the claim that Mexico's independence was a "conservative" reaction intended to silence popular insurrection and pave the way for the reinstatement of the essential elements of colonial hierarchy and despotism. Rodríguez, by contrast, argues that in dismissing the revolutionary nature of the independence movement, historians have missed what *was* radical about this process. The Spanish Cortes made an extraordinary move in allowing the overseas territories representation, and the Constitution of 1812 was "the most radical charter of the nineteenth century" (p. 165), involving wide swaths of the population in broad electoral processes and transforming political culture on the ground. This is a beautifully narrated story, and an important corrective to pervasive assumptions about the conservatism of both Spanish and Mexican political culture.

At the same time, Rodríguez's insistence on weighing the global political revolution against the insurgencies raises questions. Although historians have lavished attention on the local conflict, he writes, "[b]y any standard, the political revolution was more profound and extensive than the insurgencies" (p. 192). Surely the importance of the former need not preclude an equally profound significance for the latter. In addition, Rodríguez's book is unabashedly about the elite, which leads him to identify consensus and continued support for the monarchy among the larger population, an assertion not clearly substantiated and perhaps not substantiable. I would have liked to have seen the author engaging more actively with those with whom he disagrees. He takes on other historians far more on details than on the meat of their arguments, and we do not see how others have made the case for the importance of the insurgencies and of the local, or why his arguments should supersede theirs.

Nevertheless, the author's central assertion of the radical nature of the larger political processes that prompted the movement toward Mexican independence remains extraordinarily important. This complicated narrative of constitutional wrangling and novel electoral activity can and should continue to help us understand the way a broad range of people in post-independence Mexico engaged and struggled with liberalism, and to grapple with Mexico's peculiar combination of liberal ideology, political instability, and social and ethnic stratification. Historians of Mexico and Latin America should and will continue to debate the specific arguments in this book. But without doubt, the story that it tells should be far more widely known.



The book takes on an implicit but powerful tendency in the writing of Latin America's history and Mexico's history in particular: the impulse to compare the region and the individual nations within it to the United States. This is invariably a comparison in which Latin American nations, Mexico in particular, fare poorly. Rodríguez would not, I think, disagree. But he strenuously insists that we revisit the reasons, which he argues lie in the particularities of the process of independence and of its timing, not in the incapacity of Latin Americans as political actors or in their fundamental despotism and anti-liberality. He reminds us that the U.S. enjoyed advantages unavailable to its southern neighbors, including a relatively unscathed infrastructure, a continued relationship with the world's preeminent economic and political power, and the advantages of the 25-year European conflict that provided a vast new market for U.S. goods. But he also shows us that Mexico's independence process was constitutionally complex and rooted in the same global concerns that faced the new United States. It was also undoubtedly more inclusive, coming on the heels of both electoral and insurrectionary processes in which a far wider swath of the population participated. This last claim is very important, but also tricky. In making it, Rodríguez may have overestimated the inclusive nature of Mexican politics and underestimated the elitist and exclusionary impulses of many of those involved in the independence process. And for those so inclined, it potentially offers fodder for the pervasive argument that Mexico's mistake was letting the rabble participate in the first place. Still, this point deserves far more attention than it usually receives. Rodríguez's book ought to provide substance for ongoing discussions inside and outside of academia about both Latin American "failure" and the controversial notion of the exceptionalism of the United States.

KAREN D. CAPLAN  
Rutgers University, Newark

LAURA ISABEL SERNA. *Making Cinelandia: American Films and Mexican Film Culture before the Golden Age*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2014. Pp. xvi, 317. Cloth \$99.95, paper \$27.95.

Laura Isabel Serna's intervention in the historiography of Mexican cinema makes an important contribution to our understanding of transnationalism and its relationship to the nation and mass culture. Between 1916 and 1929, Mexico produced an average of six feature films a year, but screened thousands of U.S. motion pictures. Historians have viewed cinema in this era before the "golden age" of Mexican film as a source of cultural imperialism rather than nation-building. Serna turns this assumption on its head. She argues that Mexican audiences in the 1920s created a national film culture based on their encounters with U.S. motion pictures. Referencing trade publications, fan magazines, government files, and studies of film exhibition, Serna locates a transnational social geography that she refers to as

"Cinelandia." On both sides of the border, Mexicans participated in the distribution, exhibition, and reception of U.S. films, which informed both their post-revolutionary nationalism and "distinctly Mexican" expressions of modern subjectivity.

After motion pictures first appeared in Mexico in 1896, they quickly spread across the country. By 1923, theaters in Mexico City and the surrounding suburbs could seat more than 80,000 patrons. During the Mexican Revolution, European productions, especially those from France and Italy were popular; Mexican and U.S. American motion pictures were less common. But in the late 1910s, when World War I weakened Europe's film industries, the U.S. seized the opportunity to capture the lion's share of Mexico's film market. The U.S. government supported these efforts because it believed that Hollywood films could improve the nation's image abroad and contribute to economic growth. Meanwhile, the end of the Mexican Civil War ushered in heightened concerns over Mexico's national identity and global modernity. Despite the "yanqui invasion" of U.S. films, Mexican filmgoers, journalists, and government officials saw cinema as a tool for advancement, and viewed theaters as emblems of national progress in the modern industrialized world. For the revolutionary government, motion pictures, especially film exhibitions, were integral to the growth of the national economy. Serna traces how post-revolutionary modernization efforts played out in motion picture theaters as city inspectors pushed proprietors to update their amenities, and as government organizations endeavored to create ideal citizen-consumers by encouraging respectable viewing habits and launching public health campaigns.

Moving skillfully between Mexico City, El Paso, and Los Angeles, Serna shows how star-struck fans, ordinary filmgoers, and critics of U.S. films generated transnational articulations of Mexican identity. Figures such as the *pelona*, a modern woman akin to the flapper, evoked debates over proper feminine behavior and the post-revolutionary nation's relationship to U.S. film. Particularly fascinating is Serna's exploration of the Mexican government's growing concerns over the representation of the nation on screen (p. 161). While the U.S. emphasized issues of "morality," Mexican censorship became primarily interested in protecting its national image. U.S. films that employed the *charro*, sombrero, and the tricolored flag as symbols of backwardness were especially troubling because Mexican intellectuals, government officials, and artists mobilized these same images to promote the post-revolutionary nation. Serna's treatment of Mexico's 1922 embargo against U.S. films provides insight into the interplay between state and business powers that informed the era's strategies of cultural diplomacy. In the U.S., audiences were not only confronted with racist and anti-Mexican films, but Mexican immigrants also faced discrimination in movie theaters. Serna explains that these experiences led to the creation of separate barrio theaters and linkages to Mexico through fan cul-

ture and publications such as *Cine-Mundial*. Building on the work of historians such as Lizabeth Cohen, who argued that mass culture does not necessarily undermine ethnic identity, Serna explains that Mexican immigrants' engagement with cinema was marked "Mexican" by language and attachments to their home countries.

Serna's interdisciplinary study demonstrates the value of transnationalism in both history and cinema studies. By focusing on film distribution, exhibition, and reception, Serna presents a compelling reinterpretation of Mexican film culture. However, a few slippages, particularly in reference to nation and race, raise questions that Serna occasionally sidesteps. For example, Serna explains, "Mexicans' racial status shaped their movie going practices" (p. 183). If this is the case, how do tensions and differences between national belonging and race affect the contours of Mexico's film culture? Serna cites examples of mestizo Mexicans defining themselves against Indians, "Negroes," and Afro-Mexicans, and moments when cinema contributed to broader hemispheric and Hispanic social identities, but we are left to wonder if these pushed against, supported, or simply overlapped with the Mexican national culture she describes. The text is the strongest when it describes Cinelandia as a "social space" for various conceptions of nationhood, rather than as a site in which heterogeneous audiences were "increasingly united by a notion of what it meant to be Mexican" (p. 217).

Serna's prose is accessible and engaging. The text is well suited to advanced undergraduate students, while Serna's innovative, archive-driven research will appeal to specialists from a wide range of disciplines. Although primarily a social and cultural history, this book also contributes to business and diplomatic history. Historians of U.S. and Latin American leisure and film history will particularly enjoy this fascinating book.

CARA CADDON

Indiana University Bloomington

HALBERT JONES. *The War Has Brought Peace to Mexico: World War II and the Consolidation of the Post-Revolutionary State*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2014. Pp. xvi, 296. \$55.00.

Halbert Jones's first monograph convincingly argues that President Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940–1946) used Mexico's involvement in World War II to consolidate the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) regime's enduring traits. Although the author makes frequent references to public opinion regarding involvement in the war, the book's core is a fine-grained study of high politics: Ávila Camacho's astute handling of army generals, key cabinet figures, and leaders of the Left and Right. The elite debates, decisions, and discourses Jones analyzes over time, however, had profound and largely negative impacts on the everyday lives of Mexicans.

The book's chronological order captures Ávila Camacho's persistent and opportunistic strategy to turn

key wartime and diplomatic events to his advantage. The president used German U-boats' sinking of Mexican ships to join the Allied war effort. He coaxed his popular and powerful predecessor, Lázaro Cárdenas, into the cabinet as defense minister (and thus out of politics) by playing on Cárdenas's nationalist fears of creeping U.S. military presence on Mexican soil. Ávila Camacho sought to use his generals' unrealistic ambitions to field an entire infantry division to fight the Nazis by encouraging the Mexican brass to professionalize and refrain from political meddling. The idea of military modernization, however, always remained more aspirational than normalizing. Most importantly, I would argue, the presidential proclamations of national unity made labor demands for higher wages seem unpatriotic, thus allowing capital to recoup political and economic power lost under Cárdenas.

To his credit, Jones's arguments never overshoot the empirical evidence, and their implications are consequential indeed. Without Mexico's entry into World War II, Mexico's state would have been less authoritarian and centralized. It would have been dominated by heavy-handed aging generals for much longer and would have delayed the rise of the young, technocratic *licenciados* led by Interior Minister Miguel Alemán Valdés, Ávila Camacho's successor. Absent the wartime discourse of national unity, its cult of economic production, and the political neutralization of Cárdenas, the PRIista state would have found it difficult to divide and weaken leftist leaders and ignore calls for social justice made in the revolution's name.

Many of these changes were structural, but Jones reminds us of the president's role in consolidating the PRIista state. Consistently underestimated and depicted as dull ("Mexico's Unknown Soldier"), Ávila Camacho proved to be a master of calculated ambiguity, proclaiming that Mexico was in a "state of war" without fully declaring war against the Axis powers in order to mollify strong neutralist sentiment. Part of Ávila Camacho's political genius—if that is the right word—lay in his refusal to forcefully exert executive authority as had Plutarco Elías Calles and Cárdenas. He was also lucky. Ávila Camacho's ogre of a brother died before he could run for president, and he benefited from the Left's altruistic if naïve desire to fight global fascism at the price of domestic concessions.

Jones does not ignore Ávila Camacho's mistakes, but I wonder if Ávila Camacho failed to make the most of the U.S.'s need to bring Mexico into the Allies' camp. Brazil was in a comparable position, and it extracted the transfer of technology from the U.S. to jump-start steel production. Although Ávila Camacho could be credited with limiting the bitter Left-Right ideological rivalry that threatened to split the ruling party and society, he was often generous to a fault with the Right and at times callous when it came to dealing with the working poor. Indeed, he once dismissed complaints by Mexicans about the wartime squeeze of inflation and wage controls by saying they should think of the suffering of the European civilians (pp. 158–159). On the whole, how-



ever, Jones accurately assesses Ávila Camacho as the ideal face of the PRIsta state: self-effacing, avuncular, and honest, yet willing to privately threaten to send in the army against “unrest” created by pro-democracy demonstrations (pp. 137–139).

Jones’s monograph contributes to an emerging historiographical current defined by the pathbreaking collection edited by Paul Gillingham and Benjamin T. Smith, *Dictablanda: Politics, Work, and Culture in Mexico, 1938–1968* (2014). This group of scholars identifies the PRI’s formative period as the 1940s and early 1950s—not Cárdenas’s presidency (1934–1940). Just as Jones notes that Ávila Camacho appropriated Catholic-tinged conservative rhetoric of “patriotism and nationalism” to brand class-based politics as “subversive” (p. 86), Thomas G. Rath in his *Myths of Demilitarization in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 1920–1960* (2013) reveals how the military echoed the Catholic Right’s calls to use the draft to discipline workers and purge them of leftist vices in the 1940s.

For all these reasons, Jones’s book makes an original and significant contribution to understanding the maturation of Mexico’s long-ruling PRI, its protean ideology, and its imperfect professionalization of the military.

BEN FALLAW  
Colby College

ROBERT F. ALEGRE. *Railroad Radicals in Cold War Mexico: Gender, Class, and Memory*. Foreword by ELENA PONIATOWSKA. (The Mexican Experience.) Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013. Pp. xviii, 275. \$40.00.

It is a felicitous sign of the times that gender shares the marquis with class and memory in a book about the all-male Mexican railroad workers. Robert F. Alegre makes a valiant effort to integrate women into the narrative, but since the workforce was male, the men are the core of the story and the women the periphery. Women were nevertheless important because the *rieleras*, as they called themselves, moved close to the center during times of crisis. And there were plenty of crises between 1948 and 1959, the decade that this enjoyable monograph covers. In that decade plus, the railroad workers suffered a coup and became the quintessential Mexican *charro* (sell-out) union; organized two successful nationwide strikes against the nationalized railroad; dumped the *charro* leadership in favor of union democracy; staged a third, unsuccessful strike against privately owned railroad lines; suffered state repression; lost its independent leadership to imprisonment; and witnessed a reestablishment of *charro* control. It is a roller coaster of a history, told in vivid detail in English for the first time.

Alegre argues convincingly that the focus of the battle between the union and the administrations of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952–1958) and Adolfo López Mateos (1958–1964) was the industrialization of Mexico. How should that process proceed? Who should

reap the harvest of the “Mexican miracle” (that started in the 1940s)? The Mexican government believed that import-substitution industrialization would benefit everyone eventually. Yet the reality was not encouraging, as two decades into it, only a minority enjoyed the fruits of the country’s economic boom. Fed up with their role as sacrificial lambs at the altar of economic development, the workers organized a grassroots movement to catch up with the cost of living and retake their union in 1958.

Women related to the workers were crucial to the effort, as Alegre amply documents. They supported the strike, at times strengthening the backbone of hesitant relatives, and activated family and neighborhood networks to win the strikes. The oral histories that Alegre unearths give voice to that unrecognized component of history. Clearly the 1958 movement owes a debt to the *rieleras*, one that Alegre repays by highlighting the many ways in which the women contributed to its success.

However, as Alegre points out, times changed. By 1959, the Mexican government had no patience for activists. The Cold War was in its ascendancy and the state had thrown its lot in with the United States and the *desarrollista* (developmentalist) option. While, as Alegre documents, the 1958 victories showed that workers could influence economic decisions in state-owned enterprises despite extensive Red-baiting, the tide turned in 1959. López Mateos had no desire to inconvenience private enterprise and repressed the strike against the privately owned railroad companies. The government castigated the union in the media as “communist,” arguing that railroad stoppages were “anti-patriotic.” Nationalism meant not disrupting economic activity, irrespective of working conditions. Strikes became “social dissolution” (p. 200), a crime under Article 145 of the Federal Penal Code. That article was used against the union leadership, sentencing legendary leader Demetrio Vallejo to 11 years in jail after the 1959 strike. Sixty-five other independent union leaders would receive similarly harsh sentences.

At that moment, when the government hunted down union leaders, the women rose to the occasion again. They protected men who went into hiding and organized campaigns to release those detained. This time, however, their efforts were in vain. The independent unionists remained behind bars while the *charros* returned to rule the Sindicato de Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros de México (STFRM).

But the memory of those years was not erased. It is, as Alegre shows, contentious, contradictory, painful at times, but very much alive even today. That is where I quibble with Alegre. In giving a nod to recent literature on memory, he characterizes some of the men and women he interviewed as “memory entrepreneurs” (p. 17), a concept he borrows from sociology. The choice is unfortunate because, as Alegre describes it, it emphasizes an individualistic, almost selfish and self-serving approach to memory, which could not be further from what the book shows. Alegre’s interviewees deploy memory as a political, collective act of community

preservation. That, to me, speaks of hope and historical actors who refute the notion that it has always been this way. Alegre shows that the railroad workers exemplified a time when Mexican politics was not business as usual, in which no member of the railroad family would consider him or herself an “entrepreneur” of any type. However, the point is minor. The book is not. It is a long overdue addition to Mexican labor history that belongs in undergraduate and graduate classrooms everywhere.

MYRNA SANTIAGO

*Saint Mary's College of California*

KIRSTEN WELD. *Paper Cadavers: The Archives of Dictatorship in Guatemala*. (American Encounters/Global Interactions.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2014. Pp. xvi, 335. Cloth \$99.95, paper \$26.95.

Although 30 years have passed since Guatemala began an arduous return to democratic rule, we still lack a full understanding of how and why horrendous, sustained political violence took place. *Paper Cadavers: The Archives of Dictatorship in Guatemala* illuminates one key facet of the technologies of terror from the 1950s through 1985, telling the story of the National Police (PN), the records they kept, and the actions these records enabled, from banal to horrific. In so doing, Kirsten Weld shifts attention toward the capital city and away from rural Guatemala, where most of the armed conflict took place; toward targeted political violence and repression and away from the systematic mass killing that the army inflicted. The very reason such histories have been so difficult to write—relative scarcity of documentary evidence—makes Weld’s study especially gripping. While animating the PN as a full-fledged institutional actor, the book also narrates the process that allowed Weld to tell that story in the first place.

The “Project” began in 2005 with a chance discovery of an enormous warehouse of some 75 million documents—most in advanced states of decay—dating back to the nineteenth century. In subsequent years, a visionary and courageous array of actors managed to wrest control of the warehouse, garner international aid and technical assistance, and begin to turn this dumping ground for PN records into an archive. A decade later, the National Police Historical Archive (AHPN) was a fully functioning and vibrant institution, serving as a crucial font of data for human rights trials, for individual Guatemalans seeking closure, and for historical research like that conveyed in the first part of Weld’s book. In a further twist, Weld herself served as a volunteer staff member of the AHPN. This imbues her study with an especially powerful combination of insight and conviction.

The concept of “archival thinking” drives Weld’s central arguments. To protagonists of the AHPN this meant a set of routines and logics distinct from the principles of human rights activism. For historians, archival thinking includes placing “archives . . . at the heart of our research questions” (p. 13).

Weld’s arguments unfold embedded in a series of ironies, beginning with the creation of the archive itself.

Throughout the Cold War period, U.S. assistance played a depressingly predictable role. “[I]n order to kill university students or community organizers,” Weld concludes dryly, “one had to keep track of who they were, who their friends and relatives were, and what daily routes they traveled” (p. 87). What began as a U.S. government-conceived effort to imbue the PN with archival thinking, ended as counterinsurgency aid that “condoned counter-terror” (p. 117). Years later, after a flurry of initial activity driven by the urgent imperatives of human rights activism, the AHPN found its footing thanks to an expert who guided the Project’s implementation of archival thinking. Internal routines for processing and organizing documents changed and priorities shifted. Gently deferring Foucault-inflected conclusions, Weld argues that achievements associated with this transition outweighed the costs. Yet she does not ignore the tensions: to fully implement archival thinking, AHPN staff had to subordinate commitments that brought them to the Project in the first place.

This tension invokes a second theme, the Project’s lasting impact. The era when human rights activists deploy AHPN evidence to bring Guatemalan state officials to justice will soon yield to a broader objective: steeling “never again” convictions about the genocide and opening new political horizons inspired by past struggles for social change. The 200-person Project staff, amid painstaking archival work, participate in just such a transformation, punctuated by poignant discoveries in the documents themselves, and moving exchanges with one another. Older staff—actors in the armed conflict—share experiences with younger colleagues; they regularly engage functionaries linked to the atrocities that the archives document. Consciousness forged through the creation of the AHPN, Weld argues, is the Project’s most tangible legacy.

Yet questions linger. International aid crucial to the Project’s success was provided because of its potential to advance human rights prosecutions; this raises doubts about the AHPN’s financial viability. Moreover, underlying commitments driving the remarkable achievements of the first decade could fade as the logic of archival thinking prevails. Younger workers take inspiration from their elders’ quest for revolutionary change, while espousing their own aspirations consistent with the times. Would their more moderate, political sensibilities propel the deep structural change that Guatemalan society still sorely needs?

The most sweeping claim for archival thinking—transparency and access to institutional routines of record keeping help us to gauge a regime’s claim to democracy—also confronts ironies when applied to the AHPN. At first this claim seems to hold: the PN archive started as a secret accessory to counterinsurgent terror; after 1985 it fell into disarray but remained secret, an index of the fragile character of the democratic transition. Yet the AHPN’s florescence since 2005 comes paired with what most observers characterize as the cruel negation of high hopes produced by the 1996



peace accords, the constriction of democratic and citizenship rights, and the increasing criminalization of protest reminiscent of the counterinsurgency era. We can join Weld in affirming the great achievements of the AHPN, while questioning a little more vigorously than she does what this third principle of archival thinking tells us about Guatemalan democracy today.

A final query—only obliquely raised by Weld herself—concerns the present absence of Guatemala's Maya majority in her narrative. While in many respects Mayas are appropriately absent, at a deeper level, they will need to be written back in. How did the identity of the PN rank and file shape interactions with their non-Indian superiors and targets? Is the Project, as a cauldron for new political horizons, truly inclusive and anti-racist, fully transcending the traditional premises of the ladino middle-class? Does Guatemala's characterization as a racial state stand up to scrutiny when Mayas remain off-stage, just barely out of sight?

Weld's skillfully deployed "dialectical" method makes a compelling case that historical research on such questions cannot take the constitution of the archive itself for granted. She has inspired us to explore the historical processes underlying the creation of the data we collect, while reflecting critically on the relationship between this data (including that which might have existed) and the core values that drive our research.

CHARLES R. HALE  
University of Texas at Austin

HAL LANGFUR, editor. *Native Brazil: Beyond the Convert and the Cannibal, 1500–1900*. (Diálogos.) Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2014. Pp. xvi, 285. \$29.95.

Brazilian indigenes inspired towering figures in Western thought over the ages to reflect on the essence of the human condition, whether Michel de Montaigne, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, or Claude Lévi-Strauss. Yet notwithstanding such ontological ruminations, or perhaps because of them, historical research on Brazil's indigenous population long lagged. The culprits abound. Nineteenth-century racial science heralded the ultimate disappearance of the "primitive" races, a trend seemingly confirmed by the decimation of millions of Brazilian Indians since conquest. Brazilian postcolonial "Indianist" authors were more interested in conjuring noble savages than documenting factual or actual histories of ethnic struggle. And historians of Brazil, who were traditionally implicated in state-building projects, and bound by the written documentary sources required of their discipline, readily ceded the study of a far-flung hodgepodge of marginalized peoples to cultural anthropologists in the intellectual division of labor. Over the last two decades, however, historical research on Brazil's Indians has gathered steam, precipitated by the surging political mobilization and demographic rebound of the indigenous population, as well as the Latin Americanist historiographical wave fo-

cused on subalternity, hybridity, and resistance. This volume, which brings together scholars of Brazil's indigenous history, represents a welcome addition to the literature.

In his introduction, Hal Langfur provides an overview of the conceptual biases and methodological challenges that historians of indigenous Brazil have confronted. The musings are both historiographical and pedagogical. Langfur bemoans the binary of ferocious cannibals or passive converts as essentialized colonial constructs. He likewise laments the omission of native Brazilians from undergraduate survey courses, crowded out by histories of the Aztec and Inca and those of the transatlantic slave trade to Brazil that have spotlighted (and normalized) the Iberian colonies' economic cores. Through the contributors' regional studies, the volume aims to underscore the processes of resistance, negotiation, migration, and alliance that Langfur argues is more representative and useful for understanding Brazil and its indigenous history.

Given the centrality of the mission villages, or *aldeias*, in the Portuguese colonial blueprint for the Christianization and Europeanization of indigenous peoples (and the documentary paper trail they engendered), several of the contributors focus on this institution of social engineering, albeit from somewhat different perspectives. Alida Metcalf's essay examines the objectives, strategies, and frustrations of the Jesuits in their pioneering efforts to proselytize the eastern Tupi- and Guarani-speaking populations. Through the adaptation of indigenous song and dance, admonitions of the torments of hell, and condemnations of cannibalism and polygyny, the Jesuits aimed to convert the native villages initially through preaching and peaceful "persuasion" in situ. Yet ongoing Indian attacks, conjoined with the persistence of condemned indigenous practices, led the Jesuits to endorse the colonial governor's more violent military campaigns, and to oversee resettlement in *aldeias*. Using missionary accounts, Metcalf details the nature of proselytization and the political structure of villages whose populations numbered in the thousands, but whose long-term objective of nurturing sedentary, Christian agriculturalists was stymied by epidemic disease, famine, settler attack, and indigenous resistance.

Whereas Metcalf highlights the unstable and unsustainable nature of the majority of the Jesuit-administered missions, Maria Regina Celestino de Almeida's study of the late-colonial *aldeias* of Rio de Janeiro suggests the opposite. For Indians, she argues, the *aldeia* not only provided a refuge from war and enslavement, but it also allowed for the rebuilding of social networks, cultural practices, and legal identities as Christian subjects of the Portuguese crown. While attentive to the broader Luso-Brazilian subordination of indigenous peoples, Almeida, like scholars of colonial Spanish America, casts the mission village as a site of negotiation and ethnic reconstitution. Most illuminating is her discussion of the business practices and conflicts surrounding the legally recognized common lands of

the *aldeias*, which allowed indigenous peoples to sustain multiple strategies to modulate engagement with the dominant society: whether agriculture, craft production, fishing and hunting, extractivism, employment outside the village, and leasing of village land. The territorial and legal boundaries afforded by the *aldeia*, and mediated by the residents' politico-legal appeals, organizational frameworks, and subjective experiences, forged a novel and enduring political identity for communities as "Indians."

The two essays centered on the colonial Amazon likewise diverge in their narration of indigenous histories. Neil L. Whitehead's macrohistory focuses on the destruction and deculturation of the Amazon's indigenous population by epidemic disease, warfare, enslavement, and forced assimilation in the missions and Directorate villages (1757–1798). Indigenous resistance, ultimately futile, is located in instances of flight and armed conflict, as well as alliance with other European powers. Barbara A. Sommer's engaging essay, conversely, focuses on the pacts between Portuguese officials and indigenous leaders as key nodes of colonial hegemony and social segmentation under the Directorate. Native headmen, whose offices were often hereditary, received fine clothing, honorific titles, European educations, and colonial exemptions from the crown in return for assistance in communal labor drafts for raw material extraction, public works, military battle and defense. Whether exploiting indigenous commoners in their position as labor administrators and traders, or defending them against overreaching lay or religious authorities, Sommer argues, native headmen's pivotal role derived from the state backing and kin networks that buttressed their position as community leaders.

The essays on Minas Gerais, site of a legendary late-seventeenth-century gold rush, likewise revise our understandings of Brazil's indigenous history. Hal Langfur and Maria Leônia Chaves de Resende challenge the notion of indigenous disappearance amid an advancing frontier by exploring myriad forms of native resistance and adaptation. Utilizing military dispatches, travel accounts, baptismal records, and judicial documents, the authors discuss the violent clashes with settlers, ranchers, and military contingents in the outlying and forested countryside; in towns, they highlight natives' legal initiatives, both successful and failed, to escape the confines of the Indian administration system and its bonds of personal servitude. For the nineteenth century, Judy Bieber analyzes the evolution of state policy toward the Botocudo Indians of the Doce River basin of eastern Minas Gerais, a generic name applied to indigenous speakers of mainly Macro-Gê dialects, who systematically harassed Luso-Brazilian officials and frontier settlers. Bookended by the royal decree of 1808 that authorized "just war" against the Botocudo and the 1845 federal legislation reinstating a Directorate for Indians, Bieber's study chronicles the government failure to transform the semi-nomadic Botocudo into sedentary agriculturalists. Although she attributes such shortcomings to official ignorance rather than arrogance, her es-

say is one of the few that attempts to foreground indigenous political ecology to explain native peoples' selective embrace of the material lures of the dominant society.

The volume's final two essays respectively approach indigenous history in nineteenth-century central Brazil from a top-down and bottom-up perspective. Mary Karasch's study of indigenous policy in Goiás between 1780 and 1880 reprises the saga of frontier conquest through warfare, enslavement, and *aldeia* resettlement under lay directorship and revived missionary oversight, with an eye to regional and ethnic variation. Overall, she finds that the *aldeias* failed to convert the natives into Christians or regiment laborers due to inadequate state investment in both financial and human capital, as well as indigenous resistance to frontier expansion in Central Brazil. The latter trend is the main topic of Karasch's co-authored essay with David McCreery, replete with tales of the raids, subterfuges, and getaways of the Apinayé, Canoeiro, Kayapó, Xerente, and Xavante. Based on their thematic interrelationship and overlap, it might have been more fruitful to merge these chapters into one.

Given that colonial and nineteenth-century native Brazilians are popularly glossed not only as converts and cannibals, but also as consorts, the omission of gender as a primary category of historical analysis is regrettable. From Gilberto Freyre's rendition of indigenous women's purported infatuation with Portuguese men to Brazilians' genealogical boasts that their great-grandmother was "caught by a lasso," the gendered and sexualized realms of inter-ethnic contact are well referenced—and stereotyped—in Brazil. Yet none of the authors foreground gender in their argument: whether in unpacking the meanings of masculinity for frontiersmen, or in focusing on the discrete experiences of indigenous men and women in colonial and nineteenth-century Brazilian contact zones. Still, as a testament to the courage and creativity of indigenous peoples in resisting the onslaught of Portuguese and Brazilian dominion, the volume offers an important corrective to the threadbare narratives of the disappearing native.

SETH GARFIELD

University of Texas at Austin

BRYAN MCCANN. *Hard Times in the Marvelous City: From Dictatorship to Democracy in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2014. Pp. xi, 249. Cloth \$89.95, paper \$24.95.

Bryan McCann's new book offers an important account of a series of developments that have not yet received the attention of historians based in the United States. The setting is Rio de Janeiro—the "marvelous city" of the title and Brazil's second-most-populous urban center—between the 1970s and the early 1990s. At the outset of this period, activists in the city's iconic informal settlements (*favelas*) built movements that sought to establish residents' claims to their homes while demanding further rights taken for granted by many residents



of the formal city. In the 1980s, amid Brazil's transition from military dictatorship to multi-party democracy, these activists and *favela* residents more generally were courted by ambitious politicians with bold reformist plans for Rio's remaking, including the delivery of land titles, services, and social and civil rights the earlier movements had sought. Reform, however, was at most a partial success, and was accompanied by the expansion of the power and reach of organized crime groups, which were able to colonize the grassroots structures that activists had envisioned as giving voice to *favela* residents. This situation, according to McCann, was Rio's "Breaking Point"; it was followed by "The Unraveling" that characterized "Rio's violent 1990s" (p. 161).

Over the course of five reader-friendly chapters, McCann provides a narrative overview of these developments, together with the necessary national context, descriptive portraits of key figures, more than a dozen illuminating photographs, and concise comparisons with other Latin American cases. An epilogue, in addition to providing a tentative outline of the experience of Rio and its *favelas* since the 1990s, offers a discussion of sources and methods, including McCann's decision to abandon his early plans to make oral-history interviews the focus of his research in favor of drawing primarily on written sources, most notably theses and dissertations by Brazilian researchers in fields ranging from anthropology to urban planning. Despite the book's declensionist narrative arc (from "Mobilization" to "The Unraveling"), McCann remains an optimist, and while he foregrounds other explanations for his self-described "sunnier perspective" (p. 182), it seems inextricably linked to his affection for Rio and its people, and for Brazilian culture more generally, on display in this volume as in his two previous books, *Hello, Hello Brazil: Popular Music in the Making of Modern Brazil* (2004) and *The Throes of Democracy: Brazil Since 1989* (2008).

Like *The Throes of Democracy*, *Hard Times in the Marvelous City: From Dictatorship to Democracy in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro* is written in such a way as to be accessible to undergraduate students. Instructors, however, will have to provide additional maps, for the ones featured in the book are inadequate. Their inadequacy should not, however, be taken as a knock on the author's work. McCann, after all, was trained as a historian rather than as a cartographer. The publisher, however, might have been more attentive to this issue. Indeed, the book as a whole would have benefited from closer editorial attention throughout, including at the copy-editing and proofing stages.

The requisite faultfinding, however, seems an odd note to sound while reviewing a book so brimming with enthusiasm for people enduring far greater hardships than poor copy-editing. It may also be beside the point. McCann should be congratulated for providing readers with a neatly constructed account of popular politics

and sociopolitical change in one of the world's great cities.

JAMES P. WOODARD  
Montclair State University

SERGIO SERULNIKOV. *Revolution in the Andes: The Age of Túpac Amaru*. Translated by DAVID FRYE. Foreword by CHARLES F. WALKER. (Latin America in Translation/en traducción/em tradução.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2013. Pp. xvi, 159. Cloth \$79.95, paper \$22.95.

CHARLES F. WALKER. *The Tupac Amaru Rebellion*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014. Pp. 347. \$29.95.

The Tupac Amaru and Katarista rebellions were a cycle of indigenous uprisings between Cusco and Potosí in 1780–1782, which claimed over 100,000 lives, primarily indigenous, out of a population of 1.5 million, before being crushed by colonial authorities. They have received excellent local studies, but no modern synthetic treatment. The books under review both meet that description, but they are complementary rather than redundant. Sergio Serulnikov's is a concise survey of the rebellions throughout the region, bringing clarity to a complex group of uprisings, each with its own contours and protagonists. Chronologically organized, but too brief and wide-ranging to be called a narrative history, it showcases both the heterogeneity of the rebellions and their connections. (Its clarity owes much to the graceful rendering by David Frye, an experienced and versatile translator.) By contrast, Charles F. Walker's book is a rich, unhurried narrative history and character study of José Gabriel Condorcanqui (Tupac Amaru) and Micaela Bastidas, who led the most famous of the rebellions, along with their family members who continued the fight after their deaths. Where Serulnikov pays somewhat more attention to the southern half of the story (known as the Katarista rebellions), Walker focuses on the northern half; where Walker's book is steeped in the primary sources, Serulnikov's synthesizes recent scholarship on the various individual rebellions.

In spite of his subtitle, *The Age of Túpac Amaru*, Serulnikov does not place Tupac Amaru at the story's center. He begins with Tomás Katari, who led a popular movement in Chayanta (northern Potosí) to allow Indian communities to choose their own caciques, instead of corrupt outsiders appointed by the *corregidor*. (This movement was the main focus of Serulnikov's 2003 book *Subverting Colonial Authority: Challenges to Spanish Rule in Eighteenth-Century Southern Andes*, which underlies significant parts of *Revolution in the Andes*.) Katari successfully appealed to the viceroy in Buenos Aires for support, but met illegal repression by regional authorities on his return. Only then did Katari resort to force, rallying communities to expel the *corregidor* and outsider caciques and establish *de facto* indigenous rule in the province. Even then, Katari claimed that he was not challenging imperial authority, but vindicating it. His principal demand, until he was ambushed and killed

by a Spanish militia, was that colonial authorities follow the Spaniards' own laws.

Serulnikov then moves north to Canas y Canchis (southern Cusco), where Tupac Amaru served as cacique to several Indian villages. His rebellion began independently and almost simultaneously with Katari's. Having failed in a legal petition to confirm his claims as direct descendent of the last Inca king, and to institute reforms for improving the lives of indigenous commoners, he and his wife Micaela Bastidas began their rebellion by executing their local *corregidor* for his abuses, alleging that they did so on royal instructions. Like Katari, Tupac Amaru and Bastidas claimed they were acting within the framework of the Spanish monarchy; unlike Katari, they asserted a further legitimacy as heirs to the Inca monarchy, calling themselves Inca and Coya.

Serulnikov continues through an overlapping series of uprisings throughout Upper Peru, which invoked the authority of both Tupac Amaru, as Inca king, and the Katari family. After the defeat and execution of Tupac Amaru and Bastidas, the story climaxes in two sieges of La Paz by indigenous armies from both south and north, whose defeat by Spanish soldiers and indigenous loyalists represented the end of the rebellions. What emerges from Serulnikov's telescoped account is the diversity of the various uprisings. Every rebellion between Cusco and Potosí had its own circumstances, leaders, and trajectory.

Serulnikov's objective is to uncover the political projects of indigenous communities and their leaders. Where scholars once portrayed the rebels either as precursors of Independence or as avatars of an Andean millenarianism, recent historians have described Andeans asserting agency within the colonial system. Tomás Katari defended the traditional balance of rule, whereby Indian communities enjoyed partial autonomy in exchange for tribute and *corvée*-like *mita* labor. Even his resort to violence was not a radical departure, but resembled the periodic, limited rebellions that had traditionally pushed back against the worst Spanish abuses, without challenging the colonial system itself: "the politics of violence and the politics of rights were part and parcel of the same political practice" (p. 27). Tupac Amaru and Bastidas shared in this tradition, but their acceptance of the colonial framework coexisted uneasily with their Inca claims, which implicitly challenged Spain's rule. Gradually, however, the conflict in both north and south evolved into a caste war. The violence on both sides reached levels unknown in earlier rebellions; the tortures and horrific executions suffered by rebel leaders represented a new colonial politics of terror.

Serulnikov does an impressive job making the tangled story coherent, but his rapid pace does not leave enough space for synthesis. The various uprisings were heterogeneous in personnel and goals, while converging into a single movement; *Revolution in the Andes: The Age of Túpac Amaru* does not fully reconcile the rebellions' unity and diversity. Serulnikov suggests that there

was a basic difference between the Cusco region, where the rebellion drew in part on a widely shared resistance to the Bourbon Reforms across race and class, and Upper Peru, where a long, slow process of alienation between caciques and Indian commoners had finally reached a breaking point. Given the book's brevity (141 pages of text), a fuller treatment of the eighteenth-century background and a more substantial conclusion would have been welcome.

Walker, too, is interested in reconstructing the rebels' political principles and goals, alongside more extended narrative and biographical sketches. Like other scholars, he emphasizes Tupac Amaru's and Bastidas's goal of building a cross-caste and cross-class coalition, in which they attacked corrupt *corregidores*, the *mita*, *reparto de bienes*, and Peninsular officeholders, but not royal authority, caciques, creoles, or the church. In spite of this stance, as David T. Garrett and others have demonstrated, the Inca elite and most caciques fiercely opposed Tupac Amaru. To this list, Walker adds the Church, which some historians have portrayed as tacitly supporting of the rebellion. While some rural priests did support it, most did not, and its most important early opponent was Tupac Amaru's one-time ally, Cusco bishop Juan Manuel Moscoso y Peralta. Walker illuminates an important, previously ignored phenomenon: the influence of loyalist priests in the rebel-held territories, whom Moscoso ordered to remain in their parishes, correctly guessing that Tupac Amaru's and Bastidas's ideological commitments would protect these priests from harm. The priests' sermons against the rebellion damaged the very claim to Catholic piety, on the rebels' part, that guaranteed the priests' freedom to attack it.

In spite of tapping into widely shared opposition to the Bourbon Reforms, Tupac Amaru's and Bastidas's goal of a broad coalition was never feasible. Historians have exaggerated their early support among creoles; most creoles who supported the couple were already connected to them by kinship or long association, or acted from fear or coercion. In a rich reconstruction of the rebellion's leadership circle and its gradual collapse, Walker clarifies the relationships between Indian and creole leaders as well as the central role of Bastidas, recognized at the time as the movement's co-director and chief of logistics. As creole supporters fell away, it became clear that the movement's only reliable support was from Peru's indigenous majority. But many of those fighting against the rebellion were also indigenous; most of the caciques close to Cusco opposed the rebellion, and their subjects fought against it.

The richness of Walker's narrative relies on a comprehensive reading of the primary sources, both archival and published. Multivolume publication projects have transcribed a remarkable number of documents, primarily from the northern half of the story. Walker notes that he sometimes read something in the archive before realizing that that very document was available in published form. He cites such documents in their archival location. However, while these examples seem to



be relatively few, they do make the book slightly less helpful to readers (especially students) who will want to follow his endnotes for their own research.

Both authors must account for the atrocities that characterized these rebellions, on both sides. Serulnikov sees deep cultural roots of wartime violence, at least on the indigenous side. When confronted with reports of rebels massacring captives, or eating the hearts of non-Indians, Serulnikov invokes an argument previously made by Jan Szeminski: indigenous Andeans saw non-Indians who behaved in sinful ways as “bestial, diabolical beings, as ‘nonhuman humans’” (p. 93), tying the war’s extreme violence to a distinctive Andean Christianity. Walker finds such ethnohistorical arguments less persuasive. He sees atrocities on both sides as a natural consequence of war: “the spiraling of violence and the conversion of the enemy into a wretched ‘other’ seen as deserving abuse and death” (pp. 144–145). He emphasizes the everyday experience of war, including the likely role of dysentery in forcing Tupac Amaru to lift the siege of Cusco (a decision historians have seen as a major strategic error). But Walker does see symbolic content in the gruesome executions carried out by Spaniards. Among the book’s most shocking pages is a map (p. 248) of the locations where rebel body parts were carried and publically exhibited.

Given excellent monographic research on the period, and long-standing interest in indigenous resistance, the need for a synthetic account of the Tupamarista rebellions has been widely recognized. While it is not unusual for books on a previously neglected subject to appear nearly simultaneously, it is fortunate when they supplement rather than compete with each other. (*Revolution in the Andes* includes a gracious foreword by Walker.) Both books are well suited for college students and informed nonacademic readers. Both have excellent maps, though *Revolution in the Andes* would benefit from a timeline, which *The Tupac Amaru Rebellion* has, while the latter book would benefit from a family tree of the Tupac Amaru clan. It would be feasible, and worthwhile, for the publishers to make such teaching aids available as online supplements.

Perhaps the most widely shared rebel claim was that of restoring Inca kingship. The idea inspired indigenous people throughout the south-central Andes, even when they knew almost nothing about José Gabriel Condorcanqui, to take up arms in his name. A previous generation of historians essentially reduced the 1780–1782 rebellions to Inca revivalism, part of an allegedly age-old Andean millenarianism. Recent scholars have rejected this view as saddling Andeans with (in Serulnikov’s words) “an essentialistic atavism” (p. 10). Both Walker and Serulnikov give Inca revivalism sensitive treatment but downplay it in favor of other, more pragmatic rebel goals. The true significance of the restored Inca monarchy, for both leaders and followers, is one of the hardest things for a historian to reconstruct. What finally remains mysterious, in these fine accounts and perhaps in the sources themselves, is the very thing

that most seized the imagination of contemporaries and posterity: the return of the Inca and the Coya.

JEREMY RAVI MUMFORD  
Brown University

VIVIANA L. GRIECO. *The Politics of Giving in the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata: Donors, Lenders, Subjects, and Citizens*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2014. Pp. ix, 298. \$55.00.

Viviana L. Grieco’s study examines the connection between conflict and finance in the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata and its intended (and unintended consequences) in the course of war with France and then with England between 1793 and 1808. Grieco focuses on how the Spanish government obtained financial contributions, including gifts and loans, from the vast La Plata area, which ran from Potosí via Charcas and Córdoba to Buenos Aires.

Through her innovative and imaginative analysis of government finance in eighteenth-century England, France, and Spain, Grieco finds that England obtained funding from Parliament-approved direct taxation, while France, lacking a representative institution, employed a variety of indirect pressures to receive funds, including granting privileges and repeated borrowing, which produced financial instability. Spain, however, resorted to a system long in gestation, one through which voluntary “donations” (i.e., “gifts”) and loans were given in return for grants of privilege such as conferring posts to corporate bodies, civil servants, and army and naval officers at home and in the colonies.

The hitherto neglected role of Spanish merchants and merchant-bankers in colonial and metropolitan government finance is illuminated in Grieco’s book, which is a welcome addition in tracking the *donativos* (contributions) of regular military and local militia units, civil servants, and ecclesiastical and mercantile groups. The methodology is clear in the latter part of her study as Grieco examines La Plata revenue-collecting in three periods: 1793–1795 (war with France), 1797–1801 (war with England), and again with England from 1804 to 1808 when defeat at Trafalgar (1805) made colonial silver transfers across the Atlantic difficult.

Grieco pieces together an impressive mass of statistical material. Two groups gained from “gifts” and loans to the colonial government, presumably to be put at the disposition of the metropole. Since the brief English occupation of Havana in 1763, Madrid reinforced its military units in the viceroyalty. The upper class of Buenos Aires was the principal donor financing the regular and—after the failure of the first British invasion—the locally recruited militiamen with sages, equipment, and supplies. Moreover the militia units incorporated creoles, *castas*, free men of color, and slaves thereby opening avenues of social mobility. The other group included the Buenos Aires merchants and many members of their newly registered guild (*consulado*), who now emerged as indispensable fiscal intermediaries between

the colonial administration and the public. In return for their funds and services, after 1801 the hard core of the Spanish merchant elite lobbied Madrid to terminate *comercio neutral* in periods of warfare and to restore the secular Spanish system of managed trade, i.e., monopoly between Cádiz and the empire's Atlantic ports. To be sure, the major source of government funds was merchants, not the small gifts from the lower classes, the "poor but loyal people" (p. 110).

Two conflicts, the war with France and then the war with England, were the prelude to the crisis of the colonial regime in Rio de la Plata. Conflict with England brought two failed British attempts to occupy Buenos Aires and open its port to trade with England; these operations accelerated change in the colony. Resistance to the invading British troops obliged the municipal council, the *cabildo*, of Buenos Aires to initiate and expand the militia. Second, fiscal demands forced the *cabildo* to rely heavily on the merchant community and landed gentry. The *cabildo*, rather than viceroys, emerged as the locus of power and authority in La Plata. The *cabildo* then convened a congress of the provincial elite and created a Junta de Guerra that promptly authorized the *cabildo* to appeal to the militia for *donativos* and to the public for loans at interest, and also to legislate new taxes. Unsurprisingly, the largest gift-givers and lenders of 1806 were 153 merchants grouped as *comerciantes*, *almaceneros*, and *tenderos*. Among the merchants were slave traders, participants in the large-scale smuggling of English textiles, and partisans of neutral trade. The merchant community was now split between "free" traders and monopolists, between importers of Spain's sugar, wines, and liquors and those handling goods shipped by neutral nations.

In the climactic moment of Grieco's model monograph (1808–1810) we can follow the interplay of finance, trade, and popular participation in politics by militia units loyal to the *cabildo*. It was instrumental in the appointment of Santiago Liniers as viceroy, a supporter of neutral trade and the militia. Immediately he requested that the *cabildo* finance the militia, now among the "powerful players" in the politics of La Plata. Militia units, at the command of the *cabildo*, prevented a coup d'état by the Spanish monopolists to remove Liniers and exiled the leadership of this faction to Patagonia. And responding to the *cabildo*'s request, the militia "gifted" the new local authority, a sign of their politicization.

Grieco argues that giving and bargaining for privilege cemented ties between colonials and the government and opened avenues of "social improvement" for militiamen. As *vecinos*/citizens of Buenos Aires, they were in the initial stage of politicization. How, then, can we explain why their loyalty to the colonial regime vanished so rapidly when revolution flared in 1810? Perhaps the degree of social mobility in the stratified society of Buenos Aires and its interior—as Tulio Halperín Donghi claimed in *Revolución y guerra: For-*

*mación de una élite dirigente en la Argentina criolla* (1972)—has been exaggerated?

S. J. STEIN  
Princeton University

LINDSEY CHURCHILL. *Becoming the Tupamaros: Solidarity and Transnational Revolutionaries in Uruguay and the United States*. Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 2014. Pp. viii, 206. \$59.95.

In 2009 voters elected José "El Pepe" Mujica to the presidency of the small South American nation of Uruguay. Since then, Mujica has attracted a good deal of attention from international media outlets, who have praised his austere living habits and a series of progressive legislative initiatives passed during his tenure, including the creation of a state marijuana monopoly, the legalization of same sex marriages, and providing a home for both Syrian refugees and Guantánamo detainees. Mujica is a former political prisoner and urban guerrilla affiliated with the *Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros* (MLN-T, or just Tupamaros).

The publication of Lindsey Churchill's *Becoming the Tupamaros: Solidarity and Transnational Revolutionaries in Uruguay and the United States* is thus well-timed for those who might be interested in learning more about the revolutionary organization in its heyday. In the 1960s and 1970s the Tupamaros gained attention and acclaim for their daring actions, such as bank robberies, prison breaks, and high-level kidnappings, including the abduction and subsequent murder of U.S. Agency for International Development advisor Dan Mitrione, a story that was reprised in the 1972 Constantin Costa-Gavras film *State of Siege*. The first scholarly English-language treatment of the group in many years, *Becoming the Tupamaros* is a welcome addition to the small number of English-language historical works on Uruguay. Readers interested in urban guerrilla movements, their racial and gender politics, and their regional and international networks—in both Latin America and the U.S.—will find valuable information here. Churchill is at her best when discussing relations between the Tupamaros and the U.S. Left—especially groups like the Black Panther Party and Weather Underground—and the romanticized and exoticized images these groups seemed to harbor about the other, reminding us that the politics of solidarity can also be a politics of self-fashioning and identification.

The focus of this study is on the Tupamaros's racial and gender politics, the contradictions therein, and how those politics were shaped in part, by relations and identifications with groups outside Uruguay. The group sought to align itself with the politics of women's liberation and black power, but much of that, as Churchill demonstrates, was more symbolic and superficial than reflective of any substantive commitment to gender or racial equality. In discussing the Tupamaro fascination with the Black Panther Party, for example, Churchill notes that, while the group praised the actions of African Americans in their struggle against a common en-



emy (a racist, imperialist U.S. regime), they made little or no effort to reach out to Afro-Uruguayans or to take up the issue of racism and racial inequality within their own borders. Churchill also taps into a related contradiction among Uruguayan leftists, who seemed to simultaneously want to identify themselves as more “civilized” (i.e., European) than their continental neighbors and to identify with the struggles of “Third World” peoples. The Tupamaros have a reputation of being the most “feminist” of the Latin American guerrilla organizations, due to the relatively high percentage of women and female combatants in their ranks. Churchill helpfully seeks to separate the reputation from the reality and finds, not surprisingly, a world of contradictions. At the heart of Tupamaro ideology was an equating of femininity with weakness: women were accepted as combatants it seems, if they conformed to masculine ideals (single, childless, and tough).

This is an important book, but it is not a perfect book. In many parts of this study Uruguay seems to exist in a vacuum, as if the issues of guerrilla warfare, state repression, and other related themes were not also happening across the continent. The vacuum can be temporal as well. The fact that the MLN-T position on homosexuality has changed—from condemning homosexuality as predatory and bourgeois to championing same-sex marriage—is not, I suspect, so much evidence of the group’s ideological flexibility as the fact that attitudes of the militant Left (and indeed much of the world) on LGBT identity and rights has undergone a dramatic change during the intervening decades. Finally, it is unfortunate that the author was apparently unable to conduct any interviews or oral histories of living veterans of the MLN-T, who surely could have provided some interesting insights into the questions under examination here.

Despite its limitations, *Becoming the Tupamaros* is an important and valuable contribution to the literature on Uruguayan history, guerrilla warfare, and the gender and racial politics of the Latin American Left in the 1960s and 1970s. It also makes a very important contribution to breaking down the walls between studies of radical politics in the U.S. and Latin America, reminding us that this generation of revolutionaries was well aware of each other and to some extent fashioned their own politics and performance in each other’s reflections.

CHRISTINE EHRLICK  
University of Louisville

#### EUROPE: ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL

MIRA BALBERG. *Purity, Body, and Self in Early Rabbinic Literature*. (The S. Mark Taper Foundation Imprint in Jewish Studies.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2014. Pp. viii, 265. \$90.00.

Mira Balberg’s *Purity, Body, and Self in Early Rabbinic Literature* is a fine book that makes a novel and powerful argument concerning a corpus of early rabbinic

writing that, until recent years, has been largely neglected by scholars. The corpus is tractates of the Mishnah (ca. 200 C.E.) that detail laws of ritual impurity. Students of these tractates have commonly assumed that their laws are relevant only in the world in which the Jerusalem Temple stood, and that, subsequent to the destruction of that temple by Roman forces in 70 C.E., these laws are overwhelmingly mere theory. Balberg argues that this assumption is erroneous.

Based upon a close reading of the rhetoric of these tractates, Balberg contends that maintaining purity and avoiding impurity is presented in the Mishnah “as the daily and ongoing concern of *everyone*” (p. 28 [emphasis in the original]). In her conclusion she goes so far as to say that “the rabbis . . . positioned the desire to be pure . . . as the ultimate virtue” (p. 179). Accordingly, she devotes a seriousness of focus to the interpretation of these materials that is virtually unprecedented.

The thesis driving her interpretation is that “the mishnaic discourse of purity and impurity . . . is *guided* by unspoken, and perhaps unconscious, assumptions about personhood and subjectivity, and *creates* certain dispositions and attitudes toward the self through its authoritative rhetoric” (p. 12 [emphasis in the original]). The first two foci to which she applies her thesis are (Jewish) human bodies (chap. 2) and objects owned by Jews (chap. 3). Her interpretation of both is informed by a “revolutionary perception” introduced by the rabbis that “the mental investment of a person in a thing is a condition for the inclusion of this thing in the realm of impurity” (p. 49). With respect to the body, this yields the conclusion that “the parts of the body that can become impure and that need to be purified are *the parts through which the person’s bodily self is defined*” (p. 69 [emphasis in the original]), while the objects that can become impure are those that matter to the owner; for the rabbis, impurity is not located in things, as in the Bible, but in relations between (Jewish) people and things.

In chapter 4, Balberg examines corpses as sources of impurity, showing that, in the view of the rabbis, “the less a corpse can be identified as a person, the less capable it is of conveying impurity” (p. 98). In chapter 5, she turns her attention to the impurity of gentiles, seeking to resolve a conundrum: on the one hand, gentiles cannot *become* impure, but on the other hand, gentiles are statutorily impure. In Balberg’s reading, the latter is meant to cultivate a way of thinking about gentiles while the former is the rabbis’ way of saying that gentiles are not full persons. This latter deficiency is defined in two ways. First, full persons are those—Jews alone—who “shape reality through their consciousness,” something that “critically depends on their subordination to Torah” (p. 138). Second, full men are persons who control their genital flows, not those who, like women, do not. The impurity of gentile men is equivalent to those who are not in control and they are, therefore, effeminate.

In her final chapter, Balberg argues that the Mishnah demands a “*quest* for the attainment of purity” (p. 151

[emphasis in the original]), a heightened self-awareness and self-command that is reminiscent of Greek and Roman accounts of philosophical discipline. In her view, this purity discipline demands not only mental dedication, but also unrelenting attention. These disciplines become “the ultimate virtue,” the hallmark of the pure person whose attention effectively creates his or her world.

Balberg’s argument is, overall, a *tour de force*, and her conclusions are worth serious consideration. But there is room for argument with some of her claims, and I would like to share two of my misgivings. With respect to the insusceptibility of gentiles to impurity, she insists that this quality is evidence of the insignificance of gentiles. But why not simply read the structural parallel between gentiles and corpses—neither of whom can contract impurity while both are sources of impurity—as a statement that gentiles are as though dead, a claim with echo elsewhere in the rabbinic corpus?

More crucially, I am afraid that her assertion about the pervasiveness of the concern for impurity and pursuit of purity may overreach. There are several cases on which she builds her argument (Mishnah Toharot 7:8 and 8:2, for example) that she reads as pertaining to all Jews but that traditional commentaries understand to apply to priests alone. The Mishnah often makes unarticulated assumptions, perhaps in this case that the referent might be priests alone, and I am not sure why her interpretation is preferable. Furthermore, her claim for pervasiveness is based upon the rhetoric of this corpus of texts, but in the end she admits that “the rabbinic discourse of purity and impurity is not fundamentally different from the rabbinic discourse on any other legal theme” (p. 175). Precisely. I am afraid that Balberg’s immersion in these texts made her lose the forest for the trees. I have to wonder whether what she sees as pertaining to all Jews may apply primarily to priests or to “fellows,” not to Jews more broadly. If this is so, her readings would describe the “self” as constructed within a more limited group, the circles of priests and maybe rabbis, but not more.

DAVID KRAEMER

*Jewish Theological Seminary*

RACHEL NEIS. *The Sense of Sight in Rabbinic Culture: Jewish Ways of Seeing in Late Antiquity*. (Greek Culture in the Roman World.) New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. xii, 319. \$99.00.

Over the last few years we have witnessed a burst of publications on the topic of Judaism and the senses, mirroring a trend in Religious Studies. By exploring sight in rabbinic Judaism in Late Antiquity, Rachel Neis’s book is a splendid addition to this same trend in Jewish Studies. The range of disciplinary approaches utilized and the scope of texts covered are vast. Neis emphasizes that explanations for vision began in Ancient Greece, and she begins with an investigation of seeing that goes beyond the physical characteristics of the eye and its function. This introduces the book’s

agenda: the cultural history of vision in rabbinic discourse. Neis focuses on the third to seventh centuries C.E. when Greco-Roman ideas about the “mechanism” of vision shaped rabbinic practice, thought, and religion. This approach places rabbinic Judaism in its historiographical context, and the author compares rabbinic texts with contemporaneous Roman, Christian, Babylonian sources and other written records in order to determine similarities and differences among them.

Neis’s introduction to visual theory emphasizes the value of textual evidence and she offers postmodern as well as antique approaches to the topic. She does not, however, suggest a systematic account of visual theories, instead she navigates between medical, philosophical, and literary theories. In a work of this magnitude, one may certainly find a few minor problems with this approach. For example, Neis cites the blessings that are pronounced upon seeing certain unexpected things or people (in Mishnah, *Berakhot*, and Tosefta, *Berakhot*). She writes that they “constitute instruction manuals on how to perform vision” (pp. 9–10). In this reviewer’s opinion the formulae of the blessings seem to elicit a verbal response rather than a “visual performance,” since each unexpected perception requires a person to pronounce a variation of the benediction “Blessed is the One who (did/created something).” Nevertheless, quoting these blessings sets the stage for the rest of this book, in which Neis prudently decides to limit her investigation to four topics: God, the erotic, idols, and the rabbinic sage.

The title of chapter 4, “Visual Eros,” is based on the idea that *eros* was interpreted by the Greeks as an eye pathology. Neis analyzes rabbinic engagements with the erotic gaze because vision was perceived to be capable of arousing and transmitting sexual desire. A woman casting her eyes downward would have been perceived to be modest, whereas a prostitute would have directly engaged people with her gaze. This visual pattern appears in rabbinic culture, the Pseudepigrapha, and the Patristic literature, among other literatures. Neis notes that this constituted “a curious reversal of normative gender and gaze dynamics” (p. 144–145). A (male) rabbi could be the object of desire either by males or females, thus rabbis were trapped between looking and being seen, both of which were dangerous visual activities. Moreover, from this we may gather that controlling or permitting a gaze determined gender and influenced sexuality in rabbinic literature. Chapter 4 also addresses some well-known and frequently analyzed sources (e.g., Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metsi’a 84a–b) that appear in discussions of homoerotic passages, but Neis provides nuanced and innovative insights into them. She explains the gaze in terms of what she calls “visual economy.”

Neis challenges some untenable claims concerning the absence of a rabbinic visual culture and, paradoxically, she contends that some rabbis believed in God’s visibility. These rabbis visualized God in very graphic, erotic, and gendered terms. These visual encounters with God served as a catalyst for the radiant faces of the



rabbis. Neis also establishes that rabbis were aware of modes of viewing in other religions, in which the supplicants engaged with the perceived gaze of the idol. Instead, rabbis devised strategies to avoid looking at idols.

The author is to be applauded for exploring an area of rabbinic culture that had been marginalized in Jewish Studies, and for presenting consistently high-quality analyses. The book includes an enormous bibliography, and it has indices of subjects and texts. A short overview of rabbinic literature, explanations of Jewish rituals, and the firm historical grounding in Late Antiquity and Greco-Roman culture render this book accessible to readers not well-versed in rabbinic texts or Jewish Studies.

RIVKA ULMER  
Bucknell University

JASON CROWLEY. *The Psychology of the Athenian Hoplite: The Culture of Combat in Classical Athens*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pp. x, 240. \$99.00.

Jason Crowley's book follows in the footsteps of recent attempts to approach ancient warfare through a modern theoretical lens in order to understand the individual in context on the ancient battlefield. His is a natural extension of the work of scholars like Victor Davis Hanson, Adam Schwartz, and, most recently, Christopher Matthews. The theoretical point of difference for this book is that Crowley explores the Athenian citizen as soldier in the classical period using methods employed in the study of modern psychology.

Crowley argues in chapter 1 that the methodology used in modern psychology can be applied (and has not been to date) to studying ancient Greek warfare. One of the obvious hurdles for this approach is the absence of direct ancient testimony of actual participants in warfare and, more significantly, the inability to conduct interviews of those who experienced warfare and who might provide participant observation. We are blessed, however, that the ancient Athenians wrote voluminously about warfare and that some of their most famous writers (like Thucydides and Xenophon) actually experienced combat as soldiers and generals. We also have some crucial testimony from legal speeches concerned with military campaigns, like those of Lysias and Isaeus. Even those who did not experience combat (like Herodotus) interviewed (as a modern student of psychology or anthropology might) those who fought in battles. Crowley's plan is to examine the role of the "primary group" in framing and motivating the individual Athenian combatant. He identifies the "primary group" as the immediate set of people around an individual in combat within the wider military unity (i.e., the regiment), the army, and the state as a whole.

The chapters that follow explore a well-organized series of topics dealing with recruitment and mobilization. Chapter 3 highlights the role of the primary group in combat. This is arguably the central point of the book as it seeks to identify the stimuli and relationships cre-

ated through warfare within the Athenian state. The primary group represents those most associable with the Athenian soldier: his family, his family's closest network of connections—through ritualized friendships, ancient religious fellowships, and dining companions—alongside his fellow villagers. Crowley next explores ideas of regimentation and more state-organized tribal affiliations that imposed themselves over and above the more traditional family-group connections within the state that clearly played some role in the Athenian military in the fifth and fourth century B.C.E. Crowley concludes that tribal and regimental identity was secondary to relationships nurtured and enhanced in the family and *deme* (village). Thus, ideas about the Athenian state as a political identity that supplanted more traditional bonds are, to Crowley, not borne out in military contexts. The primary group remained central. Next, in chapter 5, Crowley examines the role of the Athenian sociopolitical system as a whole in integrating warfare and violence into the lives of every Athenian citizen. This made Athens quite a different environment from modern states. Warfare appears to have been central to the lives of ordinary Athenians, who saw it as a natural part of sociopolitical and religious life. Finally, in chapter 6, under the heading "The Compliance Relationship," Crowley explores the willingness of Athenians to fight. This resulted from a combination of an individual's commitment to the group (to volunteer) and the power of both coercion and reward. In Crowley's terms, this willingness boils down to three phenomena: "the combination of alienative commitment with coercive power, calculative commitment with remunerative power and, finally, moral commitment with normative power" (p. 105).

For classicists and ancient historians this book will appear at first as rather gimmicky as a result of its use of a modern heuristic device—the discipline and methodology of modern psychology—to explore ancient evidence, primarily written texts, and to glean an understanding of phenomena well-studied for decades. Indeed, the first chapter appears to add little beyond newly applied theoretical perspectives and modern jargon to debates about classical Greek warfare. But the chapters that follow are very interesting and extremely useful explorations of the organization and motivation of Athenian citizen soldiers in the context of imperial and democratic Athens. Readers will find the explication of the organization of Athenian military structures from family, to *deme*, *trittys*, and tribe of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E. useful. There are a lot of helpful references to the social, tribal, state, and military structures that underpinned Athenian military organization.

Of course, there are problems with a work of this nature in addition to the potentially controversial intersection of modern theory. It is impossible to interview Athenian citizens about their experiences of war and the battlefield. Even Crowley is left to interrogate ancient sources in the traditional and, dare I write it, philological manner. Classicists will read chapters 2 to 5 with pleasure for a wealth of evidence and information.

The Athenocentric approach may be driven by our sources, but does leave us wondering about the everyday experience of most classical Greeks who lived in far less militarized and imperial societies. Plenty of evidence tells us the Greeks, even Athenians, hated war and saw it as abnormal. Crowley's book demonstrates the importance of war to classical Athenian society, but also leaves one wondering the extent to which it shaped or was shaped by that society.

MATTHEW TRUNDLE  
University of Auckland

GUY MACLEAN ROGERS. *The Mysteries of Artemis of Ephesos: Cult, Polis, and Change in the Graeco-Roman World*. (Synkrisis: Comparative Approaches to Early Christianity in Greco-Roman Culture.) New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2012. Pp. xii, 500. \$45.00.

The cult of Artemis at Ephesus, one of the most renowned in antiquity, is noted for its temple (one of the Seven Wonders of the World), its distinctive statue (with many "breasts"), its socioeconomic impact (it was a major financial institution), and its longevity (approximately 1,000 years). Guy Maclean Rogers's book treats a lesser-known aspect of the cult: the celebration of the goddess's mysteries from the early Hellenistic period through the third century C.E., when the worship of Artemis at the site finally ended. Rogers's treatment brings to non-specialists an accessible account of the archaeological and epigraphic discoveries that have added to our knowledge of Ephesus and its mysteries over the past century.

The evidence, surveyed in chapter 1, consists primarily of some 90 inscriptions related to various officials and attendants of the cult, in particular the Kouretes ("Youths"), an association of men closely connected with the mysteries, together with passages from Strabo and Tacitus. Rogers traces the mysteries from their inception at the end of the fourth century B.C.E., focusing above all on the cult in its political context. To this end, he applies the German-language scholarship of Dieter Knibbe, who has spent more than four decades studying the inscriptions of Ephesus.

Following the death of Alexander, a struggle among the Macedonian dynasts for control of the strategic site of Ephesus ended in the triumph of Lysimachus, who transferred the people of Ephesus away from their homes around the sanctuary to a newly founded, more highly fortified city. Rogers suggests that Lysimachus took the opportunity to reorganize the mysteries through his establishment of a temple and statue of Artemis Soteira ("Savior") in Ortygia, the nearby grove where the mysteries were conducted. After Lysimachus, there is a gap in our evidence until the early Roman Empire, when the privileges of the sanctuary as a place of asylum for outlaws and escaped slaves were repeatedly modified by successive warlords (Mithradates, Antony, Augustus). Rogers follows Knibbe's theory that Augustus personally sanctioned the move of the Kouretes from the Artemision to the town hall (*prytaneion*) of Ephesus, concluding that the change resulted in a further diminution of the sanctuary's religious authority.

A repeated theme in the book is the gradual transfer of authority from the priestly administration of the Artemision to the city of Ephesus. Yet it would be remarkable if the sanctuary of Artemis ever possessed ultimate authority in the conduct of the mysteries. Greek *poleis* typically had the final say in the affairs of all civic sanctuaries, even those staffed by hereditary priesthoods; this was true of the Eleusinian Mysteries, which were supervised by the Athenian state at all periods of which we have knowledge. Rogers also overstates the impact of the spatial separation between the Artemision and the new urban area (not "the polis") to the west. The territory of ancient *poleis* extended well beyond their city walls, so there was never a time when the Artemision was separate from the polis.

By the reign of Tiberius, yearly lists of the Kouretes and other cult attendants involved in the mysteries were inscribed on the *stoa* leading to the *prytaneion*. These inscriptions, with their mention of offices such as *hieroskopos* ("examiner of sacrificial entrails"), *hierokeryx* ("sacred herald"), and *hierophantes* ("revealer of the holy things") provide a fascinating window onto the ritual details of the mysteries. We also find that membership in the Kouretes was increasingly an honorific role, assigned to rich and influential citizens, while cult specialists assumed the practical duties. During the middle of the first century, the Kouretes began to be described as *philosebastoi* ("emperor-loving") in their annual inscriptions, indicating that the imperial cult was being smoothly integrated into the celebrations of the city's goddess.

The second century C.E. was the heyday of the mysteries; Rogers ably demonstrates how the changing needs and interests of Ephesus brought continuous if incremental change to the annual festival. The fortunes of Artemis's cult followed those of Ephesus, with increased financial challenges during the third century leading to a collapse after a cataclysmic earthquake and invasion of the Goths in 262. Rogers proposes that these disasters irretrievably damaged the relationship of reciprocity between Artemis and her worshipers, resulting in the abandonment of her cult. He presents a (necessarily speculative) reconstruction of the mysteries themselves, based on the etiological myth of the birth of Artemis and Apollo at Ortygia. The volume concludes with the suggestion that the fall of the cult can be understood in a Darwinian context of pagan "memes" giving way to more successful Christian ideas. Although memetics is now an outdated methodology and has been itself replaced by cognitive approaches to cultural change, the point that adaptation and selection occur in the evolution of religious ideas is well taken.

JENNIFER LARSON  
Kent State University



CHRISTOPHER P. JONES. *Between Pagan and Christian*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014. Pp. xv, 207. \$39.95.

Alongside the perennial question of how, or whether, the Roman Empire declined and fell, a second grand narrative looms large in studies of Late Antiquity: the story of the “rise” or “triumph” of Christianity. This subject has been particularly prominent in recent years, both due to the seventeen-hundredth anniversary of the military victory (and possible “conversion”) of the emperor Constantine at the Battle of the Milvian Bridge and also because of the publication of Alan Cameron’s monumental *The Last Pagans of Rome* (2011), which has attacked the traditional concept of a “pagan revival” or “reaction” in the later fourth century. Christopher P. Jones’s new volume is a welcome addition to the current, revitalized debate, providing an accessible exploration of the growth of Christianity in a predominantly pagan empire and the impact this had on the worship of the old gods. After opening with a thoughtful exploration of the tendentious terminology of “paganism,” chapters 2 and 3 provide a clear and fairly traditional account of imperial attitudes toward pagans, beginning with the conversion of Constantine and then exploring the laws and actions of various emperors between the fourth and sixth centuries.

The next three chapters provide surveys of different aspects of religious belief and practice in Judaism, early Christianity, and traditional Greek and Roman cults and philosophy. The first of these chapters deals with concepts of divinity, along with angels, demons/*daimones*, and spirits. There is also some discussion of heretical Christian groups, such as the Carpocratians and Messalians, who were said to combine aspects of these different religious traditions. These are interesting examples, although it can be difficult to assess the degree of polemic present in the hostile ancient accounts, especially when they are from heresiologists such as Epiphanius of Salamis. Chapter 5 explores images, idols, and art in Judaism and early Christianity, tracing a trajectory down to the Byzantine disputes, while the following chapter deals with sacrifice and prayer, with the emphasis on the former, including discussing pagan criticism of animal sacrifice.

Chapter 7, entitled “Debate,” is an illuminating examination of imagined debates and dialogues in early Christian literature, ranging from the apologetic to the polemical, although it can be hard to gauge the extent to which the continued presence of “pagans” in literature reflected contemporary reality. The section on epistolography is particularly interesting, as letters may provide greater insight into the process of religious change. The following chapter deals with conversion directly, theorizing how concepts such as sin and resurrection may have been approached by pagans. Famous accounts of conversion are explored, including the *Confessions* of Augustine of Hippo, the destruction of the Alexandrian Serapeum in 391 or 392, and the mission of Augustine of Canterbury, and Jones also uses ha-

giographical literature to suggest that medical cures and other “miracles” played a part in bringing many individuals to Christianity. The final two chapters then track developments in the West and East respectively. While the former is not presented as a site of spirited resistance to Christianization, a pattern of “attachment to the pre-Christian culture of Rome” (p. 119) is traced here, raising the question of what exactly made a particular text, image, or activity “pagan,” as opposed to merely “traditional.” Jones also argues that paganism continued longer in rural areas, but that the reign of Clovis was a turning point, although this image may owe much to panegyric accounts of his conversion to Catholic Christianity. The description of the East moves through Greece, Asia Minor, Judaea, and Egypt, making use of some archaeological material, but focusing on the evidence for urban notables, especially famous philosophers in Athens and Alexandria.

In particular, this book is to be welcomed for its sophisticated approach to the issue of defining late-antique “paganism,” recognizing that identity is not a simple matter of objective categorization, but rather a label that can mean different things to different people at different times, and which can be imposed on opponents for polemical purposes. Many “pagans” in our texts may have seen themselves as Christians, but have held certain beliefs or participated in particular activities that some of their co-religionists regarded as beyond the pale. As Jones states in his introduction, “Paganism is always a blurred and shifting category that defies neat taxonomies” (p. 7), meaning that it can be extremely hard to produce a definitive portrait of religious conflict, survival, or syncretism. Elsewhere in this book, however, this sensitivity to the problems of classification is not quite so prominent, with certain people and concepts more clearly identified as “pagan,” “Jewish,” or “Christian.” This is often an artifact of the surviving ancient material, whose assumptions and purposes lead to a polemical simplification of more complex realities. The difficulty of assigning stable religious identities to individuals from this period has recently been explored in Éric Rebillard’s excellent *Christians and Their Many Identities in Late Antiquity, North Africa, 200–450 CE* (2012), and Jones’s book demonstrates that this is an extremely fruitful area for further research. Despite a few small errors (e.g., Hilary of Poitiers assigned to the third century, rather than the fourth; Clovis living at the end of the fourth century, rather than the end of the fifth century; Gratian described as the son of the emperor Valens; and the Goths occupying Armorica in 416), this is a lively exploration of a fascinating period and will serve to bring these complicated issues to a wider audience.

RICHARD FLOWER  
University of Exeter

ERIC H. CLINE. *1177 B.C.: The Year Civilization Collapsed*. (Turning Points in Ancient History.) Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014. Pp. xx, 237. \$29.95.

The recipient of the Best Popular Book Award from the American Schools of Oriental Research in 2014, this work masterfully incorporates the present state of research into a welcome reevaluation of a period less known to the general public, the crisis of Late Bronze Age civilization, which saw the collapse of major state formations and cities in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, along with the appearance of the Sea Peoples. Even more brilliant is the spin on the similarities between the predicament of this area three millennia ago and now: Greece's economic troubles, prolonged internal conflicts in the Middle East, the displacement of thousands of refugees, all with uncomfortable implications as to the stability and endurance of our own society. The terms of this long-debated historical question ("What caused the collapse?") are framed in the prologue, with a list of the regional powers that disintegrated and a discussion of proposed identifications of the Sea Peoples and their origins. While Eric H. Cline's purpose is to argue against the Sea Peoples' role as the determining factor in the collapse, the premise still relies upon the acceptance of pharaoh Ramses III's account of the events. The propagandistic quality of Ramses III's narrative and its inflated depiction of Egypt as the last bastion against a single, sudden migratory push has been analyzed by the author of this review in a 1988 article ("Ramses III and the Sea Peoples: A Structural Analysis of the Medinet Habu Inscriptions," *Orientalia* 57 [1988]: 275–306); although, late in the book Cline does question the accuracy of the pharaoh's statement. The next three chapters offer an extended overview of the historical and cultural background of the Late Bronze civilizations, from the early contacts in the fifteenth century B.C.E., through the establishment of a network of international relations that flourished in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries. Trade and gift exchanges, epistolary archives, diplomatic relations and royal marriages, wars and peace treaties are presented in an engaging narration directed at the non-specialist, yet grounded in extensive, up-to-date research. This reconstruction nicely entwines the interesting details of the histories of discovery together with suggestive parallels to current events—the first trade embargo, the demand for tin compared to that for oil today (Cline referring to the work of Carol Bell [p. xvi]), the rise of a globalized society with mutually dependent economies (referring to the work of Susan Sherratt [p. xvii])—and includes excursus on more popular topics such as the Trojan War and the Exodus question. The events leading to the crisis of the Late Bronze Age are examined in chapter 4 with the treatment of widespread evidence of destruction at sites in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean at the beginning of the twelfth century B.C.E. With the exception of the epigraphic records from Ugarit, the emphasis is on the latest archaeological investigations, which in some cases have resulted in the reinterpretation of previous analyses.

Despite the wealth of recent data, not much progress has been made with respect to the agents of destruction,

and Cline rightly points out how it could be ascribed to external invaders, internal uprisings, or natural causes like earthquakes. Chapter 5, aptly titled "A 'Perfect Storm' of Calamities?," reviews the possible causes of the collapse and how no one in particular would have been sufficient by itself. In the process, numerous references are made to the pertinent publications, even if the preference for the most recent research tends to crowd out previous contributions. One cause, recently corroborated by high-resolution paleoclimate data not available when it was first suggested, is climate change. This affords another powerful analogy to one of today's most pressing challenges, such that the scientific evidence of drought as the trigger of civilization collapse has drawn the attention of the media. Once dismissed by historians, non-human agency has found increasing favor with the shift toward the environmental humanities seeking to study the human within the material context. The coincidence of prolonged dry events with societal disruptions in other periods and cultures seems to provide a definitive explanation for the sudden, unexpected decline of successful civilizations. Cline, however, is convincing with his observations that climate change was only one of many stressors concurrently contributing to the end of the Late Bronze Age, rather than the first in a simple chain of events from drought to famine to migrations that interrupted trade routes and destabilized regional administrations. After two decades of additional research, the persistence in some literature of the massive, unitary land-sea invasion paradigm is surprising given that valid arguments against it had been made already in earlier studies. Notions of systems collapse and decentralization are also considered to explain why the Late Bronze civilizations could not recover and continue as before, and why instead a new sociopolitical order emerged after the crisis. Finally, Cline's introduction of complexity theory—as applied in other fields to observe how the interconnected parts of complex systems make them susceptible to destabilization and crisis—is useful in further debunking the traditional understanding of this period and allowing for a more intricate scenario. It is also hoped that the study of ancient histories and challenges as a way to better appreciate modern ones will give renewed impetus to the humanities, and to the Classics and Ancient Near East in particular, at a time when the scale keeps tilting in favor of science and technology.

BARBARA CIFOLA

*University of California, Los Angeles*

SHIRIN A. KHANMOHAMADI. *In Light of Another's Word: European Ethnography in the Middle Ages*. (The Middle Ages Series.) Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. Pp. 202. \$47.50.

Ethnography was not a recognized genre in the Middle Ages; the authors of the texts retrospectively identified here as ethnography used other terms such as "description," "itinerary," or "travel" to describe their works. Irrespective of the lack of contemporary recognition,



Shirin A. Khanmohamadi notes among writers of such genres a “common language” and “intent to describe and record the differing manners and customs” of the peoples they observe (p. 3). However, Khanmohamadi finds that the late medieval works that she examines—Gerald of Wales’s description of Wales, William of Rubruck’s account of the Mongols, Jean de Joinville’s *Vie de Saint Louis*, and *The Book of Sir John Mandeville*—are not just linked by a new concern for direct empirical observation of peoples and cultures. Drawing on the critical vocabulary of Mikhail Bakhtin—the source of the monograph’s paraphrased title quotation—she also identifies a “dialogic poetics” at work in these texts. To write medieval ethnography was not to attempt an objective view and representation of others’ beliefs and practices, nor to project onto others the desires and fears of the self, but it was a process of “dialogic engagement with alternative perspectives” (p. 4).

The author explores the “intersubjective, dialogic gazing” (p. 7) that unites her selected medieval ethnographies across five clearly and concisely written chapters. The first delineates the influences of classical thought, salvation theology, and canon law on contemporary discourses concerning pagans, Muslims, and their conversion. The meat of the work, however, is in the following four chapters. After considering Gerald of Wales’s own hybrid identity, the chapter “Subjective Beginnings: Autoethnography and the Partial Gazes of Gerald of Wales” considers the incorporation of multiple perspectives into the *Descriptio Cambriae* (1194) in light of contemporary techniques of visual representation in which structures were shown from multiple angles simultaneously. Like such art, the *Descriptio* rejects the uni-focal in favor of “a deictic and perspectival approach to ethnographic objectivity” (p. 55).

Chapter 3 links William of Rubruck’s itinerary to the project of conversion of non-Christian peoples and the need to distinguish between those capable of conversion and those not, only to demonstrate William’s refusal to play the game by the established rules. The signs and principles of categorization that, in contemporary theoretical discourse, signified savagery or sophistication were shown by William to be inadequate to the Mongols’ complex but unfamiliar forms of social organization. Again, the author fruitfully draws in the visual. William’s ethnography demonstrates a “fluidity and dialogue in the relation between the viewers and viewed” that aligns well with a contemporary optics in which beholder and beheld were physically linked by the act of sight (p. 86).

Chapter 4 considers how Joinville’s *Vie de Saint Louis* casts “a sideways glance” at a Crusades-era Levant, which Khanmohamadi considers a “contact zone” of improvised relationships rather than entrenched enmities (p. 91). Bakhtin’s distinction between heteroglossic and monologic utterance provides a key to the roles of others’ voices and perspectives here. The *Vie* contains both monologic (official, authorized, authoritative) and heteroglossic (unofficial, unauthorized, unscripted) speech. The heteroglossic (varied, sometimes unlikely,

and occasionally countercultural) voices and perspectives of Europeans and Muslims that Joinville cites subvert the monologic “official, prescribed agendas of the text” (p. 109).

In chapter 5, Khanmohamadi turns to a different kind of text altogether: the fictionalized ethnography of *The Book of Sir John Mandeville*. This chapter holds the multiple threads of its argument together less successfully than the others; the sudden incursion of Sigmund Freud’s uncanny jars in a work where theoretical perspectives and concerns are normally woven in seamlessly. The chapter’s contextualization of the text’s dialogic ethnography amid fourteenth-century debates over the salvation of pagans is more successful, though I cannot agree with the author that the cannibal, free-loving Lamorians of the narrative are uncontestedly represented as virtuous pagans (p. 129). Overall, however, the chapter once again shows awareness of the partiality and incompleteness of human perspectives profoundly shaping ethnographic practice.

Khanmohamadi has rendered a valuable service to scholars and students of medieval travel writing, human geography, and cultural contact. She presents a clear-sighted and well-articulated vision here of the distinctive generic and discursive characteristics of medieval empirical ethnography.

My few criticisms largely relate to the volume’s range of reference, which could at times have been wider. Discussion of Thomas Aquinas’s attitude toward conversion in chapter 1, for example, does not refer to the *Summa theologiae* or, perhaps most pertinently, the *Summa contra gentiles*, and lacks some important bibliographical references (e.g., several essays in Guyda Armstrong and Ian N. Wood, eds., *Christianizing Peoples and Converting Individuals* [2000]). Greater attention to critical work on *Mandeville* would have nuanced chapter 5; the author does not seem to be aware, for example, when elements of her argument are based on later interpolations (e.g., p. 141).

Nonetheless the work makes, overall, a profound and significant argument for medieval ethnographers’ espousal of partial perspectives and dialogic modes of representation. The author shows us how medieval ethnographers often recognized what their post-Enlightenment counterparts did not: that their words and gazes made them not objective observers, but engaged them in an intersubjective, dialogic relationship with those they described.

MARIANNE O'DOHERTY  
University of Southampton

EMILIA JAMROZIAK. *The Cistercian Order in Medieval Europe, 1090–1500*. (The Medieval World.) New York: Routledge, 2013. Pp. vii, 315. Cloth \$130.00, paper \$39.95.

Emilia Jamroziak’s *The Cistercian Order in Medieval Europe, 1090–1500* argues that the Cistercians became one of the first trans-regional organizations in Europe because of their pragmatic response to social, eco-

nomic, and religious conditions. Jamroziak situates her study in relation to Louis Julius Lekai's *Cistercians: Ideals and Reality* (1977), for Lekai's work has long provided the standard overview of the Cistercian order. Jamroziak critiques the "golden age and decline" paradigm that Lekai and others established and that many of us have sought to overturn. Instead of adopting this older narrative of Cistercian ideals and corruption, she focuses on the "structures of the Cistercian movement" (p. 285) that created a trans-European order and allowed for regional developments and adaptations.

The best parts of this book analyze the Cistercians' relations with their patrons and their evolving economic practices. They focus not just on the twelfth century but also on the less-studied thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Jamroziak draws on her own research concerning relations between the Cistercians and their patrons on medieval European borderlands. She illuminates the ways the Cistercians responded to their patrons' expectations for commemoration and burial, how Cistercian settlement patterns intertwined with the expansion of the frontiers of western Christendom, and the ways that monasteries became important participants in a market and money economy. She repeatedly stresses that there was no single Cistercian ideal either for economic practices or for interactions with lay patrons. Rather, Jamroziak posits particular structures—the grange system, patterns of donation, commemoration, burial, and hospitality—that the monks modified in response to changing circumstances and local conditions. She articulates a similar point in the chapter examining the Cistercians' layout and use of their churches, monastic precincts, and manuscripts; there she argues against a single "defined and prescriptive Cistercian style," and suggests that the Cistercians' artistic choices created an environment that fostered their "contemplative spirituality" (p. 178).

The structures that Jamroziak finds especially important were the Cistercians' administrative innovations. These include the yearly meeting of Cistercian abbots in General Chapter, the compilation of the Chapter's statutes, the system of filiations, the practice of visitations, and the provision of a "starter kit" that provided new foundations with people, liturgical books, and building supplies so that they could follow already-established practices and procedures (p. 81). Here, Jamroziak nicely distinguishes between an early-twelfth-century "Cistercian movement" and the institutionalized "order" of the thirteenth century and beyond. However, she does not explore the process by which the Cistercian movement became an institution; her confusion as to whether to capitalize "order" reflects the unanalyzed nature of this thorny and recently debated problem. Nor can she decide how much of the Cistercians' trans-regional spread was due to informal networks of episcopal and papal allies and to the enthusiasm and activities of Bernard of Clairvaux, and how much was due to the Cistercians' centralized organization. In her chapter on "Intellectual Horizons," Jamroziak discusses the Cistercians' recordkeeping and

history writing; unfortunately she does not consider the formation of the Cistercians' institutions in light of new textual practices and juridical developments.

Jamroziak's decision to give Cistercian women a chapter of their own is another lost opportunity to incorporate the insights of recent scholarship into her survey. She recognizes that women were part of the Cistercian movement from the beginning, she relies on the recent scholarship on Cistercian women, and she uses as the book's cover a sixteenth-century image of the Virgin Mary sheltering both monks and nuns under her cloak. But she makes no effort to consider how the inclusion of Cistercian women might change our understanding of the Cistercian order. Instead, throughout most of the book, "Cistercian" means "Cistercian monk": the filiation structure established by the abbey of Las Huelgas in Spain; the hospitality and charity offered by female communities in the Champagne; the writings of the nuns of Helfta; and the production of numerous female scribes are segregated into a single chapter on Cistercian nuns rather than included in a broader discussion of Cistercian structures, practices, and culture.

When Julia Smith asked Jamroziak to contribute to Routledge's *Medieval World* series (once published by Longmans), there was a need for a new survey of the Cistercian order that synthesized the scholarship of the last four decades. In the last four years, however, two other such volumes have appeared: *The Cambridge Companion to the Cistercian Order* (2013), edited by Mette Birkedal Bruun (to which Jamroziak and I both contributed), and Janet E. Burton's and Julie Kerr's *The Cistercians in the Middle Ages* (2011). All three books cover the entire medieval period rather than just Cistercian origins, and all three seek to counter the older paradigm of a golden age that declined. Both Jamroziak's book and that of Burton and Kerr are geared toward students and non-specialists. Yet, as Anne Lester astutely asks in her 2013 *Speculum* review of Kerr and Burton, should we continue to teach the history of monasticism as the history of orders? If, as Jamroziak posits, the Cistercian order was the first European multinational organization, what factors led to the formation of this institution and what was its relation to other trans-regional organizations in the Middle Ages? If as Jamroziak also argues, Cistercians remained influenced by concepts of reform and renewal, should we not query the very concept of reform, as Maureen Miller and William North have suggested? And if the Cistercians were not just an order but a movement, in which ways were the impulses that motivated Cistercian monks, nuns, laybrothers, and donors shared by their contemporaries and put into practice? Emilia Jamroziak has done an excellent job bringing together recent scholarship in multiple languages, and her book provides illuminating details about Cistercian practices across Europe and throughout the Middle Ages, but she ultimately offers a conventional picture



of the Cistercian order and its place in medieval European society.

MARTHA G. NEWMAN  
University of Texas at Austin

NORA BEREND, PRZEMYSŁAW URBAŃCZYK, and PRZEMYSŁAW WISZEWSKI. *Central Europe in the High Middle Ages: Bohemia, Hungary and Poland, c. 900–c. 1300*. (Cambridge Medieval Textbooks.) New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. ix, 536. \$99.00.

A book such as this one—indeed, *this* book—has long been needed. A satisfactory synthesis bridging the scholarship, produced in several vernaculars over nearly a quarter-century, concerning what was once known as “Eastern Europe” is overdue and most welcome. Although a promotional paragraph on the back overstates the distance between the world of Anglophone medievalists and this region, a significant void remains. Thus, it is most helpful to have a regional history encompassing a wide span and range of subjects, written by a team of distinguished younger historians, and crossing the received conceptual boundaries between Europe’s “West,” “East,” and “Center.”

The book concerns three major polities: the Czech lands (Bohemia and Moravia), Poland, and Hungary. Chapter 1 specifies the macro-region of medieval Europe where the story of the book happens by naming it and by pondering the conceptual implications of the resulting designation. Here, in the book’s most explicitly argumentative section, the authors develop the case for designating this macro-region as “Central” Europe, and purging “East” from the qualifying adjectives. This dilemma—what to *name* this historical space—has long been a major conceptual issue, all the way back to the work of Oskar Halecki. Although I am quite unconvinced by the argument, the chapter serves as an excellent introduction to the historiography of this problem, and intervenes in that historiography.

Each of the subsequent chapters considers a major theme common to all three polities. Chapters 2 and 3 outline the formative period of all three between the late Carolingian period and the early twelfth century. The next three chapters address the major aspects of high-level order that emerged after the formative period. Chapter 4 concerns governance, understood as ducal or royal power, the law, and the surrounding geopolitical scene, namely the Holy Roman Empire and Byzantium. Chapter 5 treats economies and societies, while chapter 6 concerns religious matters: the emergence of ecclesiastical networks and communities, continuing Christianization, and the relative impact in these areas of Rome and Constantinople. These chapters crest principally in the twelfth century with some spillover into the thirteenth; the latter period is treated at the same level of thematic complexity in chapter 7.

This large and important book may be assessed from several vantage points. It reflects the specialization of each author in the earlier-medieval segment of East Central European history. This explains the promi-

nence of three organizing themes: ethnogenesis, in its current meaning of the emergence of peoples through constructed identities; archaeology, as a complement or alternative to the written record; and the written record itself, or rather the multiple challenges posed by its sparseness. For its main target audience—Anglophone historians not directly familiar with East Central Europe—the book is an invaluable, in-depth introduction to major aspects of the history of the Czech lands, Poland, and Hungary, including the histories of the indigenous dynasties; the curious mode of framing royal lucrative resources, conceptualized as “service settlements”; and ethnic, especially religious, diversity. Thanks to this book, the void among communities of medieval historians noted in the testimonial is now much diminished.

From the perspective of the historiography produced by our colleagues in Poland, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia, the book is extremely ambitious and largely successful. Current historiography is one of the book’s subjects, and indeed the text is palpably informed by a long legacy of debate, reassessment, synthesis, and conceptual polyphony in several literatures and across many generations. A reader familiar with the material will know just how challenging this aspect of the project is. The historiography on this part of Europe has been marked by unusually traumatic discontinuity—especially in the twentieth century—interspersed with remarkable moments of recovery, innovation, and synthesis. Given this complexity, the book’s engagement with the major aspects of the resulting legacy is nothing short of remarkable.

What tempers my enthusiasm about this aspect of the book are three synthesizing choices the authors make so as to impose some order upon the unwieldy historiographical universe. One is a recurrent rhetoric of exuberant innovation: asserting, on some given subject, a dramatic, presently ongoing transition in which this book is itself a central event or culmination. This rhetorical device underrates creative transition in the historiography over its long duration, and exaggerates innovation in the immediate present. Another is the uneven attention to the historiography in the text. Parts of the book are splendidly grounded in the literature, but substantial portions appear (misleadingly) to rest on the work of one or two colleagues. Perhaps most disturbing, at least to this reader, is the frequent discernment of “nationalism,” a message that seems overstated after decades of sustained work by so many of our Hungarian, Czech, Polish, Slovak, and German colleagues in precisely the opposite direction.

The responses of specialists in the subjects treated by this book will vary in their particulars, but that is inevitable, indeed desirable. From my perspective, the relegation of the entire thirteenth century to one, final chapter—however substantial and informative—tends to marginalize the most dynamic and best documented of the three centuries encompassed by the subtitle. Since a key part of the book’s message is that those centuries were a time of a dramatic, multi-leveled transi-

tion, relegating to the very end the stretch of time over which the documentation of that transition increased substantially creates an explanatory imbalance. This may be why, on a few of the subjects most familiar to me (especially the law and its conjunctions with society and ducal power), the actual execution of the book's project seems, up close, a bit thin.

However, the reservations suggested here are inevitable given the multiplicity of perspectives in the underlying literature and in the book itself. They are, ultimately, a tribute to the book and the complex, challenging project of inclusion it embodies: a crucial moment in the bridging of histories and historiographies, and a marker of a multi-generational work in progress, now more accessible in English than ever before. It is urgently hoped that, for the relatively unfamiliar readers at whom it is principally directed, this book does not now function as closure or the last word on its enormous subject.

PIOTR GÓRECKI

University of California, Riverside

MATHEW KUEFLER. *The Making and Unmaking of a Saint: Hagiography and Memory in the Cult of Gerald of Aurillac*. (The Middle Ages Series.) Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. Pp. 306. \$79.95.

If reviews bore titles, this one would be called "The Making and Unmaking of a Monograph." Mathew Kuefler's study of the dossier and cult of Gerald of Aurillac (who died c. 909) is extraordinarily bifurcated. The opening chapters on the "making" of the saint are exemplary. Kuefler's completely convincing re-dating and reattribution of all the earliest writings about Gerald will need to be taken on board by everyone who works on Western Europe in the Central Middle Ages. His careful rethinking of received views on the subject not only tells us much about important figures of the era (above all Odo of Cluny and Ademar of Chabannes), but also serves as a model of historicized textual criticism. Unfortunately, the second part of the book insists on a narrative trajectory for the subsequent history of Gerald's cult that is unsupported, and indeed contradicted, by the evidence. What Kuefler's data in fact show is that Saint Gerald of Aurillac was neither "unmade" nor forgotten, but was repeatedly re-imagined to serve the needs of generations of devotees and promoters.

Kuefler has, despite himself, effectively contributed to the literature on the now well-known tendency of saints' personae to metamorphose through the centuries. Yet the book is misleading. I recommend it to specialists, who will appreciate the virtuosity of chapters 1, 2, and 3, then draw their own conclusions from the evidence of chapters 4, 5, and 6. Experts will not be unduly influenced by Kuefler's baffling insistence that Gerald was forgotten, or his completely unsuitable metaphor of a "historical 'bell curve' of popularity" (p. 148)—with its apex in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries—to convey the shifting level of interest in the saint. However,

I would not direct any neophytes toward a study whose announced goal is "to challenge especially the notion that medieval hagiographers wrote only with the most transparently pious of intentions" (p. 6), and that styles its own subject as "a fascinating departure from the otherwise familiar banality of the cult of saints" (p. 186). More than anything, these quotes reveal Kuefler's limited familiarity with decades of scholarship that long ago abandoned the figure of the "pious hagiographer" and now takes for granted that the variegated medieval beliefs and practices around Christian saints were anything but banal.

I turn now to the important contributions of Kuefler's opening chapters. Beginning in the nineteenth century, it was believed that Odo of Cluny wrote a detailed biography of Gerald in about 930 (known as the *Vita prolixior*) and that an unknown monk of Aurillac made an abbreviated version of Odo's text (the *Vita brevior*) shortly thereafter. This view has been enshrined in a number of studies by Anne-Marie Bultot-Verleysen, including her 2009 critical edition of the (full and abbreviated) *vitae* by Odo. However, Kuefler persuasively argues otherwise. In his scenario, Odo composed the *Vita brevior* around the time that he reformed the monastery of Aurillac (late 928 or early 929). This *vita* taught the superiority of the monastic lifestyle and rendered Gerald an almost-monk, all in the service of Odo's project of monastic reform, but was in many ways lukewarm (even doubtful) about Gerald's status as a saint. (An English translation of the *Vita brevior* appears in Appendix I.) Then, probably during the 1020s, Ademar of Chabannes, a monk at St. Martial of Limoges, forged the *Vita prolixior* under Odo's name, and composed anonymously an account of Gerald's death (the *Transitus*), a report concerning his posthumous miracles (the *Miracula*), a sermon for his feast day (October 13), and a report of additional miracles (the *Miracula addita*). Ademar may also have composed liturgical music for Gerald's feast day. All these writings vigorously defended Gerald's sanctity. Later in that century, or at the beginning of the next, someone at Cluny created a composite version of the two *vitae* (the *Vita prolixior secunda*), believing both to be by Odo, in an attempt to reconcile the contradictions between them. The point that emerges most clearly from Kuefler's painstaking (and manuscript-based) reconstruction of Gerald's dossier is that the key figure in the history of the saint's cult is Ademar of Chabannes. Ademar's writings about Gerald can now be exploited by specialists in the history of early-eleventh-century southern France, and will be of particular interest to those concerned with the violence, and the peace movement, that marked the region at the time, both of which play important roles in Ademar's work.

Kuefler's subsequent chapters veer increasingly off course, beginning with chapter 4 ("Saint Gerald and the Swell of History"), which argues that the cult of Gerald was at its thriving peak during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Yet all of the evidence in that chapter clearly indicates devotion to Gerald dates from Ade-



mar's own lifetime, or before. The sheer fact that the monastery of Aurillac appears to have possessed a number of priories in the twelfth century is not *ipso facto* evidence of widespread interest in Gerard. And the astonishing claim that Gerald sank into obscurity after the thirteenth century is belied by 70 pages filled with evidence of continued interest in the saint: late medieval translations of the *Vita prolixior* into French and Catalan; a 1536 translation of his relics from a wooden reliquary to a silver one; a 1635 complaint that the many statues of Gerald in the many churches and chapels in which he was honored did not properly capture his character; a 1703 attempt to avert summer floods by exposing his relics; and much more.

Despite its weaknesses, this is an important book. The contributions of the opening chapters will have an enduring impact.

FELICE LIFSHITZ  
University of Alberta

WOLFGANG RIEHLE. *The Secret Within: Hermits, Recluses, and Spiritual Outsiders in Medieval England*. Translated by CHARITY SCOTT-STOKES. English edition. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2014. Pp. xviii, 427. \$35.00.

"Jesus, the very thought of Thee / With sweetness fills the breast! / Yet sweeter far Thy face to see / And in Thy Presence rest. / No voice can sing, no heart can frame, / Nor can the memory find, / A sweeter sound than Jesus' Name, / The Saviour of mankind" (p. 32). In this new study, Wolfgang Riehle draws upon this twelfth-century Latin hymn by an anonymous English Cistercian to find the predominant sentiment of the diverse group of writers known as the medieval English mystics. He describes "the element of sweetness (*dulcedo*)" as "a distinctive English characteristic," exhibiting a foundational Cistercian influence on their lives and writings, and acting as a unifying thread holding the group together (p. 302). Finding further expression as joy, tenderness, melody, and harmony, this sweetness reverberated beyond their writings into medieval English cathedral music and the visual arts.

The medieval English mystics, while usually studied together, are rarely described as comprising a discernible school of theology or mysticism because each is so unique. While Riehle acknowledges their individuality, he spreads his net wide to include in his study earlier English devotional writings and those of both continental and English Cistercians, finding a foundational unity among the group in their indebtedness to these common sources. The other unifying factor is their distinctive preference for the eremitical life as suggested by the book's subtitle.

The first two chapters establish these foundations, the first on English eremitical mysticism, the second on the early English Cistercians. These foundations are alluded to in each subsequent chapter, demonstrating how they grow and develop, and giving a feeling of continuity to the whole. The third chapter studies the *An-*

*crene Wisse* as a legitimate mystical text, followed by a brief chapter on *A Talking of the Love of God* and the *Meditations* of the Monk of Farne. A very substantial examination of Richard Rolle, the most prolific of the English mystics, then precedes chapters on the English translation and reception of Marguerite Porete's *The Mirror of Simple Souls*, Walter Hilton's *The Cloud of Unknowing*, and the writings of Julian of Norwich and Margery Kempe. Wherever appropriate, Riehle brings these authors into dialogue with one another. Each chapter is finely crafted and exquisitely detailed to allow the authors to emerge in both their variety and shared characteristics. A final chapter explores how various authors in late medieval England popularized mystical theology to reach a wider audience inclusive of the laity, a trend already discernible in the English mystics themselves.

Riehle examined a similar subject in *The Middle English Mystics* (1981), a philological study of the images used by mystics to express the ineffable experience of the divine. It is interesting to note one characteristic he then felt distinguished the English mystics: "a distaste for theological learning" (*The Middle English Mystics*, p. 5). The present work frankly disputes that claim; it is a far more expansive study inclusive of the theological nature of these mystical writings. Indeed, these texts and the works he brings into conversation with them provide a far-reaching survey of both medieval affective theology and mysticism, with no clear-cut distinction between the two disciplines. Nevertheless, Riehle the literature scholar is still present, demonstrating how the structure, imagery, and rhythm of both prose and poetic language act as handmaids to the theological points being made.

Another place where Riehle has substantially changed his mind is in his assessment of Margery Kempe. He acknowledges having been aided by the scholarship on the mystical writings of medieval women, which has burgeoned in the decades between his two texts. He consistently gives prominence to women's mystical writings, bringing the English mystics into conversation with continental women like the Beguines and the community at Helfta.

It has been a pleasure to read this book. Not only is the flow of ideas clearly and artfully done, and the English translation graceful, but also the typeface used, the way the chapters are set out, and the choice of illustrations all together make this a beautiful book to hold and read. It can be enjoyed with most profit by those already familiar with the medieval English mystics because it provides a deeper, more detailed reflection than one expects in an introductory study. This is part of its beauty as well: the author can leave aside more mundane introductory material to explore the subtlety and nuance of his subjects. I have come away from it with a deeper appreciation for the desire these mystics had to embrace the sweetness and joy of the hidden interior life.

And yet I am left with the perplexing question I always have when considering the English mystics. It has

to do with their focus on “the secret within” and their proclivity for being “hermits, recluses, and spiritual outsiders.” Fourteenth-century England was, by all accounts, one of the most miserable places to live during the Middle Ages; it is the century Barbara Tuchman labeled “calamitous” (*A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century* [1978]). Yet there is rarely mention of society’s ills by any of the authors treated in this book. Was their movement to “the secret within” a form of escapism? Or was it an effort to find strength through union with God to face such ills with courage and equanimity? Perhaps our more overt social consciousness would be anachronistic when applied to fourteenth-century England. Or, perhaps we today need the movement inward espoused by the English mystics to balance our more extroverted world consciousness for the greater health of our individual and communal lives; if so, accessing this book is highly recommended.

JOAN M. NUTH  
John Carroll University

KEITH J. STRINGER and ANDREW JOTISCHKY, editors. *Norman Expansion: Connections, Continuities and Contrasts*. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2013. Pp. xiii, 261. \$119.95.

The Norman diaspora has occupied the interests of many scholars over the years. Key to this interest have been debates about the extent to which any of the component parts of the “Norman Empire” were, realistically, Norman. How Norman, for example, was post-conquest England (and, conversely, how English)? Catalyzed in part by the publication of books such as R. H. C. Davis’s *The Normans and their Myth* (1976), a line of research has flourished that reflects upon the ways the Normans saw themselves and were seen by others: Norman identity, “Normanness,” or *Normanitas*. Although markedly more attention has been paid to Norman holdings and activities in England and France than to their deeds further afield, such questions of Normanness are of particular interest and complexity at the fringes of their activity, where they stood “on the peripheries of Christian Europe” (p. 1).

In this volume, Keith J. Stringer and Andrew Jotischky bring together a collection of essays that further our understanding of these liminal areas of the Norman world, exploring how local pressures and interests interacted with notions of a broader Norman community, and asking to what extent Normanness was reflected in the states they created. With one exception, the chapters here are drawn from papers presented as part of an Arts and Humanities Research Council-funded project entitled “The Norman Edge: Identity and State-Formation on the Frontiers of Europe, c.1050–c.1200,” which examined three such “edges”: “middle Britain” (northern England and lowland Scotland), southern Italy, and the crusader states. The chapters group roughly around these themes, supplemented by a piece on Ireland after 1169.

The volume opens with three explorations of the

Normans of middle Britain, with the aforementioned Irish chapter in support. Stringer leads off with an analysis of three Norman settler families in the Anglo-Scottish borders, contextualizing this within diaspora theory. He draws our attention to the strength of networks formed among the newcomers in these families, and the ways continued interaction with Normandy created a dual society; this was a colony, but one regularly reinforced with new blood. Alexander Grant examines the important role of royal patronage in bringing Normans to Alba, particularly from 1124 under the Normanizing kings David I, Malcolm I, and William I. Here, Grant argues, the Normans played an important role within royal retinues, to which they were recruited for their expertise not only in military matters, but also for their experience of participation in highly organized administrative and legal systems.

Continuing the Scottish theme, Jonathan Gledhill picks up on the notion of administrative transformation, examining the structure of Eastern Lothian in order to reflect upon the “baronialisation” of Scottish society, the shift from a shire structure to one organized around knights’ fees. Gledhill points to Norman or Anglo-French lords as the tools through which these changes were effected, noting a pattern of granting formerly royal dues to Anglo-French barons, which effectively reduced the status of the existing native landholders by breaking their direct link to the king. Finally, Robin Frame explores the emergence of the stark dualism between “English” and “Irish” that resulted in a society in which the Irish were unprotected by the law of felony, their titles to land were not defensible in court, and they were excluded from government office. There was, he suggests, a presumption against cultural exchange and a clear break with the Irish past, and although forms of lordship grew to have “a distinctly Gaelic tinge” (p. 141), Irish culture remained subject to a rhetoric of rejection.

The fifth chapter, by Leonie V. Hicks, opens up the broader vista of the Norman world through a consideration of the concept of the “frontier,” a term with a contested and changeable meaning. She contends that the frontier landscape was both a physical and metaphorical space through which chroniclers could reflect on the nature of power and authority, drawing on classical references (such as Julius Caesar and Scylla and Charybdis) to underline both the qualities of leadership and the hazards of border-crossing expeditions. The book then refocuses on the second of the three “edges,” southern Italy, with chapters by Catherine Heygate, on the eleventh-century marriage strategies of the Normans in this region, and Paul Oldfield, on the Normans’ relationship with southern Italian urban communities. Heygate explores the difficulties of establishing whether or not a given marriage was intermarriage—it is often remarkably hard to be sure about the ethnicity of both participants—and the role of intermarriage in the shaping and expression of ethnic identity. The nature of southern Italian society was such that exogamous marriage had been commonplace prior to the ar-



rival of the Normans, and Heygate argues that the resultant positive attitude to intermarriage led to “a depoliticisation of ethnic identity” (p. 177). Oldfield suggests that the ethnic impact of the Normans was minimal, at least on urban society. The incoming population was small with few legitimate claims to authority, and in the face of increasingly assertive city identities, Norman lordship was often formal but distant, allowing urban customs and practices to be retained. This relative autonomy continued under the kings of Sicily, producing cities that were more than capable of effective self-government through the turmoil of 1194–1220.

The third “edge” is addressed in the three closing chapters. Léan Ní Chléirigh considers the presentation of the Normans in the Latin chronicles of the First Crusade, Denys Pringle some issues concerning the fortifications of the Eastern frontier, and Peter W. Edbury the laws and customs of Antioch. Ní Chléirigh argues that the *Normanni* were simply not as distinctive or important to their twelfth-century contemporaries as we might believe. She draws our attention to a mismatch between the “intense scholarly interest in the historiography of the Norman world or worlds” and the extent to which crusade chronicles talk about Normans, particularly Normans from southern Italy (p. 208). Indeed, even when distinguishing between ethnic groups, the term *Normanni* was rarely used and, perhaps unsurprisingly, the chronicler most emphatic about the Normans’ role, Ralph of Caen, was himself a Norman.

Pringle shifts the focus of definition from the Normans to the edge itself, discussing border arrangements and the functioning of frontiers. In particular, he presents a focused critique of recent work by Ronnie Ellenblum. Pringle notes the authority with which sources speak for contemporary perceptions, and contends that places named as castles were always fortified, and that linear political boundaries did exist, even if they were disputed. Lastly, Edbury’s shorter piece draws our attention to the extensively neglected *Assises d’Antioche*, a legal treatise composed before 1219 that survives only in an Armenian translation from the French. This document has the potential to offer insights into the oft-disputed Normanness of Antioch; interesting then is its fusion of the customs of Jerusalem and Cyprus with a handful of practices resembling English custom as well, including a version of the “curtesy of England,” conceivably a result of the Norman element in Antiochene society.

Overall, this is an interesting collection presenting a balanced body of material from both established and younger scholars. Each chapter makes an important contribution to the Norman debate, and there is some excellent and highly detailed analytical work here. The only flaws are slight: conclusions to some of the chapters could have been more developed, and the running order seems a little strange, a problem reflected in an introduction that addresses the chapters out of sequence. It must, however, have been a difficult task to structure a collection that is in many ways just as much

about Norman unity as it is about the distinctiveness of different frontier environments.

NICK WEBBER

Birmingham City University

ELIZABETH MCCAHERILL. *Reviving the Eternal City: Rome and the Papal Court, 1420–1447*. (I Tatti Studies in Italian Renaissance History.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013. Pp. 288. \$49.95.

The history of the later medieval papacy has traditionally lent itself to easy periodization, accompanied by a straightforward accounting of the popes’ changing relationship to the Eternal City: from the Avignon papacy (*Roma abbandonata*) to the Great Schism (*Roma contestata*), and then to the Renaissance papacy (*Roma rinnovata*). Yet the period between the end of the schism and the election of the first “Renaissance” pope, Nicholas V (1447–1455), remains something of an outlier. The pontificates of Martin V (1417–1431) and Eugenius IV (1431–1447), while hardly ignored by scholars, have long defied ready placement in the scheme. If Martin figures prominently in any discussion of the schism and the Council of Constance, his role in the restoration of Rome has perhaps received somewhat less attention than it warrants, while poor Eugenius is usually cast as the hapless, cardinal-ridden, and council-wracked after-effect of Martin’s decidedly more forceful reign. Elizabeth McCahill’s *Reviving the Eternal City: Rome and the Papal Court, 1420–1447* seeks to clarify matters once and for all with a thorough investigation of the cultural and intellectual history of Rome in the decades immediately before the Renaissance papacy.

*Reviving the Eternal City* is neither a history of the papacy nor a study of the two popes whose reigns define the book’s chronological scope, but rather, it is a biography of a city in the initial stages of significant change and a study of the Curia—increasingly but not yet pervasively subject to the influence of humanist thought—whose return, after decades of absence or instability, played such a vital role in Rome’s transformation. McCahill argues persuasively that the fifteenth-century Roman revival began in earnest with Martin V and continued—indeed, accelerated—under Eugenius IV. She understands “revival” in broad terms; building (or renovation) projects, cultural and intellectual patronage, reform agendas, and even ceremonial activities were all part of the larger programs by which Martin and Eugenius sought to leave their respective marks on the city. While there were inevitably links between them, the revivalist programs of the two popes were distinct. They were informed by learned men of the Curia (many of whom had ideological visions and agendas of their own) and predicated on the very different backgrounds of the popes themselves. Martin, a scion of the mighty Colonna clan (and perhaps the less innovative of the two), was a Roman; his programs emphasized the eternity of the city, his strong personal connection to it, and his role in restoring the papacy to

its rightful seat. The Venetian-born Eugenius, by contrast, was never popular in Rome and in fact undertook some of the most important initiatives of his pontificate while elsewhere. Unlike his iron-willed predecessor, he struggled to rein in his cardinals and was beleaguered by a surfeit of councils. Under the circumstances, Eugenius pursued a vision, in which the humanist inflection is rather more apparent, that played on the chronological distance between the ancient city and the Rome of his own day while simultaneously emphasizing, against the assertions of his critics, the power and authority of the papacy (the chapter on papal ceremonies is particularly fascinating in this respect). Still, however different their contours may have been, McCahill leaves no doubt about the importance of Martin's and Eugenius's revivalist activities. Renaissance Rome was not created *ex nihilo* by Nicholas V and his successors; by the time they appeared on the scene, the Roman revival was already underway.

McCahill draws on an impressive range of sources, including a great corpus of works by both luminaries and lesser-known figures of the early Renaissance. Many followed career tracks that led, at least for a time, to the Curia, whose inner dynamics, incidentally, are made wonderfully apparent in the second chapter. Niccolò Signorilli, Poggio Bracciolini, Æneas Sylvius Piccolomini, Maffeo Vegio, Lapo da Castiglione, Leon Battista Alberti, Lorenzo Valla, Flavio Biondo, and many others provide McCahill with the bases of her insights, frequently as a result of her own fresh reading of familiar sources. Nor does McCahill restrict herself to textual sources: her treatment of important artistic evidence, most notably the bronze doors that Filarete produced for St. Peter's Basilica, reveals a firm grasp of the interpretive methods associated with art history. While the nature of her argument perhaps necessarily privileges published sources, unedited materials are well represented. Bibliographical references are embedded in the notes, but the absence of a self-standing bibliography is a regrettable omission, and, while complaints are on the table, one could also observe that in a monograph as richly documented as this one, footnotes would have been much preferable to endnotes. But a few minor quibbles should not tarnish the luster of this excellent book. McCahill has proven herself a first-rate scholar; her writing is elegant, clear, and engaging. *Reviving the Eternal City* is a most welcome addition to the literature on a crucial, transitional period in the history of papal Rome.

BLAKE R. BEATTIE  
University of Louisville

BENJAMIN WEBER. *Lutter contre les Turcs: Les formes nouvelles de la croisade pontificale au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle*. (Collection de l'école française de Rome, no. 472.) Rome: école française de Rome, 2013. Pp. viii, 594. Paper €49.00.

Benjamin Weber's book is a welcome addition to a growing literature on the Later Crusades (including the

numerous contributions of Norman Housley and Jacques Paviot, among many others), examining the period when the war against the Ottoman Turks replaced the recovery of the Holy Land at the forefront of crusading activity.

The author is careful to set out the limits of his work: first, the book essentially deals with a "short" fifteenth century, from 1420 to 1481; second, it focuses on the papacy's role in organizing, propagating, and conducting the war against the Ottomans. The third limitation concerns the sources: Weber bases his work primarily on the surviving papal documents. This might appear rather restrictive for a book that runs to almost 600 pages. To fully appreciate the scale of the undertaking, however, it should be noted that the *Registri Vaticani* series of papal correspondence for this period covers more than 300 volumes, while the corresponding records of the curia's finances (the *Introitus et Exitus*) amount to over 100 volumes. The richness of the material is awe-inspiring compared to the twelfth, thirteenth, and even fourteenth centuries.

Two themes run through the entire book. First, the effort against the Turks, from the point of view of the curia, was as much about stemming the Ottoman advance as it was about establishing the papacy's leading role within Latin Christendom, something that was urgently needed after the devastating loss of papal prestige over the previous century, the growing power of secular authorities, and the widening "national" rifts in Europe. The second point is that, despite the traditionalist language that presented the crusade as virtually unchanged since the late eleventh century, there was actually a marked evolution of the practice of crusading in the fifteenth century and a constant effort to readjust means and objectives to the realities of the time.

Weber examines both the reality and the theory of the war against the Ottomans in two parts. Part I, "Vaincre en Orient," deals with the war as it was waged in the East. Weber identifies the direct involvement of the popes in military planning as "undoubtedly the main innovation of the late Middle Ages as regards the crusade" (p. 152). The papal conception of crusading entailed a distribution of tasks with the pope as the ultimate leader, the lay rulers as his field commanders, and "the people" no longer expected to participate *en masse* in the campaigns but rather to help finance the war through the purchase of indulgences.

Part II, "Convaincre en Occident," deals with the organization of the war in the West and the propaganda deployed by the papacy to promote the campaigns. Weber offers a detailed and illuminating account of the creation of new financial and administrative structures to deal with the needs and opportunities of the war against the Ottomans. The collection of funds was actually quite successful despite the complaints and reactions; in administration, the main tendencies were for specialization and rationalization, while central control over the fiscal apparatus was strengthened. Innovations were introduced both in the papal camera and in the



chancery, most strikingly the creation of a dedicated "commission for the Holy Crusade."

Weber brings out well how the crusade operated under the dual pressures of tradition and contemporary circumstance. He shows that the latter was the most prominent factor in planning and conducting the war, even though the former was the main element taken into consideration in presenting and propagating the crusade and the papacy's role in it. This, Weber argues, was intended to establish and legitimize the Apostolic See's preeminence in the affair, and to "mask" the innovative elements (that could generate tensions) under the mantle of time-honored clichés going back to the First Crusade, effectively equating the Turks with the old "Muslim" or "pagan" enemies.

Weber demonstrates that the failure of crusading against the Turks was not due to an alleged lack of papal commitment or waning enthusiasm for the cause. Much more crucial was the complicated political situation across Europe and the staggering disproportion between the resources at the papacy's disposal and the needs of the task at hand. The problem was even more acute as the papacy tried to exercise direct control over the expeditions.

Weber makes his case with conviction, highlighting the differences of approach between popes and putting to rest the image of the crusade in the fifteenth century as a "fossilized" institution that was out of touch with the times. The source material is handled confidently, a wealth of information and details are provided, but at the same time the main arguments remain clear thanks to copious signposting.

Nevertheless, Weber appears to overestimate how conscious decisions were on the part of the papacy on certain issues, particularly on *deliberately* obfuscating the nature of the war against the Turks behind the traditional language of crusading. Under the accumulated weight of crusade history, fifteenth-century popes were probably just as ready as their audience to see their role cast in the likeness of their predecessors.

Furthermore, although Weber's mastery of the sources and literature on the period under examination is incontestable, he is sometimes on less solid ground regarding the precedents of some of the phenomena he is discussing. Some developments presented as departures for the fifteenth century actually make their appearance as early as the thirteenth, for example, the preference for monetary assistance rather than mass recruitment for non-combatants, or the invocation of French "national" pride for motivation.

These secondary points aside, Weber's meticulous work is undoubtedly an important contribution to our understanding of the fifteenth-century papacy and of crusading at the end of the Middle Ages.

NIKOLAOS G. CHRISSIS  
University of Athens

## EUROPE: EARLY MODERN AND MODERN

THOMAS JAMES DANDELET. *The Renaissance of Empire in Early Modern Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Pp. ix, 305. Cloth \$85.00, paper \$29.99, e-book \$24.00.

The humanistic tradition of the Italian Renaissance, which drew on the arts and letters of antiquity, proposed two main political models: the republican and the imperial. In this book, Thomas James Dandelelet's focus is on the latter, claiming that modern, postwar historiography has mainly favored republican ideals, owing to their affinity with modern democratic regimes, while ignoring or utterly dismissing the imperial, supposedly despotic, model. Accordingly, the main objective of this book is to emphasize those European powers that have been particularly successful in "renovating" the imperial past of Rome, namely Spain, France, and Great Britain, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Dandelelet's fresh and innovative synthesis draws on an impressive body of primary and secondary materials in various European languages. In this respect, he also breaks new ground by stressing the importance of those Renaissance histories of new empires modeled on ancient examples and compartmental manuals for princes that encouraged the imitation of the imperial past, and by aptly introducing these texts within the broader context of European attempts to legitimize the founding of new global empires.

Chapter 1 trails those Italian states that served as pioneers of imperial renovation in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries before their example migrated to other European powers. First, we are presented with the courts of Ferrara and Mantua. As close political and military collaborators with the Holy Roman Empire it is not surprising that their rulers chose to adorn their new palaces, built on Vitruvian principles, with such classical imperial motifs as triumphal arches, busts, columns, equestrian statues, and sculptures of Roman emperors. Yet, despite their magnificent lifestyle and lavish patronage, they ultimately remained peripheral political players in the larger European chessboard. Next, the focus shifts to other Italian potentates who could make a more substantial claim to imperial continuity with the Roman past: the contemporary rulers of Rome, like such popes as Alexander VI and Julius II, who backed their imperial ambitions with both artistic and intellectual patronage on grand scales (including the beginning of such commanding new projects as the new Saint Peter's Basilica and the Sistine Chapel), as well as with territorial expansion acquired by the force of arms.

Chapters 2 and 3 center on the Spanish Habsburg monarchs and follow the political and military feats of the two legendary rulers of the dynasty, namely Charles V and his successor, Philip II. With a global empire that included large parts of Southern and Central Europe, the Americas, South East Asia, and Africa, it is not surprising that "comparisons with ancient Rome and the ancient Caesars by both friends and foes were inevita-

ble" (p. 75). These conquests were legitimized via the writing of Spanish humanists, like Antonio de Guevara and Pedro Mexia, who portrayed Charles V as Caesar and Philip II as a worthy successor in the image of either Augustus or Constantine. According to Dandele, Charles V's visit to Italy for his imperial coronation in 1530 provided him with an aesthetic model that was later carried over to Spain and upheld by his successor, as best exemplified by the architectural plans of Charles V's palace in Grenada, Philip II's palace, the Escorial, the paintings of Titian, and the sculptures of Leone Leoni. The author concludes the Habsburgs' contribution to the "Renaissance of Empire" with Philip III. Uncharacteristically, rather than setting him apart from his two imposing ancestors as a weak and ineffectual successor, we are told that with a "bold and bellicose agenda both at home and abroad, Philip III also sought glory in imperial expansion" (p. 191). Dandele ultimately links Philip III's inability to expand his empire to unfavorable historical conjuncture and bad luck, but his ability to keep the empire intact is portrayed as a success in itself.

Dandele begins his treatment of France, in chapter 4, with the valiant albeit ineffectual attempts of such Valois monarchs as Charles VIII, Francis I, and Henry II to challenge Spain's continental hegemony via the Italian Wars (1494–1559). It is only with the conclusion of the Wars of Religion in France and with the ascent of the Bourbon dynasty under Henry IV, Louis XIII, and Louis XIV that France could stake a claim in the "Renaissance of Empire." Massive investments in the military apparatus, facilitated by greater administrative and financial control of the country, allowed the French to become the greatest continental power after the middle of the seventeenth century. Moreover, the acquisition of colonial territories in Central and North America gave the French monarchy "the beginnings of a real empire to match its imperial image" (p. 228). Finally, Dandele aptly demonstrates how Louis XIV was eager to project the grandeur of his rule by embarking on costly military conquests as well as lavishly investing in the arts, as illustrated by the unparalleled project of Versailles.

The last chapter focuses on Great Britain. According to Dandele, who acknowledges the early beginnings of an imperial pursuit by the Tudors, the first phase of the British tradition properly starts with the first Stewart monarch, James I, and the Union of England and Scotland. Like previous examples, the Stewarts proved to be prominent sponsors of imperial arts and efforts to expand British colonial power in the New World.

The book is a pleasure to read and is virtually free of typos. Its greatest merit is that it offers a novel interdisciplinary interpretation of the first European empires, defined as such by their imitation of the imperial Roman past through military pursuits, architectural, literary, and artistic sponsorship, and colonial expansion. Consequently, it also provides a blueprint for future scholars pondering the extent to which a European power can (or cannot) be considered a protagonist in

the "Renaissance of Empire." Ultimately, the book should be obligatory reading for anyone interested in imperial history, early modern art and architectural history, and the history of the Renaissance.

GABRIEL GUARINO  
University of Ulster

BRIAN TIERNEY. *Liberty and Law: The Idea of Permissive Natural Law, 1100–1800*. (Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Canon Law.) Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2014. Pp. xii, 380. Paper \$39.95, e-book \$39.95.

Brian Tierney's new book, like his 1997 work, *The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law, 1150–1625*, usefully illuminates modern political thought by revealing its origins in medieval and early modern juristic debates. Permissive natural law defines the genus of which natural liberties, powers, rights, and immunities are species; in this sense, his new volume on permissive natural law is a companion to the earlier one on natural rights. Due to the influence of voluntarist and positivist legal theories, we tend to think of law in terms of command and prohibition, but even the modern positivist legal theorist H. L. A. Hart pointed out that law also creates permissions in the form of rights, powers, liberties, and immunities. Tierney's important new study draws our attention to this oft-neglected dimension of the rule of law.

Although trained as a historian, Tierney takes to heart George Santayana's dictum that history should be written by philosophers. Tierney attempts to occupy a middle ground between the two disciplines; therefore, his book will strike many historians as too philosophical and many philosophers as too historical. His studies are not organized around a single or unified tradition of thought. Instead, the authors he discusses, including Gratian, Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham, Marsilius of Padua, Johannes Valentinus Andreae, Richard Hooker, Francisco Suárez, Hugo Grotius, John Selden, Samuel von Pufendorf, Christian Wolff, and Immanuel Kant (just to name the major figures), have in common only an interest in the idea of permissive law. Because this book is organized around theorists, rather than around themes, there is some repetition of ideas as Tierney moves from writer to writer. He nicely situates each thinker in his proper political and philosophical context.

What is permissive law? Tierney shows that the notion of permissive law has two important ancient sources: one is the Aristotelian idea (though Tierney focuses on the Stoics) of "things indifferent" (*adiaphora*); the second is the famous tag from Justinian's *Digest* (1.3.7) that "'the force of law is to command, to prohibit, to permit, and to punish'" (p. 6 [emphasis in the original]). Matters that are considered morally indifferent are often described as matters in which morality and law permit us to do as we please. Those theorists who treat law as a system of commands tend to look to liberty only



where the law is silent. But Tierney argues that moral and civil law often explicitly create this realm of moral and legal freedom by means of permissions. Were liberty merely the absence of law, we would find ourselves in an anarchy in which no one is required to respect the liberty of anyone else. Tierney's important book shows how a diverse range of authors treat the relation of the permissions of natural law to natural rights, liberties, powers, and immunities.

Many of the authors Tierney discusses reveal themselves to be better lawyers than philosophers. At one level, the doctrine of permissive natural law was a clever legal strategy deployed to reconcile traditional natural law precepts (such as those forbidding divorce or usury) with the reality of civil laws that tolerate divorce or usury. If natural law consisted only of exceptionless norms, then it would be very difficult to harmonize with the diversity of positive human laws that often tolerate many evils. But if natural law includes permissions, then there is more room for choice and creativity in the framing of human laws. This use of permissive natural law might be more clearly framed in terms of legal presumptions. Natural law creates moral and legal presumptions in favor of liberty, equality, marriage, and lending without interest, but these presumptions can be temporarily overridden by positive laws permitting slavery, private property, divorce, and usury if, for example, these positive laws prevent even worse evils.

The philosophical inadequacy of the discourse of permissive natural law is especially evident in the discussion of property. According to many of the classic sources of natural law theory (such as the Bible, Aristotle, and Roman law), the world and all its wealth was given to the human race as a whole. By nature, it was often said, property is held in common. How, then, do we justify private ownership? If the relevant natural law norm established common ownership by command or prohibition, it would be very difficult to reconcile with the widespread reality of private property. Hence, natural law was interpreted as permitting either private or common property. But this purely legal solution hardly does justice to the moral issues involved here. Aristotle and Aquinas, by contrast, distinguish the ownership from the use of property in order to show that private ownership is not only compatible with common use, but also can be the most effective way to ensure common use. As Aquinas would say, natural law requires common use of property, which is often best secured by the human law of private ownership. Here the natural law norm of common use continues to regulate the positive law of private ownership so that property serves the common good. A similar philosophical analysis of the law of marriage and of money-lending would yield a deeper and more adequate reconciliation of moral norms and legal realities than the more purely legal strategy of referring to permissive natural or civil laws.

Finally, Tierney sometimes too quickly associates permissive natural law with human freedom and rights. Yet the power to grant permission is also the power to revoke it. For a divine or human sovereign to explicitly

grant his subjects permissions to engage in innocent or harmless activities appears to be the epitome of tyranny. What self-respecting adult regards his own use of his private liberty as a matter of legal permission? Rather, we tend to presume natural liberty and expect governmental authorities to seek our permission when proposing to restrict it. Even for the government to define or list our natural rights is to limit them by the implication that any such list could be exhaustive. Hence, moral or legal permissions have an ambiguous relationship to our experience of real human liberty.

JAMES BERNARD MURPHY  
Dartmouth College

TAMAR HERZIG, *Christ Transformed into a Virgin Woman: Lucia Brocadelli, Heinrich Institoris, and the Defense of the Faith*. (Temi e Testi, 114; "Scritture nel chiosastro.") Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2013. Pp. xix, 330. €48.00.

Heinrich Institoris holds the unfortunate distinction of hating women more fervently, and with greater consequence, than anyone else in late medieval Europe. His most infamous work, the *Malleus maleficarum* or *Hammer of [female] Witches* (1487) asks, "why a larger number of sorcerers is found among the delicate female sex than among men?" A question he answers with a flurry of misogynist invective drawing on everything from Genesis to Cicero to the sort of humorless bawdy joke that presumably passed for wit in the refectories of his Dominican order. It is therefore puzzling that Institoris's final published work extolls the holiness of the stigmatic Italian "living saint" Lucia Brocadelli, who, in her devotional ecstasies, very nearly attained the status of a "feminine incarnation of Christ" (p. 181). It is to Tamar Herzig's great credit that, after reading this dense and erudite study, the great witch-hunter's admiration for holy women seems almost inevitable.

Herzig modestly presents her study as an inquiry into the content, authorship, and publication circumstances of a brief, peculiar pamphlet entitled *Deeds of the Stigmatic Virgin Lucia of Narni and of Other Spiritual Persons of the Female Sex who are Worthy of Admiration*. Compiled in haste by Institoris in 1501 while he served as papal nuncio in Olomouc, Moravia, the *Stigmifere* comprises a collection of letters from Italian notables testifying to the bleeding stigmata and Eucharistic *inedia* of Lucia Brocadelli and other holy women, rounded out by a long Latin poem in the best humanist style. In part III of *Christ Transformed into a Virgin Woman: Lucia Brocadelli, Heinrich Institoris, and the Defense of the Faith*, Herzig provides a meticulously annotated critical edition of the *Stigmifere*; part II contributes a close reading of these texts, none written by Institoris himself. Only part I commands the interest of non-specialists, for here Herzig allows herself to consider the implications of the demonologist's advocacy of Italian holy women, an advocacy which, as she dryly notes, calls for "a reevaluation and a contextualization of Institoris' attitude toward women" (p. xii). Such a

reevaluation involves the most thorough examination of Institoris's life and works to date, and much more besides: an exploration of gender ideology at the end of the Middle Ages, of the surprising connections between scholastic Germanic inquisitors and courtly Italian humanists, and of the role played by female ecstasies in the defense of Catholic orthodoxy against Hussitism, Judaism, heresy, and the devil.

Institoris emerges from Herzig's pages as that most dangerous type: a careerist who was also a true believer. From the beginning of his life as a priest, he distinguished himself as a hardworking clerical functionary of various bishops and, from 1460, the pope. Joining the Dominicans at an unknown date, Institoris felt no qualms attacking his confreres whenever called upon to do so in defense of papal prerogatives. But he found his true calling as a preacher and polemicist against doctrinal error, especially where that error impugned Christ's real presence in the Eucharistic host. In 1467 he was preaching against the Hussites; in 1475 he was likely identical to the "Heinrich of Schlettstadt" who took a prominent role in the trial of the Jews of Trent for the alleged ritual murder of "little Simon." From 1479 until his death he worked tirelessly as a papal inquisitor, writing against Hussites and Waldensians, and prosecuting the "new sect" of female witches who, like heretics and Jews, delighted in desecrating the Eucharist. Interrogating an alleged witch in 1485, Institoris displayed the obsession with female sexuality that so marks the *Malleus*: witches, he explained, tended to be women who "indulge[d] in lustful acts and adulterous relations from youth" (p. 45). So far this is the Institoris we might expect: fanatical, intolerant, dirty-minded.

However, as Herzig cogently argues, Institoris's condemnation of female witches derived from the same gendered assumptions that informed his praise for female living saints. Both represented *embodied* forms of holiness or wickedness, both largely bypassed the mind. Witchcraft was a non-doctrinal heresy expressed through sexual depravity; female saintliness was equally somatic, expressed most fully in stigmatization. Women's impressionability rendered them susceptible to the devil's wiles but also to perfections of *imitatio Christi* usually closed to men. Their very thoughtlessness made them "privileged conduits for divine revelations that confirmed the tenets of Christianity" (p. 234). If this pedestal-or-the-stake polarization seems small improvement on the old image of the woman-hating demonologist, Herzig leaves us with a provocative comparison: where Institoris was willing to imagine Christ transformed into a virgin woman, a generation later Martin Luther discouraged such flights of feminine ecstasy. Luther's model for female piety was the dutiful housewife, Martha, barefoot and pregnant in the kitchen.

MICHAEL OSTLING  
University of Queensland

IRIS IDELSON-SHEIN, *Difference of a Different Kind: Jewish Constructions of Race during the Long Eighteenth*

*Century*. (Jewish Culture and Contexts.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. Pp. 267. \$55.00.

This book focuses on the Jewish attitude toward race as it evolved in the so-called long eighteenth century, mostly during the Jewish Enlightenment of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It attempts to decipher the manner in which European Jews, the "intimate Others" of the "white" Christians, viewed the "exotic other," mostly black Africans and Native Americans (p. 4), and the way this was reflected in the construction of their own identity vis-à-vis other Europeans. While there is already quite a substantial body of literature concerning the Jewish attitude toward their various others, these mostly concentrate on views toward blacks and cover the period up to early modern times, and thus do not focus on Ashkenazi Jews. As the author correctly indicates, only a handful of studies have focused on the attitudes of Ashkenazi Jews in this particular period with reference to other "others," and so this book is certainly a welcome addition.

The author attempts to accomplish this through four case studies based upon a thorough analysis of texts written by early modern European Jews. The texts selected are taken from four different literary genres: "folktales, philosophical literature, scientific writings, and children's books" (p. 7). These genres represent the most dominant modes of writing about race during this period, making them quite representative. The process is chronological, corresponding with the evolution of racial discourse during this period. The image of the non-European savage was gradually relocated from folklore, in the early eighteenth century, into the philosophical literature of the Enlightenment, which was then transplanted to children's books; later, in the early nineteenth century, this racial discourse then moved into anthropological positivism. This method is also very useful in placing evolving Jewish attitudes in the context of the general European racial discourse of the period. The investigation of the manner by which Jewish scholars adapted such beliefs and applied them to their unique experience is very illuminating. Although the study relates to texts written in various languages, the author wisely concentrates on those written in Hebrew. This stems from the fact that Jewish intellectuals of the Enlightenment (*Maskilim*) renewed the usage of biblical Hebrew for secular writing. Another reason is that some of their works are free translations into Hebrew, mainly from the German, of non-Jewish works, which were transplanted into the Jewish context. The author's nuanced comparisons between the original texts and their creative Hebrew versions, which were practically complete rewrites, is a very valuable means of deciphering the manner by which these Jewish scholars adapted the European racial discourse to their needs, and used it to reevaluate their own position as the "other" of white Europeans. They did this in order to advance their Enlightenment project of being absorbed into European culture as equals, all the while preserving their unique Jewish identity.



The author contends that “until the late eighteenth century, skin color *did not* play a significant role in European [Ashkenazi] Jews’ descriptions of other people” (p. 5 [emphasis in the original]). This is correct, but the reason is not that their attitudes changed, but rather that there is very little reference in premodern Ashkenazi literature to non-European people at all. Unlike southern European Jews (Sephardim), who encountered the existence of non-European people, including black Africans, in premodern times, and reacted to the discoveries of the great geographical voyages very early, Ashkenazi Jews encountered this much later, in the period this book focuses on (as the author herself admits on p. 23). The author also refers to the influence of medieval Sephardic Jewish scholars, such as Judah Halevi and Maimonides, on the Enlightenment scholars she studies. This was practically the first time they related to the existence of “exotic others” such as blacks and Native Americans. By and large this was a new phenomenon for them. Moreover, skin color did play a significant role in the manner by which Ashkenazi Jews in the later Middle Ages and early modern period described themselves, mostly in the religious polemic literature, as dark skinned or swarthy vis-à-vis the “white” Christians, and they reacted to this “fact” in various ways. The author also argues that skin color was considered a byproduct of other influences, such as climate, thus it was not innate, but might change with the move to another climate. The climatic theory, however, was one of the main explanations for differences in skin color among humans since ancient times. The manner by which notions of race and gender are closely intertwined is very well described in this book, but this too is not a new phenomenon, and has a long history. The specific encounter of Ashkenazi Jews in this period with the question of ethnic and racial difference is very interesting, and adds another layer to our understanding of the manner by which a group considered to be the “other,” related to other “others.” However, this seems to me to be only yet another variation on the old theme. The real change came with the emergence of modern racial thought in the later nineteenth century, based upon the idea of biological determinism. That, however, is already beyond the scope of this book.

ABRAHAM MELAMED,  
Emeritus  
University of Haifa, Israel

MARGARET C. JACOB. *The First Knowledge Economy: Human Capital and the European Economy, 1750–1850*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Pp. ix, 257. \$29.99.

How and why did Britain become the first nation to achieve sustained economic growth? These two questions have commandeered discussion of industrialization since the postwar era of the 1950s, when economic historians assembled a list of social and geographical factors responsible for something akin to spontaneous combustion in the realm of British cotton manufactur-

ing. Gesturing to this obsolete “universalizing discourse” with its “mono-causal determinism,” Margaret C. Jacob sets forth a case for a different account that admits “complexity in history, the multiple avenues by which [Western nations] escape the misery of poverty, or, more broadly, the Malthusian dictum” (p. 5). This latest treatment of industrialization focuses on a very particular form of culture consisting of a shared belief in scientific and technical knowledge, fostered by particular educational institutions in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain. Through the minds and actions of a group of entrepreneurs, Jacob reconstructs the manner in which competitive innovation came to characterize the British manufacturing process.

*The First Knowledge Economy: Human Capital and the European Economy, 1750–1850*, intended primarily for college-level audiences, delivers its message in a notably clear and candid voice. Readers familiar with debates over economic divergence will see how Jacob wishes to position her arguments in relation to recent scholarship. She acknowledges her debt to Joel Mokyr’s *Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy* (2002), while dismissing the arguments of Prasannan Parthasarathi’s *Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not: Global Economic Divergence, 1600–1850* (2011), misconstrued here as a top-down account of industrialization. *The First Knowledge Economy* fashions a trademark blend of intellectual and social history, featuring a band of innovators (described as middling engineers and entrepreneurs) and their inventive role in boosting industry and their own fortunes. We learn about the remarkable drive toward knowledge acquisition and improvement associated with the plucky protestant nation of steam engines and spinning jennies. Unitarians and other dissenters figure large, as do the redoubtable scientific societies, where one can imagine Robert Boyle’s iconic air pump as a placid bystander. In later chapters of the book, Jacob includes useful comparative treatment of Belgium, France, and the Dutch Republic, where we see variables like religion and educational policies come into play.

Jacob’s accessible portraits of leading figures effectively draw us into their mental worlds: their struggles in early life, their haphazard accumulation of knowledge, their adherence to Newtonian principles as guiding truths in determining how the world worked. (“Listen to what a British maker of spindles for cotton jennies, Mr. D. Clark, could imagine” [p. 15].) Included in these treatments are unvarnished details of cutthroat attitudes toward competitors and a rough and ready resentment of the landed classes. The Watts (father James, b. 1736 and son James Jr., b. 1769) present a colorful, dynamic drama of gritty determination in the design and production of steam engines, alongside partner Matthew Boulton, “something of a dandy” who “loved fame, married well, and used his wife’s capital as he needed it” (p. 25). Watt Sr.’s decidedly middling-class mentality reveals itself in salty commentary: his correspondence betrays a hatred of aristocratic privilege and a desire for free rein to profit from his own

ingenuity. James Jr. absorbed the subversive element couched within his father's stance; at one point, he traveled to Paris and "marched in the streets" during the early days of the French Revolution (p. 41). Chapter 3 singles out John Kennedy (b. 1769), a Scottish-born cotton factory owner in Manchester, who never ceased to deploy technical skills at his job. "Being able to talk to the engineers as peers was the only way" such upwardly mobile men could maintain tight control of their own inventions (p. 92).

Jacob shows how technical knowledge transformed each sector of the industrial economy: the production of steam engines, the accessing of coal, the manufacture of cotton, and—contrary to older approaches to industrialization—woolens. This cast of entrepreneurs knew how to generate mechanical improvements and exploit innovations to the hilt. Technical knowledge was a form of "cultural capital that industrialists held in common with engineers, physicians, and practicing natural philosophers" (p. 104). Jacob fills out the picture with interesting details about the religious affiliations and social observations of these strenuous capitalists, who felt triumphant in their success in introducing factory production as part of an "industrial race" (p. 112) laden with seemingly endless opportunities. By the 1830s, steam power and new machinery had clearly won the day. Evoking allegiance to Baconian values, one lecturer in Leeds proclaimed that "science, no longer confined to the closets of the learned, is applied to the comforts and amelioration of mankind" (pp. 128–129).

Jacob's linkage between the fertile knowledge base of British entrepreneurs and escape from "the Malthusian dictum" may seem somewhat overstated to some readers, given the direction of recent scholarship in the history of British industrial developments. While "bottom-up education" (p. 10) clearly galvanized a group of British innovators in the eighteenth century, the ultimate success of such men (and the sale of their commodities) depended on a pattern of relationships rooted in the wider context of global capitalism. Focusing on technological developments within Britain (and in later chapters, continental Europe), Jacob's narrative makes no mention of the intricate interplay between restrictions on the importation of printed and white Indian cloth and the stimulus to British production and printing, laid out in compelling detail by Parthasarathi's work. The larger scheme of British success, which depended on colonial markets that constantly fueled production, is not discussed here. The British Parliament that enabled commercial interests to make headway appears only through the eyes of inventors, as an impediment to patent claims. Jacob's account makes a compelling and necessary contribution to our understanding of how industrial innovations repeatedly broke new ground in Britain, and for that, we must be grateful. But the question of how and why Britain won the race to achieve sustained economic growth demands a more inclusive concept of "human capital."

DEBORAH VALENZE

*Barnard College, Columbia University*

DAN STONE. *Goodbye to All That? The Story of Europe since 1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. xxvii, 379. \$39.95.

It should be easy to write a history of the tiny half-continent of Europe as our globe shrinks and the "national" becomes subsumed by the "transnational." Dan Stone's absorbing and provocative work shows that writing this history remains vexingly difficult. Europe was at the heart of the Cold War, and that makes its postwar story much more than European. The single city Berlin reproduced the bipolar world in miniature, with welfare capitalism in its Western sectors but welfare dictatorship just a few streets to the East. Like the old German capital, Cold War Europe focused on big questions but also divided populations: how does one hold together Europeans' divergent experiences in a single narrative?

Stone's solution is to admit to the division wrought by the Cold War while arguing for deeper unity. His chapters alternate between East and West but the book as a whole traces the adventures of the single concept "antifascism," which Stone understands as a consensus favoring reasoned compromise that prevailed across the continent. "[A]ntifascism," he writes, "became the basis of stability in postwar Europe," a development that would help explain why Christian Democrats embraced welfare states along with corporatist labor arrangements (p. 9). Because Stone understands welfare states as postwar elites' antidote for fascism he sees the weakening of welfare states since 1989 as a sign of fascism's return. (Hence the book's title.) Is this intriguing intuition correct?

Antifascism prevailed after 1945 in the sense that fascist parties were disbanded and openly racist rhetoric became taboo. Yet Stone fails to show how suppression of fascism produced ideological energy in favor of particular social or economic policies. The welfare state, after all, was post-ideological. Sometimes Christian Democrats fostered it, and sometimes Social Democrats scaled it back. But it was also pre-ideological. Fascists in Germany and Italy had done much to advance social welfare.

If Stone fails to demonstrate connections between antifascism and actual policies, his treatment of Western Europe is engaging and as far as I could tell accurate, tracing major themes with attention to old and new literature. His sections on international relations are riveting, bringing readers up to date with recent debates on the unleashing of the Cold War and the early push to West European union. But Stone stumbles when faced with complexity beyond the old iron curtain: the chapters on Eastern Europe often proceed from the (German) particular to the (European) general in ways that mislead.

In Eastern Europe antifascism was a tool of political struggle meant to project images of "progressive" unity and to disguise Leninism's drive for control. Directly after the war antifascist rhetoric was used to suppress critiques of communism and to justify the arrests of an-



ti-communist anti-fascists; for example, Social Democrats in Poland or liberals in East Germany. But after 1948 antifascism gradually lost the mobilizing power that Stone ascribes to it everywhere but in East Germany. He takes the legitimating force of antifascism in the GDR as a general truth about the Soviet Bloc, and applies it broadly upon Nicolae Ceaușescu's nationalism (p. 284), the Hungarian Workers' Party's Stalinism, and even, bizarrely, the anti-Zionism of the Polish United Workers' Party in 1967–1968 (p. 143). How *de facto* antisemitism embodied antifascism is left a mystery. In a parallel move Stone takes “Nazism” (that is, German National Socialism) to embody the “‘deep unconscious’ of Europe, something that people call on in desperation,” and so portrays the rise of Golden Dawn in Greece as a “turn specifically to Nazism” (p. 262).

Antifascism was weak in the Soviet bloc because it served little evident legitimating purpose. In Poland or Czechoslovakia native fascism was insignificant in the 1930s and seemed of little relevance three and four decades later. Regimes sought legitimation in a nationalism that placed the Soviet Union and native communism in line with themes and anniversaries from the national past. In the German Democratic Republic, antifascism had exceptional power because it could mobilize elites sharing remorse for Nazism. (The Berlin Wall was the “antifascist protection barrier.”) In Russia World War II retains enormous legitimizing force, that has, if anything, grown since the end of the Cold War. In other words, the Russian case does not fit Stone's contention that something was lost with the end of communism. The uses of antifascism in the Ukraine crisis of the past year also reveal the malleability and illiberal potentials of the concept.

Stone's efforts to integrate Eastern Europe are admirable but the results are often several degrees off the mark. He portrays Sovietization as gradual in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and abrupt everywhere else, when in fact it was gradual everywhere except Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. He leaves the origins of the Josip Broz Tito-Joseph Stalin split and Prague Spring a mystery, and misrepresents the course of the Hungarian Revolution. According to Stone, Imre Nagy willfully led Hungary out of the Soviet bloc in November 1956, when in fact Nagy was desperately trying to keep up with popular demands and responding to news of a Soviet invasion. Comparing the Hungarian Revolution with Czechoslovakia in 1968 Stone writes: “in 1956 Moscow had the almost-legitimate excuse that it had been asked to intervene” (p. 136). What makes an invasion “almost” legitimate? In fact party chief János Kádár betrayed Nagy's legitimate government and went over to the Soviet side, where he “asked” for an intervention that was already underway. Unlike Imre Nagy, claims Stone, Alexander Dubček was an “idealistic reformer *within* the party” (p. 136). In fact Nagy considered himself a loyal party member until Kádár had him hanged in 1958.

Such faulty analysis is embedded in a narrative that features too many errors. Stone writes that Czechoslo-

vak communists suffered a “lack of electoral success” after the war (they won); that governments in exile returned to Eastern Europe (mostly they did not); that Władysław Gomułka claimed to be “anti-Soviet” (he did not); that Ernő Gerő was more “hardline” than Mátyás Rákosi (he was not); that Mieczysław Rakowski became prime minister in 1982 (it was 1988) (pp. 17, 133, 221). I count three-dozen such inaccurate or misleading assertions in three chapters.

On the one hand Stone deserves credit for imagining unity across the Cold War divide. By viewing Europe in terms of the rise and decline of antifascism he provokes valuable new perspectives. Yet on the other, these perspectives undermine Stone's thesis, which involves applying German ideas to areas where they do not apply. He would have been better served treating the force of antifascism as an open question, a hypothesis from which to survey a messy diversity of local stories. Similarly, he would have been better advised to test whether neoliberalism abets neofascism rather than treat this as an established fact.

Why care about diversity? Because Europe is diversity. Without scrupulous regard for the peculiarities of myriad local histories there can be no discerning of any deeper truths the half-continent has to reveal. That is a lesson Tony Judt drew after the East opened in 1989. In his densely detailed, exhaustive, and highly accurate study *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (2005) he called his approach, after Isaiah Berlin, that of the “fox.” Whatever one's reasons for studying Europe, it offers treacherous terrain to the hedgehog.

JOHN CONNELLY  
University of California, Berkeley

RICHARD MC MAHON. *Homicide in Pre-Famine and Famine Ireland*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2013. Pp. xiii, 221. \$74.95.

*Homicide in Pre-Famine and Famine Ireland* is a solid work of historical analysis with a great number of strengths that make it a pleasure to read. The author focuses on homicide, not because he thinks it is more important than other kinds of violence, but because we are able to obtain better data on homicide relative to other forms. He compares violence among Irish counties, giving special attention to Armagh, Fermanagh, Queen's, and Kilkenny, but he also compares this violence with violence in other countries. Mc Mahon's analysis is exemplary, most notably in the care he takes and the cautions he offers. I was especially impressed with his analysis of quantitative data in Chapter 1. In addition, he provides descriptive information on homicides, which he uses to illustrate his arguments, but also to give the reader particular instances of murders that are exceptions to generalizations he is making.

An even greater strength of this book is Mc Mahon's engagement with large bodies of literature. This includes studies of nineteenth-century Ireland, research on violence in other countries, and more general literature on “modernization,” “civilizing processes,” and

so-called honor cultures. In these discussions and in his analysis of pre-Famine and Famine violence, Mc Mahon reveals his exceptional skill for the logical dissection and evaluation of claims other scholars have made; typically, he presents a contrast between two or more theses and counter-theses, for example different explanations for long-term trends in violence in Early Modern Europe. This raises the book to a higher level of importance than it would otherwise have had. Mc Mahon offers a theoretical as well as empirical contribution to understanding violence in Ireland.

Mc Mahon's principal argument is clear. He identifies and critiques claims that pre-Famine Ireland was a "remarkably violent country," that many homicides stemmed from an honor culture among men, that its purpose was to enforce communal norms, and that violence was declining as a result of a civilizing process or the evolution of a more disciplinary society. In doing so, he challenges the fundamental assumptions of some major perspectives on social change, especially social change in Western society over the past several centuries. Mc Mahon warns against the widespread temptation to posit long-term patterns of growth and decline in social structures and practices. Most helpful, in my view, is his critique of typologizing. Rather than contrasting different types of societies and violence he suggests that we should examine degrees of variation: degrees of differences in societal features (such as nationalism and sectarianism), degrees of differences in types of violence, and degrees of differences in "marginality," by which he means the extent to which violence or a particular kind of violence is "closer to or further away from the centre of everyday life" (p. 174).

Mc Mahon insists that there is much constancy in homicide over space and time. With a few exceptions, considerable similarity can be found among Irish counties in their rates of homicide during the period he is studying. There has also been significant continuity in homicide rates in Ireland over the past several centuries. And Irish rates of homicide are not greatly different from rates of homicide in other countries. The majority of homicides in all these places and times involve young men losing their tempers, usually under the influence of alcohol. True, he does recognize some distinctive features of Irish violence, but they constitute relatively small percentages of the total violence that occurred. Although he is not willing to embrace evolutionary psychology as the explanation for this universality, he does believe that the "roots of male predominance in violence . . . have their origins deep in human history" (p. 88).

The book is not without weaknesses. First, Mc Mahon can be very repetitive, though I should acknowledge that what gets repeated are important points that he wants to make. And second, he makes one important argument for which he does not provide sufficient evidence, namely, that Irish communities utilized "a variety of tools of conflict negotiation" and "for the most part . . . skillfully managed" violence (p. 173). It may be

true, but I would have liked more evidence of this social control and how it worked.

SAMUEL CLARK

*University of Western Ontario*

WILLIAM MURPHY. *Political Imprisonment and the Irish, 1912–1921*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. xii, 301. \$110.00.

With some astonishment William Murphy declares that it is "startling . . . that this book has not been written before," given that imprisonment was an experience that "every member of the first Executive Council (cabinet) of the Irish Free State" had in common. It is a justifiable assertion of scholarly originality, as "a comprehensive history of political imprisonment focused on these years does not exist" (p. 1). But in a way this book could not have been written before, or at least a book of this scholarly level, because while it does stand alone, it draws on a wide range of work dealing with particular aspects and periods of the Irish prison experience. To name just a few: Seán O'Mahony's work on the Frongoch internment camp; Seán McConville on Irish political prisoners in the period from 1848–1922; Patrick Carroll-Burke on the making of the Irish convict system; and George Sweeney on Irish hunger strikes and the cult of self-sacrifice. Murphy also draws on scholarly work dealing with political imprisonment in India under British rule and on the subject of political imprisonment in general. This, however, is far from being merely a work of synthesis. Murphy's study impresses not least for the depth of his research in a wide range of archives in Britain and Ireland covering British government ministers, the Irish administration, prison officials, republican organizations, and individual prisoners. All are employed to deliver on the author's ambition: to rescue the Irish prison experience from its hitherto subsidiary status in accounts of this period and have the prisons acknowledged for what they were: a major site of the independence struggle. Murphy convincingly positions the prisons as central to the struggle in the years from 1916–1921. Indeed, in 1917–1918 prisons were the most significant site of revolutionary activity: "Political prisoners were an important cohort throughout the revolutionary period, providing energy, publicity, and practical weight to the effort to overthrow British rule in Ireland" (p. 106). Yet the activities of the republican prisoners did not always cohere with those of the republican leadership, as the strategies prisoners adopted to improve their position were often not the product of a grand plan, rather the spontaneous action of individuals, as in the period from July to December 1921 when the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed. The dynamics of the republican prisoner experience is at the heart of Murphy's study.

Murphy employs dense description in accounting for that experience. In the process a rich vein of social history is mined, which disposes of any simplistic impression of a struggle between a wholly unified prisoner population and the agents of "perfidious Albion" (p.



95). The differing statuses of prisoners—remand, convicted, internee—and social status, determined their treatment by the authorities and also complicated relations among the prisoners themselves. Murphy writes that every prisoner experienced incarceration individually: “The enforced close social contact was enjoyable for some, but unbearably claustrophobic for others . . . instinctive empathies, snap judgements, formal allegiances, secret significances, and above all experiences and attitudes shared (or not shared) accumulated to form a Byzantine network of interpersonal relations . . . As in most environments, wealth, class, and status emerged as fault lines” (pp. 67–68).

Murphy also demonstrates that prisoners differed widely in their attitudes about how far prison protests should reach and what forms they should take. He reasonably suggests that for a radical such as Austin Stack, prison aggression was due to Stack’s belief that he had to compensate for failure to significantly contribute to the 1916 Rising in Kerry. Stack’s case also demonstrates how an aggressive attitude toward the prison authorities could influence progression in the republican hierarchy. At the same time, the most extreme form of protest, the hunger strike, could be highly problematic, capable of causing division among the prisoner population and if embarked on, requiring careful estimation as to the likelihood of its success. Of course if death ensued, as in the case of Terence MacSwiney, the funeral, if properly exploited, could prove a powerful and emotive weapon in terms of popular support, though the publicity attending a high-profile case could lead to the deaths of lesser-known hunger strikers being passed over with little public recognition. But the hunger strike was problematic in another respect. While republican struggle lies at the center of Murphy’s study, it begins with that of suffragettes in the prewar period. That it was the suffragettes who established the hunger strike as a form of prison protest affronted the masculine sensibilities of some republicans reluctant to adopt a “women’s weapon” (p. 83).

One of the most significant aspects of Murphy’s work is the attention given to the experience of state personnel. Here, the stresses of dealing with the republican prison population are detailed, both in terms of divisions between the administrative and military authorities in Ireland and in the emotional toll exerted at both the higher levels of the prison administration and among prison wardens having to live among an often-hostile civilian population. Murphy reveals an Irish prison system under intolerable strain, relieved by moving the most troublesome inmates to British prisons where their activities would have less popular impact.

This is a landmark study on the subject and will be a benchmark by which subsequent work in this area is judged.

JAMES LOUGHLIN  
Ulster University

ERIKA HANNA. *Modern Dublin: Urban Change and the Irish Past, 1957–1973*. (Oxford Historical Monographs.)

New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. vi, 230. \$110.00.

In 1941, an architect and a writer stood on the Cruagh, a peak in the Dublin mountains, and surveyed the city below. Writing later, the architect, Raymond McGrath, recalled the “grey, silent desolation of the city” (p. 1). They gazed at a predominantly eighteenth-century city shrouded in smoke and apparently unencumbered by progress. Atop the mountain, the two imagined it anew, as if the dismal place had been touched by the genius of architects such as Le Corbusier, Walter Gropius, and Alvar Aalto, and transformed into an emphatically modern city.

Thus begins Erika Hanna’s book. McGrath was a foreign, modernist architect, an Australian who arrived in Dublin via an extended sojourn in London and who, in 1948, became Principal Architect of the Office of Public Works. His literary companion, Seán Ó’Faoláin, was a native Irishman, veteran of the Irish Civil War (the outcome of which continued to shape social opinion), and a critical commentator on the mores of middle-class and Catholic Ireland. As the international flow of modernization reached Ireland, it inevitably collided with the cultural conditions of a nation that had only achieved independence a few decades earlier in 1921.

Pursuing a close reading of the causes and events that modernization brought to the fabric of the city, the book is structured loosely around a series of case studies. Hanna selected these studies to evoke the rich and complex conditions and ideologies that waxed and waned over Georgian terraces as the buildings were occupied, emptied, demolished, squatted in, saved, preserved, and resurrected. The particularities of what befell these physical pieces of architecture often lay at the intersection of contested political, economic, and cultural positions. History became a key device in these battles, used in various ways to legitimize or vilify. Modernity, for example, was often posited as a means to escape the colonial nightmare of the past. At its most extreme, this meant that Georgian architecture embodied the continued presence of a historic oppressor and, therefore, not only could, but also actually should, be disposed of as an impediment to the edification of the new state. This was contested by groups such as the Irish Georgian Society (IGS) set up in the aftermath of the destruction of a particularly conspicuous pair of properties in Kildare Place. The social profile of this group—founded by the Anglo-Irish aristocrat Desmond Guinness and his wife Mariga (a former middle-European princess)—seemed to confirm the opposing view that the Georgian terrace represented the cultural interests of an anachronistic elite. And yet, as Hanna carefully excavates and eloquently argues, the contested status of these pieces of architecture had multiple dimensions.

One instance, the so-called Battle of Hume Street in the late 1960s, is particularly emblematic. Here, a group of students—supported by many other diverse social groups including “Sinn Féin, the Georgian Society, An

Taisce, and the Bricklayers Association” (p. 195)—squatted two city-center sites to prevent them from being demolished and replaced by a modern office block by a firm of British developers. Under the leadership of Seán Lemass (1959–1966), Fianna Fáil, the ruling political party, had been among the most ardent advocates of modernity. The apparent intimacy between Fianna Fáil (particularly through its fundraising organization Taca) and the interests of the construction industry, however, began to attract controversy. This is synopsized in a speech from a window at Hume Street by the architect, artist, and critic Niall Montgomery, who railed against the uses of nationalist rhetoric to legitimize evictions, demolitions, and profit-led redevelopment. In one passage cited by Hanna, he memorably asks, “What happened in 1922? Was there a revolution or just a takeover of the machinery of government by a lot of hard faced business men?” (p. 193). Thus, within the latter chapters of the book, the myths of national identity are resolutely challenged by more international issues of class and the tensions between capital and labor.

These issues are particularly acute in Hanna’s explorations of working-class housing wrought within the Georgian terraces on the north side of the city. Here, modernization of dangerous slums often meant not only demolition but also, for the people who occupied them, displacement to suburban peripheries and the dissolution of community. Evictions often happened without this provision, moving tenement dwellers to emergency accommodations, which were sometimes in the same austere institutions that had housed the poor in the nineteenth century. Events like these helped precipitate the emergence of radicalized left-wing groups like the Dublin Housing Action Committee, whose members included the Diogenesian figure of Denis Dennehy, squatter of Georgian terraces, dweller of caravans, advocate of birth control, and social critic extraordinaire. His reasons for the preservation of Georgian architecture were a million miles from those of the IGS and yet they sat side-by-side in the battle for the Gardiner Estate.

Hanna’s ability to construct a series of nuanced arguments and sophisticated readings while making sense of what is a complicated and evolving narrative is one of the many strengths of this important book. Her exposure of the Georgian terrace as both conduit and source of aspects of radical politics in the south and the north of the island is, in itself, radical enough surely to provoke further scholarship on the contradictions of modern development within the Irish capital’s recent past.

GARY A. BOYD  
Queen’s University, Belfast

MICHAEL GUASCO. *Slaves and Englishmen: Human Bondage in the Early Modern Atlantic World*. (The Early Modern Americas.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. Pp. 315. \$45.00.

In a welcome addition to the literature on American slavery, Michael Guasco takes us away from the iconic moment when “20. and odd Negroes” (p. 1) were first brought to Virginia in 1619 and takes us on a journey across the English world in the early years of Anglo-American colonization (roughly the 1490s through the 1660s), demonstrating that English people knew about and encountered slavery in a variety of forms—from Japan to the Americas—long before they came to Virginia. It was a complicated relationship in a time and place where Englishmen were vulnerable to enslavement themselves: at the hands of the Turks, the Spanish, or even other Englishmen. By the end of the book, there is no longer a question of why the English turned to slavery to develop their American colonies. In a world of omnipresent slavery, the real question should be, “how could they not do so?” In the early modern world, the rejection of slavery was a rare exception.

Guasco brings us to this sobering but edifying conclusion after a thorough reading of a range of (mostly printed) English sources (sermons, travel narratives, promotional accounts, captivity narratives, laws, colonial correspondence) that employ the word “slavery.” His broad approach is an important reminder for American historians that the people who enslaved Africans in Virginia were English, not American, and their reference points stretched far back in time and beyond North America. In six chapters Guasco analyzes ideas about slavery within England, the English encounter with practices of slavery across the world, the question of English alliances with maroons and escaped slaves in Spanish America, the threat of slavery at the hands of “Turks” that mariners faced in the Mediterranean, a comparison of the indentured servitude of English people and the ambivalent enslavement of Native Americans, and the emergence of enslaved Africans in the early English colonies. Earlier arguments about whether the English turned to slavery because of racial prejudice or economic necessity are effectively replaced by a new argument: the English turned to slavery because it was everywhere, especially in the Americas, and they had become familiar with it long before they established Jamestown.

The randomness and diversity associated with slavery in these years is striking. Slavery was not exclusively associated with Africans, nor was it justified in terms of race. Rather, it existed in different ways for different reasons: occasionally an English colonist was put into “slavery” as a punishment, with the expectation that it would help reform the miscreant’s character; indigenous war captives, like the Pequots, could be deemed viable candidates for enslavement; enslaved Africans liberated from Iberian masters could sometimes be freed or held as “servants,” though the word “slave” was rarely applied to them. Some were manumitted. The codification of slavery that began in the mid-seventeenth century changed this world of mixed possibilities. Guasco suggests it provided more explicit protection of slaveholders’ property rights in people, “thereby ensuring their ability to continue doing what other Eng-



lishmen had already been doing for the better part of a hundred years" (p. 233). It also firmly associated slavery with people of African descent.

Despite making regular claims that they abhorred slavery, Englishmen rarely objected to it unless it was a fate that confronted their own persons. And that it did, in so many ways: religiously, politically, and economically. Unfortunately, despite his deep reading in the sources, Guasco's grasp of English history seems limited, if only because his interest is in English interactions with non-English peoples overseas. Like other early Americanists who dabble in English history, Guasco tends to overlook the many divisions and conflicts *within* English society. His discussion of the discourse about slavery leaves us with bland claims about "Englishmen's" need to maintain their "identity" and "order." Surely the tremendous religious and political changes affecting the country between the 1530s and the 1660s had something to do with the ubiquitous use of the word "slavery," if not the rise of it as an English institution.

Guasco has done terrific work here, laying a strong foundation for future research. The tentative nature of his prose and his literature-based approach occasionally give the impression that he is skimming along the surface of cultural generalizations. His conclusions may be enough for purposes of American history, but those wanting a deeper, more contextualized explanation of how Anglo-Americans could physically enslave others while decrying the imposition of "slavery" (in whatever form) upon themselves (a contradiction that may or may not be distinctively English, as Guasco suggests) will do well to mine his rich footnotes, where his analysis can be more pointed than it is in the main body of the text.

EVAN HAEFELI  
Texas A&M University

NICHOLAS POPPER. *Walter Raleigh's History of the World and the Historical Culture of the Late Renaissance*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012. Pp. xvi, 350. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$30.00, e-book \$30.00.

This book is a careful and indeed exhaustive examination and analysis of Walter Raleigh's *History of the World* (1614), which was also a handbook of advice for his queen—and king—drawn from historical examples. In this study, Nicholas Popper uses both the rich manuscript background and the voluminous ancient, medieval, and Renaissance scholarship, good and bad, on which Raleigh relied. Raleigh himself was educated as much in the streets of London as in schools. In 1581 his political career began under the favor of Queen Elizabeth, in 1583 he was given a patent to explore the New World, then he entered Parliament the following year, and was knighted in 1585. In 1594 he received his highest position as captain of the guard, and he began publishing his writings, but he failed in his ambition to be admitted to the Privy Council. Rumors began to circulate about his alleged atheism and his pursuit of Eliz-

abeth's favor. At that time, he began his voyages to the New World. Accused of conspiring against the new king, James I, in 1603, Raleigh was condemned to the tower, where he began to produce position papers. By 1607 he started his world history in an effort to reestablish himself in the new regime, and in 1614 the first edition appeared, but it displeased James for being "too sawcie in censuring Princes" (p. 18). In 1616 Raleigh was reprieved and made a voyage across the Atlantic in search of gold, but in 1618 he was tried again, condemned, and beheaded, though he also published, along with many others, several advices on policy during the reign of Elizabeth.

Working within the old Eusebian tradition of universal history, Raleigh's *History* includes both a standard Christian view and a Ciceronian concept of history as "the teacher of life," with frontispieces illustrating both perspectives. History progressed from Creation under God's guidance, showing how tyranny and error were punished by divine Providence. He traced the settlement of the Earth from the expulsion from paradise. He continued the story from the birth of Abraham, through the enslavement of the Jews, their exodus to the holy land, the scattering of the tribes, and the Trojan war. Avoiding the four monarchies thesis, Raleigh pursued the history of the Assyrian, Persian, and Hellenic empires, including their later dissolutions. The longest section of his work traced the rise of Rome.

Raleigh focused especially on matters of geography and attended also to the contributions of previous writers, especially their value in giving advice to sovereigns, as he himself was doing. He worked from a "staggering collection of sources" in six languages that he kept in the tower (p. 29). Besides standard classical sources like Livy and Tacitus, he used many medieval and modern historians down to that of Jacques-Auguste de Thou and Lancelot-Voisin de La Popelinière, but he also went beyond just histories. Popper offers a careful and critical study of Raleigh's sources, concluding that he was no revolutionary, but that James I did not like his history anyway. Like many others, Raleigh fell under the influence of Annius of Viterbo, but at the same time he shared Francis Bacon's view of history as a form of experience. He was also affected, at least indirectly, by the methods of the *artes historicae*. Popper comments extensively on contemporary theorists and practitioners, second-hand counselors and policymakers, showing that Raleigh was fully abreast with "historical culture" (meaning historiographical culture). Later chapters of Popper's book take up Raleigh's reading and research methods, especially concerning his geographical learning and experience, his narrative mode and employment of providential design, his combination of historical knowledge and political counsel, and the reception of his work in later centuries, ranging across the political and doctrinal spectrum.

In later centuries, readers of Raleigh's *History* focused on his Puritanism, his anti-Stuart political position, his negative attitudes toward rulers, his philosophical insights, his royalism, his providential interpretation, his

political counsel, his extensive scholarship, his moral opinions, and the book's value as a reference work, its coverage of the revolutionary period, and, finally, its literary virtues. But for Popper, Raleigh's contribution was in his combining of a religious interpretation with modern knowledge, his practical and learned views of geography, his joining of modern geographical experience with Baconian methods, and especially his reflection of "historical culture."

DONALD R. KELLEY  
Rutgers University

RICHARD YEO. *Notebooks, English Virtuosi, and Early Modern Science*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014. Pp. xviii, 398. \$45.00.

We live in an age of information, where the amount of material available at the touch of a button has changed the way scholarship is done and how it is accessed. A similar change occurred in the seventeenth century, when the volume of printed and non-printed material threatened the traditional ways of recording and ordering knowledge. Richard Yeo describes this intellectual moment in his study of changing note-taking practices in the seventeenth century. His detailed and penetrating discussion of how the reconciliation of humanistic learning with the imperatives of the new Baconian program by many virtuosi, or investigators of the natural world, reveals how important the management of information was in creating what he calls "the modern scientific ethos" (p. xiii).

During the Renaissance, humanists and others copied excerpts of what they considered valuable insights about moral and legal matters into commonplace books, which were divided into sections under various headings. This process allowed the material to be memorized and used at will by the copyist in his own speech and writing. By the seventeenth century, this method was attacked as "bookish learning," which could cripple any creative intellectual activity and produce, at best, learned fools. Yeo shows that however much English virtuosi may have disparaged commonplacing, they still learned from its organizational imperatives. But in addition to recording what they learned from books, the new scientists had to find ways to remember sensory experiences, empirical data, and particulars witnessed by others, and make this information accessible for further individual and collective reflection. Responding to the ancient Hippocratic lament "*vita brevis, ars longa*," the new scientists and their compatriots produced several different note-taking strategies (p. 91).

Yeo begins with Francis Bacon, that pioneer of empirical practices who thought that every particular piece of information should be recorded before any accurate generalizations could be produced. His concentration on collecting matters of fact continued to animate his followers, who also sought to avoid system-making before masses of information were gathered and recorded. Nevertheless, mid-century thinkers, like the information broker Samuel Hartlib and the

mathematician John Pell, realized that there had to be some kind of ordering principles for arranging Baconian particulars. They experimented with primitive filing systems, proto-index cards, and charts to aid recollection and reflection. Following their lead and the advice of John Beale concerning the securing of memory, Robert Boyle also attempted to organize the realms of observations and experiments he made during his life. Yeo's account of Boyle's struggle to reconcile the necessity of note-taking and the danger of premature systematizing is particularly interesting. Boyle wanted not only to record but also to relive the process of experimentation as a way to stimulate his own ideas on the subject under investigation.

Unfortunately Boyle was a very messy note-taker and his friend John Locke despaired of making any sense out of his records. Locke himself was obsessive about keeping notes of everything he did, observed, or experienced during his long life and he tried to develop an indexing system to order his records. Combining journal keeping and his own unique methods of arranging material by alphabetic markers, Locke recorded both scientific data and daily activities. He explicitly adopted the Baconian program of noting particulars in order to aid memory, but his method was too idiosyncratic to be useful to anyone else. Locke, Boyle, and those that came before them and indeed after them, suffered from the same problem: It is very difficult for any person to make sense of the notes made by another.

Robert Hooke, the Curator of Experiments for the Royal Society, tried to develop methods for recording information in a scientific archive for the use of fellow scientists. Faced with the growing abundance of empirical observations, and cognizant of the weakness of memory, he knew that some form of ordering material and reinforcing memory with graphic images was necessary for the success of the Baconian program. Ultimately, he hoped that the *Philosophical Transactions* would enable collaborative work on scientific subjects. But he also realized that the quantity of material necessitated someone taking charge of organizing a dynamic institutional archive that could benefit all current and future members of the Royal Society. Hooke's specific method for such organization also remained unclear.

Yeo's exhaustive treatment of seventeenth-century note-taking is itself a valuable resource for other scholars trying to make sense out of the changing intellectual processes of the past. But Yeo is perhaps too much like the heroes of his book, Francis Bacon and Robert Boyle, avoiding systematic generalizations in favor of individual instances. He also shies away from the epistemological questions raised by note-taking. To what extent did these practices contribute to a probabilistic attitude toward scientific formulations? How was knowledge generated and verified? How did the different methods employed by these thinkers to record their experiences affect the content of what they recorded?

In many ways Yeo's book belongs to the traditional historiography of the Scientific Revolution, a term he



does not use until the very end of his book. The figures he examines are familiar to anyone who studies this period, although Isaac Newton is largely absent from his discussion. Yeo expressly limits himself to these special note-takers, which is probably necessary given the scope of his study. However, some comparison with how others took notes, whether scholars or memorialists, would have been interesting. Yeo argues that the two cultures of humanism and science were not yet distinct in the seventeenth century. If that is true of the scientists, what about the humanists?

LISA T. SARASOHN,  
Emerita  
Oregon State University

SAREE MAKDISI. *Making England Western: Occidentalism, Race, and Imperial Culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014. Pp. xxiii, 295. \$30.00.

Over the past 15 years, Saree Makdisi has emerged as one of the most incisive and influential surveyors of British literature and empire in the Romantic age. Following *Romantic Imperialism: Universal Empire and the Culture of Modernity* (1998) and the remarkable *William Blake and the Impossible History of the 1790s* (2002), Makdisi's *Making England Western: Occidentalism, Race, and Imperial Culture* sets out to significantly reorient how scholars think about the so-called civilizing mission by making the case that as late as 1800 the "civilizational notion of a West" was still remarkably incoherent and inchoate, despite whatever cultural incursions were performed in its name (p. xii). England has to be strategically "Occidentalized" in order to fully assume the mantle of modern empire, and Makdisi argues that this process of Westernization often had to account for an Orient embedded within England's own national culture. Makdisi has long noted an anti-modern otherness lingering in romantic thought, but here for the first time it is given its specific geographical coordinates.

Makdisi's study toggles between matters of precise locality and the sweeping symbolic geopolitics of what goes by the designations "East" and "West," "Orient" and "Occident." For instance, in chapter 1 Makdisi painstakingly maps early-nineteenth-century London according to its starkly uneven development and the "compartmentalization" of discrete populations (p. 47) with the aim of understanding how areas like the notorious Seven Dials, or St. Giles's rookery, became warrens of suspended time and immobility. These massified urban spaces not only house Lascars and African immigrants, but also myriad "street Arabs," a name often used for the native English poor. Makdisi highlights reformers like Reverend James Pycroft who, citing these white "City Arabs," suggested that "a veritable heathen mission is as much wanted in the interior of London as in the interior of Africa" (p. 78). *Making England Western* continually demonstrates how broad populations of English civic life are Orientalized and then reformed or jettisoned in the effort to make room

for "the habitation of new, white, properly Occidental individuals." The English Arabs need to be roused in an act of urban "aeration" and "ethnic cleansing" (pp. 83–84), while at the other end of the socioeconomic continuum the English aristocracy are cast as sultans of indolence and effeminacy whose reign must be challenged. In other words, to imagine a civilizational homogeneity, an English "us" symbolically underwriting colonial imperatives, requires coming to terms with England's curious forms of self-othering.

One of the conceptual hinges of Makdisi's study is Henry Mayhew's distinction in *London Labour and the London Poor* (1851) between "the wanderers and settlers—the vagabond and the citizen—the nomadic and the civilised tribes." By dividing the world not according to a racial/complexional or ethnic schema, but a civilizational one, Mayhew imagines "other fault lines within the space of the would-be nation" (p. 8). In chapter 2, this emphasis on vagrancy propels a reading of balladry, specifically William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge's *Lyrical Ballads* (1798 and 1800). Makdisi reads early poems like "The Female Vagrant" and "Old Man Travelling; Animal Tranquillity and Decay, a Sketch," as well as Wordsworth's compulsive revisions, as a form of aesthetic engineering that mirrors a social engineering: the "high art" lyric form rechannels the plebian and radical energies of the ballad into a modern and stable Occidental subject. These first two longer chapters are in many ways the heart of the book, moving seamlessly between discourses of social reform and inventive close readings of literary works, illustrations, and maps to chart the terra incognita—and "tempus incognitum"—within the borders of England (p. 54).

The three middle chapters revisit familiar sites of what one might call postcolonial romanticism, such as Edward Said's reading of Jane Austen's *Mansfield Park* (1814) and the novel's nearly invisible imperial infrastructure (chap. 3), Lord Byron's famous turn to the image-world of the Orient as an answer to poetical exhaustion with the other geoaesthetic coordinates (chap. 4), and Thomas Macaulay's venomous attack on poet laureate Robert Southey's Orientalism in the 1830s (chap. 6). In each of these cases a considerable body of scholarship already exists, but Makdisi finds new critical possibilities available once one moves away from the East-West binary. Thus, in his discussion of *Mansfield Park* Makdisi notes that critics of Said have frequently conflated slavery and imperialism in their rush to rescue Austen, forgetting that the British empire was transitioning toward "more productive and efficient modes of imperial rule" (p. 134). In other words, abolitionist sentiment was often part of an effort to "shore up the empire's moral resources" with a broader campaign on the horizon (p. 135). Makdisi then reads this complex political wager back onto *Mansfield Park*'s lessons in individual self-regulation, arguing that it "defined the sharpest cutting edge of the new imperialism that was emerging in Austen's time" (p. 136).

*Making England Western* ends with a historical leap

forward to Charles Dickens's final novel, *The Mystery of Edwin Drood*, unfinished at the time of the author's death in 1870. Taking issue with the Oriental "contamination" thesis so often applied to Drood's preoccupation with exotic consumption, Makdisi insists that Dickens's novel recognizes that Englishness was never all that stable, secure, and uniform in the first place. The final chapter returns the reader to the temporal and geographical relays that structure the early portions of the study: among other things, *The Mystery of Edwin Drood* is contextualized against the massive public works projects like the Holborn Viaduct and Farringdon station construction in the 1860s, which sought to modernize London and which required forms of population removal in the process. Makdisi cleverly makes conceptual use of the narrative's incompleteness to suggest how *Drood*'s meditation on cyclicity and restless renewal ultimately mirror the impatience and ambivalence of modernity writ large. While Occidentalism might have promised smooth, progressive, and modern forms of historical accountability, *Making England Western* continually demonstrates how fitful and self-contradictory such promises were when we attend to the public and literary works that made them possible.

SCOTT J. JUENGEL  
Vanderbilt University

ELLEN BOUCHER. *Empire's Children: Child Emigration, Welfare, and the Decline of the British World, 1869–1967*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Pp. xi, 292. \$99.00.

*Empire's Children: Child Emigration, Welfare, and the Decline of the British World, 1869–1967* is a rich, thought-provoking study of the complex and changing relationship between child welfare policy, imperial aims and identities, and the emergent field of child psychology. Ellen Boucher takes as her starting point those British children, collectively termed "orphans," although many had at least one living parent, who were sent out to the empire, often without consultation or consent, to begin life anew from the Victorian period through the 1960s. Since the 1980s, there have been several studies of these children, the majority written by scholars based in Canada and Australia, the two countries to which the majority of child migrants were sent. Such studies have highlighted the abuse and alienation felt by boys and girls separated from their families and sent to live in a foreign land by well-meaning charitable workers and government agents who nonetheless took little trouble to ensure that the reality of child migrants' experiences lived up to the expectations of those who arranged their transport. In 2010, the revelations documented in these studies, as well as the lobbying efforts of former child migrants, led then British prime minister Gordon Brown to issue a formal apology for the British government's participation in child emigration schemes, which continued until 1967.

Boucher's study certainly contains its own share of horror stories, the most notable of which is the tale of

a twelve-year-old boy from Stepney sent to the Canadian frontier by the children's charity Barnardo's where he was placed with an abusive foster family, ran away, contracted frostbite hiding under a barn in the dead of winter, was denied prompt medical care after he was found, and ended up a triple amputee. But instead of denouncing Barnardo's, Boucher seeks to explain why philanthropists like Thomas Barnardo and Kingsley Fairbridge, who founded what became the Child Emigration Society in 1909, supported child emigration; why the British government, through the Overseas Settlement Committee (OSC) sponsored these and other charitable initiatives on such a large scale in the period between the two world wars; and why the British government and the charities themselves ultimately abandoned the policy.

Neither Barnardo nor Fairbridge was a proto-eugenicist seeking to rid Britain of unwanted "street Arabs" by dumping the future *lumpenproletariat* in the colonies; although, from the 1920s the Canadian and especially the Australian and Rhodesian governments became concerned that child emigration schemes were, in fact, attempts to push undesirables onto the dominions. Nineteenth-century ideas of child development focused on the importance of environment in molding character. Street urchins grew into shiftless wastrels or criminals not because they were inherently amoral or imbecile, but because the polluted, overcrowded environment in which they were raised, and the corrupting influence of their indolent, amoral parents, left them little opportunity to flourish. If only these children could be relocated to more auspicious surroundings, they might well thrive. Barnardo began his charitable career operating orphanages in Britain, providing needy children with an alternative to the workhouse. However, as the high costs of maintaining children in Britain pressed heavily upon him, and he began to look to the "wide open" prairies of Canada—to which a child could be shipped for a mere £10—as an opportunity to give his rescued street urchins a better life at a fraction of the cost. Barnardo's was not an imperial project, although he took for granted that the unity of the empire meant that Canada was a "British space" to which children could unproblematically be sent. Fairbridge conceived the connection between child emigration and empire more strategically: "Children's lives wasting while the Empire cried aloud for men . . . And then I saw it quite clearly: *Train the children to be farmers!* . . . Shift the orphanages of Britain north, south, east, and west to the shores of Greater Britain" (p. 65).

The interwar British government liked this idea of simultaneously saving children and strengthening imperial ties and continued to support child emigration even as Dominions officials, bolstered by eugenicist thinking, grew chary of accepting Britain's unwashed youths. By the late 1940s, however, new ideas of the importance of maternal attachment, made popular by John Bowlby and others, raised anxieties that the "clean break" with the past advocated by child emigration en-



thusiasts was actually harming those sent abroad. Such views coalesced with the decline of a unified view of the dominions as a single “Greater Britain” around which children could be shifted without political, cultural, or psychological fallout. Nonetheless, as Boucher shows, such schemes had a momentum of their own and continued to limp on for another two decades. The book is immensely strengthened by a series of oral interviews from these latter day migrants. These interviews highlight migrants’ ongoing feelings of dislocation, both as a consequence of their familial separation and, more significantly for the conclusions of her study, as a result of the dissolution of an (always problematic) ideal of Britishness, which had once united inhabitants of Britain, Australia, Canada, and the former Rhodesia as part of a coherent British world.

LAURA BEERS  
American University

STEPHANIE OLSEN. *Juvenile Nation: Youth, Emotions and the Making of the Modern British Citizen, 1880–1914*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014. Pp. xi, 238. \$120.00.

In 1901, the temperance magazine *Onward* published a short story called “The Boy Who Beat his Father.” In it, the hero—Paul Halliday—is worried because his father has become a “slave of drink.” Paul realizes that he has a duty to take responsibility for “the moral education of his father.” He begins by cajoling his father to drink less and, when that fails, threatens his father with a beating if he does not reform. The happy ending has Paul “conquering” his father, rescuing him not only from an accident at work, but also from his immoral demons (p. 110).

This short story exemplifies some of the themes in Stephanie Olsen’s book, *Juvenile Nation: Youth, Emotions and the Making of the Modern British Citizen, 1880–1914*. *Fin-de-siècle* Britain was plagued by concerns that young people, especially boys, had been failed by their families and by the education system. Although schools had been revolutionized by the 1870 Education Act and its successors, reformers were increasingly donning their moral armor to provide the nation’s youth with a different kind of instruction. It was necessary that boys not only learned how to act correctly, but that they also internalized these rules of conduct. Paul Halliday’s father was inadequate to the task. Through reading magazines such as *Onward*, boys like Paul could serve as “moral beacons” to their fathers and transform their own worlds (p. 95).

Olsen draws attention to the remarkable faith that British reformers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had in the printed word. In the 1880s, over 900 new books marketed to children and adolescents were published every year. The number of juvenile periodicals increased from 59 in the 1870s to 218 by 1910 (p. 22). Despite the different ideological and commercial motivations of these publishers, Olsen reveals a surprising level of agreement about what con-

stituted an ideal, youthful masculinity. Whether published by the Religious Tract Society, the numerous temperance and socialist societies, or Alfred Harmsworth’s secular Amalgamated Press, this literature emphasized moderation, emotional restraint, and the enactment of a responsible citizenship.

Furthermore, morality was understood to have an emotional basis, which was why children needed to internalize notions of right and wrong. External compulsion was ineffective; being good had to be made fun. It was also important that virtuous traits were acquired when a person was young. As the author of a short story titled “Uprooting the Passions” (1908) informed readers, it was easier to uproot negative passions when they were still undeveloped. He warned that “if we let them cast their roots deep into our souls, then no human power can uproot them” (p. 62).

Emotional attachments to family, community, nation, and empire are central to Olsen’s argument. She reveals the particular importance of domesticity to new forms of youthful manliness. Love and sympathy were essential to a boy’s future happiness. Temperate and devoted fathers were central to the survival of the race. In the words of the popular advice writer Sylvanus Stall, husbands who possessed the “true father-spirit” would find happiness while also acquiring “more profit than could be secured elsewhere” (p. 79).

Given the scale of the reforms needed to ensure that young, male Britons became not only happy but also wealthy, newly professionalized teams of social workers, educators, physical trainers, and psychologists dedicated their energies to the task. They disagreed about when adolescence ended (some even assumed that it continued until a person was in his mid-twenties), but they shared anxieties about urban degeneration and emotional flaccidity. They were passionately committed to scientific intervention.

Olsen could have said much more about where young girls fit into her argument. She begins her book with the famous recruitment poster from the First World War that shows a young daughter sitting on her father’s lap asking, “Daddy, what did YOU do in the Great War?” (p. 1). What Olsen does not say is that the initial idea for the poster came from a printer named Arthur Gunn. Shortly before volunteering to serve in the army, Gunn was watching his son Paul sleep and, turning to his wife, said “If I don’t join the forces whatever will I say to Paul if he turns round to me and says, ‘What did you do in the Great War, Daddy?’” (Joanna Bourke, *Wounding the World: How Military Violence and War Games Invade Our Lives* [2015], p. 178). It is important to note that when Gunn’s idea was translated into a recruitment poster, the designer thought it more poignant to substitute a girl for the boy.

But this is a very minor quibble. Olsen’s astute, meticulously documented, and compelling account of the emergence of modern boyhood and adolescence illuminates aspects of *fin-de-siècle* British society that have

been overlooked. It is a wonderful addition to a growing literature on youth and masculinity.

JOANNA BOURKE

*Birkbeck, University of London*

PETER GRANT. *Philanthropy and Voluntary Action in the First World War: Mobilizing Charity*. (Routledge Studies in Modern British History, no. 10.) New York: Routledge, 2014. Pp. xiv, 254. \$125.00.

Was World War I truly a “People’s War” for Great Britain? In his comprehensive study, *Philanthropy and Voluntary Action in the First World War: Mobilizing Charity*, Peter Grant makes the case that it was. Grant’s work breaks new ground by showing how wide-ranging Britain’s philanthropic responses to wartime needs were and how wartime philanthropy was not merely an afterthought on the road to the welfare state. He shows the depth of the web of voluntary associations and private charities, and how they anchored the British war effort and contributed to wartime social stability.

Grant has gone much further than recent studies on wartime philanthropy and fundraising by scholars such as Adrian Gregory and Deborah Cohen. He digs deeply into a wide variety of primary sources on wartime philanthropy from the Imperial War Museum, the National Archives, the London Metropolitan Archives, and the National Army Museum, among others. Grant has also thoroughly gone through the appropriate parliamentary papers and government publications on charities (which are numerous) and perused the wartime press and book publications. The book has seven main chapters. Grant begins by examining the antecedents of wartime British fundraising and proceeds to the sometimes chaotic early wartime charitable efforts. The conclusion of his story deals with the arrival of greater state direction and the eventual registration of wartime charities through the War Charities Act in 1916.

Grant’s early chapters show how large a place prewar charity occupied in British society and life (total charitable income, excluding religious charities in 1913 was equal to two-thirds of the funds distributed by the Poor Law through local authorities). He also shows how the prewar momentum for charitable giving and charitable organizations continued without interruption while adapting to the growth of state intervention. Early charitable initiatives from August 1914 to September 1915, such as the National Relief Fund and the Belgian Relief Fund, are analyzed as examples of paternalistic philanthropy operating in a top-down manner. This *laissez-faire* approach would soon reveal its limitations.

As Grant goes on to show, it would take the “Comforts Crisis” in the summer of 1915 to correct the early problems that wartime charities faced. The mismatch between needs and donations sent for wounded men and concerns over waste led to the creation of the Director General of Voluntary Organizations (DGVO) and the appointment of Sir Edward Ward. The DGVO was advised by the military of the needs of the troops and then assembled the supplies and arranged for their

transportation. With the advent of the DGVO, philanthropy would be under partial state control from September 1915 to August 1916. Ward, who had previous experience organizing supplies during the Boer War and modernizing the War Office in its aftermath, is presented as a neglected hero of this phase. However, a series of scandals and frauds revealed the limitations of existing legislation governing charities and led to the War Charities Act of August 1916. Under this act, there was compulsory registration for wartime charities and a mandate for registered charities to keep clear accounts. Even though there were problems in administering the act, the 1916 legislation reduced blatant fraud and re-established public faith in wartime charities. Once the act took effect, the final phase of the war from August 1916 onward had charities continue in this more controlled fashion.

The final chapters of the book take a more in-depth look at overall patterns of wartime charities. Grant makes some important conclusions. First, he shows their huge scope. He estimates that almost 18,000 new wartime charities were created and the money raised may have been as high as £125 to £150 million. He also shows how despite these huge numbers there was “no catastrophic effect on existing charities” (p. 142). Second, he shows regional differences in class participation. In southern England, a majority (60 percent) of charities had no committee representation from the working classes while in the Midlands and the North only a small minority (12–13 percent) of charities was in a similar position. Third, he shows that rather than serving as a factor toward their alienation, wartime charities increased the bonds that tied frontline soldiers to the home front. In fact, Grant takes the controversial position that soldiers were as appreciative toward charity workers who labored in comparative safety at home as they were toward charity workers at the front. Fourth, he argues that wartime philanthropy helped increase the amount of social capital and led to a level of social cohesion that allowed Britain to survive the wartime crisis.

Grant’s rehabilitation of wartime philanthropy is impressive. However, there are several questions left unanswered. His assertions over the sanguine reactions of soldiers toward home-based charity workers and the status of charity workers as “volunteers” seem contestable. It would have been helpful to show more examples of soldier criticisms toward charities and charity workers (especially by those soldiers whose families may have been excluded from receiving charitable benefits). Although it might be beyond the scope of his book, a greater grounding in political theories of the state might also have helped. Prewar Britain’s devotion to philanthropy and the relatively small level of state intervention in welfare provision (compared to Germany) was due in part to British ideas of a limited state. Some discussion by Grant of British exponents of classical liberal ideas of the limited state and ideas on individual liberty and their ties to philanthropy would have been illuminating.



Peter Grant has written a pioneering work. Packed with figures, interesting examples from case studies, and analysis linking wartime charities to social cohesion, Grant has shown that civil society and philanthropy were vital parts of Britain's wartime effort. His enthusiasm for wartime voluntarism may have led him at times to overstate the positive reactions toward these charities and their effectiveness. Nevertheless, no one can ever look at the British effort in World War I again and dismiss British philanthropy as an amateurish exercise in sock knitting soon swept away by the inexorable growth of the British welfare state.

MATTHEW C. HENDLEY

State University of New York Oneonta

R. GERALD HUGHES. *The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy since 1945*. Foreword by LORD HENNESSY OF NYMPFIELD. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014. Pp. x, 331. Cloth \$130.00, paper \$39.95.

Due to the centenary of the outbreak of World War I and the critical situation in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, 2014 was a suitable year for the publication of R. Gerald Hughes's second monograph, *The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy since 1945*. The use of historical analogies currently enjoys a lot of popularity in the debate about international politics, which makes Hughes's analysis of the impact on British policymakers of one such analogy, "appeasement," particularly timely and relevant. A lot has been written about Britain's policy toward Europe's fascist dictatorships during the 1930s, and especially about Neville Chamberlain and the Munich agreement with Adolf Hitler. But the long-term consequences of that policy for Britain's international relations during the period from Winston Churchill to Tony Blair, the issue addressed in Hughes's book, are less well known.

Hughes takes on three different, if related, challenges in his study: to trace how discourses of appeasement were constructed from 1940 onward and how these discourses were employed strategically by politicians to either further their own agendas or to discredit their opponents; to explain how the experience and memory of appeasement affected the decisions of individual British decision-makers; and to discuss whether Britain's postwar foreign policy was influenced by a tradition of appeasement, which predated the Munich agreements and can be traced back to the nineteenth century. Hughes focuses on a number of international crises and summits, including Potsdam, Geneva, Suez, Berlin, Helsinki, the Falklands, Kuwait, Bosnia, and finally Blair's wars in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan, to discuss these challenges. This is a lot to take on in a book of only 190 pages, even with the inclusion of a 130-page notes and bibliography section. While Hughes provides in-depth analysis and details on the wars in the Falklands and in Bosnia, the chapters on Geneva and Berlin have a much lighter feel

and might have benefited from a more extensive discussion.

However, Hughes has managed to achieve the first two aims of his book. He explains how "appeasement" very quickly became a dirty word after Chamberlain's resignation as prime minister in 1940. A black-and-white narrative of Chamberlain's foreign policy toward Hitler soon gained prominence, one in which his attempts to avoid war by appeasement were not only the wrong choice to protect British interests, but also essentially dishonorable and shameful for Britain. The notion that immorality was inherent to appeasement was confirmed by the discovery of the evils committed by the Nazi regime. The extremely negative public sentiment about appeasement was stirred up by a very influential polemic authored by Michael Foot, Peter Howard, and Frank Owen, who introduced the "Guilty Men" thesis about the architects of Munich, and by Churchill, both in his speeches in Parliament and, later, in his famous history of the Second World War. This widespread public perception turned references to appeasement into a political weapon in Britain. Proponents of more interventionist policies frequently used the appeasement analogy as a negative example to defend their decisions, while the advocates of more neutralist and compromising positions had to be careful to avoid the term, or any association with the kind of policy it described. Still, the careerist necessity to be on the right side of the public debate did not mean that some British leaders were not genuinely convinced that appeasement could only postpone war, but never avoid it. Hughes shows that some major foreign policy decisions after World War II, especially Antony Eden's hard line during the Suez Crisis, and Margaret Thatcher's uncompromising stand over the invasion of the Falklands were, at least in part, motivated by a real concern not to repeat Chamberlain's mistakes.

The third question of Hughes's book, whether there was such a thing as a long-standing British tradition of appeasement that was revived after 1945, is less straightforward. Pointing to Paul Kennedy's distinction between the real meaning of appeasement, namely a policy of settling international disputes by negotiation and compromise in order to get the best available deal while avoiding a war, and the negative connotations the word gained after 1939, Hughes argues that appeasement, in the original sense of the word, remained a constant factor in British foreign policy formulation after 1945, even though no one could afford to use this term anymore. This is a legitimate point because Britain's constantly reducing importance on the world stage and the advent of the nuclear age made a foreign policy based on a general refusal to accept grievances almost impossible. However, one cannot help but wonder whether Hughes's insistence to revert to the pre-1930s definition of appeasement in his appraisal of Britain's postwar foreign policy does not defeat the purpose of his book: to find out whether Britain's decision-makers after 1945 learned a real lesson from the experiences of the 1930s. A more thorough discussion of the place of

Munich in the British appeasement tradition would have been beneficial. Nevertheless, Hughes has produced a readable account of the uses and abuses of the appeasement analogy, reminding us of the dangers of history turning into a political battleground on which the decisions for the future are made.

HELENE VON BISMARCK  
*Independent Scholar*

ANDY PEARCE. *Holocaust Consciousness in Contemporary Britain*. (Routledge Studies on Cultural History, no. 27.) New York: Routledge, 2014. Pp. x, 323. \$125.00.

This thoughtful but flawed account of how awareness and knowledge of the Holocaust became increasingly widespread in Britain in the second half of the twentieth century complements the late Peter Novick's provocative volume *The Holocaust in American Life* (1999). Andy Pearce describes in detail the political and cultural avenues by which the Holocaust gained "a prominence none could have foreseen" (p. 1). Individual chapters trace the incorporation of the Holocaust into the National Curriculum for History, the establishment of the Holocaust Memorial Garden in Hyde Park (a state initiative), the establishment of the Holocaust Centre, Beth Shalom, in rural Nottinghamshire (a private initiative), the creation of the Imperial War Museum's permanent Holocaust exhibition, and the introduction of an annual Holocaust Memorial Day into the national calendar. Pearce also covers, in a more abbreviated fashion, the impact of Holocaust-themed cultural events, in fiction, cinema, drama, and television such as the British release of Steven Spielberg's *Schindler's List* (1994) and the publication of D. M. Thomas's novel *The White Hotel* (1981).

Undergirding Pearce's account is the notion that the "orientational framework" (p. 1) known as Holocaust consciousness became, from the 1970s on, "a multifaceted and hotly contested collection of cultural expressions and memories" (p. 2) in which Britons revealed "our obsessions, our insecurities, and our politics" (p. 1). Given the geographical remoteness of the destruction of European Jewry from Britain, this makes sense. Holocaust consciousness in Britain is as much about stresses and strains in British life in recent decades as it is about the events of 1933–1945. What, then, were the obsessions, insecurities, and politics that fueled and clashed within this orientational framework?

The answers that Pearce offers are convincing but insufficient. His treatment of how New Labour used the Holocaust in its campaign to envision a tolerant, multicultural, immigrant-friendly Britain is illuminating. The same is true of his account of how politicians and opinion-makers used Holocaust tropes in responding to massacres in Bosnia and Rwanda. He is less successful in describing the deeper obsessions and insecurities of those who responded, positively and negatively, to calls for greater Holocaust memorialization and education. While short-term political aims help to explain the dif-

fusion of Holocaust consciousness, they alone do not seem to account for its pervasiveness—and the heightened emotions it aroused—by the end of the twentieth century.

This problem is closely linked to an issue he does explore judiciously and at length: how the Holocaust is to be represented and remembered (as well as taught in the classroom). Is it to be treated as a timeless lesson about humanity's capacity to do evil and the consequences of prejudice? Or should it be taught as a time- and place-specific episode in the history of antisemitism and European Jewry? Pearce explains how efforts to universalize the Holocaust repeatedly created conflict among those supporting greater state involvement in teaching and memorializing the Holocaust. While he is diplomatic in his choice of words, he makes clear that some Britons did not want their Holocaust to be "too Jewish."

What he fails to explore is the relationship between the history of Holocaust consciousness and the history of British antisemitism and British reluctance to offer refuge to Jews fleeing Nazism, whether in Britain itself, its colonies, or Palestine. This is surprising because Pearce is critical of the high-minded but insipid project to draw "lessons" from the Holocaust and argues instead for Holocaust education that encourages students to think critically about historical currents and structures and the uses and abuses of power. But he does not explore how British attitudes toward Jews in the 1930s and 1940s may or may not have contributed to the debates about Holocaust representation and memorialization in the second half of the century. As Tony Kushner has shown, there was no diminution in antisemitism in Britain during the war years and immediately afterward. One wonders whether anti-Jewish attitudes quietly melted away in the second half of the century or whether they persisted and shaped how the Holocaust was remembered.

An equally glaring lacuna is Pearce's failure to explore the relationship between the simultaneous growth of anti-Zionist sentiment and Holocaust consciousness. Given the frequency with which the demonization of Israel in Britain features antisemitic tropes and often slips into overt Jew-baiting, it would be instructive to know how these seemingly contradictory impulses coexist. One possible answer can be inferred from Pearce's treatment of another issue. If he is correct that the universalization of the Holocaust, which is common in British culture and politics, obscures the particular fate of the Jews, then it may be that many Britons see no inconsistency in simultaneously memorializing the Holocaust and demonizing the State of Israel.

In general, Pearce's account is not an easy read. As befits a book published in a cultural history series, it starts with a theory-heavy introduction. This will enhance its appeal to some readers, while it will leave others annoyed or indifferent. In any case, Pearce's recourse to theoretical work on collective memory and memorialization does not impinge on the substance of



his account. His decision to organize his material on a topical rather than a chronological basis also creates some difficulties. Readers who are not already familiar with the sequence of events he describes may experience difficulty in remembering what preceded or was coterminous with the event under discussion. It would also have been helpful if he had identified those historians, like Kushner, David Cesarani, and Lionel Kochan, who were active participants in the public debate about the place of the Holocaust in British life. In many ways, this is a book for insiders, who presumably already know who the players are.

TODD M. ENDELMAN  
University of Michigan

JOHN BELCHEM. *Before the Windrush: Race Relations in Twentieth-Century Liverpool*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014. Pp. xxi, 298. \$39.95.

As the “second city of empire” (p. xviii), Liverpool, through its strategic position on the Atlantic periphery, played a pivotal role in the development of Britain’s seaborne economy. During the era of transatlantic slavery, Liverpool stood notoriously at the apex of the triangular trade, the departure point for British manufactures exchanged in Africa for slaves transported to the Americas. This legacy, John Belchem suggests, has poisoned race relations in Liverpool. The city has yet to fully acknowledge this past which, he argues, has culminated in Liverpool’s decline from one of the most diverse to one of the least diverse metropolises in Britain.

Equally important in terms of Liverpool’s identity has been its proximity to Ireland, with 75 percent of Liverpudlians claiming some Irish heritage. Given Belchem’s earlier research into this phenomenon (*Irish, Catholic and Scouse: The History of the Liverpool-Irish, 1800–1939* [2007]), it is surprising the present work about this iconic city did not produce more discussion of the interaction between the Atlantic world and the Celtic fringe (including the hinterland of North Wales). Such an engagement may have more coherently addressed the historic clientelism around race and religious affiliation, which might indeed justify comparisons with New York claimed by Liverpool’s boosters.

While crucial to the emergence of Britain as an industrial nation, Liverpool, as Belchem carefully describes, has paradoxically occupied an increasingly liminal position to much of the United Kingdom, especially London. Liverpool’s status as “second city” was never assured, even in its heyday, and its fall was accelerated by the stigma of slavery during the moral backlash of the post-abolition era. Glasgow, Dublin, Manchester, and, in any comprehensive appraisal of empire, Kolkata, could all lay claim to the title. The associations with slavery may be less obvious in these great cities but are certainly to be found with the merest scratch of the surface. Kolkata, for example, was a central departure point for the Indian indentured servants who replaced chattel slaves into the twentieth century.

That after 1807 Liverpool became a place of sanctuary for Africans escaping slavery surely points to a more ambiguous history. Belchem highlights the distinctive identities that emerged from a city also heavily infused with Chinese, South Asian, and Scandinavian immigrants who responded to demands of the “transnational maritime labour” market (p. xviii) from the nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries. The post-abolition, municipal pioneers of Liverpool sought to erase associations with the slave trade and differentiate the city from the provincialism of textile-rich Lancashire. The cultural mix of “Sailortown,” they asserted, marked Liverpool as a world-beating city. It was this heritage that enabled the renowned Liverpudlian Labour MP, Bessy Braddock, to boast, “I am at the service of people from all over the world” (p. 12).

While “Sailortown” could be a marker of friendly exoticism for publicists of the city, including J. B. Priestley in *English Journey* (1934), it also served to delineate the borders *within* the city. By the early twentieth century, union leaders in the shipping industry vigorously opposed black employment to maintain wage levels. Sectional interest was underpinned by emerging nationality legislation, such as the 1905 Aliens Act, which was introduced to curb Eastern European Jewish migration but mostly deployed against nonwhite imperial subjects. There were race riots during and after the First World War, accompanied by the sacking of black crews who had served during the conflict. Repatriation followed resulting in the forcible breakup of families when fathers were sent back to West Africa or the Caribbean.

The redefining of British nationality accelerated in the post-World War II decades. As Belchem notes, the increasing segregation and marginalization of Liverpool’s black minorities culminated in the riots of 1981 (pp. 251–264), characterizing for some the failure of Britain’s multicultural nation. But, while the black population of Liverpool suffered discrimination, alienation, and poverty, the white working class was only slightly less impoverished, suggesting that the benefits of racialized campaigns in the labor market were only temporary. Indeed, as Belchem shows, Liverpool’s pariah status was at its most acute during the years of the Thatcher government (1979–1990), under which the industrial heart of maritime trade and manufacturing were ripped apart. For a country immersed in postcolonial and post-industrial distress, Liverpool served as an uncomfortable and painful reminder of the past.

Belchem is a self-confessed incomer to Liverpool who expresses endless warmth and affection for his adoptive home but who never romanticizes its history. *Before the Windrush: Race Relations in Twentieth-Century Liverpool* represents part of a lifetime’s contribution to the story of this remarkable city, and Belchem is swift to acknowledge the work of fellow community historians who have made it possible. However, there are moments when Belchem loses his critical edge. He describes the “workerist” Militant City Council’s race relations advisor during the 1980s as “a toady from London” (p. 267). The previous Liberal administration of

Sir Trevor Jones, which started to implement cuts in social provision before the retrenchment of the Thatcher era, is treated less harshly.

At points in the volume, there is also a pessimistic tone, which seems to be more concerned with confirming Paul Gilroy's postulations of postcolonial melancholia, than with exploring the more nuanced lived experiences of one of Britain's historically most diverse populations. This has the paradoxical effect of fixing the biological and cultural markers of identity that Belchem insists in his introduction are undermined by processes of transnational migration. There is also a danger that Liverpool's association with the slave trade may be overemphasized at the expense of other factors such as Irish identity and religious sectarianism. Profit from the slave trade can be identified in every hamlet in the United Kingdom, and I am not sure if Liverpool should continue to bear the burden of guilt on its behalf.

RICHARD SMITH  
*Goldsmiths, University of London*

GLENN RICHARDSON. *The Field of Cloth of Gold*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2013. Pp. xii, 275. \$65.00.

The meeting of kings Henry VIII of England and Francis I of France at the Field of Cloth of Gold in 1520 has tended to be regarded, for all its splendid arrangements and grandness, as an essentially frivolous exercise. This view, shared by contemporaries as weighty as Bishop John Fisher and accepted by most historians since, has laid stress on the expense and extravagance of the occasion and pointed to its apparent failure, as Henry abandoned the peace with France that the Field celebrated in the months that followed and proceeded to align himself with the emperor Charles V.

Glenn Richardson's book on the Field of Cloth of Gold offers a different interpretation. The nature of the event, a celebration of peace between two monarchs whose realms had a long and bitter history of conflict, demanded display of an advanced and even extravagant sort. Yet the Field was more than an exercise in ostentation for its own sake. Rather, it was designed to send an unmistakable signal not only to each of the protagonists and their respective political nations, but also to the rest of Europe (and especially to Charles V, watching proceedings balefully from his Flemish dominions a day's ride away), that a lasting and universal peace had been met and was intended to hold. These intentions were genuine at the time of their expression at the Field of Cloth of Gold, and neither they nor the event itself should be diminished or dismissed because of what happened afterward.

The book examines the diplomatic maneuvering that preceded the event. This was guided largely by Cardinal Thomas Wolsey, and his plan, in the wake of Henry's expensive French campaign of 1513, to establish a European peace, culminating with the Treaty of London in 1518, of which the Field was intended to be the final

Anglo-French ratification. It considers the discussions over the siting of the tournament, the making of the logistical arrangements for the French encampment at Ardres and—a mere five miles distant—the English one at Guînes, the agreeing of the tournament lists, the setting of the precise location, and the complex order of the various meetings. Richardson rehearses the process of selecting and summoning the royal entourages, the journey of the courts to the event, the symbolically important first meeting of the two kings (in the arranging of which Francis proved much more amenable than Henry), the jousts, wrestling matches, and other sporting encounters of the tournament, and the elaborate series of banquets, dances, masques, masses, and other divertissements that accompanied it. We are provided with fresh and nuanced analysis of the personal dimension of the meetings between Henry and Francis, including an enjoyable reconsideration of the famous episode in which Henry spontaneously challenged Francis to a wrestling contest during a drinking session and found himself rapidly and embarrassingly bested by his more skillful opponent. We learn of the architecture of the Field's specially commissioned buildings, tents, tilt-yards, and pavilions, the associated decorations and artwork, the provisioning of the food and drink for the feasts and meals, and the delicate and complicated matter of the procuring and the offering of suitable gifts. The detail is scenic and fascinating, both for its own sake (that the English kitchens required 98,050 eggs for the event may or may not mean much in the wider scheme of things, but it is a delightful fact) and for what it reveals about the culture and conduct of Renaissance diplomacy and courtly behavior. Moreover, the sheer weight of the evidence and the telling of the story ultimately make convincing the book's argument that the exercise should be seen by historians as a genuine attempt to demonstrate a commitment to a new diplomatic and political engagement between ancient foes, rather than merely as an outsize example of early modern celebrity frippery.

Yet even as one is persuaded by the view that the Field should be taken seriously in its own right and not judged in the light of the subsequent breakdown in Anglo-French relations, perhaps the event did also have some longer-term diplomatic significance. Richardson alludes to this, though the point may warrant stronger emphasis. Notwithstanding Henry's abandonment of Francis in the early and mid-1520s and the recrudescence of Anglo-French warfare in the mid-1540s, no armed conflict took place between the kingdoms in the crucial and dangerous years of the early Henrician Reformation. This may partly be ascribed to the broader circumstances of the time and the often antagonistic relationship between Francis and Charles during the 1530s. Nevertheless, this admirable book might reasonably lead some readers to wonder if Henry's ability to maintain peaceable relations with his French cousin when English domestic affairs were at their most fraught was in some measure informed and influenced by the personal and cultural ties and understandings



that were forged between them in the fortnight they spent together in northern France in the summer of 1520.

RORY MCENTEGART  
*American College Dublin*

W. GREGORY MONAHAN. *Let God Arise: The War and Rebellion of the Camisards*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 297. \$115.00.

The War of the Camisards (1702–1704), was a violent insurrection by poor people in the Cévennes mountains of Languedoc. They formed guerrilla-like bands, attacked priests, and burned churches. Historians deeply involved in chronicling Louis XIV's armed struggle against most of Europe in the War of Spanish Succession have tended to treat the Camisard War as a side-show of little consequence. Close examination suggests otherwise.

W. Gregory Monahan has undertaken the difficult task of correlating the correspondence of the royal ministers with a voluminous body of contradictory memoirs, false accounts, and recollections composed long after the events in question. He also fits into his narrative the multiple movements of several rebel forces and many royal officials. The result is a clear, excellently crafted narrative that makes sense out of a complicated set of events.

The author argues convincingly that the motivation behind the Camisard rebellion was fundamentally spiritual, not anti-state or anti-tax. In 1685, by revoking the Edict of Nantes, the king had outlawed the Calvinist church. Throughout the 1680s and 1690s, Protestants were forcibly converted by royal troops. Their children were taken away. Their temples were demolished. Their ministers were sent into exile. Forced conversions led to guilt. By 1702, a younger generation, cut off from church rituals and contact with pastors, focused on Bible reading and began to assimilate the language of the Old Testament. Self-appointed prophets emerged warning of God's wrath. They preached at large, open-air prayer meetings in the woods and soon formed armed bands of several hundred men. These improvised companies, led by captains who believed that their instructions came directly from God, hid out in the hills, living off provisions smuggled in from friendly villages. For many months they burned Catholic churches and murdered priests and officials, always believing that they were doing God's will. In mid-1703, the rebel troops under Jean Cavalier attacked two small villages. They burned the church and every house in Saint-Series and killed 11 people. In nearby Saturargues they burned every other house, killing 13 men, 20 women, and 24 children, six of them infants. True or false, tales of ritual violence circulated, such as the roasting of babies on a spit. Through all of this, the rebels claimed to be loyal to the king and to want nothing more than freedom of conscience. They "still followed the orders of the Spirit, were prepared for martyrdom, and remained firm in their demands that the 'liberties' once granted

to them in the Edict of Nantes must be restored" (p. 142).

These practices naturally elicited retaliation. Local Catholic militias began mobilizing troops to defend themselves and attack the rebels. A contingent of more than 600 villagers burned the rebel village of Branoux, "killing and massacring forty-seven people of all ages and sexes." Protestant sources reported that "there were several pregnant women from whom the babies were ripped from mothers, hearts still beating, and carried in a procession on the points of swords and batons" (p. 155). When the king finally sent troops to the Cévennes, he called for the destruction of 500 villages. In January 1704, a royal brigadier, Charles de Planque, set out "on what can only be described as a killing spree." He chose 30 of his 350 prisoners at random and made them "run out of a church into a gauntlet of soldiers who killed them with axes and swords" (p. 178). The rest were lined up on a high bridge and pushed off onto the rocks below.

This war offers an interesting commentary on the government of Louis XIV. Monahan notes how long it took for the king to focus on the severity of the situation. The people at court had trouble taking seriously an army of woodsmen who successfully evaded and defeated royal troops. Nicolas de Lamoignon de Basville, the tough intendant of Languedoc, viewed the rebels as devils or imagined a vast conspiracy led by nobles. He never fully understood the mentality of the rebels and he wavered between harsh repression and conciliation as a solution. There were lapses in the king's grip on events, and it appears that Basville was left to handle much of the governance of Languedoc. The ministers at court even referred to the Camisards as "Monsieur Basville's war." Thus, there were still important weaknesses in the functioning of absolutism.

This gruesome conflict had important ramifications. In a sense, it was an extreme example of a popular revolt. Aspects such as significant participation by women, ritual violence, revolt against taxes, even a mention of men disguised as women, place it in a much longer tradition looking back to the religious wars and forward to the local massacres of the French Revolution. This was how common people might act when they were motivated by extreme blind faith, and when they were isolated, oppressed, and uneducated. The Camisard War was not an anachronistic footnote to the reign of the glorious monarch. It was a depressing low point on the spectrum of possible popular action, and a reminder that such levels of violence are always possible when other options fail. Recent events remind us that the brutality of blind faith is still very much in evidence.

WILLIAM BEIK,  
*Emeritus*  
*Emory University*

CHARLY COLEMAN. *The Virtues of Abandon: An Anti-Individualist History of the French Enlightenment*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2014. Pp. xi, 402. \$40.00.

In *The Virtues of Abandon: An Anti-Individualist History of the French Enlightenment*, Charly Coleman draws together various strands of anti-individualist thought in philosophy, religion, and politics that have been ignored or obscured by accounts of the French Enlightenment as a movement in which the individual emerged as an autonomous subject, “‘master and possessor’” (in the words of René Descartes) of nature and himself, as well as by interpretations of Enlightenment as an anti-religious, secularizing process (p. 8). He persuasively argues that the situation was much more complex: that throughout this period, and even beyond it, there was a clash between proponents of self-ownership and advocates of self-abandon; that the same contest played itself out *within* the views of backers of both positions; and that throughout the eighteenth century there was no single, stable notion of selfhood. Indeed, without a great deal of violent self-sacrifice the ultimate triumph of autonomous individualism would not have been possible. He also shows that even the most radical, atheistic arguments depended in part upon religious premises. In eighteenth-century France, Coleman contends, emphasis upon self-possession made it possible to value the other forms of property (spiritual, material, moral, and political) that were available to an acquisitive self. Coleman’s most original contribution to the understanding of the French Enlightenment is to have provided a coherent, synthetic, and nuanced account of the challenge that was posed to this “culture of self-ownership” (p. 3) by theologians, *philosophes*, and politicians whose views on most other subjects greatly diverged, but who all contributed to the creation of a “culture of dispossession” (p. 4). By framing the argument in these terms, he is able to reveal the connections between such seemingly unrelated intellectual currents as heretical mysticism and radical materialism, both of which stressed the immanent connections between human beings and the world, and thus participated in a process of “resacralization” (p. 12). His contention is that the Enlightenment displaced the sacred rather than eliminated it. Coleman encourages the reader to understand the plurality of views on selfhood as part of an overall struggle to define the relationship between personhood and property.

Each of the chapters in the book’s two parts emphasizes a different context in which the debate over the status of persons took shape. Part I covers the various forms of this polemic in the religious sphere, as theologians and philosophers reacted to the way in which the sale of offices and letters of ennoblement broke down the traditional connection between personal virtue and social status. Chapter 1 examines the questions that seventeenth-century jurists (Charles Loyseau), theologians (Pierre Nicole, Antoine Arnauld), and philosophers (Descartes) were led to ask as they sought to redefine the self in reaction to the crown’s increasing dependence upon venality. If offices and titles could be bought, did they therefore belong to their holders? Are humans essentially acquisitive beings? And if so, how is moral action possible? In what senses can we be said to

possess our ideas and actions, to *have* a self? Chapter 2 considers how mystics such as Miguel de Molinos, Madame Guyon, and François Fénelon challenged emerging beliefs in a possessive self, which they viewed as obstacles to true devotion. Chapter 3 is devoted to a review of evidence that the disavowal of spiritual goods persisted throughout the eighteenth century, thus testifying to the fact that, despite the papal censure of Fénelon’s *Explication des maximes des saints sur la vie intérieure* (1697), Quietism had a long afterlife and that its rhetoric continued to be deployed in diverse and somewhat surprising places, such as the libertine novel *Thérèse philosophe* (1748). Part II of *The Virtues of Abandon* explores the culture of dispossession in philosophical and political contexts, first in the work of Spinozists and radical materialists (chap. 4), and then in Enlightenment reflections on “the sleep of reason” in the dream state (chap. 5). The section of the latter chapter on Denis Diderot’s “aesthetic dispossession” (p. 192) relies on the common (but in my view unfortunate) tendency to attribute stable identity to genres (philosophy, aesthetics, novels) and other terms (“viewer,” “painting,” “active/passive,” etc.) in works that consistently elude such ready classification. For this reason, it is difficult to find anything in Diderot that resembles a “totalizing force.” Chapter 6, “The Politics of Alienation,” is devoted to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, of whom Coleman rightfully states that “more than any major figure of the period, he recognized and experimented with the logics and lexicons of both self-ownership and dispossession, combining and recombining them in artful and influential ways” (p. 205). This chapter is particularly strong on the evolution of Rousseau’s complex and famously contradictory thought. The next-to-last chapter contains a typically nuanced discussion of the continuing struggle between possession and dispossession in the words and deeds of the French Revolution, and concludes with an epilogue on the ultimate triumph of the culture of self-ownership.

JAY CAPLAN  
Amherst College

NINA KUSHNER. *Erotic Exchanges: The World of Elite Prostitution in Eighteenth-Century Paris*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2013. Pp. xi, 295. \$35.00.

In *Erotic Exchanges: The World of Elite Prostitution in Eighteenth-Century Paris*, Nina Kushner paints a vivid picture of elite prostitutes, or *dames entretenues*, and the men who supported them. Departing from earlier regulatory accounts of prostitution and the police, Kushner focuses on the *dame entretenue* in order to reconstruct the demimonde of mid-century Paris that saw the advent of a “professional mistress who sold sexual services in a highly structured marketplace, one that regularized almost all aspects of elite transactional sex, especially its remuneration” (p. 7). In short, sex is defined as work. Kushner then goes on to define the demimonde as “a discrete sexual and social subculture” (p. 8) in which the elite males of Europe—“princes of



blood, peers of the realm, robe nobles, and financiers” (p. 15)—paid their mistresses for sex, companionship, and sometimes love. Through an impressive archival analysis of thousands of pages of police reports, Kushner describes where these women came from, for whom they worked, the terms of their employment, how much they made, and if they had private lives of their own. She concludes by suggesting that these women possessed a form of agency.

Crucial to Kushner’s account are the two police inspectors, Jean-Baptiste Meusnier and Louis Marais, who compiled reports on over 1,000 women from 1747 to 1771 and directed the *Département des femmes galantes* for over a quarter century. Why all of this surveillance, Kushner asks. It turns out that this is not an easy question to answer. Kushner demonstrates that the dossiers were rarely used for judicial purposes, for blackmail, to prevent financial ruin, or even to entertain Louis XIV and the marquise de Pompadour. Instead, after studying the evidence, she concludes that the dossier system sought to render the clandestine activities of important men visible, and hence functioned as part of a greater effort to organize and regulate the perceived chaos of the capital itself.

In a veritable *tour de force*, Kushner draws compelling portraits of these women’s lives. We learn about Demoiselle Varenne from Angers, Anne Michelet from the village of Nesle-en-Brie, and Marie Lemaignon, known as Demoiselle Brillant, who was a member of the Opéra-Comique, married its oboe player, and gained and lost several wealthy patrons. By and large, the young women who were the subjects of police surveillance were not from the lowest social classes; rather they tended to hail from the middle- to lower-middle class: artisans, servants, and trades folk. Through a comparison with the marriage market, Kushner explains that inadequate social institutions, specifically the dowry system, largely accounted for a girl’s entry into prostitution and eventually the demimonde. For instance, when faced with economic hardship, some families pimped their virginal daughters as a last “resource,” while others relied on the services of a madam to sell their girls. In addition to parents as sex brokers, the mid-eighteenth century also saw the development of a network of elite brothels and madams who worked hand-in-glove with the police to ply their services and prevent scandal. Finally, a significant number of elite prostitutes belonged to and were supported by the theatrical world.

What distinguished the kept woman from the average prostitute, explains Kushner, was the existence of a contract between the would-be mistress and her patron. Though not legally binding, these contracts spelled out the amount of monthly allowance, or *honoraires*, clothing, jewelry, furnishings, and cash payments, what Kushner refers to as the “pay package” (p. 133), that the mistress would exchange for sex and companionship. Indeed, Kushner’s boldest assertion is that the *dames entretenues* of the demimonde wielded a certain amount of power despite the tremendous odds stacked against

them. Setting aside our modern-day presumptions, Kushner suggests that to a certain extent the marriage contract and this extra-legal arrangement mirrored one another. Like a mistress, a would-be wife exchanged sex for social and economic security through the marriage contract. In contrast to the wife, however, the mistress forsook social acceptability when entering into her contract, yet maintained “ownership” of her sexual labor. Given the limited possibilities afforded women of this social class, some *dames entretenues* had a better existence with more choices (at least for the ten years that their careers usually lasted) than many wives yoked forever to a husband’s whims or in comparison to other types of wage earners.

Kushner’s study is richly textured, smart, and it is a lively read. She navigates extremely well between individual lives, as recorded by the police, and the larger population of kept women. Moreover, in framing sex as work, her research sheds important light on the realities faced by many French women of the mid-century, namely, significant economic fragility. It also offers opportunities to rethink libertine literature and Rococo painting that never tired of depicting the *dames entretenues*. *Erotic Exchanges* thus represents an excellent example of sociocultural history that compellingly recreates the demimonde, the women who worked there, and the culture that made it all possible.

LESLEY H. WALKER

Indiana University, South Bend

CAROL E. HARRISON. *Romantic Catholics: France’s Post-revolutionary Generation in Search of a Modern Faith*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2014. Pp. xiv, 328. \$49.95.

*Romantic Catholics: France’s Postrevolutionary Generation in Search of a Modern Faith* is, at heart, a work of reclamation. Carol E. Harrison sets out to reclaim and integrate a generation of French Catholics who have been largely forgotten by historians: a vibrant cohort of devout believers who came of age around 1810 and who sought to distance themselves from “the ‘wreckage’ of the Old Regime and the Revolution” (p. 2) in order to fashion a faith that was “hopeful” and “forward looking” (p. 3). Separating themselves from the battles that their parents fought, these “romantic” believers, Harrison argues, tried to create a new kind of “Catholicism that would be expansive, dynamic, and glorious instead of the nostalgic, bitter, and fearful faith that was the stereotype of the Restoration years” (p. 2).

The author advances two interconnected arguments that are developed over the course of six chapters. First, she contends that this cohort of lay believers endeavored to produce a *modern* faith, which for Harrison means a faith that accepted (even as it tempered) notions of individual liberty, democratic nation-states, and an independent civil society. Second, it was the failure to reconcile papal temporal sovereignty with an Italian nation-state, she argues, that brought a more adversarial and “anti-modern” ultramontane Catholicism

to the fore. This ultramontane piety—a faith that rejected democracy and embraced the supernatural—has long been associated with women’s increasing dominance in the Church (the so-called feminization of religion). Harrison, however, suggests in her epilogue that this decidedly anti-modern faith had more to do with the failures of the Rome question than with women’s religious practices.

This engaging book focuses on a tight-knit cohort of individuals with overlapping ties of family and friendship between them. The group included public figures such as Maurice de Guérin, Charles de Montalembert, and Frédéric Ozanam as well as best-selling female authors Pauline Craven (née de la Ferronnays) and Victorine Monriot. Victor Hugo’s daughter, Léopoldine Hugo, Ozanam’s wife, Amélie Soulacroix, and Henri Lacordaire, the Dominican preacher and activist, also feature prominently in the book. Most were the sons and daughters of émigré aristocrats who grew up in a larger Catholic cosmopolitan society; they lived for long periods of time outside of France and interacted with writers and thinkers across Europe. These individuals were also deeply influenced by Hugues-Félicité-Robert de Lamennais and his espousal of a liberal ultramontanism that called for freedom of conscience and obedience to Rome. Harrison anchors each chapter with the biography of one of these individuals, whose published writings, diaries, and voluminous correspondence provide the evidence for her analyses. Chapters 3 and 4 astutely illuminate the gendered dynamics of this modern Catholicism, showing how men like Montalembert struggled over autonomy and obedience in the political realm while Craven’s writings attempted to reconcile piety and publicity by fashioning a model of unassuming female sainthood.

*Romantic Catholics* offers a revisionist interpretation of nineteenth-century French Catholicism by calling attention to a moment when lay believers sought to synthesize faith and modernity. Their brand of Catholicism stands in stark contrast to post-1870 ultramontane piety, especially the latter’s rejection of democracy. Yet in championing this group of thinkers for their “progressive” politics, Harrison embraces an overly narrow definition of the modern. In doing so, she neglects how late-nineteenth-century ultramontane piety (despite its rejection of democracy) was quite creative in utilizing mass cultural forms to fashion new forms of Catholic devotion. In short, she misses the extent to which this later piety was itself modern.

This construction of the modern leads the author to downplay the links between pre- and post-1870 Catholic thought and practice, especially with regard to her otherwise-insightful portrayal of gender dynamics. For example, Harrison fails to recognize how Craven’s distinctly modern vision of unassuming female saintliness also scripted spectacular forms of Catholic melodrama, such as extraordinary deathbed conversions, suggesting the long-standing importance of the miraculous. Meanwhile, all the members of this romantic cohort saw “the immutability of women’s weakness” (p. 231) as central

to their vision of social obligation to others, a key theme in later forms of Catholic piety as well. These limitations to the book have much to do with Harrison’s effort to exonerate women from producing an emerging, “emotive, papal-centered cult” (p. 239). In her analysis, blame is now shifted to Pius IX and his call to sacrifice conscience and follow obediently. Craven’s personal despair over the Rome question serves as evidence of at least one woman’s discomfort with this newly intransigent faith. Yet such an analysis begs the question of why so many thousands of other French women actively embraced this emotive, ultramontane model of piety.

Despite my disagreement with Harrison’s understanding of the modern and her perspective on female religiosity, she has produced an important contribution to the study of nineteenth-century France and the history of Catholicism. *Romantic Catholics* is a beautifully written and deeply researched work that provides insightful analyses of a flawed yet fascinating cast of characters. Moving beyond a view of an embattled church fighting the forces of secularization, the book opens the door to new ways to understand the give-and-take of Catholicism in the nineteenth century.

SUZANNE K. KAUFMAN

Loyola University Chicago

RACHEL CHRASTIL. *The Siege of Strasbourg*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014. Pp. 302. \$39.95.

The siege of Strasbourg in 1870 was a traditional affair. It was a fortress city. Its peacetime garrison of 8,000 (a tenth of the population) rose to 17,000 as the siege began. The siege lasted seven weeks, during which time 861 French soldiers were killed, compared to 933 besieging Germans. About 340 civilians died violent deaths. The Prussian commander August von Werder deliberately bombarded the city center hoping that a demoralized citizenry would pressure Jean-Jacques-Alexis Uhrich into a quick surrender. This was not a new tactic, although modern artillery made it much more destructive. It did not work, so trenches and parallels were built allowing German artillery close enough to pound the city’s walls. By September 27 a passable breach had been made: an assault, and with it the possibility of unrestrained violence against defenders and civilians, was imminent. Although custom and French regulations stipulated that a city should suffer at least one assault before surrender, this expectation was seldom observed. Without hope of relief, Uhrich believed honor was satisfied (an official inquiry after the war disagreed). The municipal authorities supported his decision to surrender.

Strasbourg was neither a particularly heroic nor a bloody affair. Rachel Chrastil does not devote much attention to its military conduct, but it followed a regular course. The occupation was not brutal. This was not a Badajoz, Belfort, or Leningrad. But for commentators Strasbourg represented degeneration from the heights of civilization to the abyss of the Thirty Years’ War (a shared point of reference throughout the Rhineland).



Chrastil's focus is on the civilians who found themselves in this unanticipated position: the voices most frequently cited come from the male bourgeoisie, often Protestant and Republican, who were the most likely to record their experiences. This social cohort took the discourse of progress and gendered separate spheres seriously. They identified the bombardment as a new form of warfare conducted against the helpless. Unfortunately, civilians, although military targets, could only perform limited military roles. The National Guard patrolled the streets, churches were converted into hospitals, the charitable set up *restaurants populaires* (there was no rationing). But Strasbourg was observers rather than participants. Their inability to take a public role affected men particularly. While women and children sheltered in cellars, men wandered around listening to rumors (one of Chrastil's findings is the role of rumor among this news-hungry population), and thus were killed by bombs.

Its typicality is what makes this a worthy case study. Sieges are violent incursions into daily life, but they proceed slowly enough to allow participants to reflect. How should men and women, soldiers and administrators, behave in these extraordinary circumstances? Is their primary responsibility to their family, their city, or their country? A siege is akin to the microhistorian's "normal exception," a moment that forces people to articulate that which is usually implicit. For example, Chrastil detects three philosophical traditions working on the decision makers: Emile Küss, the republican mayor, was a consequentialist, arguing that surrender would avoid pointless destruction; Uhrich was the deontologist, adhering to a set of rules; Edmond Valentin, Léon Gambetta's newly appointed prefect who had crossed enemy lines disguised as an American correspondent and finally swum through no-man's land to join the defenders, was the upholder of virtue ethics, urging resistance at all costs. In Chrastil's treatment the whole of European culture can weigh on individual choices. Sometimes the effect is bathetic. For instance, when Uhrich advertised his sincerity to the municipal commission we are told that sincerity had been "highly prized since the publication of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Confessions*" (p. 182); however it can be illuminating, as when Chrastil demonstrates how nineteenth-century conceptions of gender informed not only the besieged civilians' self-presentation, but also their behavior.

There were some unusual features of this siege. All protagonists knew that a French defeat would mean that Strasbourg would become a German city. The besiegers, many Badenese and therefore intimate with the region, coveted the city they were destroying. The shift in regime from empire to republic (Strasbourg had been a center of moderate opposition to Napoleon III) colored the last weeks, though the siege's short duration prevented the dramatic political consequences witnessed in Paris. There are only hints of hard-core republican resistance among some soldiers and citizenry. The most unique feature was the humanitarian inter-

vention of a Swiss delegation, which persuaded Werder to allow them to report on conditions and permit those with resources to accompany them back to Switzerland. Werder hoped that the Swiss would carry incontrovertible news of Napoleon III's defeat, hastening surrender. Although the Swiss were drawing on religious and political traditions, this was a novel development, a product of a self-consciously civilized and civilizing society responding to the "emergency imaginary" of recrudescent barbarism in a new media age.

Humanitarianism may relieve but it does not prevent wartime suffering. Both Werder and Uhrich regretted civilian casualties, but considered besieged civilians as legitimate targets; the same argument was successfully used by the defense at Nuremberg in 1945. There is considerable controversy about whether the civilian casualty ratio increased dramatically between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but no one could argue that the trend was (or is) propitious. The example of Strasbourg helped shape the debate concerning right behavior toward civilians in wartime, but it certainly did not resolve it.

DAVID HOPKIN

*Hertford College, University of Oxford*

NOËL BURCH and GENEVIÈVE SELLIER. *The Battle of the Sexes in French Cinema, 1930–1956*. Translated by PETER GRAHAM. English ed. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2014. Pp. 373. Cloth \$99.95, paper \$28.95.

This title brings to English-speaking readers around the world a well-known work that was originally published in Paris by the Nathan house in 1996. It provides the Anglophone reader with a thorough and precise translation as well as some very brief new bibliographical material, albeit omitting reference to the work of Colin Crisp, which is an unfortunate oversight. Nonetheless, this is a very welcome addition to any Anglophone library on French film history and is arguably a long overdue one.

Those readers who are unfamiliar with the original publication will discover here a sustained interpretation of the cinema of the interwar, occupation, and Fourth Republic periods. The researchers treat film as a social mirror that captures evolving attitudes in gender relations: specifically, the warp and weave of competing versions of masculinity vis-à-vis what the authors infer to be proto-feminist treatments of women in fictional/melodrama films. Maybe a little too boldly for some of us, Noël Burch and Geneviève Sellier suggest that the defeat of France in 1940 prompted some more subtle filmic representations of men and women. To paraphrase, military collapse and the uncertainties of the time generated a space in cinema for some unexpectedly strong women characters. Moreover, the victory in 1944–1945 witnessed a corresponding reassertion of heavy-handed sexism on the screens. The great service of the writers is to offer a critically informed reading of the "golden age" of French cinema that reveals sexist and also racist content in many well-known,

as well as less-familiar movies, especially in works dating from the mid- to late 1930s. On almost every page Burch and Sellier include an original insight. The work can be rightly called a “revisionist” classic because it counters the once commonplace apolitical celebrations of poetic realism and questions those historians who have argued that the cinema of the late Third Republic blended seamlessly into that of the Vichy years of production. Similarly, this extended treatment of the cinema of occupation France convincingly gives the lie to the idea that to avoid the censor’s scissors Vichy filmmaking was somehow only capable of making apolitical dramas.

Not that this is an easy work to always agree with fully. Certainly, it is unfortunate that Burch and Sellier read French cinema mostly in cultural isolation, particularly when it comes to the period that so fascinates them: the occupation years. Thus, the authors provide little context unlike that provided long ago in the overlooked but still fascinating documentary film and short book of the same title, André Halimi’s *Chanton sous l’occupation* (1976). Let us recall here that it was Halimi who unearthed how enthusiastically some in the French entertainment industries were integrating themselves into the broader new order of Europe. Local reception and film practice, such as when French actors made promotional visits to Germany, would have at least deserved a footnote alongside the extended praise lavished on the improved image of women in filmic narratives. Perhaps more importantly is the neglect of the body image of the French “stars” in this same period. Such considerations of physical type were important for some people in the 1940s (the Nazis and their fellow travelers thought a great deal about that sort of thing, presumably) and a discussion of Jean Delannoy and Jean Cocteau’s fascistic-looking *L’Éternel retour* (1943) cannot seriously work without due consideration of this aspect. In my mind that is a film that still today reeks of kitsch Aryanism much akin to Arno Breker’s “art.” I do not want to use this review to pick holes in a book that for the most part I greatly admire. However, one should also add quite quickly here that given the centrality of Jean Gabin to the thesis of the study, it is another omission not to have filled in some more biographical information about him. Some greater acknowledgment of his very practical absence from screens during the occupation would have been a helpful nuance to the hypothesis on changing representations of masculinity. It is however because Burch and Sellier provide such a fascinating and detailed account that one is inspired to think further on their themes and to make future new research.

Finally, one must note that Burch and Sellier’s interpretation of works from Marcel Carné, Henri-Georges Clouzot, and especially from Robert Bresson, are carried off with brio and merit frequent rereading. This latter director is a favorite of the historians and they discuss his works most admirably. The treatment of Jean Renoir is similarly fascinating. Burch and Sellier’s powerful reexamination of *La Règle du jeu* will fea-

ture in any serious discussion of that still compelling work. This detailed and assured study is no doubt considered by many to be a classic in the field and we can congratulate the press on this new translation, not so as to freeze its original ideas into a new orthodoxy but rather to serve as a spur for continued reflection.

HUGO FREY

University of Chichester

STEPHEN L. HARP. *Au Naturel: Naturism, Nudism, and Tourism in Twentieth-Century France*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014. Pp. xiv, 293. Cloth \$45.00, e-book \$45.00.

Twentieth-century nudism evokes two images for me. The first is George Orwell’s portrayal of nudists as sandal-wearing, vegetarian kooks; harmless, but off-putting to normal people. The second is the opening scene of the film *The Baader Meinhof Complex* (2008), which has the German terrorist Ulrike Meinhof reading the newspaper on a nudist beach while her husband and young children play in the surf. It turns out that both of these contain more than a grain of historical truth.

*Au Naturel: Naturism, Nudism, and Tourism in Twentieth-Century France*, written with great clarity and style, and based on a highly impressive collection of sources ranging from public and private archives to industry publications and interviews with some of the surviving participants, recounts the story of this curious piece of European culture as it evolved from cultish practice to mass consumer phenomenon. The author, Stephen L. Harp, avoids any abstract speculations about *why* so many Europeans liked to take off their clothes, or why they preferred to do it in France. He is more interested in the *how*.

Harp begins in the 1920s, when Europeans were thinking about how to regenerate both the symbolic body of the nation and the real bodies of its people after four years of destruction. The first naturists were visionaries and true believers. The pioneers of naturism in France were the Durville brothers, André and Gaston, medical doctors whose prescriptions for better lives included hypnosis, psychotherapy, and x-ray massages, and who believed that with a healthy, largely vegetarian diet and a lot of volleyball, people could live to age 150 (p. 17). To create and to celebrate beautiful bodies—Harp says they never really figured out what to do about ugly bodies—the Durvilles opened Physiopolis, a site in the Paris region where naturists could gather to disrobe and exercise in the sun. But they soon ran afoul of laws against public indecency. The Durvilles imposed the *cache-sexe* on their followers as the price that vice needed to pay virtue in a society that remained opposed to public nudity.

The Durvilles paid it because they wanted to stay in business. This was less true of their great rival, Marcel Kienné de Mongeot. Kienné de Mongeot was closer to the German tradition of naturism, especially in his insistence on the benefits of full nudity, but was less ruthlessly ascetic, and his private naturist resort, the Manoir



Jan, included five-course lunches, wine, and tobacco. Kienné de Mongeot's naturism was apolitical, upscale, orderly, clean, eugenicist, and not a little bit racist; in other words, in tune with its time.

As Harp points out, both the Durvilles and Kienné de Mongeot dealt with the ticklish connection between nudity and sex by denying it. If anything, they argued, it was *clothed* bodies that were more erotic and likely to be debauched. They frowned upon flirting and believed that the nude, naturist lifestyle could cure all sorts of sexual dysfunction, above all masturbation and homosexuality. Aside from the energetic leaders and a few thousand ardent followers, however, naturism did not leave a deep impression on interwar culture.

Harp's story takes a dramatic turn after 1945, as thousands of Europeans, especially northerners looking for a warm place by the sea to take off their clothes, flocked to France, where they met French municipalities eager to profit from the swelling demand for nudist beaches. Indeed, the enterprise of local leaders is one of the book's most striking lessons. At the same time, driven perhaps by the logic of popularization, naturism began to lose some of its eccentricities. Both sun-loving nudists and tourism-loving mayors faced a generic intolerance for "indecent," which they repeatedly overcame through negotiation, compromise, and looking the other way.

In the end, nude tourism became the prodigal child of modernization. This was often explicit, as in Gaullist plans for economic development in Languedoc-Roussillon. There could be no Cap d'Agde, after all, without a state willing to drain tidal marshes, build roads, and lay on the DDT. More generally, the fortunes of naturism followed the upward curve of prosperity and sexual openness in postwar Western Europe. Harp tells this part of the story through the experiences of three new centers of postwar naturism. He first describes the colonization of the Île du Levant, off the Var coast, which became a small naturist paradise (aside from the fact that the navy used a part of the island for target practice). He then focuses on the development of a more extensive and family-friendly Aquitaine coast at Montalivet, where, in exemplary fashion, what began as a wooded spot for campers, largely without fresh water or water closets, evolved into a more modern resort with bungalows and flush toilets in accordance with the rising expectations of its visitors. Cap d'Agde, on the edge of the Hérault took a different route, becoming in the 1960s not just a preferred spot for nude tourism but also the continent's foremost swingers' resort. Here, rather than deny the link between nudism and sex, they built a monument to it. If Michel Foucault never wrote about Cap d'Agde, he should have done so.

STEVE ZDATNY  
University of Vermont

TEOFILO F. RUIZ. *A King Travels: Festive Traditions in Late Medieval and Early Modern Spain*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012. Pp. xv, 356. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$45.00, e-book \$45.00.

The events of royal lives still command a remarkable amount of public attention. They convey different types of significance, some planned, some unintentional. They speak to general or communal as well as to personal concerns. Not surprisingly, how such events were commemorated in the past has obsessed many medieval and early modern historians. For some time, the leading scholar of festive traditions in the Spanish monarchy has been Teofilo F. Ruiz. This book sums up 25 years of his research, but it also offers provocative reinterpretations.

*A King Travels: Festive Traditions in Late Medieval and Early Modern Spain* is a relaxed, diffuse, and wide-ranging work. Its engaging, conversational tone contrasts with the underlying anxiety of other studies of royal commemorations, whose authors seem grimly determined to prove that they have something new to say. Ruiz does indeed have fresh ideas, but he is happy to back them up with extended discussions of the planning and procedures behind royal events. Although his declared focus is King Philip II's royal entries into Spanish towns, he warns us in advance that he is going to wander, and he does: back to the 1300s, into the realms of martial festivals and chivalric jousts, across the contrasting cultural terrains of Carnival and Corpus Christi, and finally through non-calendrical royal events like births, accessions to the throne, and deaths. A less confident historian might leave the reader feeling disoriented, but Ruiz continually nudges and coaxes us back toward his chosen themes, giving the book an ineffable sense of direction.

Ruiz's opinions are clear, although he is also obligingly open to tempering previously stated views. As in his other writings, he does not support the idea of a clear separation between the medieval and the early modern periods. He repeatedly traces the origins of Habsburg royal ceremonies to the preceding Trastámara dynasty (1369–1516), rather than to fifteenth-century Burgundian prototypes, and he stresses the survival of Spanish chivalric values from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries. Yet Ruiz is willing to admit that there were changes under Philip II, such as the physical withdrawal of the king, and of the high nobility, from contact with the common people. A medieval festive culture centered on Carnival changed into one that elevated the feast of Corpus Christi above all others. Ruiz rejects Mikhail Bakhtin's view of Carnival as an unfettered expression of popular rebelliousness, seeing it instead as scripted and tightly controlled by local authorities. Nevertheless, he concedes that it was a time for laughter and for a gentle relaxation of social constraints. He associates Corpus Christi with strict religious orthodoxy, the exaltation of hierarchy, and the persecution of dissenters. While the point is convincing, the extent to which Corpus Christi replaced the spirit of Carnival is debatable. In other parts of Catholic Europe, moreover, the feast of Christ's body did not necessarily coincide with the public punishment of heretics. How distinct was Spain in this respect?

The same question might be asked of royal entries,

which in Spain, according to Ruiz, were occasions not just for the celebration but also for the contestation of royal power. This can be observed, as one might expect, in the fiercely autonomous kingdom of Aragón, but also in the more placid cities of Castile. The factional struggles of courtiers, the ambitions of town oligarchs, and the grievances of the common people were played out through intricate scenarios involving fine distinctions of precedence, in the presence of an often helpless monarch. Philip II was not the first Spanish ruler to be subjected to these situations, and he was not to be the last, although royal entries became less common in the seventeenth century. It seems likely that Ruiz's conclusions about the contested nature of royal events can be applied to other monarchies as well. Certainly, officials in London and Paris were no less inclined than those in Barcelona or Seville to offer strong advice to monarchs through festive theater, poetry, and visual arts.

Although Philip II was ruler of many realms, Ruiz does not give much attention to celebrations outside Spain, which is understandable as he has a lot of ground to cover within the Iberian peninsula. The author's fascination with the details of festive events provides many delightful passages. He informs us about the costumes worn by knightly brotherhoods; he provides wonderful tales about chivalric vows to fight against all comers; he pauses to digress into a superb examination of "Moorish" dancing; and he includes a whole chapter on the *juego de cañas*, the mounted game of canes that regaled crowds at almost every major royal event. Although this book is too scholarly to appeal to a broad audience, it will surely delight academic readers. Perhaps it represents the final display of fireworks in Teofilo Ruiz's long-running exposition of royal ceremonies, but one hopes that for this great historian of Spain, the festivities will go on and on.

PAUL MONOD  
Middlebury College

SAMUEL COHN JR., MARCELLO FANTONI, FRANCO FRANCESCHI, and FABRIZIO RICCIARDELLI, editors. *Late Medieval and Early Modern Ritual: Studies in Italian Urban Culture*. (Europa Sacra, no. 7.) Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2013. Pp. viii, 364. €90.00.

In his introduction, Samuel Cohn Jr. declares that the essays gathered in this volume constitute neither a synthesis of recent scholarship on the nature and significance of late medieval and early modern ritual, nor an example of comparative study. Instead, says Cohn, the editors decided to exploit the strength of individual authors by encouraging them to "revisit traditional topics" and to consider them "through a new prism" (p. 2).

This introduction is followed by a densely written and exhaustively documented essay, entitled "Symbols and Rituals: Definition of a Field of Study," in which Marcello Fantoni returns to the concept of civic ritual as introduced several decades ago in the work of such historians as Richard Trexler and Edward Muir. Among the numerous issues that Fantoni canvasses are the use

and conceptualization of civic ritual, its implications for the periodization of premodern European culture, and its frequent association with highly circumscribed studies that do not attempt, or are unable, to incorporate the dynamic of long-term change. He remarks that despite a half century of work in this field, no unified picture of Italian ritual has emerged.

The essays are divided into four parts. The first, "Consensus and Social Identity," which concentrates on Tuscan cities and republics, opens with a lucid piece by Ilaria Taddei, who explains how ritual form was embedded in the minutely controlled electoral procedures of medieval Florence, and the theatrically public investiture of the commune's highest officials. Franco Franceschi's sensitive—and nicely complementary—chapter on ritual in Florentine guilds portrays an ethos in which the world of work and the economy merged into an all-embracing ethic that simultaneously promoted religious piety and sociality. The author elucidates his argument with reference to guild oaths, ritual meals, death rituals, and public processions. The following two chapters, by Fabrizio Ricciardelli and Carlo Taviani, deal respectively with the rhetoric of political power as expressed in ritualized relations between Florence and its subject territories, and the significance and efficacy of sworn oaths in brokering peace in the period of the Italian Wars.

Part II, "Family and Gender," the book's shortest section, consists of two chapters. Guido Alfani surveys rituals surrounding baptism, the appointment of godparents, and the impact of Tridentine reform on the baptismal rite. The second, by Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, seeks to revise the context for interpreting the significance of the earliest female nude images of the quattrocento, which constituted the decorative program on many fourteenth- and fifteenth-century marriage chests. Klapisch-Zuber's powerful argumentative distillation links these nudes with contemporary social developments, medical thinking, and attitudes to imagery; she offers an important caution regarding the potentially erroneous assumptions that even specialist scholars can make about seeing in the literal sense.

In part III, entitled "Death and Violence," William Caferro, like Klapisch-Zuber, takes an apparently familiar theme (in this case the ritualized staging of public insult in war), and demonstrates not only that it has received less attention than one might have assumed, but that it also has often been comprehended within an erroneous or even anachronistic frame of reference. Caferro lifts military insults and rituals of triumph and celebration out of the limited context in which they have been seen (that of the individual city-state), and refigures them as elements in a binary dialogue of honor and shame between different city-states and a range of protagonists. John A. Marino's richly detailed essay on the invention of the genre of "pictorial biography" for the funeral rites for Philip II staged in Florence in November 1598, and the Jesuit-inspired use of recondite symbolism employed in the array of *imprese* for Philip's Neapolitan exequies in January 1599, un-



ravels the “local distinctiveness” (p. 232) and larger significance of rituals staged for the same monarch in two different places. Andrea Zorzi’s chapter (a revised translation of an essay published in 1993) considers the destabilizing presence in urban society of young boys whom Florentines called *fanciulli* (they went by other names in different places). Zorzi explains how society’s elders struggled to incorporate and control a group that, capable as it was of performing acts of sickening public violence, nevertheless fulfilled an important symbolic role by ritualistically expelling the contaminating bodies of convicted malefactors from the community.

Part IV comprises chapters on “Civic and Power Rituals.” The first, Maria Antonietta Visceglia’s chapter on the complicated, shifting relationship between popes and the Roman *municipium* in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is another reworking of an earlier published essay (in this case from 2005). Visceglia’s subtle analysis revises and complicates previous assumptions about a binary relationship between increasingly absolutist popes on the one hand and ever-fainter municipal culture and authority on the other. This is followed by an essay in which Genevieve Warwick examines Rome’s Piazza Navona to reveal how civic spaces from the city’s ancient, medieval, and Renaissance past were developed, used, and manipulated to incorporate public space as part of a princely theater for the performance of absolutist values. In the book’s penultimate chapter, Andrew Hopkins contends that in the sixteenth century, increasingly monarchical and theatrical ceremonial practices refashioned Venice’s doge as a distant, absolutist figure. Hopkins’s analysis encompasses the ritual of the mass in San Marco itself, extends to the utilization of the city in public procession, and concludes that the Venetian government systematically manipulated ecclesiastical architecture (at San Giorgio Maggiore, Il Redentore, and Santa Maria della Salute) to further the monarchizing trend that he identifies. The final chapter, by Giovanni Ricci, examines a series of ritual entrances to the city of Ferrara after the moment in 1598 when power passed from the lords of the Este family to the church. Ricci’s intriguing analysis teases out the details of a fragmentary and often partial documentary record, parsing the ritualized group behavior of youth, and interrogating shadowy events that attended on what he sees as the emergence of a new era of (not always welcome) papal authority.

I confess to experiencing some misgivings in reading this book, as the contributions vary considerably in quality, and there is less critical reflection on the concept of “early modern ritual” than I had expected in a volume explicitly dedicated to refining and advancing this field of inquiry. I was bewildered by the number of typographical and grammatical errors that litter the volume from start to finish, and by infelicities of expression that perhaps stem from unsatisfactory translation into English. I would refrain from mentioning such problems, were it not that these defects are often serious enough to obscure what an author is arguing, and are

distracting for the reader. Scholars will, nevertheless, find stimulating material in many of the essays that comprise this volume, regardless of their own areas of specialization.

NICHOLAS A. ECKSTEIN  
University of Sydney

NICHOLAS SCOTT BAKER. *The Fruit of Liberty: Political Culture in the Florentine Renaissance, 1480–1550*. (I Tatti Studies in Italian Renaissance History.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013. Pp. x, 368. Cloth \$49.95, e-book \$49.95.

In the early eighteenth century, at nearly the exact time that the first edition of Lodovico Muratortori’s *Rerum Italicorum Scriptores* was published for the first time, the ardent anti-Medicean antiquarian Francesco Settimanni chronicled the late Florentine republic through the principate of the Medici dukes in the sixteenth century in four handwritten volumes. Settimanni assembled not only sixteenth-century records and diaries, but also the *pareri*, or opinions, of statesmen like Francesco di Piero Vettori, Francesco Guicciardini, and Roberto di Donato Acciaiuoli concerning how the Florentine government should function after the fall of the republic in 1532. Settimanni prefaced this compilation with a scathing denunciation of the authors of the *pareri* as traitors and with selections from chronicles that portrayed in sordid detail the alleged crimes of Pope Clement VII and of Alessandro, the first Medici duke.

Although our modern views of the Medici principate are now less vitriolic (or not vitriolic at all), the sharp contrast between republican virtue before 1532 and courtly servility afterward has dominated the historical imagination, especially, as Nicholas Scott Baker mentions near the end of this rich, illuminating book, among the generation of American historians who wrote in the middle third of the twentieth century, perhaps best exemplified by Hans Baron’s *The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance* (1955) and J. G. A. Pocock’s *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (1975). Baker engages this tradition of scholarship as well as its challengers by arguing that the office-holding class in Florence retained continuity in their political interests and affiliations across the divide between republic and principate, and that as they shaped and reacted to their political world, the culture of this ruling class changed, redefining its conceptions of *virtù* and liberty. Baker argues in particular that the political crises of 1494, 1512, and 1527–1530 engendered conflicting definitions of liberty and a general shift from the notion of liberty as individual liberty within the state to an idea of the liberty of the sovereign state against its enemies. Both definitions coexisted during the republic but the political crises of the early sixteenth century prompted a shift decisively in favor of the latter. Baker’s argument is an extremely useful contribution to recent reappraisals of the meaning of liberty in the context of civic humanism in the later fifteenth century.

Since Baker's work is as much a cultural as it is a political history, he marshals a wide range of source material in support of his argument, including archival materials of state deliberations, letters between members of the office-holding elite, and literature. He also pins much of his argument on selected monuments of Florentine art, ranging from the frescoes of Domenico Ghirlandaio, through the mannerists Agnolo Bronzino and Jacopo da Pontormo, and finally the sculpture of Michelangelo and portraits of Francesco Salviati. By selecting carefully a few works of art and examining them in detail, Baker succeeds in linking the artistic patronage of Florence's office-holding class to the changes in their political fortunes. He relies on Carole Collier Frick's work on fashion to target the ways in which changes in the social identity of the ruling class manifested themselves in dress as well as in choice of artistic subject. Baker's instincts are sound, even if at times art fits argument almost too neatly. His use of it nonetheless succeeds admirably, and since each chapter has its selected works of art as symbols of its major theme, the narrative flows well and is easy to track.

After an introduction to the early history and social structure of the fifteenth-century Florentine republic, Baker moves immediately in the first chapter to the illustration of these status hierarchies in two frescoes by Ghirlandaio in the church of Santa Trinità in Florence, one for the newer Sasseti family, and the other for the more deeply rooted Tornabuoni family. Both frescoes reveal Florentines' fixation on lineage—a fixation that almost overwhelms the religious messages in the works—and the prevalence of what Baker calls “hyper-masculine space,” from which women were largely, though not totally, excluded (p. 45). In one of many delightfully pithy summations, Baker writes that “patriarchy does not explain how this society functioned, only how men idealized its functioning” (p. 43).

The following chapters treat the place of the Medici in this social hierarchy and the political crises that changed the culture of the office-holding class, but that left most of its membership intact. For Baker, the return of the Medici in 1512 brought great hope for stability, a hope disappointed by the larger role that a Medici pope played in Italian politics, which often ignored or even ran contrary to the immediate needs of the city and its office-holding class. Caught between divided loyalties to pope and emperor, Florentines during the siege found maintenance of the republic too costly. Baker is at pains to point out that there is little evidence of anti-republican ideology in the late 1520s and early 1530s, but that the republic's lack of military resources made the principate inevitable, a view to which the Guicciardini, Vettori, and other elite Florentine families eventually (but reluctantly) subscribed. The final chapters describe the gradual accommodation of ruling elites to their new role as Medici courtiers both in political and cultural terms.

Anxious as Baker is to de-emphasize the revolutionary or radical nature of this change, it is impossible to mask its political or cultural poignancy. Concluding

with the Confraternity of the Archangel Raphael's performance of David's battle with Goliath, and comparing it to Donatello's *David* of an earlier Medici period, Baker writes that “David was no longer a communal symbol but an avatar for the Medici prince,” associated no longer with republican virtue but with the ability of a Medici prince to preserve the liberty of the *stato* (p. 230). Expressions of abject servility in Florentine correspondence, so different from the robust exchanges of an earlier period, suggest a psychological shift as melancholy as it was profound, however gradual the political and ideological transition from republic to principate may have been.

PHILIP GAVITT  
Saint Louis University

GREGORY MURRY. *The Medicean Succession: Monarchy and Sacral Politics in Duke Cosimo dei Medici's Florence*. (I Tatti Studies in Italian Renaissance History.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014. Pp. 347. \$49.95.

In this stimulating account, Gregory Murry shows how Duke Cosimo I de' Medici (1519–1574) dexterously wove together pre-existing Florentine religious traditions to make his new sacral monarchy palatable to the proud, former Renaissance republic; indeed, to present himself as a terrestrial god. Dramatizing the assassination of Cosimo's predecessor, Duke Alessandro de' Medici, in 1537, and the compromise between the Florentine Senate and Emperor Charles V that brought the 17-year-old Cosimo to power, he underscores the problem of legitimacy that the young duke faced at the outset. Citing as his foremost exhibit Giorgio Vasari's famous fresco of *The Apotheosis of Cosimo I*, Murry argues that Cosimo “quite consciously set out to make his power not just legitimate but sacrosanct; to make his personage not just regal but divine; and to make himself into not just a prince but a god” (p. 7).

Contrary to what Florence's republican history might suggest, there were features of the city's cultural and religious past that favored such a strategy. Building on the work of Charles Trinkaus, Murry demonstrates that, despite the boundaries set by Christian monotheism, Florentine humanists celebrating the “dignity of man” (based on humanity's creation in God's image [Gen. 1: 27] and related themes) had done much to blur the distinction between the human and the divine: “terrestrial divinity was a surprisingly humdrum affair” (p. 19). Cosimo's propagandists, allowing themselves considerable verbal slippage, built on these legacies to present him as “a simulacrum of the God of the universe” (p. 20). Cosimo was “a divine being, but so was every man” (p. 49), and his apotheosis “dovetailed with the reigning assumptions of Florentine political culture” (p. 48).

Cosimo's claims to rule by divine right fell on equally fertile soil. A strong Augustinian strain still infused humanist thought and the notion of divine providence was ubiquitous. Taken as signs of virtue, Cosimo's victories



at Scannagallo and Montemurlo could be proof of divine election by merit. Moreover, providence could be multi-causal: Cosimo's election by the Florentine Senate did not contradict but manifested the will of God working through the people, making Cosimo both "a divine and republican prince" (p. 97).

Niccolò Machiavelli and Girolamo Savonarola left complex legacies to contend with. Cosimo's response to Machiavelli was simple and, Murry believes, sincere. His propagandists presented him as an anti-Machiavellian epitomizing the utility and divinity of traditional moral virtues. When dispensing justice, Cosimo demonstrated both severity and clemency, earning his subjects' love as well as fear and facilitating civic life while legitimizing and divinizing his rule. He responded to Machiavelli's emasculating critique of Christianity by framing himself as unafraid to make war for the sake of peace, particularly with regard to Italy. Savonarola and the *Piagnoni* were more difficult. While attempting to expel the friars from San Marco, Cosimo set about "purloining the cowed friar's program of moral legislation point for point . . . thus the Savonarolan prince could pose very easily under the colors of the Counter-Reformation" (pp. 163–164). His legislation against blasphemy, sodomy, prostitution, and gambling was suffused with a Savonarolan fear of divine retribution. Through direct government subventions, reform of hospitals, sumptuary legislation, prosecution of usury, and the *Monte di pietà*, Cosimo made himself the "father of the poor" (p. 178). Reforming the clergy, especially the nunneries, by moving clients into key positions helped Cosimo "conquer" secular and regular clergy alike with the aim, like Savonarola, of a broader reform of society (p. 186).

Ecclesiastical patronage was a reflection of heavenly intercession, and rather than assert statist control over the church, Cosimo reverted to the strategy of his fifteenth-century Medicean predecessors: making himself an essential mediator between benefices in Florence and favors in Rome. He inherited from his forebears not a bank but control of a number of Tuscan bishoprics, and despite the hostility of Pope Paul III (1534–1549), Cosimo was able by shrewd marriages and well-cultivated friendships to build a patronage network within the College of Cardinals that facilitated the elections of his allies, Julius III (1550–1555) and Pius IV (1559–1565). To preserve that network, Cosimo supported the Inquisition in the early 1550s; faced with the less helpful Paul IV (1555–1559), he became more alert to his own juridical prerogatives. He made himself the defender of local religion, supporting the patronage rights of local families and communities. Circumspect in his own patronage, he maintained traditional family interests and intervened indirectly in other institutions. He subtly reshaped the city's rituals and sacred calendar, moving himself to the center of the festival of St. John the Baptist, Florence's patron saint, and favoring Medici saints' days, while avoiding direct challenges to Florence's civic religious traditions. A survey of 1,400 testaments over the years 1520–1559 shows that 93 per-

cent of Florentine testators identified as Catholic and over half made bequests for commemorative masses (pp. 231–234). Cosimo readily fed this belief in purgatory by seeking indulgences for the city (though he preferred that the revenues remain in Florence). He trusted the miracles of his family's Virgin of Santissima Annunziata more than the popular image of the Virgin of Impruneta, eventually displacing her with a newer cult of the Virgin of La Quercia.

Murry writes with panache and supports his arguments with a mass of archival and manuscript materials documented in extensive endnotes. More discussion of how Cosimo coordinated the message of his numerous propagandists, and how it was received, would have been helpful. Unfortunately, a "Glossary of Names" is oddly selective and the index is minimal, making it difficult to track the many preachers, eulogists, and other *litterati* who flash across Murry's text. Nevertheless, he amply makes the case for the importance of religious legitimation to Cosimo I and for taking religion seriously in Renaissance politics.

DAVID S. PETERSON

Washington and Lee University

THOMAS F. MAYER. *The Roman Inquisition: On the Stage of Italy, c. 1590–1640*. (Haney Foundation Series.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. Pp. 361. \$79.95.

*The Roman Inquisition: On the Stage of Italy, c. 1590–1640* is the middle installment of the late Thomas F. Mayer's trio of books on the Roman Inquisition and Galileo. Mayer set out initially to write a single book on the Galileo affair, but his planned chapter on the Inquisition grew into not one, but two volumes. In the first book (*The Roman Inquisition: A Papal Bureaucracy and Its Laws in the Age of Galileo* [2013]), Mayer examined the early development of the Congregation of the Holy Office in Rome. The third volume, on the Galileo affair itself, is due out this year. In the work under review here, Mayer explores the congregation's interactions with local tribunals. Mayer aims to fit the Holy Office into the context of the rest of the church's bureaucratic structure and, especially, the political and diplomatic ties that entangled the states of the Italian peninsula.

Writing the middle installment of a trilogy is perilous, as it is neither beginning nor end. Some of the audience will have skipped the opening work and some will have not. It cannot provide the full, satisfying conclusion. Although Mayer strives to make this volume stand on its own, it is best read after its predecessor. And the payoff of his detailed account here of the Florentine Inquisition's activities is somewhat obscure. One hopes that the forthcoming Galileo volume will draw on this work to create a richer understanding of one of the most famous inquisitorial incidents.

The point of departure for this book is Mayer's argument that the Inquisition was fundamentally a political institution. This claim is not entirely novel, as Mayer himself acknowledges. Mayer's key contribution

is instead his close attention to detail, which reveals what that broad claim of a political Inquisition meant in practice. He traces specific cases in depth to show how popes developed and wielded the Inquisition alongside other political tools, especially diplomacy, and how secular leaders sought, with varying success, to parry papal pretensions.

Mayer's case studies are the cities of Naples, Venice, and Florence. Mayer rarely offers fundamental challenges to current understandings of these local tribunals, although this is not to say he is uncritical. He does not hesitate to correct the existing literature based on his own reading of the sources. But his primary accomplishment is to deepen our understanding of these local tribunals by linking them to the international political scene and the longer-term institutional development of the Roman Inquisition. For Naples, the arc of Mayer's story is one of rising papal power achieved largely by Pope Urban VIII at the expense of the Spanish. In Venice, Mayer focuses on the pontificate of Paul V and the long shadow of the Venetian interdict of 1606–1607. Here, Mayer reads the absence of information about the Venetian inquisitors as indicative of their relative insignificance and emphasizes instead the nuncio's influence in the tribunal, demonstrating the increasingly close ties between Rome's inquisitorial and diplomatic activities. He also highlights, as others have, the consistent success Venice's government had in protecting those living in the republic, when it wanted to. The Florentine chapters revolve around the long papal pursuit of the Alidosi family, clients of the Grand Duke and (not incidentally) of the French crown. Here Mayer finds secular government less able to thwart papal intentions as expressed through the Inquisition, though the Holy Office was kept at bay for nearly three decades. The extent to which that delay was attributable to the Florentines or to the French is somewhat unclear in Mayer's telling.

Like *The Roman Inquisition: A Papal Bureaucracy and Its Laws in the Age of Galileo*, this work reveals prodigious amounts of research. Chapter 3 alone includes over 500 endnotes in its 50 pages. Mayer relies heavily on the records of the Congregation of the Holy Office, especially the decree registers and limited surviving correspondence. In addition to curial sources, he uses local archives (though only the Venetian tribunal's records remain substantially intact) and a wide range of other published and archival materials. The level of descriptive detail occasionally overwhelms the analysis, but Mayer's wry humor and eye for a good anecdote help to lighten the load.

Mayer's Rome-centric approach complements studies rooted in the local context of tribunals. However, this perspective, combined with Mayer's emphasis on a handful of particularly high-profile cases in each city, suggests that generalizing his broader conclusions should be done with care. Mayer argues that his findings reveal the "degree to which politics determined the outcome" of these cases (p. 219). But Mayer's research also shows that the Italian inquisitions were complex insti-

tutions and that complexity left room for much variation. The activities of Roman and local inquisitorial officials varied not only across space and time, but also from case to case. The political implications of and inquisitorial approach to a case featuring a Tommaso Campanella or Rodrigo Alidosi differed from that featuring a poor defendant with only a baptismal name accused of stealing holy oil, or an artisan denounced for heretical blasphemy. Mayer's thorough descriptions of struggles between Rome and local governments also threaten to give the misimpression that lay authorities and inquisition tribunals were consistently at odds. Ecclesiastical and lay authorities both had interests in maintaining religious order, even if those interests did not always align perfectly.

Nevertheless, Mayer provides a crucial analysis of the ways in which inquisitorial activities could fit into the political agenda of the popes and illuminates both the power and limits of the inquisitions as papal tools in the context of Italian political rivalries. As with his first volume, this work will be essential to anyone seeking a fuller understanding of the Roman Inquisition at the turn of the seventeenth century.

JONATHAN SEITZ  
Drexel University

PASCHALIS M. KITROMILIDES, *Enlightenment and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greece*. English ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013. Pp. xvi, 452. \$55.00.

Few cases in recent history speak more eloquently to the vexing relationship between economic decline and extremism than the ongoing Greek debt crisis and the ascendance of political parties like Golden Dawn. Greece's runaway public spending and institutionalized corruption have repeatedly rocked the Eurozone and, periodically, even the world economy, galvanizing chthonic passions and prejudices there and abroad. Paschalis M. Kitromilides is undoubtedly one of the greatest living authorities on the history of modern Greek political philosophy, and in the magisterial work here under review he seeks the sources of his homeland's "politics of unreason" in the "deeper and endemic pathology in the country's political life" resulting from its failed Enlightenment in the long eighteenth century (pp. ix–x). Though such a connection might ultimately not establish causality, its learned investigation is nonetheless deeply rewarding.

Kitromilides's wide-ranging synthesis of the Greek Enlightenment is a dazzling mosaic of people and places, ideas and inflections that, though intrinsically part of the wider European world's tumultuous long eighteenth century, remain largely unknown to non-Hellenophone historiography; from the striking geography of intellectual life in Greece under Ottoman rule through Nikolaos Mavrokordatos's readings of John Locke in the early 1720s, and the remarkable and anonymously published *Hellenic Nomarchy* of 1806 to the counter-Enlightenment crusade of Panayiotis Kodrikas



and the eventual triumph of conservatism, self-interest, and authoritarian romanticism. While we have come to know quite a lot about how ancient Greek history and exemplars influenced the eighteenth century, Enlightenment Greece itself has been considered far more rarely. Kitromilides's greatest achievement lies precisely in expounding the largely unknown world of the Greek Enlightenment and its diaspora, as well as its complex international situation and the structural reasons for what he sees as its eventual failure to produce a modern, liberal, and functioning democracy.

The Enlightenment, which Kitromilides generally equates with the "amelioration of the human condition" (p. 10), largely arrived in the Greek-speaking world through Italian intermediaries, be they translations, academic peregrinations to universities like Padua, or the key Greek presses in Venice, Trieste, and Vienna (p. 55). As such, the Greek Enlightenment was not merely spatially but also chronologically distant from the movement's eighteenth-century core, leading to a fascinating situation in which Cesare Beccaria's ideas on penal reform, the Terror of the French Revolution, and the "highly contentious" concept of heliocentrism could all spark debates around the same time (pp. 51, 187–188, 274). Kitromilides powerfully highlights that, as a result of this temporal delay in the reception of European intellectual debates, "in modern Greek culture the Enlightenment provoked rather than resolved the dispute between Ancients and Moderns" (p. 156). Indeed, the modalities of international emulation, the ways of adopting foreign ideas and policies to new soils, and the wide array of historical and present experiences available to Greek reformers provide some of the book's most intriguing passages. This bird's-eye perspective on Greek intellectual life in a wider European context also reveals the subterranean tension in Greece between an emerging, eventually overpowering nationalism and a wish for foreign saviors, which during the period analyzed by *Enlightenment and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greece* included Catherine II, French revolutionary forces, the British protectorate of the Ionian Islands, and, one might add, the present-day Troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (e.g., pp. x–xi, 130, 309). Indeed, Kitromilides's reading of the *Hellenic Nomarchy*—effectively that "[l]iberation could be achieved only through the common strivings and united efforts of all patriotic Greeks" (p. 246)—seems eerily resonant in light of contemporary politics. *Enlightenment and Revolution* is the reworked translation of a 1996 Greek edition, itself a recasting of the author's 1979 Harvard dissertation, written under the influence of the likes of Louis Hartz and Judith Shklar (p. 3). Apart from a cursory engagement with the recent work of Jonathan Israel and John Robertson in the new introduction, *Enlightenment and Revolution* itself predominantly rests on—and engages with—the historiography of the 1950s–1970s, producing an at times bewildering juxtaposition of old paradigms and new texts that perhaps fittingly echoes its subject matter. When

Peter Gay's work is called upon for its revisionism with regards to the "older scholarship" on the concept of "enlightened despotism" (pp. 118 and 380, n. 1), for example, or when we read that "the method employed here attempts to follow that delineated in Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge, MA, 1936), 3–23" (p. 355, n. 1), the result is amusing, but readers are also left wondering what statements such as "the standards of the economics of the Enlightenment" might actually mean given the uncertainty of underlying historiographical assumptions (p. 127), especially since important recent works even on the Greek Enlightenment go entirely unmentioned.

Though it in the end may not explain what its subtitle suggests, *Enlightenment and Revolution* is a deeply erudite and welcome contribution to scholarship on Greece in the Enlightenment world that additionally offers a trenchant historical perspective on current events.

SOPHUS A. REINERT  
Harvard Business School

MICHAEL KITZING. *Für den christlichen und sozialen Volksstaat: Die Badische Zentrumspartei in der Weimarer Republik*. (Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, no. 163.) Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 2013. Pp. 471. €62.00.

One chapter in the story of National Socialism's defeat of German political Catholicism, the demise of the Baden Center Party (*Badische Zentrumspartei*, or BZP) marks a dramatic end to this expert account of a leading regional party in the Weimar Republic. A birthplace of German liberal constitutionalism, Baden owed its vibrant Weimar-era democracy to no small degree to traditional Catholics' avowed republicanism. Drawing from extensive research, Michael Kitzing paints a largely positive picture of Catholic politicians committed to republican values before succumbing to Nazi dictatorship. Explicitly political in approach, Kitzing's detailed chronicle, the first of the Weimar-era Center Party in Baden, will serve as a valuable resource for historians.

Focused on the Catholic milieu and politics of the Rhineland, Westphalia, and Bavaria, historians have hitherto evinced less interest in regions regarded as peripheral to national Catholic politics. Compensating for the absence of a central party archive by relying on the Catholic press and personal papers, Kitzing helps fill a lacuna by reconstituting the history of the Baden *Landtag*'s largest party from 1919 to the last Weimar *Landtag* election in 1929. Nationally, the German Center Party (*Deutsche Zentrumspartei*, or DZP) drew more votes for *Reichstag* elections from Baden voters than did any other party through July 1932, when it was overtaken by the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP); the BZP also sent two chancellors, Josef Wirth and Constantin Fehrenbach, and one finance minister, Heinrich Köhler, to the national stage.

The study of political Catholicism has benefited in

recent years from the so-called religious turn in European history, prompting an expanded understanding of the relationships between Catholic parties and Catholic cultures. Much contested as an analytical paradigm, the notion of a Catholic milieu nevertheless continues to suggest to many German historians the significance of interrelated structures of Catholic religious, social, and political life from the 1870s to the 1960s. That Kitzing treats the Catholic press and interest organizations separately from the BZP's narrative makes clear that he is less concerned with such issues. Similarly, we learn far more about the party's policies than we do about its supporters, including its female *Landtag* representatives and the female voters constituting an estimated two-thirds of the BZP's electorate. Interconfessionalism also plays little role in this analysis, although Protestant-Catholic relations were notably progressive in Baden, as made evident by the decades-long tradition of confessionally mixed public schools.

Indeed, Kitzing spends relatively little time situating the Baden Center Party in a national context. Unusual among German Catholic parties, the BZP was led almost continuously from 1888 to 1933 by a cleric hand-picked by his predecessor. Regarded as symptomatic of crisis in other Catholic parties, including the DZP which sought consciously in the Weimar years to reduce its reliance on priests, the selection of a clergyman as party head was, according to Kitzing, both Baden tradition and a function of the region's undeveloped and schismatic bourgeoisie. Largely rural and lower-middle class, the party's homogenous membership further solidified support for a strong leader unchallenged by large agrarian, industrial, or working-class interests.

Immune to the tensions that roiled other regional Catholic parties between conservatives and liberals over workers' rights, interconfessionalism, and the role of the clergy in politics, the Baden Center Party appears to have sidestepped many of the modernizing impulses coursing through pre-1933 political Catholicism. And yet the party's politics were anything but retrograde, as the BZP undertook a smooth conversion to republicanism in 1918 and, in contrast to the DZP consistently refused to govern with the anti-republican German National People's Party (DNVP). Kitzing credits Baden Catholics' democratic policies to the German southwest's long-standing republican traditions and shared battle with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) against national liberalism, but also, ironically, to the authority of commanding figures, particularly a new generation of party leaders from modest social origins, including prelate Joseph Schofer, chair from 1921 to 1930.

Ultimately, the party's lack of internal democracy would cost it dearly, as did its failure to professionalize its internal structures (until last-ditch efforts beginning in 1930), requiring an ongoing reliance on the Catholic press and caritative bodies, such as the *Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland*, for organization. The disproportionate influence of party leaders was laid bare by prelate Ernst Föhr, who after becoming chair of the party in 1931 pursued a more particularist Catholic

agenda focused on confessional schools and a concordat. Föhr's efforts succeeded in ending the BZP's 14-year-long coalition with the SPD, profoundly weakening Baden's government at a time of unprecedented challenge. Having entered the *Landtag* in 1929, the NSDAP steadily chipped away at the Catholic milieu to displace the BZP in the July 1932 election as Baden's largest party. A supporter of a DZP-NSDAP coalition, Föhr would declare his loyalty to the new regime in June 1933, even after fellow party members, including Anton Hilbert, suffered Nazi imprisonment. In early July, the Baden Center Party officially dissolved, its downfall representative of the larger collapse of political Catholicism in the face of Nazi assault.

Surprisingly, Kitzing makes no mention of the Baden Center Party's legacies. Despite Föhr's fears of interconfessionalism and efforts to reestablish a postwar DZP, the majority of former Center Party *Landtag* representatives and members drew upon their interwar experiences, both positive and negative, to support the new post-Nazi movement of Christian Democracy. Simultaneously a pillar of Weimar regional democracy, exemplar of political Catholicism's failure to withstand Nazism, and incubator of West German postwar democracy, the Baden Center Party has long deserved an in-depth history. Fortunately, Michael Kitzing has provided us a very good one.

MARIA D. MITCHELL  
Franklin & Marshall College

SABINE T. KRIEBEL. *Revolutionary Beauty: The Radical Photomontages of John Heartfield*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2014. Pp. xi, 336. \$65.00.

John Heartfield (1891–1968) was one of the most significant visual artists of the twentieth century. Sabine T. Kriebel's sophisticated study contributes enormously to our understanding of how and why. During World War I, Heartfield was one of the Berlin Dadaists who originated photomontage. From 1929 to 1938 his brilliantly montaged satires played a serious role in Communist publications, especially Willi Münzenberg's Comintern-aligned *Workers' Illustrated Newspaper* (AIZ). *Adolf the Übermensch: Eats Gold and Spouts Junk*, among others, provides a textbook illustration of Heartfield's caustic anti-Nazi propaganda and of photomontage technique: editing and combining images and texts to infiltrate them with alternative meanings.

*Revolutionary Beauty: The Radical Photomontages of John Heartfield* analyzes this middle period in Heartfield's career, from the decline and fall of the Weimar Republic through his exile from Nazi Germany in Prague, Paris, and England. Kriebel's interest is at heart thematic and theoretical. She draws on primary and archival sources and on previous scholarship, particularly the pioneering work of the East German scholar Roland März, as well as on a range of theorists, including Louis Aragon, Walter Benjamin, and Siegfried Kracauer, to explicate these images' complex res-



onances on two planes: the political and the psychological.

Kriebel assiduously identifies individuals (e.g., Berlin's chief of police), occupations (e.g., coal porter), phrases, and events obscure today. She recreates Heartfield's painstaking process and explains modern printing technologies, such as rotogravure, that enabled his AIZ works' seamless surfaces. One of these serves as the book's cover image, *On the Occasion of the Crisis Party Conference of the SPD* (1931), in which a "slick-haired capitalist smoothly metamorphoses into a savagely growling tiger" (p. 236). Such mashups inspired the 1935 essay by surrealist Aragon, "John Heartfield et la beauté révolutionnaire." Invoking Aragon, who moved to Marxism without abandoning Freud, signals Kriebel's contention that Heartfield's best photomontages comment topically while impacting psychically, evoking trauma (rooted in World War I) and uncanny slippages between human and animal, man and machine, life and death. His style and his content evolved away from what Benjamin identified as Dada's "ballistic" rupturing of the real, to unified images that could be real, if reality were dream or nightmare.

The introduction establishes Kriebel's intention to read Heartfield's AIZ work aesthetically and internationally, and to "repoliticize" it through the concept of "suture." Chapter 1 positions Heartfield as a historical and self-fashioned subject. Born Helmut Herzfeld, he changed his name to John Heartfield during World War I as a rebuke to anti-English propaganda. In a 1929 self-portrait he introduced himself to readers of AIZ, announcing his intention to use photographs and scissors as weapons. Chapter 2 alerts us to the central role of Benjamin for Kriebel's understanding of photography and montage, and also situates Heartfield's contributions relative to the work of other artists and to commercial imagery. The richly historical chapter 3 captures the ferocious confrontations of Weimar's last year, 1932, when Heartfield's photomontages moved from AIZ's interior to its front page. Chapter 4 fascinatingly interprets his work through Communist theorists' prescriptions for humor as weapon, including Georg Lukács's "holy hate," Anatolii Lunacharskii's "revolutionary laughter," Mikhail Bakhtin's "revolutionary grotesque," and Benjamin's "resuscitation of slapstick and Mickey Mouse for revolutionary purposes" (p. 208). This complex web of interpretation builds on cultural historian Anson Rabinbach's work to interpret Heartfield's increasingly horrific exilic images of Nazism. An attentive reader might be startled by the statement opening this chapter's endnote: "On Heartfield's relation to his own Judaism at this time" (p. 294, n. 128), especially having read earlier that after he and his siblings were abandoned by their parents, Heartfield grew up "a Protestant boy raised in a Catholic household in imperial Austrian society" (p. 25). Heartfield's father (pen-named Franz Held and banished for blasphemy from Germany) came from a prominent, assimilated Rhineland Jewish family. Heartfield did not cultivate a "Jewish" identity, although assimilation and

name changes *were* aspects of German-Jewish identity for Jews desiring public careers. In the guidebook to the 1937 "Degenerate Art" exhibition, the Nazis referred in bold to Heartfield's writer brother as "The Jew Wieland Herzfelde" (he had added an "e" to the family name). Judaism, antisemitism, and abandonment surely also played a role in Heartfield's unorthodox activism—Kriebel calls him a *Gefühlskommunist*, "in . . . critical dialogue with the KPD" (p. 46)—and, I would hazard, following Freud, contributed to his use of humor as a political weapon and personal defense. Chapter 5 analyzes surrealist aspects of Heartfield's work, followed by a short epilogue.

Kriebel employs film theory's "suture" hypothesis to argue that the seamless, alternate reality of Heartfield's AIZ work fostered viewers' connection to and identification with fictional images and narratives. As an example, she suggests that the arm of a reader holding an issue of AIZ could have entered the visual field of the montage depicting the raised arms and fists of a black and a white worker, causing the viewer/reader to identify and unite with them. This ingenious, speculative interpretation remains more difficult to substantiate than the admiration of intellectuals such as Benjamin or Heartfield's influence on artists such as the Spanish Equipo Crónica group, German Klaus Staeck, or American Barbara Kruger, as well as on commercial graphic designers, including Nazis.

To substantiate the suturing of a common reader, Kriebel offers the elegant framing device for *Revolutionary Beauty*: a 1939 letter from one S. B. Flint, a British colonial living in India. Mrs. Flint had seen Heartfield's works in an English publication, and innocently wrote to him requesting that he create a montage using a photo of her son, fallen in the Great War, showing him in graduation gowns he never got to wear rather than the military uniform in which he died. Photomontage, on this evidence, promised to reanimate history's morbid photographic traces, eliding trauma. Heartfield's best work, as Kriebel shows, eschewed this anodyne project in favor of disquieting disenchantment.

PETER CHAMETZKY  
University of South Carolina

TOMASZ KAMUSELLA. *The Politics of Language and Nationalism in Modern Central Europe*. Foreword by PETER BURKE. Paperback ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Pp. xxviii, 1140. \$34.95.

In this 1140-page volume, Tomasz Kamusella provides an exhaustive and largely intellectual history of what he terms "language politics" in Central Europe. His account merges narratives of political and sometimes social histories of the region over the past two or more centuries with analyses of changing language usage among variously literate social groups, political and religious institutions, and regimes. Acknowledging at the outset the diverse historical meanings of the term "Central Europe," Kamusella limits its spatial dimensions in this study to the present-day Czech Republic, Hungary,

Poland, and Slovakia. The sheer volume of Kamusella's erudition and general knowledge on this broad subject, however, tempts him frequently to comment on neighboring regions and on the politics of their linguistic histories as well. This is to some degree appropriate and always fascinating, since the four modern states whose geographic borders define the histories he tells were frequently linked both institutionally—as parts of the Habsburg monarchy—and culturally to each other and to other present-day states in the region.

Kamusella opens his study with three introductory chapters that survey the linguistic development of today's German, Czech, Polish, Magyar, and Slovak languages. He then places them in a broader Central European linguistic context that explains their developmental, institutional, and political relations to several other languages in use in the territory stretching from the Baltics to the Balkans, from Sorbian or Esperanto to Lithuanian and Macedonian. Part I of the book opens on page 365, with a detailed analysis of Central European politics as they relate to issues of language use in the long nineteenth century. Part II of the book is even longer, although it takes the reader on a tour through the history of the so-called short twentieth century and what Kamusella calls the "triumph of the national." A brief (by the standards of this book) conclusion reiterates the most important analytic points about the two centuries. Kamusella includes an extremely useful and almost exhaustive 59-page bibliography that nevertheless surprises in its omissions of key works on this topic by Peter Haslinger, Joachim Hösler, Irina Livezeanu, or Tara Zahra.

The book offers readers impressively detailed summaries and intelligent juxtapositions of highly complex histories around political questions of language use, particularly in the ways it traces the replacement of Latin in governing institutions by vernacular written languages such as Magyar or Polish. There is probably no aspect of the institutional or growing politicization of language usage that Kamusella has not documented or analyzed. Yet precisely this strength becomes the book's biggest drawback. Its encyclopedic and erudite qualities often overwhelm Kamusella's critical analytic arguments, to the point where they undermine his best intentions. The book does make several important arguments. In particular Kamusella wants to draw our attention to the ways in which Central Europe experienced comparable developments, in terms of language use, to the states of what we generally call Western Europe, albeit at different historical periods. He also aims to improve scholarly knowledge of Central Europe so that historians will no longer perpetuate popular myths based on ideas about so-called ancient ethnic hatreds or balkanization that in his view explain nothing. In effect he wants to Europeanize a hitherto orientalized and mysterious East Central Europe, reminding us at the outset that "the Western European pedigree of politics of language is at present conveniently forgotten" (p. 6). Kamusella wants his genealogies of language use to

make us think far more historically about nationhood and its construction by particular kinds of activists.

Once Kamusella has articulated his arguments—and even where he repeats them—his writing becomes so focused on telling complex political and intellectual histories that he erects few signposts to keep readers fixed clearly on the larger trajectories of the arguments. Ironically the sheer volume of information he conveys could arguably reinforce a far less historically minded case for the essential continuity of nations throughout history, which is in no way Kamusella's intention. Moreover, because the book is essentially an intellectual-political history, Kamusella is occasionally unable to explain convincingly what produced the particular transformations he documents, or to explain their broader social and cultural ramifications. One small, almost accidental example of a blind spot in this book may suffice to suggest the particular shortcomings this approach can create, given its ambitious goals. Kamusella rightly notes in his conclusion the remarkable absence of women as authors or agents of the political-linguistic developments he documents before 1918 (p. 918). He attributes this absence in large part to what he calls the particularly patriarchal character of the regional societies he examined, although a comparison to other European societies could yield startlingly similar observations. Had Kamusella investigated the gendered character of most contemporary writing about linguistic-political developments, or the ways in which his writers gendered their subjects, he would have discovered an enormous preoccupation among nationalist and linguistic activists—many of whom were women—with women's obligation to transmit the national cultural essence—its language—to the next generation. This ideological obligation legitimated several critical policy choices in the states whose histories he documents. This enormously ambitious, highly informative, and almost encyclopedic work nevertheless misses occasional opportunities precisely to historicize those Central European outcomes it documents so well.

PIETER M. JUDSON

*European University Institute*

ZOFIA WÓYCICKA. *Arrested Mourning: Memory of the Nazi Camps in Poland, 1944–1950*. Translated by JASPER TILBURY. (Warsaw Studies in Contemporary History, no. 2.) New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2013. Pp. 311. \$76.95.

The symbol of the Nazi victimization of millions is the concentration camp. It may come as a surprise, therefore, that Europeans were disinclined to put victims of Nazi camps on a pedestal immediately after World War II. Irrespective of national history and political system, European countries that had been under Nazi occupation propagated the myth that all their citizens exhibited high moral standards under the German yoke and were united behind determined political leaders and brave fighters in their nation's intrepid resistance to and ultimate defeat of German fascism. In Western Europe,



this heroic myth helped bolster the restoration of bruised national dignity. In Eastern Europe, unpopular Soviet-installed Communist regimes used it to integrate society under their rule and legitimize their power. In neither Western nor Eastern Europe was there much room in this myth for the suffering of victims, be they civilians or soldiers. Victims were either relegated to the margins of society or assimilated into an overarching patriotic narrative. This was also the fate of former inmates of Nazi concentration and labor camps.

Zofia Wóycicka skillfully demonstrates the elevation in immediate postwar Poland of former Nazi camp prisoners from victims to heroes in *Arrested Mourning: Memory of the Nazi Camps in Poland, 1944–1950* (the original Polish edition of which was published in 2009). Wóycicka shows how, beginning in 1947, Polish Communists orchestrated personnel and organizational changes in the Polish Association of Former Political Prisoners of Nazi Prisons and Concentration Camps (PZbWP). They replaced non-Communists in the PZbWP's leadership with the party faithful and expelled the politically suspect from the rolls of its general membership, transforming it from a politically neutral association whose focus was helping former camp inmates and their families to an ideologically driven veterans' organization under the control of the Communist Party. These changes were accompanied by a propaganda campaign under the slogan of "the struggle against victimhood" (p. 61), which promoted the myth that party comrades spearheaded the underground resistance movements in the camps and that most Polish camp inmates were political prisoners in the vanguard of the struggle for freedom from Nazi oppression and for socialism in Poland. This myth served as an important source of legitimacy for the regime while satisfying a widespread social need to lend meaning to the suffering and deaths of hundreds of thousands who had been incarcerated by the Nazis for reasons unrelated to political motivations.

Former Jewish prisoners of Nazi camps who sought admission to the PZbWP were, with few exceptions, denied membership on the grounds that Jews were usually deported to camps on account of their race rather than their political activities. There was, however, a deeper reason for the wholesale rejection of their applications. Wóycicka writes: "It would seem that members of the PZbWP were motivated not so much by a desire to relativize or deny the extermination of the Jewish nation as by a total indifference towards the fate of those whom they did not consider 'their own.' The Jewish experience was beyond the bounds of their imagination" (p. 104).

Jewish survivors did not refrain, however, from lobbying for their own interpretation of the war years, at the heart of which was the distinctiveness of Jewish suffering. The efforts of the Central Committee of Jews in Poland, the official representative of postwar Polish Jewry, to play a role in commemorations of internees in Nazi camps, despite stiff opposition by the PZbWP and certain officials, underpins Wóycicka's main argu-

ment that, despite Communist intervention, construction of Polish memory of World War II in general and of prisoners' experiences in Nazi camps in particular was labile and part of public debate until the imposition of Stalinist orthodoxy in Poland in 1949–1950. As Wóycicka observes, "In the 1940s . . . memory of the war and occupation was still too raw and too detailed for it to be possible to erase all the cracks and contradictions and replace them with a simple black-and-white narrative. In addition, the new Communist authorities were not yet established well enough that they could impose their own interpretation of history" (p. 118). Wóycicka shows that, to the consternation of former Polish inmates of Auschwitz, representatives of the Central Committee of Jews in Poland persuaded the authorities in 1947 to permit it to organize an exhibition dedicated to the Nazi genocide of the Jews in one of the barracks standing on the new memorial site erected on the grounds of the camp; it existed there alongside exhibitions whose focus was the fate primarily of ethnic Poles in the camp. In 1950, however, the Jewish exhibition was dismantled when the Communist Party resolved to turn Auschwitz into a showcase for the ideological struggle spearheaded by the Soviet Union against Western imperialism, which was presented as being in support of Nazism. Redesign of all the exhibitions entailed, as the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party instructed, that "the impression should not be given that Auschwitz was a place where exclusively Jews were exterminated—on the contrary, it must be shown that the enemy of the Jews was also the enemy of the Poles and others" (p. 227). From this moment on, the distinctive fate of Jews in Nazi camps became a taboo topic in public discourse.

The Communists went to great lengths to monopolize Polish memory, but Wóycicka's impressive study merely hints at the extent to which their efforts succeeded. The authorities put an end to the ubiquitous use of Catholic symbols and prayer services in official commemorations of the victims of Nazi camps in 1948. But the popularity of Zofia Kossak-Szczucka's 1946 memoir, *Z otchłani (From the Abyss)*, in which she contended that imprisoned ethnic Polish women, inspired by their Catholic faith, were morally superior to female inmates of other nationalities, especially Jewish women in Nazi camps, indicates that its Christian message resonated among many of the author's fellow Poles in this deeply religious country regardless of Communist Party dictates. In 1955, at the beginning of a political thaw in Poland, one stalwart Communist described the museum at Auschwitz as "a tacky stall of cheap anti-imperialist propaganda" (p. 269). It seems fair to say that for all their efforts, the Communists' assault on memory did not touch the hearts of Polish men and women.

GABRIEL N. FINDER  
University of Virginia

BRIGITTE LE NORMAND, *Designing Tito's Capital: Urban Planning, Modernism, and Socialism*. (Culture, Politics,

and the Built Environment.) Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014. Pp. xix, 300. \$27.95.

Brigitte Le Normand's monograph describes the complex economic, social, and political factors influencing the determination of urban policy in the design of Belgrade from 1950 to 1972. Clearly a policy study that focuses mainly on urban planners, it also discusses their debates with architects, sociologists, and politicians regarding not only the final outlines of Belgrade's two postwar "master plans," but also possibilities for implementation. In Le Normand's rendition, the story is mainly about the problem of housing, and by presenting it in that way she maintains our interest and tells us a great deal about how Yugoslav elites struggled to combine their socialist commitment to planning and egalitarianism with a promise that Yugoslav citizens could achieve "the good life" by means of market socialism. In that sense, her work contributes nicely to the scholarship initiated by Patrick Hyder Patterson.

Le Normand begins by describing the long-standing faith of Yugoslav architects and urban planners in a utopian modernist vision based on Le Corbusier's 1943 "Athens Charter," which adopted a holistic, centralized approach to urban planning founded on science, technology, and public health. It presumed that in a modern functionalist city, residents would live in tall apartment buildings surrounded by all necessary services and expansive green spaces. Industrial activities would be located on the outskirts, but all other forms of employment would be as close as possible to residential areas to reduce transportation. From a socialist perspective, the housing provided by this model was affordable, efficient, healthy, and egalitarian. By 1948, Belgrade's politicians agreed to move the city center across the Sava River, creating New Belgrade; the entire master plan, incorporating significant aspects of the Athens Charter, was adopted by the Municipal Council in 1950.

By that time, however, the Josip Tito-Joseph Stalin split had already delayed implementation of the plan. Yet it was only one of many difficulties. Indeed, most of the rest of the book details the frustrations faced by urban planners in their efforts to realize a modern functional city. Two of the most serious problems were a lack of resources and extremely rapid migration to Belgrade, resulting by the late 1950s in a massive housing shortage. Although construction of large-scale apartment blocks began in New Belgrade and elsewhere, they were entirely inadequate both because the promised services, in the form of stores, schools, and public transport, did not materialize and because housing distribution was less egalitarian than anticipated. Employers distributed the apartments first to highly paid and skilled employees, leaving unskilled and low-wage employees to seek housing from those available for sublet at outrageous prices.

By the 1960s, Yugoslavia moved toward "market socialism," which loosened state controls over finance and banking in hopes that consumers would use their own reserves to build homes. Indeed they did, but often il-

legally, using scavenged materials outside city limits on land lacking water or electricity. Such "wild" or "rogue" construction was considered a serious problem by the state, and especially urban planners offended by its incursion into their blueprint for a compact regulated environment. Yet, part of Yugoslavia's "workers' self-management" was precisely the notion that socialism would no longer dictate from above but be created from below. Elites now felt obliged to ask citizens what kind of housing they preferred and it seemed that most wanted single family homes.

That knowledge did not, however, change the strategy of Belgrade's urban planners. The 1972 master plan for Belgrade still relied largely on apartment buildings, although it also included some space for individual family homes now on legal plots mainly on the outskirts of the city. As Le Normand explains, "Planners defended and continued to advocate a collectivist residential model as best suited to Yugoslavia's economic means . . . However, the new generation of town planners had left the Athens Charter behind, because they . . . had been robbed of the illusion that they could exert control over the behavior of the citizenry as a result of the intractable housing crisis, the state's inability to coerce the city's inhabitants to obey the law, and the state's drift toward a semi-market-based economy" (p. 242).

Le Normand's book is fascinating, but not always easy to follow. Her focus on elites, while understandable, comes at the expense of the consumers whom she introduces but does not always give sufficient air time. We learn just enough about them to leave us begging for more. Furthermore, Le Normand might have articulated more clearly her discussion of how differences between federal and local officials and city planners influenced Belgrade's urban development. In the competition for scarce resources, federal officials focused on macro-level economics and politics, local officials struggled to resolve an immediate housing crisis, while urban planners held to their vision of a coherent modern city. This important argument deserved broader attention in her introduction and conclusion.

Finally, Le Normand's story needed an epilogue. For those who have spent time in Belgrade since the 1970s, the end felt unsatisfying as it left so much unsaid. We know that the promised services were eventually provided and that residents of New Belgrade now enjoy shopping, public transportation, and the promised green space along the Sava River. Yet we also know that the highly vaunted subway system in the 1972 master plan has never been completed. We know that traffic and parking in Belgrade remain horrific and that the city's environmental problems are far from resolved, but that most citizens are proud of their city and especially the Sava Centar. Admittedly, the book is a policy study and such issues lie in the realm of implementation. Still, they clearly contribute to the question of how and to what extent Yugoslav elites were able to reconcile their utopian and egalitarian ideals with more pragmatic issues of urban development, and that is the core of Le Normand's argument. These are relatively



minor complaints, however, and this book remains an excellent contribution to urban studies and the social history of postwar Yugoslavia.

CAROL S. LILLY

University of Nebraska at Kearney

TOMAS SNIEGON. *Vanished History: The Holocaust in Czech and Slovak Historical Culture*. (Making Sense of History: Studies in Historical Cultures, no. 18.) New York: Berghahn Books, 2014. Pp. ix, 236. \$95.00.

This book provides an analysis of the Holocaust's position in Czech and Slovak historical culture during "the long 1990s," a period that commenced with the Velvet Revolution of 1989 and developed toward the Czech Republic's and Slovakia's entry into the European Union in 2004. As such, it covers an important lacuna in historiography. While the topic of the commemoration and historicization of the Holocaust has received generous scholarly attention in some post-Communist countries, this has not been the case in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. This neglect had its origins in the Communist period when the regime needed to avoid the risk that the suffering of the Jews would evolve into a competing narrative to the Communists' suffering and heroism. However, as the book reveals, even the fall of the Communist regime had no apparent effect to counter the exclusion of the Holocaust from Czech and Slovak history.

In order to ensure that even readers without background knowledge in Czech and Slovak history can benefit from its findings, the first three chapters of the book provide a historical, historiographical, and theoretical introduction to the topic. In this context, the different fates of Czech and Slovak Jews are especially relevant. An especially significant example is that in the Czech territory, "the final solution" was the responsibility of the occupying power, Germany. By contrast, in Slovakia, the deportations were organized by the domestic regime led by Jozef Tiso, a Catholic priest.

The introductory chapters are followed by four case studies that reflect different attitudes to the final solution and its memory during the period of transition from Communism to democracy, when the old Czechoslovak Communist narrative was replaced with new discourses. The first case study focuses on the Czech and Slovak historical debates, which followed different trajectories, against the background of Czechoslovakia's division in 1990–1992. In the Czechoslovak period Slovakia was never compelled to reflect on its role in the Holocaust, which constituted a major crime of the Tiso regime. After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, Slovak nationalist interpretations typically neglected the question of Tiso's personal responsibility, an attitude that at the extreme could even border on Holocaust denial. Whereas in the Communist period the Holocaust featured in Czech literature and films as a metaphor of the individual's fight against a totalitarian power, after the fall of Communism the Nazi genocide of Jews and other

groups was not thematized in Czech culture either at the individual or at the collective level.

The second case study revolves around an exceptionally influential if controversial historical-cultural product about the Holocaust, Steven Spielberg's film *Schindler's List* (1994), the main protagonist of which is a former Czechoslovak citizen. It studies the Czech reactions to the film in relation to the Americanization of the Holocaust and concludes that the impulse provided by the film was not strong enough to challenge the prototypical understanding of the Czech nation as a collective victim of its much stronger German neighbor. The third case study addresses the Roma Holocaust by looking at the debates about two memorial sites, where, during World War II, there were two concentration camps for Roma from the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia who were threatened with extermination. It concludes that the majority of Czech society was reluctant to accept that the Czech state also bore a share of responsibility for the Roma's tragic fate. The final case study scrutinizes the Holocaust's position in the new, post-Communist Slovak narrative by focusing on its representations in the Museum of Slovak National Uprising. It points out that the Holocaust receives attention in the exhibition, but without the explanation of the necessary historical context, which may be a sign of reluctance to address the problem of Slovak responsibility. It also indicates that engagement with the Holocaust in the museum is likely to have been motivated by the need to adhere to the demands of the international community as part of the Europeanization process, rather than being a genuine concern of Slovak society.

Tomas Sniegón's book makes an important contribution to the field. Its well-researched and persuasively argued empirical chapters offer a nuanced analysis of the Czech and Slovak historical narratives and also accommodate them in relation to Pan-European perspectives. Perhaps the concluding section could have also benefited from an attempt (however preliminary) at comparison with historical narratives on the Holocaust in some other Central and Eastern European countries. The book successfully fulfills the mission of Berghahn's *Making Sense of History* series to bridge the gap between historical theory and the study of historical memory. Official discourses promoted by European institutions typically point to the similarities between the Holocaust of Jews, *Shoah*, and the Holocaust of Roma, *Porrajmos*. This book has the merit that it calls attention to the need to consider both similarities and differences.

MONIKA BAÁR

University of Groningen

KRISZTINA FEHÉRVÁRY. *Politics in Color and Concrete: Socialist Materialities and the Middle Class in Hungary*. (New Anthropologies of Europe.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013. Pp. xv, 288. Cloth \$85.00, paper \$32.00, e-book \$27.99.

“Show me where you live, and I’ll tell you who you are!” (p. 79). With this proclamation, Hungarian home-decorating magazines of the 1960s encouraged the production of demanding consumer-citizens whose modern and forward-looking mentalities could be discerned in their material surroundings. Krisztina Fehérváry’s elegant, playful, and richly theorized anthropology of domestic materialities in Dunaújváros, Hungary, from the 1950s to the 1990s contextualizes post-socialist middle-class strivings against the backdrop of socialism’s creation of modern consumer subjectivities. Fehérváry argues that, while official culture in János Kádár-era Hungary “propagated the importance of domestic material culture for the development of a modern citizenry” (p. 51), after 1989, “Hungarians continued to attend closely to the qualities of goods and to equate certain materialities with human value and dignity” (p. 165). The retreat from politics into an idealized domesticity, in particular, turns out to have been a constant across system change.

Deftly splicing ethnography and cultural history, Fehérváry challenges assumptions of an abrupt disjuncture between the socialist and post-socialist periods and of the incommensurability of consumer-driven capitalism, on the one hand, and production-driven communism, on the other. Scholars’ tendency to focus on socialism’s economies of shortage, she suggests, has obscured the “robust materialities” of socialist consumption and how these were experienced (p. 114). Fehérváry’s book, in fact, joins a growing body of recent studies of consumption and everyday materialities under socialism. Few, however, so creatively explore socialist consumption’s aesthetic and affective dimensions or trace continuities in consumer subjectivities across the pre-/post-1989 divide.

Fehérváry conducted fieldwork in the 1990s, a time of rapid urban transformation in East Central Europe. Her focus on the new town of Dunaújváros—a model city begun in the late 1940s and intended, like other “socialist cities” of the Soviet bloc, to epitomize a socialist way of life—highlights the clash of semantic systems that characterized the first decade of “transition.” But as shiny banks and shopping centers sprang up alongside aging panel-housing and formerly state-owned shops, the urban landscape was also changing from the inside out. Fehérváry focuses on the value-laden spaces of private life, considering the wave of home renovation and construction that swept across the region, whether in the form of “American” kitchens and modern bathrooms in otherwise cramped socialist-era apartments or new, single-family homes with fish ponds, turrets, and thatched roofs in the suburbs. As rapid changes in political and economic life engendered equally seismic shifts in social relations and hierarchies of value, Fehérváry shows, her informants navigated change through the construction of domestic “heterotopias,” antidotes to and escapes from prevailing norms.

By doing so, Fehérváry argues, Hungarians betrayed values and affective associations rooted in the socialist

period. Because “the socialist state . . . invited the population to evaluate it in terms of the goods and environments [it] could produce,” they had come to see the poor quality of state-produced goods—not least the cramped and cheaply constructed mass housing of the Kádár era—as indicative of the state’s low regard for its citizens (p. 116). She introduces the vocabulary of *igények* (high standards or discernment) and *rend* (order, propriety) to suggest these normative and affective assessments. Rooted in peasant culture and with strong moral overtones, these values took on new meaning under socialism, as Hungarians studied home-decorating magazines like *Lakáskultúra* (Home Furnishings) for tips on how to transcend the aesthetic and spatial limitations of panel housing.

In an entertaining analysis of such advice from the 1960s to the 1980s, illustrated with eye-catching images from the magazine, Fehérváry elaborates upon a dialectical aesthetic triad she dubs “Socialist Modern,” “Socialist Generic,” and “Organicist Modern.” While promised a “Socialist Modern” utopia (as in the 1968 advertisement showing a mini-skirted woman in midair above an array of colorful kitchen trays: “PLASTIC! Even if you jump on it, UNBREAKABLE!”), Hungarians instead got shoddy, second-rate “Socialist Generic.” Discerning consumers, urged on again by tastemakers at *Lakáskultúra*, reacted in the 1970s and 1980s with the counter-aesthetic of “Organicist Modern,” reminiscent of both bourgeois and peasant domestic surroundings: dark brown and off-white tones; Scandinavian-style furniture; and hand-crafted, personalized accents. As Fehérváry puts it, “By bringing wood, animal skins, natural textiles, and stones into the house, urban Hungarians transformed apartments that had been configured as sterile and cold into ‘homes’” (p. 146).

As in so many other respects, the collapse of socialism left a complex legacy for Hungarians’ domestic attachments. Before, the shortcomings of “Socialist Generic” had represented all that was not “normal” about the system (just as the quality of Western goods and services had been associated with the presumed “dignity accorded respectable citizens of a ‘First World’”) (p. 27). After 1989, the inability of many of Hungary’s former socialist middle class to afford such commodities fed their disaffection, marking out the situation in Hungary as (still) “abnormal.” For those who could renovate or build, however, the home persisted as a retreat from the abnormality of the post-socialist everyday, a kind of magic rabbit-hole into the lifestyle of a global middle class imagined as comfortable, rational, and fulfilling. At the other end of the spectrum, urban workers (one step above Roma in the post-socialist pecking order) were stigmatized through their enduring association with a shabby, shoddy “Socialist Generic.”

As Fehérváry notes, the continuing popularity of organicist decorations and architecture today, having morphed into a “Super-Natural Organicism” of high-quality materials and explicitly national styles, suggests complex linkages between consumption and ideology.



There is nothing normal about the “new normal” of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, but Fehérváry’s informants—seeking moments of dignity and wholeness while cleaning their fish ponds or soaking in newly tiled bathrooms—are hardly alone worldwide in their strivings for a private utopia. For anyone concerned with the interplay of local cultures, historical consumption regimes, and globalized consumption norms, this nuanced case study offers ample food for thought.

KATHERINE LEBOW

*Vienna Wiesenthal Institute for Holocaust Studies*

WAITMAN WADE BEORN. *Marching into Darkness: The Wehrmacht and the Holocaust in Belarus*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014. Pp. 314. \$39.95.

In 1995, the Hamburg Institute for Social Research’s exhibition on the crimes of the Wehrmacht revealed that not only the Wehrmacht’s top elite but also ordinary German soldiers were complicit in the Holocaust and initiated murder actions and other mass crimes against civilians in the occupied territories in the East. Although the exhibition was eventually closed down due to some wrongly interpreted photos, it reached its goal: it attracted masses of visitors, shocked the German public, and questioned a hitherto broad consensus among historians who had ignored the genocidal disposition and actions of unknown numbers of soldiers serving at ground level. The exhibition wanted to document rather than analyze the complicity. It did not determine which share of the roughly 17 million Wehrmacht soldiers had murdered Jews and other civilians, supported their comrades, the SS, or policemen in doing so, or simply looked the other way while such crimes were being committed. While no precise numbers are available, it can be taken for granted that only a minority, yet still a few hundred thousand, actually committed murder. A much larger number, however, became complicit in one part or another of the “Nazi genocidal project” (p. 4), a term used in this book to address a multitude of crimes including the murder of Soviet prisoners of war in German captivity, the support of the Nazis’ starvation policy, and the killing of Jewish and non-Jewish civilians. Over the last 20 years, many books and articles have inquired into this complicity, its dimensions, its reasons, and the soldiers’ motivations. Proposing a broad notion of complicity that includes knowledge about, and explicit or implicit approval of the genocidal project, Waitman Wade Beorn’s meticulously researched and intriguingly well-written case study on the murderous activities of Wehrmacht units in Belarus is, to date, the most convincing, most complex, and in the English language certainly the most important contribution to this crucial area of Holocaust history, of military history, and of German history.

After outlining the history of the Jews and the violent interwar period of Belarus in the first chapter and addressing the genocidal conditions of the Wehrmacht in the second, Beorn’s narrative unfolds in six core chapters, each comprising a local in-depth study of specific

genocidal activities of smaller units or gatherings. Instead of simply proceeding chronologically, these case studies are chosen and arranged in order to track the dynamic of Nazi violence in the East, or, in Beorn’s words, “the Wehrmacht’s *progressive* complicity over time” (p. 5). Beorn’s analysis starts in September 1941 when the 354th Infantry Regiments helped the SS Einsatzkommando 8 to murder 1,000 Jews in the village of Krupki, near Minsk (chap. 3). This was the first time the regiment encountered murder; no procedures had been developed, it was all about improvisation. And yet the cooperation between the SS and the Wehrmacht worked effectively. The critical next step was taken during a three-day seminar at the end of September, in Mogilev (chap. 4). It brought together SS leaders and Wehrmacht officers, mainly in order to train and exhort the latter in supporting or carrying out the murder of Jews “as a default targeting option in the anti-partisan war . . . regardless of the presence of partisans or evidence of their connection with the enemy” (p. 101). An example of the direct execution of the policies transmitted in Mogilev was the murder of over 100 Jews in the village of Krucha on October 10 by the 3rd company, 691st Infantry Regiment, which by that time operated entirely on its own (chap. 5). The third step of the establishment of Wehrmacht complicity in genocide, its routinization, is explored in chapters 6 and 7. These chapters analyze how two companies of the 727th Infantry Regiment helped the Nazi occupational administration to ghettoize, expropriate, and eventually kill 15,000 Jews in the towns of Slonim and Novogrudok in November and December 1941. The fourth and final stage of that dynamic—the “internalization” (p. 6) of the anti-Jewish policies—is exemplified by the “‘Jew hunting’” (p. 191) of the 12th Company of that regiment in the town of Szczuczyn in western Belarus in the winter of 1941–1942. Partisans no longer showed up or existed. Instead, certain Wehrmacht officers and soldiers murdered Jews as part of their day-to-day routines not on specific orders but out of boredom and sensationalism, in fact because they had become used to it.

Some of the events covered in this book have been explored before, mostly by German scholars, but never as in detailed a fashion as in this book. Beorn masterfully brings together two types of sources: German wartime military records and German postwar testimonies, especially interrogation statements. While the first provide times, places, and actors (perpetrators, accomplices, and victims), the latter capture the subjective experience of the soldiers. Against a stream of related research that has focused either on the virulence of antisemitic stereotypes or the power of peer-group pressure and group dynamics in the all-male military society, Beorn highlights the crucial influence of the unit commanders: “Units led by particularly brutal men became particularly brutal” (p. 7). Yet individuals always retained choices. The fact that they increasingly chose to engage in violence against enemy civilians, and not to refrain from it, was the result of secondary socializations into liminal spheres of experience in which tra-

ditional moralities (the distinction between combatants and non-combatants) were overruled by the "Jew-Bolshevik-partisan calculus" (p. 80), the propagandistic conflation of these three categories, and its absorption by the soldiers' mindsets.

Beorn's book explores the Wehrmacht's complicity in the Nazi genocidal project away from the frontlines, not at them. More research needs to be done on the latter. Beorn has written an impressive book that will last and serve as a model for similar studies.

THOMAS KÜHNE  
Clark University

PAUL R. JOSEPHSON. *The Conquest of the Russian Arctic*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014. Pp. viii, 441. \$55.00.

The fiercely contested Arctic is a hot subject these days. This timely book offers an examination of Russian and Soviet attempts to develop the Arctic from the late nineteenth century to the present. The bulk of the book is devoted to developments in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, when Soviet and post-Soviet approaches to the region, informed by ideology as well as economics and geopolitics, often diverged from those of fellow northern countries. The Russian north is an immense region. Paul R. Josephson chooses to focus his study on its most populated, urbanized, and industrialized part: the three provinces of Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhangel'sk that together comprise the so-called Russian northwest. The book is organized into seven thematic chapters that draw from local as well as central archives. Josephson begins with accounts of the exploration of the region and ends with its current precarious position as both an inspiration for future development (the Northern Sea Route, resource extraction, etc.) and a cautionary tale (severe environmental degradation).

The focus on the northwest plays to the author's strengths. In a book written by a prominent historian of science and technology, one expects a detailed and nuanced consideration of Arctic science, technology, and industrial exploitation. Josephson certainly delivers on these subjects; readers who are interested in how the Soviet state went about studying, developing, and "modernizing" this forbidding terrain will not be disappointed. The Russian northwest is the site of such projects as the White Sea-Baltic Canal and such closed cities as Severodvinsk (known as Molotovsk before 1957), Russia's nuclear shipbuilding center, and the nickel-smelting town of Monchegorsk. The book describes the development of increasingly sophisticated icebreakers, the fortunes of scientific research and development (as manifested by, among other elements, specialized institutes and research stations), and the advent of massive construction and mining projects. Writing about these and other subjects, Josephson consistently and effectively brings out the tension between the imperatives of industrial development and its immense costs in terms of human health and environmental degradation.

Here it is important to note, as Josephson does, that all northern countries exploit the Arctic. The crucial question of what distinguishes the Russian exploitation from the others is answered in this book mainly through many specific examples. Although Josephson repeatedly employs the term Arctic "assimilation" to identify the processes of exploration, study, and exploitation, he does not explicitly analyze this peculiar term, which is apparently his translation of the Russian word *osvoenie*. A more thorough analysis of this politicized euphemism would have presented a useful device to flesh out the distinctive features of Russia's vision of its north.

The thematic organization of this book has pluses and minuses: the author elaborates on some subjects more than others, and the focus on the northwest leaves some important themes underexplored. One relative weakness is that the book contains little information about the native peoples of the Russian north. The only indigenous people who receive substantive, albeit sporadic, coverage are the Nentsy. And for reasons that remain puzzling to this reviewer, Josephson also brings up Vladimir Arseniev, the author of *Dersu Uzala*, a book that in 1975 was made into a well-known Akira Kurosawa film, featuring a fictional Nanai character from the Amur region of the Russian far east. The story of Arseniev and his indigenous Siberian guide is gripping, and arguably relevant to the relationship between the Russians and the peoples of the Russian north. But Josephson does not make this connection explicitly, and, puzzlingly, identifies Arseniev, an explorer of Russia's far east, as a polar explorer (p. 61).

Yet the book offers sustained analysis of the role of penal labor in developing the region. Much of this is contained in the compelling third chapter, entitled "The Role of the Gulag in Arctic Conquest," which deserves the attention of anyone who is interested in the instrumental role of the Stalinist slave-labor system in developing the Soviet north. Josephson's book demonstrates how the cajoled efforts of the relatively privileged *sharashka* engineers and the ordinary hungry, emaciated, and eminently expendable Gulag prisoners were the essential complement to the heroics of Soviet pilots and explorers that were trumpeted far and wide by the regime. The human cost of northern development, highlighted with particular focus in chapter 3, is an important thematic thread throughout the text.

This book rewards attentive readers. Readers interested in the historical background as to why Vladimir Putin's government has chosen to invest so intensively in the Arctic will find plenty to go on here, including mention of Putin's own candidate thesis defended at the St. Petersburg Mining Institute in 1997 (p. 340). To understand this vision more fully, they would also be well served to read the book's sections on the "golden age" of lavish spending on the Arctic during Leonid Brezhnev's time, when residents received substantive monetary bonuses just for living and working in the region, and the collapse of that system, as well as the near collapse of Russia's Arctic science, in the Boris Yeltsin years. This important book offers a good general in-



roduction to the history of Russian development of the Arctic but also leaves plenty of territory for other scholars to explore further.

ILYA VINKOVETSKY  
Simon Fraser University

OSCAR SANCHEZ-SIBONY. *Red Globalization: The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev*. (New Studies in European History.) New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Pp. xiv, 278. \$99.00.

This is an important book of great relevance today. It describes the complex trade and business relations between the USSR and the rest of the world from the 1920s to 1956, and it shows that in these relationships the USSR was motivated by very different factors than those often presumed. The USSR never sought autarchy, but repeatedly had autarchy thrust upon it. Despite the USSR's antagonistic political agenda, its international economic agenda was very much influenced by the realization of Soviet economic underdevelopment when compared with the West. It was participation in and not destruction of international trade that the Soviet government wanted.

The book's detailed analysis is wide and impressive. It covers Soviet relations with various advanced capitalist and underdeveloped countries. Oscar Sanchez-Sibony combines the study of archival materials with striking personal examples to illustrate his story. In one case, a young disillusioned Spanish student found it hard to believe that the communist states were undermining the position of local Communists by selling coal to Francisco Franco's Spain in the middle of a Communist-led mining strike (pp. 1–3). There are many other examples of Soviet trade officials collaborating with the agents of governments that had made Communism illegal in their countries.

The book is divided into three parts and six chapters. Part I, "Isolation," presents an account of the near autarchic policy forced on the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin and in the early postwar years. It picks up Michael Dohan's earlier arguments that far from being the ideal objective of Stalinist policy this withdrawal from trade was an unwanted result of the collapse of Western trading opportunities. Part II, "Aspiration," covers two chapters, one that explores the major capitalist countries, and another that discusses the underdeveloped countries of the decolonizing world of the 1950s. Part III, "Integration," looks in more detail at Soviet relations with these two groups of countries in the 1960s. There is a final concluding chapter entitled "Mikoyan's legacy."

Sanchez-Sibony argues that one of the main political consequences of Soviet action in the area of international trade was the strengthening of the underdeveloped world's negotiating position in its interactions with powerful Western oligopolies. This was a win-win situation for the USSR and the underdeveloped countries, and it did not mean that these countries were fall-

ing under Soviet control. Most of these relations were not initiated by the USSR. This contradicts the commonly held belief in the West that such action was a sign of growing Soviet influence that threatened the free world.

My criticisms of the book concern its failure to cover certain areas of trade, the failure to emphasize the problems arising from the presumption for most of this period that grain exports were the basis of Soviet trade, and the tendency to lionize Anastas Mikoyan, "the good-humored Armenian" genius (p. 246).

In the introduction, Sanchez-Sibony admits that he has not been able to cover Soviet economic relations within the Communist bloc, including China in the early years of the People's Republic of China, or the arms trade. These are important areas where the limited evidence indicates a greater political motivation.

Sanchez-Sibony pays little attention to agriculture, even though grain was the main pre-revolutionary export and was presumed to be the basis of Soviet exports throughout the period studied. He notes that grain exporters in the 1920s and 1930s faced the problem of a decline in world grain prices, but he is incorrect to suggest that the Soviet Union was a major victim of "increased stockpiles of grain" (p. 45). The major problem for Soviet foreign trade throughout the 1920s–1960s was not just the low world price for grain, but also the lack of grain in the USSR. The failure of the government and trading agencies to recognize this shortage was to have devastating consequences for the peasantry and the Soviet economy as a whole. Mikoyan played an important role in promoting this deception, and was criticized by Stalin in 1947 when he again refused to accept that grain production was lower than presumed (Stephen G. Wheatcroft, "The Soviet Famine of 1946–1947, the Weather and Human Agency in Historical Perspective," *Europe-Asia Studies* 64 [2012]: 987–1005, esp. 997–998). The position partly changed in 1954 when Nikita Khrushchev admitted that Soviet grain statistics had been exaggerated by about 30 percent, but the Virgin Lands campaign was soon launched in a further bid to provide the expected grain exports. The final collapse of the grain export presumption that Mikoyan had consistently supported came in 1972, seven years after Mikoyan's retirement, when Soviet traders carried out a series of brilliant trading maneuvers that have been dubbed "the great grain robbery."

Despite the need for a more complex understanding of Mikoyan's legacy, this book is still a very important one and of particular relevance today when the West is again imposing economic sanctions on Russia.

STEPHEN G. WHEATCROFT  
University of Melbourne

BENJAMIN TROMLY. *Making the Soviet Intelligentsia: Universities and Intellectual Life under Stalin and Khrushchev*. (New Studies in European History.) New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Pp. xiii, 295. \$99.00.

In this superbly well-researched and carefully argued monograph, Benjamin Tromly examines the self-conscious development of a new generation of Soviet intellectuals, fostered in the universities of the late Stalin and Khrushchev periods. The author foregrounds the reconceptualization of intelligentsia identities, which, he argues, was at the forefront of students' self-understanding throughout the period. However, while these young *intelligenty* were intimately concerned with acquiring and maintaining social status and upholding intelligentsia ideals, they navigated an uncertain terrain. "Intelligentsia," as the book painstakingly demonstrates, was not a fixed idea but rather a cluster of contested conceptions onto which students mapped their senses of self in close dialogue with, but not necessarily in opposition to, Soviet ideology. Eschewing a teleological narrative that places intelligentsia in the role of either heroic savior or submissive servant, Tromly expertly shows how students employed official understandings without being trapped into a narrow Soviet subjecthood. Intelligentsia identity was, on the one hand, a recognizable cluster of values and social roles—especially the faith in "culturedness" (*kul'turnost'*) and the *Kulturträger* ideal—and on the other, unstable, elusive, and constantly contested.

A welcome addition to a burgeoning literature on educated youth in the postwar period, this work utilizes a fantastically rich reservoir of primary resources, while also acknowledging and making use of other recent scholarly work. In an effort to present a geographically diverse portrait, Tromly conducted research in the archives of Moscow, Kyiv, and Saratov State Universities (MGU, KDU, and SGU, respectively), and he integrated materials on other higher educational institutions referenced in central state and party archives. To further enrich this narrative, the author not only draws on contemporary accounts by defectors and Western exchange students contained in the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty archives, but also himself performed dozens of interviews in Moscow, Kyiv, Saratov, and St. Petersburg from 2003 to 2005. While, as is acknowledged, oral histories carried out almost half a century later have their limitations—especially when concerned with perceived identities—these accounts enrich and are surprisingly well integrated with the other primary materials used.

The result is a work of ambitious scope, detailing a complex and overlapping set of events and circumstances on a national scale. The book expertly depicts the multifaceted ways in which university students developed and navigated their much-prized intelligentsia identities in challenging and unstable circumstances. While the author insists (contrary to some other recent scholarly literature) that intellectual self-understanding was always on the minds of these educated young people, he avoids offering simple explanations of how this developed. Indeed, he argues that any such definition is hopelessly reductionist, due to "the open-endedness of the Soviet intelligentsia, a social construct which housed divergent commitments: to state service,

to mass enlightenment, to pure science, and, not least, to the social aspirations of the middle-strata professionals" (p. 71).

The book is at its best in describing the student collectives that developed and that managed to preserve the central intelligentsia conception of *kul'turnost'* within a Soviet context. As Tromly persuasively demonstrates, old intelligentsia traditions, while irrevocably transformed under Soviet rule, survived in altered form. This continuity was even embodied in the few old professors who had, against all odds, survived at MGU and elsewhere, and who passed down a reverence not only for culture but also for "pure science" in a way that did not always mesh with the Soviet imperative that *intelligenty* serve the state and people. However, as Tromly repeatedly avers, this tension far more often led to an attempt to reconceptualize roles *within* the Soviet context than it did to direct opposition. Even the emergence of a renewed national intellectual awareness at KDU and other Ukrainian higher educational institutions during the Thaw did so within a framework in which it was (usually) understood that this was a decidedly Soviet national identity.

The sheer ambition and breadth of the work is not without its shortcomings, as several of the sections are less well integrated into the overall narrative and do not add as much to the existing literature as does the rest of the book. While the chapter on the rise of official antisemitism during the virulent late Stalinist campaigns against "rootless cosmopolitans" is linked to the rise of anti-intelligentsia populism, this thread—that is, the persistence of antisemitism well after Stalin's death—is only briefly and somewhat unsatisfactorily returned to at the end of the otherwise strong chapter on the articulation of Ukrainian and Russian national intelligentsia identities during and after the Thaw. Similarly, the book's brief foray into scientific disputes, while well written, does not add significantly to Ethan Pollock's thorough depiction of Stalin's "science wars" (*Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars* [2006]), and it rests in uneasy conjunction with an examination of ill-fated pedagogical reforms initiated during and after 1956.

Nevertheless, this highly sophisticated book offers not only a thorough depiction of university students over two tumultuous decades in Soviet history, but it also persuasively argues that rather than dying out under Soviet rule, intelligentsia identities were revived and adapted in both pertinacious and unpredictable ways.

STUART FINKEL

University of Florida, Gainesville

#### MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA

MOHAMMED ENNAJI. *Slavery, the State, and Islam*. Translated by TERESA LAVENDER FAGAN. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. xi, 252. \$29.99.

Mohammed Ennaji begins his new book on the Islamic state writ large by arguing that in order to understand



the structures of Islamic states in the present, we must look to the ways in which the early Islamic Omayyad and Abbasid dynasties were structured. Ennaji argues that the absolute authority (and as such, legitimacy) of these dynasties came from the structures of Islam and in turn influenced Islamic practices. However, his key point is that because of the intertwining of Islam and state power, Islamic states by definition must be absolutist in many ways, and thus are unable to modernize. This is a big argument to make and is not wholly done in this otherwise very interesting book.

Ennaji, however, makes a number of smaller arguments that could have a profound impact on Western scholarship in Islamic communities, especially in slavery studies. He suggests, "Rarely has the question of authority in the Arab world been dealt with in terms of servitude, and even more rarely in terms of slavery. In fact, the social relationship in question has been of little interest in the Muslim world" (p. 48). He suggests that western scholars, instead of seeing the manumission of a slave as one possible punishment for transgressions in Islam, have fetishized the idea of manumission as central to a demonstration of Islamic faith. Ennaji thus suggests that the focus on Islam as an egalitarian faith has kept scholars from examining the working of power and authority in Muslim societies. Thus, contrary to much of the scholarship that treats slavery in Islamic communities as a conditional practice and manumission as an obligatory act, Ennaji argues that Islamic states are based on the continuing submission of slaves. By examining what slavery and freedom looked like before Islam, he demonstrates how these statuses changed in meaning and practice in newly Islamized states. For example, Ennaji explains the concept of *sâiba*, a pre-Islamic method for an enslaved person to gain their freedom from their owner. *Sâiba* meant complete freedom that left no obligation to the former owner. Wherein, Ennaji argues that Islamic laws took away the possibility of "complete freedom" by tying the former slave to his/her owner through the system of *walâ'*. *Walâ'* is a "right of patronage" that a former owner could claim on his/her former slave's property, thus simultaneously denying the blood kin of the former slave and forever placing the former slave into a servile position. Ennaji uses the linguistic etymology of several words and ideas in Arabic, such as the transition from *sâiba* to *walâ'* in order to demonstrate the ways in which Islam shaped Muslim states' absolute authority over the majority of their populations.

In the latter part of the book Ennaji demonstrates the transformation from societies based on competing clans ruled by a system of first among equals to one of absolute authority in the body of a king (or sultan). Thus "the state" he is discussing is a monarchical state and not one based on an elected system. Part and parcel then of Ennaji's argument is that a Muslim king could not be a king without slaves, and, consequently, slavery was at the core of kingship. He argues that the legal framework of Islam created a system of slavery that supported Islamic authority and thus differed from other

monarchal state systems. Ennaji uses Arabic literature to illustrate how earthly power became linked to heavenly power over time, allowing Muslim leaders to legitimate their control. He notes that "greatness thus was transmitted through its opposite, debasement" (p. 56). As the slave submitted him/herself fully and became the hands and eyes of the king, the slave was dehumanized into the being of the king, giving the king even more power. It is in this way that Ennaji argues Islamic states must demand complete obedience from their subjects in order to successfully rule.

Ennaji's mastery of the Arabic literature is obvious from his erudite analysis of the sources and his many citations. However, he does not situate his work within the historiography; instead, he leaves readers to define the value of this work within the context of the larger global scholarship on slavery and state power in Islamic societies. Moreover, he does not discuss the various documents he uses and their value in relation to the time periods he is talking about. This presumption of knowledge on the part of the reader makes the book of interest to specialists in Islamic communities, but far less accessible for non-specialists.

ELISABETH McMAHON  
Tulane University

KAYA ŞAHİN. *Empire and Power in the Reign of Süleyman: Narrating the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman World*. (Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization.) New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. xviii, 290. \$99.00.

*Empire and Power in the Reign of Süleyman: Narrating the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman World* analyzes the early-to mid-sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire through a careful reading of the works of Celalzade Mustafa (ca. 1490–1567), long serving chancellor during Süleyman's reign (r. 1520–1566). Kaya Şahin introduces his study by explaining why Celalzade's life deserves close analysis and by placing the Ottoman Empire in its early modern Eurasian context. This latter point merits close attention because the field of Ottoman studies is now long past viewing the empire as unique and thus claiming the impossibility of comparing it to other polities. In line with this, Şahin's global perspective facilitates a more accurate assessment of the Ottoman Empire's interaction with other empires and states. While the primary audience of Şahin's study will be Ottomanists, the global dimension of the work will attract scholars who study early modern Eurasia, especially Europe, the Middle East, and/or South Asia. Şahin's book is not a comparative history, but "one of its objectives is to discuss the Ottoman case as a subset of early modern empire formation" (p. 11). Because Celalzade was the empire's chief bureaucrat for a significant portion of Süleyman's reign, his writings provide the means to study the administrative transformation of the Ottoman Empire during the first half of the sixteenth century.

In part I, Şahin narrates the history of the Ottoman Empire through the career of Celalzade. Şahin begins by tracing the early years of Celalzade: his family back-

ground, his early education, and the beginnings of his career as a secretary. Celalzade faced novel challenges in government service due to massive religious and political upheaval during the early sixteenth century, including the expansion of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, whose sovereigns, Süleyman and Charles V, became rivals. The extent of their power was a new phenomenon created by their immediate ancestors, and consequently generated conflict in many arenas, as well as administrative challenges. Thus, Şahin includes an analysis of Selim I's (r. 1512–1520) impact on Ottoman imperial power as well as the impact of Selim's rival to the east, the Safavid Shah Ismail. Şahin's account of the early years of Süleyman's reign as portrayed in Celalzade's history, *Tabakat*, which provides a valuable insider's view of the factional struggles among the elite, emphasizes that Celalzade was truly a "political survivor" (p. 47). Celalzade successfully weathered the forced retirement of one grand vizier patron, and the execution of another, without losing his own position in the government bureaucracy.

During the period 1523–1534, Celalzade held key positions and was trusted with the creation of documents, which Şahin emphasizes "were not given to his superiors in the scribal service" (p. 49). Thus his views are particularly useful in understanding Süleyman's reign until 1557. Celalzade became chancellor in 1534 and retained this position until his retirement in 1557, when he no longer played a key role in Ottoman administration. During retirement, he wrote several historical and political treatises. As a result of the impact of these treatises, Celalzade's views of the Ottoman Empire have been viewed as definitive depictions of Ottoman institutions, whereas as Şahin states: "His unbridled imperialism, his dedication to Sunni Islam, and his promotion of bureaucratic merit, all products of a specific period and a particular cultural environment, were given an idealized, timeless expression in his works" (p. 124). *Tabakat* ends with the construction of the Süleymaniye Mosque complex in 1557. By choosing not to record the final years of Süleyman's rule, Şahin explains that Celalzade avoided the sensitive final succession struggle between Süleyman's sons. Ironically, Celalzade was reappointed chancellor in 1566 at the death of Süleyman in an attempt to keep this secret until the sultan's son Selim II could claim the throne.

Part II examines the empire's institutions and Celalzade's cultural and political discourse regarding them. By the sixteenth century historical writing was an avenue whereby the elite could create political commentary. Here, Şahin emphasizes the connection between historical texts and identity formation. Celalzade expressed differences between himself—a free-born Muslim—and most members of the ruling elite who emerged from slave backgrounds due to the levy of boys among the Christian population of the Balkans. Celalzade's *Tabakat* is noteworthy because of its detailed account of Süleyman's reign, its use as a source by later Ottoman historians and by scholars who have written the history of the empire, and its language, which Şahin

claims made it a work of art. *Tabakat* also reproduced government documents, which is significant, for few documents survive in the archives from the early years of Süleyman's reign.

In evaluating Celalzade's influence Şahin makes several claims, for example, that as a result of Celalzade's writings the Ottomans arrived at a new understanding of space and geography. This claim needs to be tempered by comparison with other writers who wrote more explicitly geographical works during Süleyman's reign, such as Piri Reis and Seydi Ali Reis. More broadly, Celalzade's contributions need to be evaluated in the context of other Ottoman authors. Indeed, while Şahin is to be commended for presenting a thorough analysis of Celalzade's works, which are written in a very challenging style, the book would benefit from further exploration of the impact of other writings of this period such as the geographical works mentioned above. Because Celalzade was instrumental in the composition of many government documents, analyzing specific documents both by Celalzade and others would allow a more comprehensive understanding of his place as a fashioner of Ottoman administration. Nevertheless, Şahin's work is a substantial contribution to understanding the transformations in administration and political ideology that developed during Süleyman's reign through the influence of his chancellor, Celalzade Mustafa.

CHRISTINE ISOM-VERHAAREN

*Benedictine University*

[Reviewers of books by Indiana University History Department faculty are selected with advice from the Board of Editors.]

PINAR EMIRALIOĞLU. *Geographical Knowledge and Imperial Culture in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*. (Transculturalisms, 1400–1700.) Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2014. Pp. xx, 184. \$119.95.

Pinar Emiralioğlu's new book skillfully weaves together an analysis of sixteenth-century geographical and cartographical texts in Ottoman Turkish and a synthesis of scholarly work on Ottoman and other early modern imperial cultures. This allows her to contextualize what she calls a "renaissance of Ottoman geographical consciousness" (p. 21) in the sixteenth century. She argues that these geographical and cartographical texts show that the Ottoman Empire participated actively in the "age of exploration" and encouraged the dissemination of new information, while also maintaining the importance of a core area centered on the Mediterranean for articulating and legitimizing claims to universal sovereignty.

The book is divided into three main sections, each of which takes one of the spatial emphases of sixteenth-century Ottoman geographical literature as its focus: the city of Constantinople; the Mediterranean Sea; and "frontiers" such as the Indian Ocean, India, and the New World. For Constantinople, Emiralioğlu argues that Ottoman intellectuals reversed a trend of downplaying the city in earlier geographical and cartographi-



cal texts and instead portrayed it as an imperial hub and the center of the world. As evidence, she points to Abdü'l-latif's treatise on the merits of Istanbul and Mustafa b. Ali al-Muvakkit's coordinate tables that list distances from the Ottoman capital to 99 cities, both produced in the 1520s at the beginning of Sultan Süleyman I's reign.

In this same period, the sea captain Piri Reis, whom Emiralioğlu calls "the person who came closest to becoming an official cartographer" for the Ottoman Empire (p. 95), celebrated the Mediterranean as the chief arena for asserting claims to a sovereignty modeled on the ancient empires of Greece and Rome, claims that Sultan Süleyman's rival, Charles V, also sought to substantiate. Emiralioğlu argues that Piri Reis's *Book of Sea Lore* (1526) acted as a kind of advertisement for the eastern and southern Mediterranean, areas in which Ottoman dominance was either on the rise or a *fait accompli*. She then suggests that three elaborate atlases focusing on the Mediterranean from the second half of the sixteenth century, which were likely commissioned by members of the court, indicate the consolidation of the Mediterranean as a core area for the Ottoman imperial agenda.

By contrast, other areas, such as the Indian Ocean, India, and the New World, were "peripheral" to that agenda, but still attracted interest on the part of geographers and their patrons in Istanbul. Mid-sixteenth-century works such as Seydi Ali Reis's *Book of the Ocean* (1554) and *Mirror of Lands* (1557) and the anonymous *History of the India of the West* (c. 1580s) provide clear evidence of a growing interest in the latest geographical information among Ottoman intellectuals, while at the same time confirming the centrality of the Mediterranean for political, economic, and military activity. Emiralioğlu contends that while some geographers wished to stimulate intervention in peripheral areas, Ottoman policymakers remained unwilling or unable to expand beyond the established core areas of the empire in the sixteenth century.

The great strength of *Geographical Knowledge and Imperial Culture in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* is its serious engagement with the emerging field of geographical scholarship in Ottoman Turkish in the sixteenth century. Emiralioğlu argues that the absence of an official institution for geography and cartography in the Ottoman Empire has distracted attention from the major strides that were made by independent scholars who found eager patrons among court elites. These scholars combined their own observations with new discoveries and older ideas from an array of sources. They often promoted a particular political agenda, but, regardless of whether their recommendations were followed, the texts they authored have much to tell us about how geographical knowledge reflected and influenced claims to sovereignty in the early modern Ottoman Empire. Along these lines Emiralioğlu does an impressive job of synthesizing the latest scholarship on imperial cultures of Europe and western and central

Asia in this period. This allows her to situate her own analysis in a comparative framework.

The epilogue to the book traces the development of the field of Ottoman geography into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Emiralioğlu argues here that the process of seriously grappling with the "scientific model of collecting, measuring, and presenting geographic information" (p. 155) that had already gained traction in Europe began in the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth century, not, as some have assumed, as late as the nineteenth century. This development was made possible by the geographers and cartographers of the sixteenth century who had succeeded in impressing an elite audience with the political value of generating new knowledge and disseminating it in Ottoman Turkish. Pinar Emiralioğlu has made a substantial contribution by bringing the activities of these pioneering intellectuals to the fore.

ZAYDE ANTRIM  
Trinity College

İPEK YOSMAOĞLU, *Blood Ties: Religion, Violence, and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878–1908*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2014. Pp. xiii, 320. Cloth \$85.00, paper \$29.95.

In this book İpek Yosmaoğlu aims to explain "how a region inhabited by a population that had not experienced any sustained, systemic, or high level of inter-community violence until the turn of the twentieth century turned into one synonymous with ethnic conflict" (p. 1) and to examine "the transition to nationhood not through a textual analysis of the record left behind by national visionaries but through the experience of the common folk," building "on that framework to understand the dynamics of nation-making that depended on the diffusion among the peasant masses of what was essentially an elite ideology" (p. 3). In pursuit of her aim of understanding the process of nationalization of "peasant masses" in Macedonia, Yosmaoğlu divides her book into six chapters. The first chapter, a brief political history of Macedonia, based on a very limited number of secondary sources, is followed by chapters on education, mainly organized in urban centers by Greek and Bulgarian groups; ethnographic maps, largely drawn up by western European ethnographers and mappers; censuses, run by the Ottoman government and that the Bulgarian and Greek churches, paramilitary organizations, and other external actors tried to influence; religion, which was dominated by the Greek Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate; and violence, which was dominated by para-military organizations, gangs, and the Ottoman army.

Although Yosmaoğlu professes to adopt a "bottom up" approach to Macedonian history, she in fact struggles to do so on various levels. Although she talks about the "peasant masses," Yosmaoğlu reduces the complex and multi-actor conflict in Macedonia to a rivalry between contested nationalities of Greeks and Bulgarians while ignoring more than half of the Macedonian pop-

ulation, who were neither Christian nor Greek nor Bulgarian. Criticizing “propaganda groups, whose statistics usually did not even mention the Muslim population, as if they did not exist” (p. 138), she herself gives no space to the voices of those who were either Muslims or Jews, and the amount of space allocated to Vlachs and Serbians is minimal.

A further problem concerns the sources used. Although the book claims to cover the period 1878–1908, most of the unpublished archival material includes only the post-Ilinden Uprising of 1903 until 1908 and comes from the papers of the Inspectorate of Rumeli (established in 1902), which discuss Macedonia. However, the documents that Yosmaoğlu uses are in fact almost exclusively restricted to those relating to the province of Thessaloniki, only one of the provinces that made up Macedonia, and the incidents reported in the book mostly focus on the north part of the province, which bordered autonomous Bulgaria. Greek and Bulgarian archival material is limited only to a few published sources, and to Bulgarian material in translation. In contrast, Yosmaoğlu makes extensive use of French gendarme reports and consular correspondence, data that she treats uncritically without considering it in the context of the French position in Macedonia. And, to a lesser extent, she utilizes British archival sources. She also relies heavily on Western European, mostly French and British, published accounts on the region, such as Henry Noel Brailsford’s 1906 *Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future*, but, oddly, does not look at local material such as newspapers, literature, and memoirs, surely more useful sources for locating local voices.

The book also suffers from insufficient contextualization of the arguments and sources. The changing position of international actors throughout the period from 1878 to 1908 is not clarified, but instead there are patchy and random representations of their positions, as is the case in chapter 1, “The Ottoman Empire, the Balkans, and the Great Powers on the Road to Müzsteg.” This becomes very conspicuous in the case of the Ottoman position. Arguing that the Ottomans were not aware of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization’s (IMRO) activities “for years” (p. 30), Yosmaoğlu draws a picture of random reactions by the Ottoman authorities. She, for instance, argues that Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, Inspector-General of Rumeli, had a “pro-Patriarchist bias” (p. 152), a conclusion drawn mainly on the basis of French reports, without analysis of either Ottoman central government policy or Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa’s own reasoning.

Although Yosmaoğlu attempts to locate the Macedonian case in a synthesized conceptual framework, extending from nationalism theories to violence, by using various comparisons with, for example, Russia in the nineteenth century and India under British colonial administration, there is an overall lack of conceptual clarity. Conceptual discussions and ideas are not integrated with specific historical data and the book overall remains a collection of unconnected pieces rather than a coherent whole.

The desire to produce a “bottom up” history of late-Ottoman Macedonia, a small region made up of various ethnic and religious groups that attracted many external and internal actors, is very ambitious. Although from time to time the book does offer interesting vignettes from limited archival material, it fails to deliver what it promises in the introduction.

EBRU BOYAR

*Middle East Technical University, Ankara*

DINA RIZK KHOURY. *Iraq in Wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom, and Remembrance*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. xviii, 281. \$29.99.

Dina Rizk Khoury’s riveting retelling of Iraqi history over a decade of ongoing war (the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War), is a fascinating study of a variety of war fronts, home fronts, propaganda campaigns, and intense state intervention in peoples’ lives. The violence that we associate with these years, embodied in such moments as the usage of chemical weapons against the Kurds in Halabja, is put in a larger context. This work does not ask the usual questions about the Iran-Iraq War, which have tended to focus on the region’s political leadership and its geopolitical strategies on various war fronts, but rather ponders how the management of war became inseparable from the management of Iraqi society.

The book is very different from what has been written previously about the topic. First, it was commonly assumed that the Iran-Iraq War shaped the identity of the newly founded Islamic Republic of Iran, while Iraq entered the war with a more stable political leadership that had already been in power since the Ba’th takeover in 1968. Khoury, in contrast, argues that the war profoundly transformed modern Iraq by changing gender relations, sectarian relations, and patterns of memory and commemoration. Thus, while some scholars have assumed that Ba’thi methods of governance were unchanged since 1968, or that the key for understanding Ba’thi modes of governance could be ideology (radical Pan-Arabism), religious and ethnic sectarianism (the Sunna/Shi’a or the Kurdish/Sunni divide), or Ṣaddām Ḥussein’s personality and decision-making mechanisms, Khoury offers a new periodization that starts in 1979, with the rise of Ḥussein to power and the ensuing wars.

Second, this book is perhaps the first *social* history since Hanna Batatu’s 1978 *magnum opus* that pays such great heed to the Iraqi people and Iraqi society during the second half of the twentieth century, and, importantly, gives voice to entire populations neglected in the historiography. Khoury studies each battlefield, military and civilian alike, in great detail. She studies how southern Iraqis lived as their agricultural hinterlands were destroyed, as cities and provinces turned into war zones, and as Shi’i shrine cities became monitored. She focuses on military recruitment processes, the age of the soldiers, and the regions from which they came. The most heartbreaking parts, for me, were the experiences



of prisoners of war (POWs), whose bodies were photographed and displayed and whose minds were subjected to various propaganda campaigns. Similarly, the book explores the manners in which martyrs, and their families, were both manipulated and taken care of by the regime. Most insightful in Khoury's narration of the war as a quotidian experience are the interviews she conducted with Iraqi soldiers. She employs these narratives to reflect on generational and personal experiences and to unpack the manners in which these soldiers produced war narratives that challenged those of the state.

Likewise, Khoury's book is a fascinating cultural history that underlines the ways in which the Iran-Iraq War was presented to the Iraqi public. She examines a series of media campaigns and speeches and lectures delivered in women's organizations and schools. While previous scholarship focuses on state monuments, textbooks, and cultural magazines, Khoury's study is the most comprehensive, especially in the immense number of cultural artifacts analyzed (including novels). Of particular interest is Khoury's exploration of Rahim Hasan's stunning war photography of both Iraqi soldiers and Iranian POWs.

Third, despite great emphasis on wartime governance, the book gives Iraqis agency. It describes both modes of resistance and the management of resistance. The former included rumors challenging state propaganda, desertion, Kurdish rebellions, and constructing counter-memories to those of the state amid major propaganda campaigns. This is most obvious in Khoury's deft investigation of the 1991 *Intifada*, a rebellion against the state following the Gulf War.

Finally, the book is unique in its methodology and source base. *Iraq in Wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom, and Remembrance* is the second published work (after Joseph Sassoon's excellent study of the Ba'ath Party) that uses archival materials brought to the U.S. after the American occupation of Iraq. Khoury justly remarks that the use of these documents does not lend "legitimacy to the manner of their acquisition" or to the continued presence of the originals in the U.S. (p. 15). While Iraq's prolonged war is exceptional, other Middle Eastern states, such as Egypt and Israel, experienced a war-per-decade reality (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973). Since access to such materials is not possible in most Arab states, this book will be very useful to scholars of other militaristic states and societies in the Middle East.

One thing to bear in mind, however, is that scholars do not have such detailed information about modes of governance of the Ba'ath during the 1970s, when Iraq prospered economically and positioned itself as one of the leading states in the region. Therefore it is difficult to make general claims about the modes of governance in the post-1979 period. The only way to understand the 1980s and early 1990s, in other words, would be a detailed study of governmental practices under Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and the Arif brothers, who ruled Iraq before 1968. Such a comparison would yield a discus-

sion on whether violence toward the population originated in other anti-democratic and sectarian features of the regime or was mostly the result of the Iran-Iraq War. Another of the book's themes worth developing further is regionalism. While the Iran-Iraq War affected Iraq as a whole, the experiences of the residents of Sulaymaniyah differed from those of Baghdad and both differed from those of Basra. This war deepened schisms between subjects and states, between different regions, between different religions, and between genders.

This is a very important work. Its theoretical sophistication, comparative approach, and attention to questions relating to memory and Ba'athi cultural production, as well as the rich data extracted from the state archives (the appendices contain much that would serve graduate students), give readers a whole new understanding of Ba'athi Iraq as a society that paid the most horrendous price for the lethal combination of authoritarianism, nationalism, and imperialism. Knowing what happened to the book's protagonists during the next three decades, and witnessing the killings of Iraqi soldiers by ISIS as well as the horrendous toll this occupation has taken on northern Iraqis, makes the reading more relevant and tragic than ever.

ORIT BASHKIN

University of Chicago

VANESSA MARTIN. *Iran between Islamic Nationalism and Secularism: The Constitutional Revolution of 1906*. (BIPS Persian Studies, no. 6.) New York: I. B. Tauris, 2013. Pp. xi, 272. \$90.00.

In the past 35 years, official historiography in Iran has presented "Islam" as the primary motivator of all popular movements since the mid-nineteenth century. A corollary of this has been to denigrate or downplay motives that cannot be subsumed by "Islam." The purpose has been to furnish a historically rooted intellectual pedigree for the Islamism currently dominant in the country. In the book under review, however, Vanessa Martin contends that the literature in English on the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906 has emphasized the secular components of the revolution and it is now "timely" to explore the role of Islam. Indeed, she maintains, a "wide reading of the sources of the time demonstrates how far the population as a whole thought" of that revolution "implicitly as a Shi'i revolution, whilst also being conscious that it would introduce a new system of government that promised greater accountability, regularity and justice to replace the arbitrary rule of absolutism." Given that Iran was a "devoutly Shi'i country, it was natural that the Revolution would be perceived in religious terms." Unlike a small intellectual and mercantile elite who espoused secularism, the clerics were "very influential, not only because of their role in Islam, but also because the people were accustomed to deploying their influence to bargain with and protest against the state" (p. 1).

The studies of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution

have mostly concentrated on developments in Tehran and sometimes Tabriz, a city of crucial significance to that revolution. Encounters with constitutionalism in provincial centers, and the struggles to achieve and support, or derail and thwart it, have received less attention. Martin has also sought to address this by discussing the unfolding of constitutionalism in the important provincial centers of Isfahan, Shiraz, and Bushehr between 1896 and 1908, in addition to more familiar developments in Tabriz.

The political life of Isfahan, complicated by the active presence of foreigners, was dominated by a powerful local elite surrounding the prince-governor on the one hand, and an influential clerical family on the other. Aqa Nurallah, a member of this family, was able for some time to play a leading role in the post-constitutional governance of the city and advocate objectives that were to be espoused by future Islamist movements. In Shiraz, the center of the province of Fars, constitutionalist travails became entangled with the power struggles of the local elite. Conflict between the chieftains of the powerful pastoral nomadic Qashqa'i people and the cluster of forces supporting the "mayor" of the city, together with struggles against the provincial governor—a son of the shah—dominated political life and affected the unfolding of constitutionalism. Developments in the port city of Bushehr, on the Persian Gulf, differed. Here, local politics was influenced less by events elsewhere in Iran than by the exigencies of commerce and British domination. Constitutionalism failed to gain much favor with the merchants of Bushehr, who abhorred the adverse impact of disorder on commerce.

In exploring the issues of Islam and secularism in the Constitutional Revolution, Martin discusses, *inter alia*, the ways in which the relationship between constitutional law, secular legislation, and Islamic law was understood and debated, and how the question of the extent to which constitutional laws could replace the Shari'a was approached and often bitterly contested, with senior clerics insisting on the recognition of Islamic laws and values. She treats religious beliefs and attachments with sympathy, underlining what she considers to be their socio-political ramifications. However, the explanatory implications of her assertions that Iran of the time was "devoutly Shi'i" (p. 1), "profoundly Islamic" (p. 15), or "deeply religious" (p. 204), are not self-evident. She would not deny that the conflation of "Islam" and its clerical custodians, and an undifferentiated discussion of Islam, or secularism, might not prove as helpful as a contextualized exploration of how Islam was understood by its various adherents. Ultimately, only a probing historical investigation and reconstruction of lived experiences can illuminate the constellation of interests, beliefs, emotions, desires, illusions, and contingencies that, on a collective or individual level, determined or affected behavior.

In her complex account of the Constitutional Revolution, Martin implicitly questions approaches that emphasize its modernity. However, "revolution," as a project of creating new socio-political structures, not only

requires collective or popular agency but also involves a conception of agency that is fundamentally modern and transcends traditional systems of meaning and notions of self. The consciousness of being a traditional Muslim is also modern, as is the political and ideological enterprise of using Islamic ideas or idioms to affirm, accommodate, or reject constitutionalism. Martin rightly points out that "the constitutionalist period was characterized by a sense of optimism and self-empowerment, and very little by martyrdom and victimhood" (p. 207). However, her notion of "Islamic nationalism" remains problematic, and her discussions of religiosity, secularism, and nationalism could have benefited from attention to important recent debates in these fields. Martin has used a rich variety of sources and has been attentive to the roles not only of the elite, lay, or clerical, but also of lesser social strata. Despite the constraints of her heuristic framework, she has provided a useful addition to the literature on the Constitutional Revolution likely to advance our understanding of its trajectories beyond Tehran.

FAKHREDDIN AZIMI  
University of Connecticut

JÖRG MATTHIAS DETERMANN. *Historiography in Saudi Arabia: Globalization and the State in the Middle East*. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2014. Pp. xvi, 325. \$95.00.

Writing on any aspect of Saudi Arabia's history is an arduous task given the scarcity of archival sources and the difficulty of securing the cooperation of the Saudi state in conducting research; therefore, intellectual and social history has received little investigation. For various reasons many historians residing in Saudi Arabia have failed to offer a comprehensive and critical account of the intellectual and socio-religious transformations experienced by their country. The majority of historical studies have merely restated the state's narrative and national mythology about the past.

Consulting the major historical studies written by scholars since the inception of the Saudi state in 1932, Jörg Matthias Determann looks closely at how Saudi national history has been produced and presented. Four central geographical regions, annexed during the early twentieth century by the Wahhabi leaders have provided the basis for modern Saudi Arabia. These regions are the Hejaz, Najd, the Eastern Province, which encompasses al-Aḥsā and al-Qaṭīf, as well as Asir including al-Mikhlaḥ al-Sulaymānī (Gazan in contemporary Saudi Arabia). The Saudi state dominated by King Abdulaziz Al Saud's family came to embody the new "nation" and to speak for the local people despite the peoples' diverse geographical, socio-religious, and class backgrounds. Al Saud's family gradually Saudized the history of these four regions. Determann adequately surveys, groups, and analyzes several studies of Saudi history, which differed in method and complexity. First, he highlights the studies that focused on dynastic history, interweaving the links between the Saudi state and Wahhabism. He turns his attention also to the debates



that emerged between the 1920s and the 1970s in connection to the local histories of the major Saudi regions. In addition, Determann looks at the unfolding of the process of Saudization in the historiographical literature. He also examines studies of the communal and tribal groupings in Saudi Arabia including the writings devoted to the Shiites, despite their scarcity. Finally, Determann explores the main socioeconomic factors that shaped the historical profession in Saudi Arabia from the 1970s to the present.

Determann investigates some of the conflicting historical accounts about Wahhabism and the early Saudi state that emerged during the mid-twentieth century. It seems that in those accounts the Saudi sovereign was not presented as a nationalist leader who strove to unite the detached parts of a “nation” or liberate them from a foreign or colonial power. Rather, the sovereign was presented as a puritanical restorer of the religious practice of the Prophet and his companions. Under his leadership, the state implemented the politico-religious aims of the Wahhabi mission (starting in 1744), thus, eliminating *jāhiliyyah* (polytheism), reuniting Arabia, which had plunged into bloody tribal and regional wars, and restoring Islam. This form of scholarship promoted a “‘takfīrist’ paradigm” (p. 27), which excluded and apostatized all Muslim communities other than the Wahhabi ones. The expansion of the state due to oil exploration and globalization, Determann notes, caused many disputes over the pre-Wahhabi conquests, the origin and development of the first two Saudi states, and the triumph and survival of the third. Determann succeeds in showing us that these disputes created fissures in the original Saudi ideology, which weakened the fixation on the heretical “other” who was seen as having prevailed in the Hejaz and Najd prior to the rise of the Wahhabis.

Determann finds that Saudi historiography is grounded in common patterns of periodization, namely, “the period before the Wahhabi mission, the foundation and development of the first, second and third Saudi states and the associated Saudi conquests” (p. 4). A “narrative plurality,” (p. 3) that is, a diversity-within-unity pattern reflected in Saudi historical works helped incorporate the local histories of different regions and communities into one national trajectory. Determann finds the presence of “a multiplicity of voices about the past” (p. 9) quite significant. Yet, I would argue that this “multiplicity” may be deceiving. Other anti-state narratives were suppressed in favor of the state’s self-projections. Curiously, in these self-projections the Saudi state is presented as “tolerant” and respectful of human rights, nurturing a peaceful environment that permits historians who are skeptical of the state’s narrative to express their ideas openly. The disappearance of Nāṣir al-Saʿīd (1923–1979), who authored *The History of Al Saud*, is a good example of the Saudi state’s ability to silence, eliminate, and push into exile those who present a view at odds with its official ideology. Moreover, Determann does not account for the significant studies produced by Saudis living outside

Saudi Arabia. Women’s voices and views on Saudi history are also conspicuously lacking. These groups provide a valuable critique of the prevalent scholarship in Saudi Arabia and the historians who adopted the state’s narrative, thus, exposing the limitations placed on the work of the historians who reside in Saudi Arabia.

Determann has produced a well-researched and useful study of the major historiographical trends in Saudi Arabia. While a detailed map of the various administrative districts in Saudi Arabia and a standardized and edited transliteration of Arabic terms would have been useful, his work contributes significantly to our understanding of the complexity of documenting the history of Wahhabism, the Saudi state, and the shifts that occurred in the ideas and practices of historians and the state.

MALEK ABISAAB  
McGill University

JONATHAN SMOLIN. *Moroccan Noir: Police, Crime, and Politics in Popular Culture*. (Public Cultures of the Middle East and North Africa.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013. Pp. xvii, 285. \$30.00.

In the wake of the Arab Spring that dominated global headlines in 2011 there has been an increasing awareness among journalists, commentators, and scholars of the remarkable lack of change that resulted from the mass protests and violent confrontations covered by the global media. As the din of enthusiastic commentary hailing the advent of “democracy” and “transparency” across North Africa and the Middle East has quieted, more sober analysis has revealed the durability of the authoritarian and repressive apparatuses in countries as far afield as Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Bahrain. Moreover, where the authoritarian structures were not able to weather the storm, the state has disintegrated into a cauldron of vicious conflict, opening spaces for more extreme and violent forces to emerge. This is the case in Libya, Yemen, and Syria. Jonathan Smolin’s timely, insightful, and penetrating study of Morocco from the early 1990s to the present provides a clue to the persistence of authoritarian structures in the face of popular demands for change. *Moroccan Noir: Police, Crime, and Politics in Popular Culture* is a cogent analysis of the hegemonic process at work, whereby elite groups are able to reconstitute and reinvent themselves in order to preserve the overarching power structures sustaining their dominant status.

Smolin’s analysis traces important changes in the Moroccan media—newspapers, the tabloid press, television, film production, and the police crime novel—as a window to explore the nexus of public opinion, the state, and security agencies in an era of political reform in Morocco. He also explores Morocco’s place in the process of neoliberal globalization. Initially caught off guard by a scandal that called into question the invulnerability of the Moroccan police to public criticism, the state was able to intervene in subtle ways to reconstruct the image of the police in the early 1990s. Having

discovered, accidentally, the public's appetite for salacious scandals and sensationalistic journalism, the state was able, through the release of crime reports, and through access to the interiors of police stations and crime labs, to present the image of a police force being reformed and modernized. Gone were the days of official impunity where police struck fear in the public's imagination and operated as a secretive force. With political openness came reform of the security forces. The police were now impartial enforcers of the law, defenders of public order, and servants of the people. They made use of modern science, rational deduction, and Western investigative techniques to track down criminals, maintain justice, and secure the living environment for the public.

However, there was a darker side to this process. The monarchy was able to manipulate public fears to repurpose the police as guardians of the public. Rather than an instrument of terror, the public was positioned to desire a robust security presence to protect their property and lives from dangerous elements threatening Moroccan society, including crime epidemics, the terror of serial killers, and the threat of lawlessness. A series of terrorist attacks in the early 2000s provided just the element needed to solidify the transformation of the Moroccan police from secretive and corrupt to a modern crime-fighting security apparatus in an age of liberalization and official transparency. Yet, Smolin argues that this project remained flawed and incomplete. The new image of the police was largely a fabrication based on Western models of the super cop, right down to presenting women as lead investigators when there were no women detectives in all of Morocco. As the state encouraged the police to intimately integrate with the public through neighborhood policing programs, the constructed image of the police clashed with the reality experienced by those who lived and worked among them on a daily basis. That led, Smolin argues, to a public backlash against the police and the state in the form of mocking and more demands for real reform.

Smolin's well-crafted study takes the reader to the era of the Arab Spring. Even though it was written before the full implications of the general uprisings against authoritarian states could be realized, there is already a suggestion in the text about the inherent limitations of efforts to reform those structures. Smolin hints that the authoritarian state's capacity to withstand, adapt to, and ultimately triumph over popular mobilizations for change is greater than suspected and reported upon by the global media. Moreover, Smolin deftly integrates the narrative of change in Morocco into the narrative of globalization, demonstrating the manner in which global representational trends impact Moroccan society as well as how they are mediated by the particular context of Moroccan culture and history. This book is an important and timely intervention in conversations about current developments in North Africa and the Middle East.

JAMES E. GENOVA  
Ohio State University-Marion

STEVEN SERELS. *Starvation and the State: Famine, Slavery, and Power in Sudan, 1883–1956*. (Palgrave Series in Indian Ocean World Studies.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Pp. xxiv, 253. \$95.00.

In *Starvation and the State: Famine, Slavery, and Power in Sudan, 1883–1956*, Steven Serels narrates the political history of modern Sudan from the perspective of food security. Sudan is located in an environmentally precarious latitudinal band where rainfall is often insufficient to sustain the harvest of a plentiful food supply. Serels, however, is quick to point out that the continuous periods of severe food shortage in this country did not result directly from a poor rainy season and subsequent bad crops. Indeed, the author shows time and again that environmental conditions were not the sole cause of food crisis in this East African country. Tracing the development of modern Sudan from the Mahdist Revolution of the late nineteenth century to independence, Serels examines the policies of British administrators and the local elite over the course of 75 years. He convincingly argues that “famine and food insecurity played crucial roles in the creation of the modern Sudanese state” (p. xviii).

This case study contributes to a growing body of literature that explores the engagement of state and society through the prism of food provisioning. Ensuring access to affordable food is supposed to be a basic task of all governments across time and space. Focused on “the politics of famine” (p. 180), however, Serels shows that those controlling food in the Sudan—whether British administrators or the Sudanese elite—often limited access to it. In this way, Sudan is very different from Morocco—both Sultanate and French colonial—or the Ottoman Empire, where rulers have been shown to provision ordinary people in order to undercut popular unrest. In Sudan, the British government often withheld access to food and used subsequent food shortages to exercise ever more control over local resources, a pattern soon followed by the Sudanese elite.

*Starvation and the State* provides an important glimpse into the lived experiences of people in Sudan, even though, as admitted by the author, the information is based solely on the records of foreign colonizers. Serels, for example, meticulously describes the workings of East African norias and traces how such hydraulic technology organized the political economy of Sudan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (pp. 14–15). Based on records of taxes collected on these norias, Serels extrapolates population statistics (p. 14) and even the number of slaves working in a given region (p. 122). This last figure is particularly useful, since British officers obscured their pro-slavery policies in Sudan.

Serels is equally painstaking in mapping out colonial decision-making. He shows that policy was hammered out by officials in Sudan, not politicians in London. Serels in fact demonstrates that military officers often countered and contradicted policy set in London. The infamous “Lord Kitchener of Khartoum,” for example,



defied the orders of his superiors when he starved rebels into submission (pp. 69, 80). Ultimately, Kitchener's policy of starvation led to the Mahdist defeat at the Battle of Atbara, where the British killed 11,000 men and took 38,000 prisoners (p. 105).

As Serels's narrative moves closer to the nationalist era, the chapters cover more years in fewer pages. Chapters 1 through 5 examine the years 1883 to 1913, and they run for 120 pages, thereby allowing the author to provide subtle details about the time and the policies. Chapters 6 and 7, however, which cover the next 43 years, are only a combined 44 pages long, which does not provide the author enough space to give either context to the time or personality to historical actors. Thus, the rich detail of the first five chapters is missing when the author treats the history of Sudan after World War I.

This lack of detail is particularly telling in the last chapter on "Food Insecurity and the Transition to Independence, 1940–1956," which, at 14 pages, should have been expanded. In this chapter, the author might have provided—perhaps through newspaper accounts or oral history—more of a sense of the people involved in the battle over power and influence in independent Sudan. For example, Serels uses the term "elites" ten times on a single page without any qualifying description of them (p. 175). I would have welcomed further articulation of these nameless Sudanese elite, especially as they take over the reins of state and perpetuate exploitive colonial policies based primarily on controlling access to food.

Nevertheless, the author certainly accomplishes his goal, which is to show that "the legacy of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century famines continues to impact social, economic, and political conditions in Sudan" (p. xviii). Exploring the politics of state formation via the production and consumption of food, this book should be a welcome addition not only to historians of Africa but also to scholars interested more generally in modern state formation and foodways.

STACY E. HOLDEN  
Purdue University

#### SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

KRISTIN FJELDE TJELLE. *Missionary Masculinity, 1870–1930: The Norwegian Missionaries in South-East Africa*. (Genders and Sexualities in History.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Pp. xii, 325. \$95.00.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century Norway sent out more Christian missionaries *per capita* than any other country in the world. Evangelical missionaries were culture heroes, hymned in the press, celebrated authors, and subjects of portraiture. In this book, Kristin Fjelde Tjelle focuses on the cadre of 56 men and 76 women who, over the course of 60 years, set out to establish the Lutheran church among Zulu-speaking people. Tjelle is particularly interested in uncovering the role gender played in shaping missionary men's self-un-

derstanding. Missionary work was for Norwegian commoners a path upward out of poverty and anonymity. As many as 70 percent of missionary men came from agricultural families; many were junior sons who had little hope of inheriting land (p. 38). These men saw themselves as self-made men, possessing competences, strengths, and dispositions that were suited to the frontier. But missionaries' self-creating work had to be measured against the Christian virtues of asceticism and self-denial. It was between these two competing poles of masculinity, argues Tjelle, that missionary men staked their identities (p. 213).

Tjelle's book is divided into two parts. The first half of the book, which is organized in a broadly chronological fashion, charts missionary men's changing conceptions of masculinity. The chapters are organized around specific, sometimes obscure incidents in the mission's history. The resignation in 1873 of Bishop Hans P. S. Schreuder—occasioned by criticisms emanating from the self-made missionaries in the field—is interpreted as a "breakthrough of a certain masculine idea within the Norwegian missionary movement" (p. 28). The resignation of missionary Karl Larsen Titlestad in 1891 is an opportunity to see "how a particular aspect of the missionary masculinity—namely, the Lutheran identity—was strengthened" during the late nineteenth century (p. 67); while the ordination in 1893 of the first Zulu pastor of the Norwegian Lutheran Zulu Church is an opportunity to examine how "a Norwegian masculinity was constructed in relation to 'other' Zulu masculinity" (p. 87). The second half of the book focuses on the private and domestic lives of three missionary men: Karl Larsen Titlestad (1832–1924); Lars Martin Titlestad (1867–1941); and Karl Michael Titlestad (1898–1930). Tjelle uses the Titlestad men's correspondence, reports, and narrative writing to illuminate the most intimate routines that organized missionary life. There is a fascinating discussion of debt: on arrival in Durban the first Titlestad had to purchase a wagon at a cost of £120, which he borrowed against an annual salary of £60 (p. 168). Lacking capital, Titlestad and his growing family had to live in a house made of straw and sticks. Everyone—men included—was engaged in domestic work. Missionary men acted as midwives, childminders, housekeepers, and nurses (p. 187). At adolescence their several children were sent away from home and enrolled in boarding schools in faraway places. Here there was no separation between private, domestic space and public life. Missionary work was a shared project, creating unorthodox forms of family life.

There is a great deal to recommend Tjelle's book to readers of the *American Historical Review*. It draws from a rich body of scholarship composed in Scandinavian languages: well over half of the works listed in the bibliography are in languages other than English. Tjelle does us all a service by widening and thickening our understanding of the missionary enterprise in Africa. But there are important questions to be asked of Tjelle's analytical categories. It is difficult to see why

masculinity, and not some other analytic, should be central to an understanding of the Norwegian missionary movement. Among the Norwegian missionaries that Tjelle studies, as indeed among most other men, masculinity *per se* very rarely surfaces as the subject of discourse. There are no parties that defend men's interests; there are no petitions that articulate men's grievances; there are no campaigns to advance men's objectives. The archive for masculinity studies among Norwegian missionaries (as for other men) must therefore be borrowed. Sources must be recruited through acts of interpretation and translation. Scholars must take material composed for other purposes and drag it into a new field of interpretation. They must argue that material that is about other things is actually concerned with masculinity.

In Tjelle's book the work of translation seems exceedingly strained. Why, for example, should the "re-confessionalization" of the Lutheran church in the late nineteenth century be treated as a "particular aspect of the missionary masculinity" (p. 67)? Why should the mission's dismissal of Christian Oftebro—accused by the superintendent of lacking an inner spiritual life, of using "conceited allegations and great words," of carrying himself with a "little dash of English posture" (p. 61)—be read as evidence of missionaries' effort to suppress dissident masculinities? There is a tendency here to read everything—disputes over theology, contention over ecclesiastical authority, personality conflicts—as though they always pertained primarily to masculinity. The effect is to evacuate missionaries' controversies of their content and obscure their engagement with other kinds of politics. It is not until page 203, midway through the book's final substantive chapter, that Tjelle makes mention of the independence of Norway in 1905 and the concurrent blooming of Norwegian nationalism. In a book where masculinity occupies the whole analytical space, even epoch-making events are made to seem small.

Kristin Fjelde Tjelle brings to light a whole domain of missionary work about which English-speaking scholars will know nothing. But her book also raises fundamental questions about the field of masculinity studies in Africa (and elsewhere). Where is the source material for the history of masculinity to be found?

DEREK R. PETERSON  
University of Michigan

MICHELLE R. MOYD, *Violent Intermediaries: African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa*. (New African Histories.) Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2014. Pp. xxi, 328. \$32.95.

Why do individuals become involved in coercive, even violent organizations? This question constitutes the core ethical issue at the center of Michelle R. Moyd's book about askari (soldiers) in German East Africa. Or, as she states it: "At its heart, then, this book asks how and why people become part of such institutions and what outcome these commitments produce for them,

for those around them, and for the states that employ them." Her simple answer is that it is "attractive incentives, as well as visible and less visible coercive factors that limit, or make impossible, other kinds of opportunities [that] lead people to negotiate their circumstantial tight corners" (p. 35). Of course, to arrive at such a simple conclusion requires a deep analysis of the lives of askari, an analysis that covers the breadth and depth of their experience. And, this is what Moyd provides us. In doing so, she furthers our understanding of everyday colonialism by fleshing out the lives of individuals who were simultaneously agents of colonialism and objects of colonial rule.

Her basic argument is that the askari "enabled state making [in the colony] through their efforts" to become "local 'big men.'" This entailed establishing large households and livestock herds as well as the capability to serve as "wealthy patrons and power brokers to others" (p. 4). Their participation in acts that furthered German colonial rule as soldiers and enforcers of colonial policies made this possible. Such actions included not only military expeditions and intentional displays of power, but also everyday enforcement of colonial rule. The book is divided into five main chapters: 1) the recruitment of askari (including why Africans agreed or desired to become soldiers for the German regime); 2) askari training and socialization, which blended both German military sensibilities and the skills and culture of the recruits; 3) askari fighting techniques, which again showed a blend of both German and various African techniques; 4) everyday life at the *maboma*, or military outposts, through a focus on social and economic relationships established by the askari; and 5) the daily performance of colonial rule. Moyd concludes with a reexamination of the askari myth by placing it into its historical context, contrasting it with the realities of askari service and postwar experiences. Woven throughout her study is an emphasis on gender and masculinity. She contends that an essential element of askari identity was the projection of a masculine sense of self that was connected to askaris' status as "big men." Such a position, Moyd continues, depended heavily on the presence of and the supporting role played by askari wives.

In reconstructing the askari stories, Moyd has limited sources available, especially those from the perspective of the askari themselves. However, she uses them thoroughly to provide rich and insightful details about this underexplored dimension of colonialism. We see this on several occasions, such as an explanation of why one Sudanese man decided to join the askari. On other occasions, Moyd deftly reads against the grain information provided by German colonial sources. Nevertheless, because of source limitations, the amount of detail provided in the various chapters is uneven. For instance, in the chapter on askari life in the outposts, while Moyd does her best with the available sources, the lack of thick description is readily apparent. The one notable exception is at the end of the chapter when we find out about the role played by veterans as patrons.



When reading this book, the biggest difficulty initially is with the organization within chapters. In the first chapter, the function of the different sections is unclear and results in an interruption in the flow of the narrative. Are they meant as an introduction or as a place where arguments are made and supported? Initially, it appeared that some sections served the latter role, but in actuality they acted more as an introduction to the topic that was then later discussed and supported in more detail in a subsequent section. However, after reading subsequent chapters, the issue slowly resolves itself as the chapter structure becomes more apparent.

Despite these minor detractors, Moyd overall skillfully demonstrates that the askari bridged the ambiguous area between colonizer and colonized. She accomplishes this by examining a group that negotiated a position in colonial society that was acceptable to both because it furthered the agendas of the two main parties involved: the askari and the German colonial military. In doing so, she clearly reveals that violence is an inherent component of colonial rule. Moreover, by shedding greater light on the ambiguities and nuances of colonialism, she provides us with a model and an inspiration for further studies. Finally, her study offers insights into why individuals would willingly participate in such a violent and coercive endeavor and, consequently, it addresses a phenomenon that transcends European colonialism.

DANIEL J. WALTHER

Wartburg College

[Reviewers of books by Indiana University History Department faculty are selected with advice from the Board of Editors.]

ELIZABETH SCHMIDT. *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror*. Foreword by WILLIAM MINTER. (New Approaches to African History, no. 7.) New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. xviii, 267. \$27.99.

“The struggle [against foreign intervention],” Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba explained in 1960, was “something of which [Africans] are proud in our deepest hearts, for it is a noble and just struggle, which is needed to bring an end to the humiliating slavery imposed on us by force.” Elizabeth Schmidt gives voice to this struggle in *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror*. Synthetic in its ambitions and crafted for generalists, the book explores how foreigners meddled in African affairs during the second half of the twentieth century. Up until about 1990, these interventions were mostly extracontinental in nature, spearheaded by the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and the former colonial powers. After the Cold War ended, the most significant interventions took an intracontinental character, meaning that African countries—often at the behest of warlords who had external support—began meddling in their neighbor’s affairs. Throughout *Foreign Intervention in Africa*, Schmidt advances a powerful, straightforward

argument: outsiders changed local affairs by escalating disagreements into conflagrations, which devastated the African people (p. i).

This book is organized regionally. After a brief introduction and an explanation of African decolonization, Schmidt looks at interventions in North Africa—Egypt and Algeria, specifically—during the 1950s and 1960s. She then turns her critical eye southward with interlocking chapters about the Congo crisis of the early 1960s, the fight against Portuguese imperialism in Angola and Mozambique until 1975, and the dilemma of white redoubt in southern Africa between 1960 and 1990. In each case study, Schmidt illuminates how the Cold War undercut Africa’s independence, justifying the distribution of resources to opportunistic locals who were willing to pay tribute to the superpowers. Her chapters about the horn of Africa and Francophone West Africa provide contrasting lessons: the former region became a playground of superpower intrigue after the 1960s, while the latter stayed firmly (albeit informally) under France’s neocolonial finger. When the Cold War ended, Schmidt explains, Africa was economically weak, politically divided, and awash with weapons. Her final chapter shows how African states, hardly sovereign in the traditional sense, succumbed to the forces of privatization and globalization, leading to the rise of warlords, rebellions, and relentless unrest. Against the backdrop of America’s war on terrorism, outside interventions have only increased since 2001, as has a pervasive sense of ambiguity about Africa’s future in the twenty-first century.

*Foreign Intervention in Africa* represents an interesting shift in African historiography. For decades, this was a field shaped by the methodological habits of social and cultural history, and its practitioners tended to focus on the aftereffects of the transatlantic slave trade and European colonialism. Schmidt’s emphasis, in contrast, is on political and military affairs and her canvas is the late twentieth century. This work might be read as an alternative to Frederick Cooper’s *Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present* (2002), which was also published as part of Cambridge University Press’s “New Approaches to African History” series. Cooper’s influential synthesis used African history to raise questions about the constructed nature of international development and postcolonial sovereignty. Schmidt’s interpretation is punchier: interventions destabilized the continent. Not unlike Odd Arne Westad’s approach in *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (2005), Schmidt defines and documents these interventions as a diplomatic historian might—assessing the motives of each player and explaining their interactions—even as she strikes a balance between African and non-African viewpoints. The result is a compelling, clearly argued overview of African foreign relations (or lack thereof) after the 1940s, which provides a sobering introduction to Cold War Africa.

Schmidt’s approach can be critiqued on two fronts. First, she largely ignores the transnational turn. For-

eign relations history, as a framework and a discipline, has changed because scholars have turned more attention to global governance and nongovernmental activism. By limiting herself to diplomacy and war, Schmidt arguably misses an opportunity to explain the full complexity of “intervention” before and after decolonization. She does not discuss, for example, how Africans built transcontinental solidarity networks during the Cold War—relating their experiences to Vietnam and Palestine, framing their struggles in a language of shared anti-imperialism—nor does she indicate how the Cold War’s logic changed after the 1960s, as the rhetoric of development gave way to a revived humanitarianism and neoliberalism. Second, Schmidt is not interested in global history. Throughout *Foreign Intervention in Africa*, there is a tacit sense that Africa’s problems stem from external meddling, which largely elides the question: Was escape from the international community truly an option in the late twentieth century? Schmidt does not address this question, which is an argument in itself. On the one hand, one might counter that decolonization only happened because of liberal internationalism, because the superpowers, for their own distinct reasons, sought to replace traditional imperial arrangements with new forms of oversight and governance. On the other hand, one could point toward the historicization of development studies as proof that intervention deserves to be conceptualized more capably.

Regardless, Schmidt has written an excellent, argumentative book, which will hopefully prompt further scholarly conversation and get students interested in Africa’s role in the world.

RYAN M. IRWIN  
*University at Albany, SUNY*

MOHAMED SALIOU CAMARA. *Political History of Guinea since World War Two*. (Society and Politics in Africa, no. 23.) New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2014. Pp. xxxii, 531. \$109.95.

This 500-page volume on the political history of Guinea explores the ideas and actions of political elites and the institutions they established in the decades after World War II. Focusing on a country that has received relatively little attention outside the Francophone world, the study is the first of its kind in English—reminiscent of Sidiki Kobélé Keita’s two-volume tome, *Le P.D.G.: Artisan de l’indépendance nationale en Guinée (1947–1958)* (1978). The written source base includes official archives, personal collections, and especially, secondary sources, many written in French. The oral sources offer new insights gleaned from interviews with intellectuals and political figures who served in several Guinean administrations.

The book is composed of 13 chapters divided into three parts. Part I focuses on African decolonization during the Cold War, with special reference to Guinea during the period 1945–1958. Part II investigates the independence period during Sékou Touré’s presidency

(1958–1984); and part III examines Guinean politics under Lansana Conté’s military regime (1984–2008) and in its aftermath (2008–2012). The study provides a wealth of information in one volume. However, a more concise, tightly focused study would be more useful for students and scholars interested in African decolonization and the postcolonial era. Part I, which focuses broadly on African decolonization, covers terrain already investigated by earlier scholars. Two chapters are based on well-established scholarship and could be distilled into a brief introduction. A third chapter, which explores Guinea’s move toward independence, details findings from older scholarship that highlight the activities of political elites and their parties. However, it fails to consider the conclusions of newer scholarship on Guinea’s labor and nationalist movements. As a result, Mohamed Saliou Camara gives insufficient weight to the contributions of workers, veterans, market women, and farmers, who were the backbone of the mass movement that culminated in Guinea’s independence.

Similarly, part II makes scant reference to recent scholarship. Unfortunate omissions include Jay Straker’s *Youth, Nationalism, and the Guinean Revolution* (2009) and Mike McGovern’s *Unmasking the State: Making Guinea Modern* (2013), which offer important new insights into Guinea’s early independence years. Again, Camara focuses almost exclusively on political elites and institutions, shedding little light on grassroots political activity. However, the material he provides from personal interviews and communications heightens our understanding of Sékou Touré’s domestic and foreign policies, as well as the transition to military rule after the president’s death. Part III examines Guinea under military rule and during its shaky transition to elected government. Both periods have been punctuated by ethnic and regional conflict. Unfortunately, the focus on political elites again offers readers little understanding of events on the ground.

Readers seeking to understand Guinea’s political history might be frustrated by the book’s structure and by the author’s position as omniscient narrator who sometimes seems reluctant to take a position. Camara presents multiple sides of a debate, but he does not always attempt to resolve them. He notes that certain sources or conclusions should be treated with caution, but he does not always indicate why or identify the basis for his own conclusions. Curious readers might be hindered by the lack of source citations for some factual information and quotations. The book’s structure, narrative style, and encyclopedic nature could make it useful as a reference work. Its 13-page index lists important people, places, and organizations. However, even here, there are problems. The indexed terms are not divided into subcategories, which undermines their usefulness. The term “Guinea,” for instance, includes a column of page numbers that fill half a page, while those for “Sékou Touré” cover a quarter.

These weaknesses aside, Camara’s newest book brings together an enormous amount of material about



Guinea's political history during the seven decades following World War II. Although its length and level of detail render it unsuitable for classroom use, it provides an important overview for scholars and should be included in university libraries.

ELIZABETH SCHMIDT  
Loyola University Maryland

TODD CLEVELAND. *Stones of Contention: A History of Africa's Diamonds*. (Africa in World History.) Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, in association with the Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2014. Pp. xii, 225. Paper \$26.95, e-book \$21.99.

Ohio University Press's superb Africa in World History series highlights African historiographic contributions to global issues. In this worthy addition, Todd Cleveland, a historian of workers' experiences in the diamond mines of colonial Angola, explores the history of the diamond mining industry in Africa since 1867, when Erasmus Jacobs uncovered the Eureka Diamond in South Africa and initiated a diamond rush that deeply affected polities, economies, and societies across the continent.

Unlike gold and copper, there are no records of African exploitation of diamonds prior to European conquest at the end of the nineteenth century. Hence, diamond exploitation began as a colonial endeavor, albeit one that could not always be controlled by colonial states, in particular in its heady beginnings in Kimberley, South Africa. In part because of Africa's long-standing El Dorado reputation, as discussed by Cleveland, early diamond finds led to a rush of international prospectors and capitalists. Out of the chaos of the Kimberley digs emerged the De Beers Company. Following the experience gained in this ruthless environment, De Beers embarked on developing their notorious near monopolistic practices by tightly controlling the production and marketing of diamonds. Its mines also introduced worker compounds that specialized in control and surveillance, mostly to prevent smuggling, one challenge to their strategy and profitability. De Beers exported their model across African colonies, where they worked with several colonial administrations, in particular the Portuguese and the Belgians, who developed their own diamond mining enterprises in Angola and the Belgian Congo, respectively. Informed by his own research and by the rich historiography of this period, Cleveland relates the history of De Beers, the colonial mining enterprises, the mechanisms of labor recruitment, and, most distinctive of all, the travails of diamond miners under the various colonial regimes and companies. Cleveland reveals the "extremely difficult conditions" (p. 121) faced by most mine workers, which, he claims, only improved toward the end of colonialism and apartheid; such improvements are alluded to but not demonstrated by Cleveland, with the exception of the entry into managerial positions by prominent African politicians, businesspeople, and engineers.

The final two chapters relate the history of diamond mining after colonialism. Cleveland shows how diamonds fed into a toxic mix of collapsing states, feuding political factions, and a flood of post-apartheid and post-Cold War weapons and mercenaries, in particular the diamond-fueled wars of Sierra Leone and Angola at the end of the twentieth century. Reports of these atrocious civil wars led to a global human rights campaign against "blood diamonds," resulting in the Kimberley Process that sought to market only conflict-free diamonds. The final chapter offers the examples of Botswana and Namibia as antidotes to the diamond resource-curse perspective. The diamond industry in these cases has supposedly been used for national benefit. While Cleveland pokes holes into a too rosy image of Botswana's and Namibia's diamond industry and points to the unique characteristics that allowed them to prosper—essentially remote deposits that have mitigated against informal artisanal exploitation—he confirms that diamond industries have helped to build these states. (The fact that disproportionately few in Botswana and Namibia are employed or prosper directly from diamonds is underexplored, however.) The implication, as indicated by the subtitle of the final chapter, "A Rough Past with a Brighter Future" (p. 193), is sanguine: these days we can, judging by this narrative, purchase and wear our diamonds with less guilt.

Teachers of African and World history will welcome the lucid style and topical introduction to historical issues. That this book is intended for the classroom—with additional readings and discussion questions for each chapter—should not detract from its contribution. Unlike the now dime-a-dozen summaries of African history, this book marshals a great deal of evidence, contains much substance, and provides some interesting perspectives. The temptation might be to consume the book at a single sitting. This would be a pity, for the tastiest morsels, in particular primary sources that relate labor experiences on colonial mines, should be savored. Unfortunately, accessible style sometimes encourages clichés: rebels are "depraved," African politicians and armies are "greed-driven," international NGOs are "determined" (p. 171), and, of course, Zimbabwe is a "basket case" (p. 166). More analytical and objective language could have improved the discussion of the postcolonial situation.

*Stones of Contention: A History of Africa's Diamonds* is an accessible history of the political economy of diamond mining in Africa. Extending its forays into social and cultural history from the colonial to postcolonial period, and, perhaps, introducing some additional historiographic perspectives, environmental in particular, would have enriched the book, and made us feel greater unease at perhaps our most manipulated consumption habit. To be fair, the existing historiography might not yet allow for much of this discussion. Hopefully *Stones of Contention* will inspire students to embark on the needed research.

DAVID M. GORDON  
Bowdoin College

ELIZABETH VAN HEYNINGEN. *The Concentration Camps of the Anglo-Boer War: A Social History*. Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2013. Pp. xvii, 391. \$24.95.

During the Anglo-Boer (South African War) of 1899–1902, about 28,000 Boers died in concentration camps set up by the British, predominantly of measles, respiratory diseases, and typhoid. Some 79 percent of the dead were children. In addition, at least 15,000 Africans perished in their own racially segregated camps. These deaths were not the result of a deliberate genocidal policy. Rather, as Elizabeth van Heyningen explains, they were the consequence of inadequate accommodation, poor nutrition, and epidemic disease in a pre-antibiotic era following on the scrambled internment of civilians for military ends. In this the South African concentration camps were little different from those that were erected during contemporaneous colonial wars in Cuba, the Philippines, and what is now Namibia.

In South Africa, the issue for the British up to late 1900 was the lodging of destitute refugees displaced during the initial conventional stage of the conflict. But then the war entered its guerrilla phase, and with it came the military decision to drive civilians off the land and to prevent them from assisting the roving Boer commandos. About 30,000 farms were burned and their stock destroyed. Hundreds of thousands of people, both white and black, were left without food or shelter and in fear of assault. The camps were initially overwhelmed, although improvements did come. In March 1901 the white camps were transferred from military to civilian control, but not the black ones, where conditions remained consistently worse.

After the war, the bitter experience of the camps was transformed into a sacred mythology of suffering that fed a resurgent Afrikaner nationalism. In post-apartheid South Africa the memory of the camps has largely faded away. Once, the camps were a fertile field for historical study, but to many scholars their story now seems too well canvassed to warrant further investigation. Where academic interest persists it is primarily in the area of memory and commemoration. Yet, as van Heyningen demonstrates, more than sufficient research material has remained untouched to permit fresh inquiry into the under-investigated social history of the camps.

Van Heyningen's methodology as a social historian is not dominated by abstract theorizing but is informed by the historian's concrete concern with the evidence. While she possesses a comprehensive grasp of the printed official record, memoirs, and secondary literature, it is her familiarity with the extensive primary material that is so commendable. Scattered—and not necessarily catalogued—in repositories across South Africa and the United Kingdom, her source base includes letters and diaries along with the camp administrative correspondence and reports. (Unfortunately, the official records of the black camps were destroyed.) To manage and analyze this mountain of data she has created a database expressed in useful charts and

graphs. Van Heyningen is commendably critical of her sources, whether questioning the bias of the official record that sought to minimize administrative shortcomings, or peering through the emotional “haze” of traumatized women's testimonies that magnified their sufferings.

Van Heyningen's argument is that the camp experience was doubly devastating for the inmates. Materially, they experienced the destruction of their homes and property, followed by the harsh conditions of their incarceration, made worse by the high death rate. To lend a further psychologically disturbing twist to their trauma, they were predominantly a premodern peasantry fully encountering the alien culture of their captors for the first time, one that was expressed most aggressively through British medical practice with its unfamiliar emphasis on cleanliness and sanitation. This clash of cultures was central to the camp experience. For, as van Heyningen contends, British civilian administrators perceived the camps as a means of fulfilling their imperial mission by deploying doctors, nurses, and teachers as instruments of modernization and as vectors of the values and skills inmates would require when released into British-ruled South Africa.

This book succeeds as a remarkably rich and rewarding exercise in social history. It authoritatively presents the reality of the camps in their totality and liberates the long-accepted narrative from many wrong assumptions. For example, it demolishes the myth that the white camp inmates came mainly from the respectable middle class, and shows that they were socially a very diverse group with the majority being *bywoners*, poor squatters on rich farmers' land. Nor were the camps only for women, children, and old men. Many Boer men surrendered their arms and entered the camps, so that the ratio of women to men was at about two to one, and the majority of the men were in their prime. And while the irksomely rigid routines of the camps gave a sense of imprisonment, there were in fact remarkably few restrictions. Indeed, many camps were not even fenced. Inmates could shop in the nearest town, receive visitors, and earn money in occupations as varied as carpenters and camp policemen. It is to van Heyningen's credit that our understanding of life in the camps is now more nuanced and well-founded than it ever has been before.

JOHN LABAND  
Stellenbosch University

ANDRÉ ODENDAAL. *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2013. Pp. xv, 569. \$40.00.

The African National Congress (ANC) is the African continent's oldest extant political organization. Founded as the South African Native National Congress in 1912, its centenary in 2012 occasioned a flurry of conferences, publications, and reminiscences, a flood of scholarship that shows no signs of abating. Similarly, two decades of ANC rule and the passing of Nelson



Mandela, its embodied ideal, has occasioned a good deal of reassessment, some of it laudatory and much of it critical. André Odendaal's *The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa* outflanks this scholarship by going back in time from 1912, to see the ANC's founding not as a beginning, but instead as the outcome of decades of work to construct a black "South Africa" from the multiple chieftaincies, geographies, and other politics that fractured the nascent country's map. Odendaal's tome builds off his highly regarded previous scholarship on the subject, dating to the early 1980s. He is a master of multiple archives and has an encyclopedia's passion for minutiae. From the unlikely material of newspaper rivalry, cricket clubs, and meeting minutes, he has written an epic history of black South African politics in the transformative period between the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley and the promulgation of the Union of South Africa.

Odendaal is a well-respected historian, teacher and—spoiler alert—cricket administrator, with a long and distinguished career in the South African academy. With *The Founders* he has written a comprehensive and potentially final account of the great men (and they were almost entirely men) who pursued the politics of elections and political pressure in the last decades of the nineteenth century. His heart is in the details—with the various organizations that contested African political constituencies in the Eastern Cape, the area of the nineteenth-century Cape Colony in which African residents predominated, and where black voters were a majority in some districts. He ably explores the opinions, rivalries, and activities of well-known families like the Sogas and the Jabavus. The first part of the book is rooted in the Eastern Cape milieu, sustaining Odendaal's implicit argument that it was in South Africa's most thoroughly conquered lands that the African political imagination began to turn away from rebellion and resistance to accommodation with, and mastery of, the colonial political forms of property, "civilization," and electoral democracy. This is well-covered territory in the scholarship, to be sure, but the scope of Odendaal's project allows him sufficient space to demonstrate his mastery over the various personalities and organizations that brought African interests into the Cape Parliament, thus rehearsing the politics—and betrayals—still to come.

Odendaal's study is at its best, however, when he breaks with the common political narrative of organizations and famous men to explore the ways in which other forms of allegiance emerged even as the "nation" began slowly to take shape. In part II he leaves the comfortable territory of the Eastern Cape to follow the social developments that paralleled South Africa's mineral revolution. In Kimberley, Johannesburg, and elsewhere he brings in other groups, Christians from Ethiopia and other independent denominations, women's organizations and welfare societies and, perhaps most intriguingly, sporting clubs like the Doornfontein

Standard Cricket Club—Johannesburg based, Eastern Cape inspired—who closed the nineteenth century by playing a series of matches against similarly constituted clubs from the Orange Free State and elsewhere in the Transvaal. This is lovely material, which at times opens the book up to become a more satisfying picture of a black South Africa in flux.

Yet Odendaal's heart is with organizational politics and at times the narrative suffers for it. He never passes an opportunity to relate who was at what meeting, who was in the chair, who was taking minutes, who was acclaimed, and who was neglected. One can easily imagine the scions of many esteemed families delighting in their ancestors' exploits—a point Odendaal himself makes in the conclusion—but at times it does make for tiresome reading. So too does Odendaal's dedication to the archives come at the expense of his analysis. At no point does he develop a working idea of the "nation," as it was imagined by the many leading intellectuals of these decades. His narrative imposes a teleology on the past, from the Eastern Cape, to the wider South Africa, then, after the 1899–1902 South African War, to the political pitfalls of the united South Africa in the first decade of consolidated British rule. The whites are mainly offstage, but their political maneuverings drive the actions to which first Eastern Cape Africans, then black South Africans and their (briefly mentioned) Indian and "Coloured" compatriots are forced to respond. Odendaal might have slowed this narrative down a bit, to consider how African political leaders and others imagined themselves as part of the developing constructs of race, locale, and nation. *The Founders* is a compelling story of newspapermen, congresses, organizations, grievances, and rivalries; it might also have been more the story of dreams—respectable quests for political representation and democracy—that the middle-class could not contain.

Of course, that critique is not an entirely fair one. Odendaal's story is, as the subtitle suggests, the story of the struggle for democracy in South Africa. That story does begin with the franchise in the Eastern Cape and it does journey around the territory, before coming to rest in the national Parliament after the Union of South Africa, there to be trampled on by the unrepresentative white government and disengaged British public. As Odendaal demonstrates, this betrayal demanded a new, permanently constituted response by the new nation's black political class, many of whom had decades of experience struggling for the scraps of authority the white conquerors were willing to share. Odendaal's study is a testament to black South Africans' dogged struggle for democratic participation and representation, which was already decades old before it is commonly thought to have begun. Notwithstanding contemporary South Africa's manifold problems, Odendaal reminds us that its democracy is a tremendous achievement, too long in coming.

DANIEL MAGAZINER  
Yale University

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## Collected Essays

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These volumes, recently received in the *AHR* office, do not lend themselves readily to unified reviews; the contents are therefore listed.

### METHODS/THEORY

FRANK BIESS and DANIEL M. GROSS, editors. *Science and Emotions after 1945: A Transatlantic Perspective*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014. Pp. v, 432. \$40.00.

FRANK BIESS and DANIEL M. GROSS, Emotional Returns. WILLIAM M. REDDY, Humanists and the Experimental Study of Emotion. RUTH LEYS, "Both of Us Disgusted in *My Insula*": Mirror-Neuron Theory and Emotional Empathy. DANIEL M. GROSS and STEPHANIE D. PRESTON, Emotion Science and the Heart of a Two-Cultures Problem. OTNIEL E. DROR, What Is an Excitement? CATHY GERE, The Science of Pain and Pleasure in the Shadow of the Holocaust. BETTINA HITZER, On-emotions: Experience and Debates in West Germany and the United States after 1945. FRANK BIESS, The Concept of Panic: Military Psychiatry and Emotional Preparation for Nuclear War in Postwar West Germany. REBECCA JO PLANT, Preventing the Inevitable: John Appel and the Problem of Psychiatric Casualties in the U.S. Army during World War II. NAYAN B. SHAH, Feeling for the Protest Faster: How the Self-Starving Body Influences Social Movements and Global Medical Ethics. UFFA JENSEN, Across Different Cultures? Emotions in Science during the Early Twentieth Century. JORDANNA BAILKIN, Decolonizing Emotions: The Management of Feeling in the New World Order. UTE FREVERT, Passions, Preferences, and Animal Spirits: How Does *Homo Oeconomicus* Cope with Emotions? HELENA FLAM, The Transatlantic Element in the Sociology of Emotions. CATHERINE LUTZ, Feminist Theories and the Science of Emotion. RODDEY REID, Affect, Trauma, and Daily Life: Transatlantic Legal and Medical Responses to Bullying and Intimidation. CAROLYN J. DEAN, Coda: Erasures; Writing History about Holocaust Trauma.

DOMINIC JANES and ALEX HOUEEN, editors. *Martyrdom and Terrorism: Pre-Modern to Contemporary Perspectives*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. xiv, 317. \$29.95.

KATE COOPER, Martyrdom, Memory, and the "Media Event": Visionary Writing and Christian Apology in Second-Century Christianity. ASMA AFSARUDDIN, Martyrdom in Islamic Thought and Praxis: A Historical Survey. SUSANNAH BRIETZ

MONTA, Rendering unto Caesar: The Rhetorics of Divided Loyalties in Tudor England. GARY WALLER, Kristeva's "New Knowledge": Terrorism, Martyrdom, and Psychoanalytic Humanism: Insights from Two Early Modern Instances. JULIA V. DOUTHWAITE, Martyrdom, Terrorism, and the Rhetoric of Sacrifice: The Cases of Marat, Robespierre, and Loiserolles. DAVID ANDRESS, The Sentimental Construction of Martyrdom as Motivation in the Thought of Maximilien Robespierre, 1789–1792. RONALD SCHECHTER, Terror, Vengeance, and Martyrdom in the French Revolution: The Case of the Shades. DOMINIC JANES, John Foxe and British Attitudes to Martyrdom after the French Revolution. GUY BEINER, Fenianism and the Martyrdom-Terrorism Nexus in Ireland before Independence. AKIL N. AWAN, Spurning "This Worldly Life": Terrorism and Martyrdom in Contemporary Britain. ALEX HOUEEN, Martyrdom and Hostage Executions in the Iraq War: The Cases of Kenneth Bigley and Margaret Hassan. JOLYON MITCHELL, Filming the Ends of Martyrdom.

### COMPARATIVE/WORLD/TRANSNATIONAL

NANCY J. HIRSCHMANN and BETH LINKER, editors. *Civil Disabilities: Citizenship, Membership, and Belonging*. (Democracy, Citizenship, and Constitutionalism.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015. Pp. vi, 307. \$65.00.

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## CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA

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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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


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

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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


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
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
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
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


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


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


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
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
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

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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